

A Companion to Livy

Mineo, Bernard

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A COMPANION TO
LIVY

EDITED BY BERNARD MINEO



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A COMPANION TO LIVY

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eagles, lost to Parthia at Carrhes, 53 BC. De Agostini Picture Library / Bridgeman Images

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
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
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Map 2 The Mediterranean, third century BC



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Abbreviations

Acc.

Acta Tr.

Aug.

De civ. D.

AHB

AJA

AJP

Ampel.

Anc. Hist. Bull.

Anc. Soc.

Ann.

Ant. Afr

ANRW

Apollod.

Bibl.

App.

BC

Hann.

Iber.

Ill.

Lib.

Mac.

Mith.

Sam.

Sic.

Syr.

Arist.

Pol.

Ath. Pol.

Aristox.

Arr.

Anab.

ASD

BAfr.

BAlex.

BIDR

Bk

Accius

Fasti Triumphales

Augustine

De civitate Dei

Ancient History Bulletin

American Journal of Archeology

American Journal of Philology

L. Ampelius, Liber Memorialis

see AHB

Ancient Society

Annales

Antiquités Africaines

Aufstieg und Niedergang der

Römischen Welt

Apollodorus

Bibliotheca

Appian

Bella ciuilia

Hannibalica

Iberica

Illyrica

Libyca

Macedonica

Mithridatica

Samnitica

Sicelica

Syriaca

Aristotle

Politics

'Αθηναίων Πολιτεία

Aristoxenus

Arrian

Anabasis

Amsterdam edition. Desiderii Erasmi

omnia opera

Bellum Africum

Bellum Alexandrinum

Bulletino dell'Istituto di Diritto

Romano

Book

Brit. Libr.
c.
Caesar, Bciv.
Bgall.
CAH

CAH²

Calp.Piso
Cass.Hem
Cato
Orig.
Catull.
cf.
Cic.

Ad Brut.
Amic.
Arch.
Att.
Balb.
Brut.
Caecin.
Cael.
Cato Maior
Cat.
De or.
Div.
Dom.
Fam.
Fin.
Flac.
Font.
Har. resp.
Leg.
Leg. agr.
Leg. Man.

Mur.
Nat. D.
Off.
Phil.

Pis.
Q. Fr.

British Library
circa
Bellum ciuile
Bellum Gallicum
Cambridge Ancient History (first edition)
Cambridge Ancient History (second edition)
Calpurnius Piso
Cassius Hemina
Cato
Origines
Catullus
(=confer) compare
M. Tullius Cicero

Epistulae ad Brutum
De amicitia
Pro Archia
Epistulae ad Atticum
Pro Balbo
Brutus
Pro Caecina
Pro Caelio
=De senectute
In Catilinam
De oratore
De divinatione
De domo sua
Ad familiares
De finibus
Pro Flacco
Pro Fonteio
De haruspicum responsis
De legibus
De lege agraria
Pro lege Manilia (=de Imperio Cn. Pompei)
Pro Murena
De natura deorum
De officiis
In M. Antonium orationes Philippicae XIV
In Calpurnium Pisonem
Epistulae ad Quintum fratrem

<i>Quinct.</i>	<i>Pro P. Quinctio</i>
<i>Rep.</i>	<i>De republica</i>
<i>Sest.</i>	<i>Pro P. Sestio</i>
<i>Senect.</i>	<i>De senectute</i>
<i>Sull.</i>	<i>Pro Sulla</i>
<i>Tusc.</i>	<i>Tusculanae disputationes</i>
<i>Verr.</i>	<i>In C. Verrem actio secunda,</i> <i>orationes I-V</i>
2 Verr.	<i>Second Verrines</i>
CIG	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum</i>
CIL	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i>
CISA	<i>Contributi dell'Istituto di storia antica</i>
<i>Class. Philol.</i>	<i>Classical Philology</i>
<i>cos.</i>	consul (with year of office)
CP	<i>Classical Philology</i>
CQ	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
CR	<i>Classical Review</i>
CUF	<i>Collection des Universités de France</i>
DCPP	<i>Dictionnaire des Civilisations</i> <i>Phénicienne et Punique</i>
<i>De vir. Ill.</i>	<i>De viris illustribus</i> (auctor ignotus)
Dio Cass.	Dio Cassius
Diod.	Diodorus
Dion. Hal.	Dionysius of Halicarnassus
<i>Ant. Rom.</i>	<i>Antiquitates Romanae</i>
ed.	editor, edited (by)
edn.	edition
eds.	editors
EFR	École Française de Rome
Ennius V ³	Ennius, ed. Vahlen (third edition)
Enn. <i>Ann.</i>	Ennius, <i>Annales</i> (ed. Skutsch)
<i>Epist.</i>	<i>Epistulae</i>
<i>Epit.</i>	<i>Epitome</i>
<i>esp.</i>	<i>especially</i>
Eus.-Jer.	Eusebius-Jerome
<i>Chron.</i>	<i>Chronica</i>
Eutr.	Eutropius
<i>F. Cap.</i>	<i>Fasti Capitolini</i>
Fest.	Festus
<i>FgrH</i>	<i>Fragmente de Griechischen Historiker</i>
<i>FRHist</i>	<i>Fragments of the Roman Historians</i>
Flor.	Florus
Fr., frg., frgs.	fragment(s)
<i>FRH</i>	<i>Die Frühen Römischen Historiker</i> (ed.

Frontin.	Beck & Walter)
aq.	Frontinus
Strat.	<i>De aquae ductu urbis Romae</i>
Ftr	<i>Strategemata</i>
Gell. NA	<i>Fasti Triumphales</i>
Gell. Hist.	A. Gellius <i>Noctes Atticae</i>
GRBS	Cn. Gellius
HAAN	<i>Greek, Roman & Byzantine Studies</i>
Hdt.	see Gsell (Bibliography)
HN	Herodotus
Hor.	see Pliny
Carm.	Q. Horatius Flaccus, Horace
Carm. Saec.	<i>Odes</i>
Ep.	<i>Carmen Saeculare</i>
Epod.	<i>Epistles</i>
Sat.	<i>Epodes</i>
Isid. Etym.	<i>Satires</i>
Hom.	Isidorus, Isidore, <i>Etymologiae</i>
Il.	Homer
Od.	<i>Iliad</i>
HRR	<i>Odyssey</i>
HSCP	Peter, <i>Historicorum Romanorum</i>
HZ	<i>Reliquiae</i>
I Congr. di Studi	<i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</i>
Fen. e Pun.	<i>Historische Zeitschrift</i>
IG	<i>I Congresso di Studi Fenici e Punici</i>
IGRR	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>
ILLRP	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae ad Res Romanas pertinentes</i>
ILS	<i>Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae</i>
Inscr. It.	Dessau, <i>Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae</i>
Jer. Chron.	Degrassi, <i>Inscriptiones Italicae</i>
Just. Epit.	Jerome, <i>Chronica</i>
JRS	M. Junianus Justinus, Justin, <i>Epitome</i>
Juv.	<i>Journal of Roman Studies</i>
Lact.	D. Junius Juvenalis, Juvenal
Inst.	Lactantius
LMC	<i>Divinae institutiones</i>
Liv.	<i>Liverpool Classical Monthly</i>
AUC	Titus Livius, Livy
per.	<i>Ab Urbe Condita</i>
	<i>Periochae</i>

<i>LTUR</i>	<i>Lexicon Topographicum Urbis Romae</i>
Luc.	M. Annaeus Lucanus, Lucan
Macrob.	Macrobius
<i>Sat.</i>	<i>Saturnalia</i>
Mart.	M. Valerius Martialis, Martial
<i>MDAI (R)</i>	<i>Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts (Römische Abteilung)</i>
<i>MEFRA</i>	<i>Mélanges de l'École française de Rome (Antiquité)</i>
<i>Mél.</i>	<i>Mélanges</i>
<i>Mon. Anc.</i>	<i>Monumentum Ancyranum</i>
<i>MRR</i>	Broughton, <i>Magistrates of the Roman Republic</i>
<i>Mus. Afr.</i>	<i>Museum Africum</i>
<i>NC</i>	<i>Numismatic Chronicle</i>
Nep.	Cornelius Nepos
<i>Att.</i>	<i>Atticus</i>
<i>Hamil.</i>	<i>Hamilcar</i>
<i>Hann.</i>	<i>Hannibal</i>
Obs.	Julius Obsequens, <i>Prodigiorum liber</i>
OCT	Oxford Classical Texts
<i>ORF</i>	Malcovati, <i>Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta</i>
<i>Orig.</i>	<i>Origines</i>
Oros.	Orosius
<i>ORF</i>	H. Malcovati, <i>Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta</i> (second edition 1955, fourth edition 1967)
Ov.	P. Ovidius Naso, Ovid
<i>Am.</i>	<i>Amores</i>
<i>Met.</i>	<i>Metamorphoses</i>
<i>Tr.</i>	<i>Tristia</i>
<i>Pac</i>	<i>Pacuvius</i>
Paul. <i>Dig.</i>	<i>Iulius Paulus, Digesta Iustiniani</i>
P, P ² (citations of Roman historians)	<i>HRR</i> ed. Peter
Paul. Diac., <i>Hist. Lang.</i>	Paul the Deacon, <i>Historia Langobardorum</i>
Paus.	Pausanias
<i>PCPS</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society</i>
<i>Per.</i>	see Livy, <i>Per.</i>
<i>Phamb.</i>	<i>Hamburg Papyri</i>

Pl.	Plato
<i>Resp.</i>	<i>Respublica</i>
Plaut.	
<i>Bacch.</i>	<i>Bacchides</i>
<i>Ep.</i>	<i>Epidicus</i>
<i>Men.</i>	<i>Menaechmi</i>
<i>Mil.</i>	<i>Miles gloriosus</i>
<i>Per.</i>	<i>Persa</i>
<i>Rud.</i>	<i>Rudens</i>
<i>Trin.</i>	<i>Trinummus</i>
<i>Pryl.</i>	<i>Rylands Papyri</i>
Plin. <i>Ep.</i>	C. Plinius Secundus, Pliny (the Younger), <i>Epistulae</i>
Plin. <i>HN & NH</i>	C. Plinius Secundus, Pliny (the Elder) <i>Historia Naturalis</i>
Plut.	
<i>Caes.</i>	<i>Caesar</i>
<i>Cam.</i>	<i>Camillus</i>
<i>Cic.</i>	<i>Plutarch</i>
<i>Comp. Phil. and Flam.</i>	<i>Comparatio Philopoemenis et Flaminini</i>
<i>Coriol.</i>	<i>Coriolanus</i>
<i>Fab.</i>	<i>Fabius</i>
<i>Flam.</i>	<i>Flaminius</i>
<i>Lys.</i>	<i>Lysander</i>
<i>Marc.</i>	<i>Marcellus</i>
<i>Mor.</i>	<i>Moralia</i>
<i>Mul. Virt.</i>	<i>De mulierum uirtute</i>
<i>Num.</i>	<i>Numa</i>
<i>Phil.</i>	<i>Philopoemen</i>
<i>Pomp.</i>	<i>Pompeius</i>
<i>Pyrrh.</i>	<i>Pyrrhus</i>
<i>Quaest. Rom.</i>	<i>Quaestiones Romanae</i>
<i>Rom.</i>	<i>Romulus</i>
<i>Ti. Gr.</i>	<i>Tiberius Gracchus</i>
Pol.	Polybius
Polyaenus	Polyaneus
<i>Strat.</i>	<i>Strategemata</i>
Pomp. Mela	Pomponius Mela
Prop.	Propertius
<i>Praef.</i>	<i>praefatio</i>
PUF	Presses Universitaires de France
Q. Cic. <i>Comment. pet.</i>	Quintus Cicero, <i>Commentariolum petitionis</i>

Quint. <i>Inst.</i>	M. Fabius Quintilianus, Quintilian, <i>Institutes of Oratory</i>
<i>Rhet. Her.</i>	<i>Rhetorica ad Herennium</i>
Roman Praenomina	A. (Aulus), Ap. (Appius), C. (Gaius), Cn. (Gnaeus), D. (Decimus), L. (Lucius), M. (Marcus), M'. (Manius), N. (Numerius), P. (Publius), Q. (Quintus), Ser. (Servius), T. (Titus), Ti. (Tiberius)
RE	Pauly-Wissowa, <i>Realencyclopädie der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft</i>
RÉA	<i>Revue des Études Anciennes</i>
Rev. Hist.	<i>Revue Historique</i>
REL	<i>Revue des Études Latines</i>
RFC	<i>Rivista di Filologia Classica'</i>
RG	<i>Res Gestae</i>
RhM	<i>Rheinisches Museum für Philologie</i>
RIDA	<i>Revue internationale des Droits de l'Antiquité</i>
RIN	<i>Rivista italiana di numismatica e scienze affini</i>
Rol.	Warmington, <i>Remains of Old Latin</i>
RSA	<i>Rivista Storica dell'Antichità</i>
Sall.	C. Sallustius Crispus, Sallust
BJ	<i>Bellum Iugurthinum</i>
Cat.	<i>De conjuratione Catilinae</i>
Hist.	<i>Historiae</i>
Schol. Bob.	Scholia Bobiensia
Sen. <i>Controv.</i>	Seneca (the Elder) <i>Controversiae</i>
Sen.	Seneca (the Younger)
Ep.	<i>Epistulae</i>
Q Nat.	<i>Quaestiones Naturales</i>
Serv.	Servius
Ad Georg.	On <i>Georgics</i>
ad Aen.	On <i>Aeneid</i>
Sil., <i>Pun.</i>	Silius Italicus, <i>Italica</i>
SNG	<i>Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum</i> , <i>numerous vols</i>
Solin.	Solinus
Stob. <i>Flor.</i>	Stobaeus, <i>Florilegium</i>
Str.	Strabo
s.v.	<i>sub uerbo</i> , under the word
Suda	Greek Lexicon formerly known as Suidas

Suet.	Suetonius
<i>Gramm.</i>	<i>De grammaticis</i>
<i>Aug.</i>	<i>Augustus</i>
<i>Calig.</i>	<i>Caligula</i>
<i>Div. Iul.</i>	<i>Divus Iulius</i>
<i>Dom.</i>	<i>Domitianus</i>
<i>Ner.</i>	<i>Nero</i>
<i>Tib.</i>	<i>Tiberius</i>
<i>Syll.</i>	<i>Sylloge</i>
Tac.	Tacitus
<i>Agr.</i>	<i>Agricola</i>
<i>Ann.</i>	<i>Annales</i>
<i>Dial.</i>	<i>Dialogus de oratoribus</i>
<i>Hist.</i>	<i>Historiae</i>
TAPA	<i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i>
Tert.	Tertullianus
<i>Ad nat.</i>	<i>Ad nationes</i>
Thuc.	Thucydides
TLE	(Pallotino) <i>Testimonia Lingua Etruscae</i>
TLL	<i>Thesaurus Linguae Latinae</i> (1900-)
tr.	translator, translated by
Val. Max.	Valerius Maximus
Varr.	M. Terentius Varro
<i>Ling.</i>	<i>De Lingua Latina</i>
<i>Vita pop. Rom.</i>	<i>Vita populi Romani</i>
LL	<i>De Lingua Latina</i>
Vell. Pat.	Velleius Paterculus
Verg.	P. Vergilius Maro, Vergil
<i>Aen.</i>	<i>Aeneis, Aeneid</i>
<i>Ecl.</i>	<i>Eclogae, Eclogues</i>
<i>G.</i>	<i>Georgicae, Georgics</i>
Zon.	Zonaras
Zos.	Zosimus
ZPE	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i>

Introduction: Livy

Bernard Mineo

Livian scholarship, which has flourished during the past few decades, has produced remarkable analyses that make it possible to transcend the purely historical or archeological approaches to Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita*, which have prevailed for too long. On both sides of the Atlantic, the number of books and articles on Livy has multiplied, enabling one to better appreciate the richness of a work some of whose hidden beauties are, I believe, yet to be discovered. However, this renewed interest in Livy's work did not, for a long time, prove to be as fruitful as it might have been, because of a lack of communication between researchers, some of whom were too often unaware of the findings of others. The aim of this book is to take stock of the developments in our understanding of Livy's Roman history to date, and to put an end to this waste of scientific talent by publishing together contributions by some of the best contemporary Livian scholars in the world. Our other objective is to offer cultured readers, whether they be students, secondary school teachers, or university professors, the opportunity to rediscover this great author whose work is likely to be of as much interest to those whose special field is history as to those whose fields are Latin and Greek literature, ancient philosophy, or archeology. Livy's Roman history is indeed far from being solely a history book; it is, in Ciceronian parlance—and Livy shared Cicero's perspective on history—an *opus oratorium*, a literary work expressing, through the use of narrative, a particular view of Roman history whose aim was to help attain a well-defined civic ideal. This being the case, it is obvious that the best way to fully appreciate *Ab Urbe Condita* as a whole is by combining together the views of specialists in the fields of literature and of history who too often tend not to know about one another and to carry out their work within their own spheres, making it impossible to truly understand a work of, in fact, great complexity.

Thus, editing this book, *A Companion to Livy*, has been an extraordinary opportunity to bring together the marvelously talented academics who have so generously contributed toward producing this collection of chapters, providing a synthesized view unique in the history of Livian scholarship. The contributors' views do not always totally harmonize, but the end result is not, as might have been feared, a series of jarring discordant notes. Indeed, most scholars nowadays agree that Livy was not only a well-informed and reliable historian but also a writer of genius and great originality. As a matter of fact, all the most recent findings, which this compilation aims to shine a light on, underline the immense complexity and originality of Livy's Roman history. He is no longer thought to have been a plodding scrivener conscientiously adding one historical episode, taken from his predecessors, the annalists, to

another without ever reflecting on what the end result would be and on the message it would convey. In fact, what shines through *Ab Urbe Condita*, and what it stems from, is a most original philosophical approach to history that points toward a particular moment in time and space—the end of the civil wars and the establishment of Augustus' principate. Livy painstakingly worked on and rewrote the sometimes sparse and meager material that his sources provided to offer the reader a history of Rome that reflected his philosophical approach. This is what entitles Livy to number among the greatest writers. He also shows a particular talent in the way in which he structures his narrative and in the way he adapts, like a virtuoso, the style of his writing to his subject matter. Who indeed would have thought that the author of Book 1, with its poetic language, was the same author who narrated the events of the Second Punic War with all the eloquence of Cicero's prose?

The complexity and richness of Livy's narrative no doubt explain why it is so difficult to precisely define where he positions himself ideologically. However, on this point as well, the present compilation has been a means of showing how our interpretation of Livy's standpoint has evolved. Admittedly, the contributors are far from being unanimous in this regard; some are more sensitive to the politically critical tone of the work, while others, on the contrary, are more sensitive to its pro-Augustus overtones and stress Livy's desire to follow the same line as the *princeps* by striving toward a restoration of the moral and religious values that were supposed to have been at the root of Rome's greatness. Nevertheless, what I find most striking when comparing these different perspectives is, assuredly, the absence of any truly irreconcilable conflict of opinions among scholars today. If no one will deny that Livy's values are profoundly republican, nobody, however, is prepared to claim that this necessarily implies that he was really hostile to Augustus' policy. Indeed, the actual political situation at the time of the *res publica restituta*, itself a web of ambiguities, makes it possible to reconcile Livy's republican convictions with the political slogans in vogue at the beginning of the principate (Hurlet and Mineo 2009). For the rest, one would need to have second sight to be able to define with any degree of certainty what the historian had exactly in mind. Nevertheless, one can reasonably assume—and that is what, finally, the authors of this book are agreed on—that Livy, similar to Virgil or Horace, faced with either chaos or the hope of a return to civil harmony, had preferred the second option. It is also quite possible—and this I believe—that Livy gambled on the success of Augustus' plan to restore moral values and a lawful state because there was no other possible rational choice, and he did that with a degree of conviction that it is impossible to measure exactly. It also seems likely that his view of the political situation evolved when the *princeps*, far from wanting to step aside and leave the limelight to the political institutions as Camillus had done in his narrative, established his ascendancy over the state and lent a dynastic dimension to the new regime.

By giving readers the findings that the latest research on Livy has provided, the authors of *A Companion to Livy* intend to show that, in the Republic of Letters, Livian scholarship is bursting with vitality. They also hope to foster and stimulate research into Livy's work. Much remains to be done in order to discover the meaning or the symbolic or ideological aspects of a great many passages that academics in the past traditionally interpreted literally, not taking into account the backdrop against which history was being written in Antiquity. It seems that Livy's narrative depicting the beginnings of the Republic, in particular, deserves to form the subject of a thorough, detailed study using the new approaches that contemporary Livian scholars have chosen to adopt. It would greatly improve our understanding of the events and of the political upheavals that led to the true birth of the Roman republic since the old foundations on which, until now, our knowledge of this period has been based have been rocked by more recent findings.

Before handing over to the authors of this book, it seems essential, however, to recap what little information we have on Livy's life in order to support our analyses of *Ab Urbe Condita*.

We are uncertain about Livy's precise date of birth. On the strength of Jerome's testimony (*Messala Corvinus orator nascitur et Titus Livius Patauinus scriptor historicus: Ad Euseb. Chron. Ad ann. Abr.* 1958), he was, for a long time, thought to have been born in 59 BC. A remark about the historian's lifetime suggested that he must have died in 17 AD. It is possible that the choice of these dates is the result of an initial misapprehension and that 64 BC and 12 AD should be favored. Corvinus' date of birth seems indeed to have been postdated by 5 years (Syme 1955; Burck 1992; Walsh 1961, 2; Ogilvie 1965a, 1). Jerome may have mistaken the consuls of 59 (*Cæsare et Bibulo*) for those of 64 (*Cæsare et Figulo*).

Jerome's chronicle leaves us in no doubt as to where Livy died (ibid. 2033): *Livius historiographus Pataui moritur*. The tombstone belonging to the writer's family may actually have been discovered. Indeed, one dating from the age of Augustus and inscribed with the names of a T. Livius C. f., of his wife Cassia Sex. f. Prima (*CIL V 2975* = Dessau 2919) has been found in Padua. One of his sons wrote a geographical treatise. Livy is also supposed to have advised one of them to read Demosthenes and Cicero and to have written a treatise on stylistics for his benefit (Quint. *Inst.* 10. 1. 39). His daughter married the rhetorician Lucius Magius (Sen. *Controv.* 10, *præm.* 2), whose *recitationes* attracted a large audience because of his father-in-law's fame.

Padua seems to have been known for its quiet provincial life and its very strict morals (Str. 3. 5. 3; 5. 1. 7; Pomp. Mela 2. 60; Plin. *Ep.* 1. 14. 6). Asinius Pollio, according to Quintilian (*Inst.* 1. 5. 56), mentioned, somewhat ironically, Livy's *pataunitas*. However, it is difficult to know whether he only wanted to underline certain stylistic aspects of his work or poke fun at the moral tone of his Roman history (Ogilvie 1965a, 5; Syme [1939] 1939, 485–

6; 1959, 76). Miles (1995, 51) remains prudent on the subject, but suggests that Pollio's little barb implies, at the very least, that Livy's point of view was felt to be that of an outsider, historiographically as well as socially speaking.

Livy probably received his first formal schooling in his native city while Rome was prey to the disruptions caused by the civil war, which forms the backdrop against which the future historian's youth was spent (Chapter 2). Actually, the latter took his first unsteady steps when the rights and freedoms of the Republic had just been curtailed by the first triumvirate; he must have been 15 when Caesar crossed the Rubicon, and 33 at the time of Actium. One understands, then, why, when the hope of lasting peace and civic harmony presented itself at the time of the establishment of the principate in 27 BC, Livy might have opted to support a project that he would have seen as likely to contribute to the restoration of national unity.

We should also keep in mind, in particular, Livy's supposed interest in philosophy. Seneca thus mentions dialogues, the contents of which, whether philosophical or historical, one would find difficult to determine. He also states that Livy wrote philosophical works:

Scriptis enim et dialogos, quos non magis philosophiae adnumerare possis quam historiae, et ex professo philosophiam continentes libros.

He also wrote dialogues, not less liable to be filed among philosophical works than among historical works, as well as books whose contents were professedly philosophical.

Does this versatility mean that Livy hesitated for a long time before opting for a career as a historian? It does seem that he had, in any case, completed these essays when he embarked on his *magnum opus*.

We do not know whether he spent some time in Greece studying as so many Roman youths did. There is nothing that would indicate that this had been the case, and the geographical locations he sometimes mentions are so vague as to suggest that the opposite was true (Walsh [1961] 1963, 154).

Judging from his lack of technical vocabulary use when describing a battle scene, he cannot have had any military experience (Walsh [1961] 1963, 157–162).

We also do not know when he moved to Rome and how long he stayed there. Opinions differ greatly on this point. If some believe that he wrote the major part of his contemporary Roman history in Padua, others, on the other hand, argue that his relationship with Augustus, the part he played in the education of the future emperor Claudius, and the arrival in Rome of a Spanish admirer who had come on purpose to meet him (Plin. *Ep.* 2. 3. 8) would all seem to indicate that he remained in the capital for quite a while.

When did he begin to write his Roman history? The answer to that question is

of major importance to those who wish to interpret the dialectical structure of the work. Everything would seem to suggest, *a priori*, that he started his opus any time between the years 27 and 25 BC. Livy's allusion to the second closure of the temple to Janus, an event that took place in 29 BC and which he mentions in Book 1 (19. 3), leads us to believe that it is so:

... *quod nostrae ætati di dederunt ut uideremus, post bellum Actiacum ab imperatore Cæsare Augusto pace terra marique parta.* (The gods allowed our generation to witness this event when, after the battle of Actium, Caesar Augustus brought us peace on land and at sea.)

The fact that Livy is unaware of the third closure of the temple—in 25 BC—seems to imply that this event had not yet occurred. Moreover, in Book 4 (20.7), Livy seems to be alluding to Augustus' refusal to allow Licinius Crassius, who was proconsul in 27 BC, to lay the *spolia opima* in the temple to Jupiter Feretrius on July 4, 27 BC.

However, what appears to be the determining factor is the use, by Livy, when describing the closure of the temple to Janus in 29 BC, of Augustus' official title (*Cæsare Augusto*), which Octavian was only to be granted in January 27 BC.

The question of dates is more complex, however, than it would seem at first. Many scholars have often refused to accept the years 27–25 BC as a starting point because of the tone of the preface, considered pessimistic, which can only be explained, according to J. Bayet and G. Baillet (1947, XVII) and also R. M. Ogilvie (1965b, 209–240), if Livy had started writing his Roman history soon before or after the battle of Actium. Thus, J. Bayet has Livy begin writing the first books in 33–32 BC and working on the end of the first pentad in 31–29 BC. A new edition of the first pentad (around the year 25 BC) would have enabled Livy to add his preface and a few extra details (such as the title *Cæsare Augustus*). According to T. J. Luce, the first pentad would already have been completed by 27 BC; R. M. Ogilvie (*op. cit.* 94) does not refute the idea that the imperial title may have been added on at a later date. G. B. Miles (1995, 92) puts forward between 27 and 25 BC as the time when the first pentad was published.

We will soon see what is to be made of this pessimism on the part of Livy, which has too often been understood, mistakenly in my opinion, to be a sign that Livy had reservations about the new regime (Chapter 11; see also Mineo 2006, 109–111). For the time being, it is preferable to try and make sense of another passage that has long helped foster the view that Livy's narrative where Augustus' title is mentioned is the result of a second edition. The passage in question is the famous one taken from Book 4, which has already been mentioned, and in which Livy writes about the *spolia opima* obtained by Cornelius Cossus. The *spolia opima* is, in fact, a current issue at the time when Livy is writing since Augustus refused to grant them to Licinius in 27 BC

in recognition of his victory over Deldo in 29 BC. The emperor based his decision on the so-called necessity for one to be a consul in order to be able to aspire to this honor. We will stop for a moment to consider this passage, which is also analyzed later on in the book (Chapters 2 and 23), as it is liable to provide more food for thought as regards dating Livy's work and also because it sheds light on the problems of method and political diplomacy that the latter might have been faced with.

It is a fact that Livy's narrative concerning the *spolia opima* obtained by Cossus is disconcerting since, after having first introduced the general as a military tribune, Livy adds, under the guise of a parenthetical remark, a contradictory piece of information: the historian, indeed, states that Augustus had personally confirmed to him Cornelius Cossus' status as a consul. Apparently, the *princeps* had told him that he had himself noticed an indication of this fact on Cossus' linen breastplate when he entered the temple of Jupiter Feretrius during its restoration, probably in 32 BC. Livy ends the passage by stating that he himself would deem it sacrilegious to challenge such a testimony (4. 20. 7):

Hoc ego cum Augustum Caesarem, templorum omnium conditorem ac restitutorem, ingressum aedem Feretri Iouis quam uetustate dilapsam refecit, se ipsum in thorace linteo scriptum legisse audissem, prope sacrilegium ratus sum Cossu spoliolum suorum Caesarem, ipsius templi auctorem, subtrahere testem. (Inasmuch as I had heard it said that Cæsar Augustus, founder and restorer of all temples, had entered the temple of Jupiter Feretrius that he had had restored when it fell into disrepair due to its great age, and that he himself had read this piece of information on the linen breastplate, I thought it would have been sacrilegious, as it were, to deprive Cossus of the testimony given by Cæsar, the founder of the temple in question, concerning his mortal remains.)

However, a few chapters later (4. 32. 4), when Livy again mentions Cossus' feat, he calls him a military tribune.

This parenthetical remark has often been quoted to justify dating the first pentad after 27 BC since it contains Augustus' official title. This analysis, however, has sometimes been rejected by scholars who, similar to T. J. Luce, are rightly disconcerted by Livy's continued use, in his narrative, of the title "military tribune" when referring to Cossus before and after the long parenthesis presenting the contradictory piece of information offered by Augustus. T. J. Luce (1971, 209–240) has suggested that these contradictory statements are proof that the passage mentioning Augustus' title was added later, to the previous version in which Cossus was merely described as a military tribune.

This hypothesis must be taken seriously, but it does not prove that this possible first version was necessarily written before Octavian had obtained the title "Augustus," although the possibility cannot be dismissed. It is also quite

likely that Livy simply included this parenthetical remark because of its relevance to events that were happening while he was writing his Roman history, and this, no doubt, because he felt that common courtesy demanded it or because he felt constrained to do so since the prince had done him the honor of sharing this piece of information with him. The question is difficult to settle and opinions vary. According to G. B. Miles, Livy could not disregard the prince's testimony. Basing his analysis on a passage from the preface (3), he suggests that the Paduan historian hides behind the modesty of his social status and a reverential attitude toward the *auctoritas* of those above him so as to avoid appearing too daring when dealing with sensitive political issues which, in any case, could not be resolved one way or another as the events had happened a long time before. R. M. Ogilvie (1965b, 563–4) believes that Livy inserted Augustus' testimony after he had written the lines about Cornelius Cossus (4. 20. 5–11) and then neglected to make the necessary changes that would have rendered the two passages compatible. He also believes that this is a sign that Livy was independent-minded, a point of view that is shared by G. Salamon (2003, 545–7). P. G. Walsh, for his part, goes so far as to think that the contradictions present in Livy's narrative are meant to subtly discredit Augustus' statements (1961, 30).

It also seems to me that, in this case, what one senses above all is how awkward the historian's position must have been and how torn he must have felt, having, on the one hand, to take into account the information the emperor had given him and, on the other hand, feeling morally unable to disregard what his written sources were unanimous in stating. Livy could not tamper with the facts without breaking the thread of his narrative based on the annalists' testimonies, and hence the use of the title “military tribune” before and after the parenthetical remark. For the historian, the problem was not so much political as methodological (Salamon 2003, 545–7).

By retaining the title “military tribune” in his narrative, Livy was staking his claim to independence of thought as a historian, but he was not challenging the *princeps* for all that. In fact, the emperor's wish to limit, as much as possible, the granting of this honor by only allowing those who held the auspices the right to it owes its undeniable legitimacy to Livy's depiction—in Book 1—of the establishment of this rite by Romulus and, more precisely, to the words the historian has the king of Rome speak and his own comments, which are a direct allusion to the controversy that divided Augustus and Licinius Crassus (Liv. 1. 10.7):

Ita deinde dis uisum nec inritam conditoris templi uocem esse, qua laturos eo spolia posteros nuncupauit, nec multitudine compotum eius doni uolgari laudem: bina postea, inter tot annos, tot bella, opima parta sunt spolia; adeo rara eius fortuna decoris fuit. (Afterward, the gods allowed the founder not to have spoken in vain when he declared his successors would there bring spoils without, nevertheless, debasing the

worth of such a glorious gift by being lavish in the granting of it. Twice only since then, during the course of so many years and throughout so many wars, have there been *spolia opima*: so rare are those whose good fortune earned them this honor.)

Livy's insistence on the rarity of this honor—especially the use of the verb *uolgare* to underline the indignity that there would have been had this distinction been given to more than a very happy few, and, not least, his choosing Romulus, personally, to voice this concern—must be considered as evidence that Livy intended thus to put into perspective Augustus' wise decision not to grant Licinius Crassus the *spolia opima*, by bestowing on the imperial edict a Romulean stamp of legitimacy well suited to the new founder of Rome. Moreover, the length of the comment and its seamless insertion in the narrative make the hypothesis that this passage might have been added at a later stage less likely, even if it cannot be discounted. Be that as it may, what is important here, it would seem, is that, even if in Book 4, Livy appeared to be presenting the information given to him by Augustus regarding Cornelius Cossus' consular rank with all the reverence due to the master of the city while, at the same time, giving precedence to his annalistic sources, he had, nevertheless, in Book 1, and without any reservations whatsoever, shown that the philosophy that had dictated the prince's conduct was justified and valid. Memories of the civil war must have been too vivid still for Livy not to approve of a policy that discouraged the Roman aristocrats' military ambitions and the multiplication of *condottieri* likely to threaten civil harmony.

What we must keep in mind, therefore, is that there is no actual direct proof—apart from what has been subjectively felt as the pessimistic tone of the preface—which would indicate the existence of another edition of Livy's Roman history dating back to the end of the 30s, or that of a re-edition after 27 BC, although the possibility of either cannot be discounted. Whatever the date of the first edition and no matter whether there was a later edition or not, it is nevertheless true that the text under study does contain Augustus' official title. And this text can only have been written in 27–25 BC. Besides, even if the paragraphs in question were indeed added—which is possible (see Chapter 2)—it is nonetheless undeniable that the cyclic structure of Livy's Roman history, based on analogies between Evander, Romulus, Camillus, and Augustus, who all inaugurate new historical cycles in Livy's narrative (Chapter 11), means that the idea for the work must have been conceived at a time when the hope of national unity, centered around one man, a new Romulus, could be offered to the Roman people—that is, after Actium, after the moment when Octavian could present himself as the *remedium* that would make it possible to cure the city's ailing body, to give back its unity to a fractured whole, and to open up a new historical era. It seems, moreover, that this aspect of the prince as healer—under Apollo's auspices—as the herald of a new era, and as a new Romulus is given greater emphasis in the narrative

covering the period between the return from Egypt and the closure of the temple to Janus (the coins minted at the time show Octavian's wish to be perceived as the new Romulus), the inauguration of the temple to Apollo in October 28 BC, and the granting of the title "Augustus" in 27 BC, a period of time during which Augustus envisioned being called "Romulus." Even if one accepts the idea of a second edition, it is extremely unlikely that Livy started working on his Roman history much later than that date, a period in history that also witnessed the birth of Virgil's *Aeneid*, a work whose ideological intentions seem very close to Livy's.

Livy's narrative began with a short reminder of the legendary origins of the city and ended in 9 BC with Drusus' death. It is likely that this is not when the author had initially intended to end his Roman history but that he had continued his work, motivated by an insatiable need to pursue his intellectual activities, as Pliny the Elder's testimony would suggest (*HN Praef.* 16):

Profiteor mirari me T. Liuium, auctorem celeberrimum, in Historiarum suarum, quas repetit ab origine Urbis quodam uoluntate sic exorsum: satis jam sibi gloriae quaesitum et potuisse se desinere, ni animus inquiet pasceretur opere. (I admit I was surprised that Livy, a writer who was then at the height of his fame, could have written, at the beginning of one of the books of his *History* that starts with the origins of Rome, that he "had already achieved enough glory and could have stopped, had not his restless mind fed on work.")

Apparently unable to stop writing, an activity that had become synonymous with living, he offered his contemporary readers, for their own amusement, a "continuation" that enabled him to describe the events that had happened after Actium and, finally, the first years of Augustus' reign. It seems likely that, initially, Livy intended to end his history with the civil war and the return to a lawful state, that is the years 30–27 BC when he started writing his Roman history, sharing in the hope of renewal that the politicians claimed they would strive toward when they talked of a *res publica restituta* (Hurlet and Mineo 2009).

Why did he finally decide not to go beyond Drusus' death? It might not have been a decision on his part. E. Burck believes, not without reason perhaps, that it was death that stilled the writer's pen (Burck 1992, 6). The idea that either death or ill health brought Livy's work to an end is widespread (A. Klotz *R. E.* XIII, 818; Laistner 1947, 80). Others believe that it was a question of literary choice (Syme 1959, 27–87). It is difficult, if not impossible, to attain any degree of certainty. All we can do is formulate hypotheses. And we cannot exclude the possibility, suggested by L. Bessone (Chapter 31), that Livy actually wrote 150 books and actually went as far down in time as the battle of Teutoburg in 9 AD.

Of this huge body of work (142 books, perhaps 150), only a few pieces

remain: Books 1–10, 21–45, a few fragments, and very short summaries (*periochæ*) of almost all the books including those that have been lost.

The scant pieces of information we have concerning Livy's life are therefore a precious commodity, as we have seen. They will offer, one hopes, a useful reference point and will shed light on and help understand the historian's ideology and intentions.

All that remains for me to do is to hand over to the authors of this compilation, whom I particularly wish, here, to thank for the enthusiasm with which they have contributed to this book, *A Companion to Livy*. I would also like to say how moved I am to witness the completion of a project subject to human vicissitudes from which some of the contributors to this volume have more particularly suffered. Not only did such a compilation mean intellectual interaction but it also, very often, meant the forging of mutual bonds, which is the most obvious proof of our achievement. I can only express the hope that these *amicitiae* may be a prelude, and that we may be given the opportunity to work together again.

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Part I

Text and Context

Chapter 1

Livian Manuscript Tradition

Marielle de Franchis

Liuius ingens, Martial's famous metonymy (14.190), shows how ancient readers were impressed by the immensity of Livy's work, of which only Books 1–10 and 21–45 are available today. The bulk of the work,¹ which from late Antiquity probably caused both its fragmentation and the disappearance of most of it, accounts for its being circulated in various forms adapted to the different types of readership²: one could read Livy complete, in groups of books, or in a reduced form, excerpts (*Excerpta*) or summaries³ (*Periochae*).

The only attestation in late Antiquity regarding the whole of the work is to be found in a letter by Symmachus (9.13), the famous orator, written in 401, about the delay in his revision of the whole of Livy's work (*totius Liuiani operis*), and does not tell us how many books there were altogether.⁴

At the end of the fifth century, Priscianus, the grammarian, makes numerous allusions to the historian in his *Institutiones grammaticae*, but they do not go further than Book 118 (fr. 58 Jal), and none of them proves that Priscianus still had a complete Livy.

During the sixth century, there is nothing in Cassiodorus (485–580) to prove that he had direct access to Livy (Aricò 1986, 167). Recent research questions the hypothesis according to which our oldest manuscripts of Livy were at Vivarium (Troncarelli 1998, 40 n. 1).

As for Pope Gregory I's (540–604) responsibility in the destruction of Livy's *History*, it is merely a groundless allegation that comes from a legend spread in the twelfth century by John of Salisbury's *Policraticus* (1.142 and 8.19), and taken up in the sixteenth century by Machiavelli (*Discorsi*, 2.5.1).

The surviving parts go back to late antique exemplars, some of which are still extant (Cameron 2011, 466–467), while others have to be reconstructed from their descendants.

The transmission of the work was complex in the Middle Ages, taking the form of independent units, “Decades” (groups of 10 books), or perhaps sometimes “Pentads” (groups of five books). One cannot be sure of the link between Livy's method of composition and this form of transmission, nor of how much of his work circulated in separate Decades in Antiquity. The *Periochae* as well as Lucan's scholia testify, for example, to a separate circulation of a group of eight books under the title *The Civil War* (Fr. 37 Jal).

Still, Decades seem to have been the most common form of transmission for Greek and Roman historians (Irigoin 1997, 128–129), but the only attestation in Antiquity of such circulation of Livy's work occurs late, at the end of the fifth century, in a letter traditionally attributed to Pope Gelasius I⁵ (492–496), which mentions the second Decade (lost today).

The only Decades that circulated in the Middle Ages are the First, the Third, and the Fourth. They were available in Bamberg in the eleventh century (Reeve 1987a, 146). They appear together in a single volume in Italy from the end of the thirteenth century.⁶ The beginning of the Fifth Decade (Books 41–45) only reappeared in the sixteenth century. There is also a fragment of Book 91 discovered in the eighteenth century in a palimpsest⁷ and a fragment of Book 11 (fifth century) that reappeared in Egypt in 1986.⁸

The abundant research done in the past 30 years makes it necessary to update Reynold's excellent synthesis (1983). It concerns two main domains: first, the census of Livy's manuscripts copied from the ninth to the twelfth centuries (Munk Olsen⁹ 1982–2009, II, 1–16 and III, 2, 88–91, with complements in Munk Olsen 1991–2007) and of inventories of medieval libraries (Munk Olsen 1982–2009, III, 1); and second, a much deeper examination of the many *recentiores*, whose interest had been stressed by Giuseppe Billanovich (1951 and 1981).

Still, the investigations into the jungle of *recentiores* have led to a revaluation of what Billanovich thought was Petrarch's prime role in the transmission of Decades, notably for the Third and the Fourth (Reeve 1986 and 1989b). They have also revealed that the brilliant conjectures that Billanovich had attributed to Petrarch were in fact prior to him (Reeve 1987b, 424–430). He had above all a remarkable knowledge of manuscripts on which obscure readers had relentlessly made a critical work. To reach his conclusions, Michael Reeve benefited from progress on dating the illuminations in Italian manuscripts of the thirteenth–fifteenth centuries (Avril et al. 1984, 139–142; de la Mare 1985). Indeed, the confrontation of data on the dating of the text and those concerning the illuminations permits a much stricter control of the dating of the volume itself.

Therefore, we now have a precise inventory of the Livian tradition, with lists of manuscripts for the First (Reeve 1996c, 89–90) and Third (de Franchis 2000, 34–40) Decades. With the resources of libraries being gradually made available online, it is easier now to update these inventories and consult manuscripts. We shall limit ourselves to presenting the essential aspects of the transmission of the text, for each surviving Decade or part of one.

Books 1–10

Stephen Oakley (1997, 152–327; 2005, 494–501) has devoted a large study to the transmission of the First Decade. He shows how effective the stemmatic

method¹⁰ is for going back rigorously to a lost late antique archetype, even within a contaminated tradition, that is, one in which manuscripts frequently change affiliation (Oakley 1997, 154).

His investigation embraces all the manuscripts of the First Decade (about 200) available today.¹¹ This Decade was transmitted in one piece, without any distinction between Pentades,¹² between the fourth and fifteenth centuries, by manuscripts, a large majority of which consist of *recentiores*.

Only 24 witnesses are from time periods earlier than the thirteenth century. One must straightaway isolate two late antique ones, which did not play any part in the transmission, because they have no known descendants, but one of which helps us to understand the mechanisms of that transmission.

The first witness of the two (= $\mathfrak{P}$), is a papyrus from the fourth–fifth century, discovered in Oxyrhynchus (Egypt) at the end of the nineteenth century.¹³ It contains a tiny fragment of Book 1, far too small to be of any significance (Lowe 1934–1971, 2, n. 247; Funari 2011, 229–237).

The second (=V) is a palimpsest.¹⁴ Fragments of Books 3–6 written in uncials at the beginning of the fifth century, probably in Italy, were identified by Karl Blume in 1827 and published by Mommsen in 1868 (Lowe 1934–1971, 4, n. 499). This publication has revealed unsuspected corruptions in the other manuscripts, which all go back to a lost late antique exemplar.

This lost model [N] resulted from a revision of Livy's text made at the turn of the fourth–fifth century by two senatorial families, the Nicomachi and Symmachi (Cameron 2011, 498–526; Paschoud 2012, 361–363). The medieval manuscripts have kept traces of this exemplar, in the form of subscriptions (*subscriptiones*), that is, notes mentioning this revision and the names of its authors (Pecere 1986, 59–69; Cameron 2011, 498–516). It is traditionally referred to as *Symmachean*, by reference to Symmachus, who had meant to do it for the whole of the work,¹⁵ or *Nicomachean*, by reference to the two Nicomachi, whose intervention seems to have been limited to the First Decade.¹⁶

This revision, which integrated numerous variants in the text itself (Oakley 1997, 167 and 316–320), has nothing to do with modern critical editions (Zetzel 1980, 42–49; Cameron 2011, 502).

Hypotheses about the reconstruction of the lost Nichomachean archetype [N] have made enormous progress in the twentieth century. The first graphic representation of the genealogical classification of manuscripts (stemma) is by Jean Bayet (ed.), *Livre 1*, Paris, 1940. He had combined the genealogical principle with Andreas Frigell's appealing hypothesis of a geographical classification of manuscripts, now obsolete with our improved knowledge of medieval *scriptoria*. Frigell had suggested in 1875 (reference in Reeve 1996c, 75, n. 3) distinguishing between the witnesses, which went back to an Italian

model (cisalpine) as opposed to a Gallic one (transalpine). Bayet's genealogical classification was later reconsidered by Robert Ogilvie (1957), and then simplified in his edition (1974). S. Oakley (1997, 325) proposes a new configuration, apparently more complicated, with a new edition of Books 6–10 in prospect. The complication is due to the fact that he introduces several witnesses that are of use only for part of the text, because they are either fragmentary or contaminated. In the latter case, they can only be used episodically, in passages where they are the sole survivors of a lost model.

My simplified version (Figure 1.1) of Oakley's stemma aims at making its access easier.




Figure 1.1 Stemma for the First Decade

The first innovation lies in the hypothetical reconstruction of the lost Nichomachean archetype [N]. Oakley (1997, 321–324) adopts Reeve's suggestion (1996c, 87) and presents a three-branched stemma instead of two. He attributes the same value to the testimony of each of the three families μ , Λ , and Π ,¹⁷ because he did not find evidence that the binary division previously retained was well-founded. Indeed, Bayet and Ogilvie considered,

on the one hand, the μ family, represented by the two manuscripts coming from cathedrals, and, on the other, a hypothetical common ancestor (Δ), from which the two families Λ and Π are supposedly derived, represented by the numerous manuscripts that had spread essentially in monasteries.

The second innovation, which concerns the choice of witnesses, results from the systematic use of a fundamental principle in textual criticism, the *eliminatio codicum descriptorum*. Oakley, on the one hand, eliminates several manuscripts retained by previous editors, either *uettustiores* or *recentiores*, because they derive from extant manuscripts. On the other hand, he introduces several *recentiores*, because they are necessary to establish certain parts of the text. Last, he sets many *recentiores* aside because they derive from incunables, especially from the *editio princeps* (=Zr).¹⁸ He thus reveals why and how, after centuries in which the μ and, above all, the Λ families had dominated in Italy, the Π tradition imposed itself, through the *editio princeps*, until the beginning of the sixteenth century.

He therefore suggests reconstructing the Nicomachean archetype from the following manuscripts, which I shall describe by families, generally respecting the position of witnesses in the stemma.

The μ Family

This family consists of only two witnesses. The first is complete (M¹⁹ or *Mediceus*) and, therefore, particularly precious; the second, the *codex Vormaciensis* (Vo), has been lost, except for a few readings kept by the humanists. Oakley thus eliminates the third witness retained by Ogilvie (1974), the variants introduced by Petrarch in his own manuscript (A²⁰ or *Aginnensis*), very important for Decades 3 and 4: they either come from M or correspond to previous conjectures (Reeve 1996a, 122–124; Oakley 1997, 180–184).

M was copied in North Italy by five scribes in the middle of the tenth century. Ratherius Veronensis' involvement in the process, as suggested by Billanovich, is disputed (Reeve 1996a, 114). It includes important marginal notes, some of which presumably go back to its exemplar.

The *codex Vormaciensis*, named after the Worms Cathedral, where it was discovered in the sixteenth century, was used by Beatus Rhenanus (Books 1–6) and probably by Gelenius (Books 7–10) for the second edition of Livy published by Froben, Erasmus' famous printer (Basle, 1535 = Froben 2). The fact that we can only have indirect and incomplete access to it makes it particularly difficult to exploit (Reeve 1995a. Oakley 1997, 169–180).

Family Λ

This family is the most complicated, for its primary witnesses are either

incomplete or fragmentary, or else they need to be reconstructed from several manuscripts (group θ). It contains:

- H²¹ or *Harleianus*, copied in Germany at the end of the tenth century, containing Books 1–8 almost entirely.
- Two fragmentary witnesses found in bindings in the twentieth century and introduced by Ogilvie (1974): they are notably²² some badly damaged fragments of Book 2 (=K²³), copied in Corbie at the end of the ninth century.
- T or Thuaneus,²⁴ which only contains Books 6–10 (now up to 10, 46, 6). It is the oldest witness of the Decade, copied at Tours at the beginning of the ninth century. We do not know whether the (lost) Books 1–5 and T as it stands were bound together or not (Reeve 1996b, 101). T enables us to control the value of H in Books 6–8, for, contrary to what Conway (Oxford, 1914, xxvi–xxvii) and Bayet (1940, civ) thought, T is not H's twin. Moreover, T presents the advantage of having been annotated and corrected by Lupus,²⁵ the great Carolingian scholar, thanks to a manuscript (P²⁶ or *Parisiensis*) belonging to the Π family (von Büren 1996, 64–68).
- Thus corrected, T (=T^c) generated a series of contaminated manuscripts that have a role to play in the reconstruction of the text where T is not extant, that is, for Books 1–5 and for the last chapter of Book 10 (Reeve 1995b, 503–505, 1996b, 100–101). Oakley (1997, 191–217) classified this series and selected the most important witnesses—two Italian manuscripts whose dating was changed back to the late thirteenth century (Reeve 1996b): X,²⁷ and, to a lesser extent, Y.²⁸
- And finally, the Λ family contains a hypothetical manuscript θ , reconstructed from three complete ones:
 1. R²⁹ (or *Romanus*), copied in France at the end of the tenth century, but disfigured by numerous fourteenth-century corrections that hide the original text.
 2. L³⁰ (or *Leidensis*), copied in Italy in the eleventh century.
 3. D³¹ (or *Dominicanus*), the most important manuscript of the group, copied in the South of France in the eleventh century. D generated the primary stream of the tradition of the first Decade in Italy,³² to which belongs Petrarch's famous manuscript, A³³ (or *Aginnensis*). A therefore no longer needs to appear in the stemma.

The manuscripts of this group had been wrongly excluded by Ogilvie (1974) (Briscoe 1977; Zetzl 1980, 41). Because of the fragmentary character of K, and of the existence of a single continuous witness for Books 1–5 (H) as well

as Books 9–10 (T), this group is absolutely necessary for the reconstruction of Λ in these two portions of the Decade. For Books 6–8, the simultaneous presence of H and T makes the evidence of θ less crucial.

Family Π

This family is represented by two primary witnesses,³⁴ only one of which is complete. It is therefore necessary to use contaminated manuscripts to reconstruct it. I have only included in the stemma the hypothetical ancestor [Z] of the numerous witnesses of the fifteenth century whose acronym begins in “Z,” and about which Oakley (1997, 270–294) showed that they were non-eliminable for several portions of their text.

P³⁵ (or *Parisiensis*) is the only complete primary witness. It was copied in France in the middle of the ninth century (von Büren 1996, 72), under Lupus's control and corrected by him, in Books 6–10, with the help of his other copy, T (Λ family), which only contained this Pentade. Heiric, Lupus's pupil (von Büren 1996, 64–73, 2010, 375–378 and 395–396), also corrected and annotated Books 1 and 2 with a manuscript of the Λ family and supervised the copy of P (corrected by Lupus) into two manuscripts, F³⁶ (or *Floriacensis*) and B³⁷ (or *Bambergensis*), used by Conway-Walters and Bayet and rightly eliminated by Ogilvie (1974) (Reeve 1996c, 77–79; Oakley 1997, 314–315).

Finally, the second primary witness E³⁸ (or *Einsiedlensis*), copied in Germany, probably at the end of the tenth century (Munk Olsen 1991–2007, 2007, 76), is today reduced to two long fragments (from Books 1 and 4–6). It was corrected at an earlier date from a manuscript of the Λ family.

E being so incomplete, it is necessary to use another witness, O³⁹ (or *Oxonienensis*), written in the East of France at the beginning of the eleventh century. In fact, O comes from E after correction (=E^c; Oakley 1997, 273–274, *contra* Ogilvie 1974, xii). O stops in 10.22.2, and has inherited from its exemplar a big lacuna (4.30; 14–57.11), which was not present in E. Moreover, there are leaves missing in Books 8 and 9.

Oakley (1997, 294–295) strongly questions the value of O, overestimated according to him by Conway and Walters. He wonders about the suitability of replacing it by the reconstruction of the hypothetical ancestor of the [Z] family, from nine witnesses of the fifteenth century, non-eliminable in definite portions of their text. His study of group Z, whose ancestor is an Italian-contaminated descendant of North European manuscripts (E and O), reveals its interest: many of the manuscripts that compose the group come from incunables. A descendant close to that lost ancestor (= [Z]) has indeed been used as the basis for the *editio princeps* (=Zr, Rome 1469 or 1470). The text of this edition enjoyed a wide currency—despite its numerous errors—because it soon became a habit to give printers a printed edition rather than a manuscript as basic text.⁴⁰

The intervention of the printing revolution into the manuscript tradition therefore explains the supremacy gained by the Π family in the transmission of the first Decade between the middle of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth.

Books 21–30

More than 170 manuscripts that transmitted the Third Decade between the fifth and the fifteenth century are still extant (de Franchis 2000, 19–22 and 34–40). This transmission has not been uniform: one branch, stemming from a surviving late antique archetype (the *Puteaneus*), transmits Books 21–30. The other branch, traditionally referred to as “Spirensian,” only intervenes from the last third of Book 26 onward (26.30.9). The archetype of this second branch, which probably transmitted Books 26–40, has been lost, and we do not have any complete witness. Furthermore, we do not know how much is missing at the beginning of the Spirensian tradition, nor when Books 26–30 and 31–40 have been joined together (Reeve 1987b, 422 and 1989b, 108–109).

Numerous manuscripts of the *Puteaneus* tradition have been completed or corrected, in Books 26–30, by this second tradition. Reeve's researches (1986, 1987a, and 1987b) have largely contributed toward clarifying the history of this complex transmission. He notably questioned Billanovich's hypotheses (1951 and 1981) regarding, on the one hand, the importance in the Spirensian tradition of a lost Chartres manuscript (known as *uetus Carnotensis* since Fraenkel's review of Billanovich 1951), and, on the other hand, the pseudo leading role of Petrarch in the transmission of the Decade: the synthesis of the two branches took place before him.

The Puteaneus Tradition (21–30)

The *Puteaneus*⁴¹ (P), after the name of its owner, the humanist jurisconsult Claude Dupuy (1545–1594), which transmits the whole Decade, is the ancestor of the most widely spread tradition. This uncial codex was written in southern Italy in the fifth century, from the subscriptions of an anonymous reader who revised it at Avellino shortly after it was finished (Lowe 1934–1971, 5, n. 562, 1971, 54; Condello 1994, 31–36). Its text, highly corrupted or lacunary, very soon needed to form conjectures, especially in the first Pentade, which rests entirely on it. The most famous are the *Emendationes in Titum Livium*⁴² (Books 21–26) of Lorenzo Valla (1407–1457). In Books 26–30, the Spirensian tradition has allowed limiting those conjectures and filling lacunae, two of which are important (26.41.18–43.8 and 27.2.11–3, 7). Moreover, Books 21 and 30, situated at the beginning and end of the volume, have lost leaves over the centuries.

To reconstruct P where it is now missing, editors must resort to its

descendants, which all derive from copies written in France in the ninth–tenth centuries, when it was still complete.

They have devised the following stemma ([Figure 1.2](#)):




Figure 1.2 Stemma for the Third Decade

R⁴³ (or *Romanus*), the oldest known descendant, was transcribed from P at Saint-Martin de Tours in the first half of the ninth century (Busonero 2004). It is now even more damaged than P and therefore useless for reconstructing the text, but it is important for the history of its transmission, because most of the other descendants have been copied from it before its mutilation.

M⁴⁴ (or *Mediceus*) was copied at Corbie, or at Tours for Corbie (von Büren 1996, 60), at the end of the ninth century, first directly from P and then from R (Reeve 1996c, 88 n. 53; Busonero 2004, 34). It never went further than 30, 26, 10 (Reeve 1987a, 160).

C⁴⁵ (or *Colbertinus*), copied at Cluny at the end of the tenth century (von Büren, 1996, 59–63), is the only known manuscript that derives from P independently from R and transmits all the Decade. It is therefore particularly important for Book 21 and for the end of Book 30.

A lost intermediary (x) then produced three manuscripts, all of which stop before the end of Book 30.

B⁴⁶ (or *Bambergensis*), copied by numerous hands, contains two distinct elements, of different dates and origins (Reeve 1987a, 150): at the beginning,

an incomplete Fourth Decade, written in Bamberg in the eleventh century, and then a Third Decade from 24, 7, 8. This second part has been copied in France from the P tradition, at an earlier date than the first one, at the beginning of the eleventh century, up to 30.42.21 (Reeve 1986, 154). It was later completed from a Spirensian source.

D⁴⁷ (or *Cantabrigiensis*), copied in the twelfth century, between 1164 and 1170, near Paris, contains the Decade up to 30.41.3. Reeve (1987a, 136–137) identified several members of its family, which would permit reconstructing its ancestor (Δ).

The third manuscript, lost (Λ), transmitted the Decade at least up to 30.41.6. It is the ancestor of P's Italian descendants (Reeve 1987a, 138–152). The *Puteaneus* tradition thus reappears in Italy, but only from the twelfth century (Reeve 1987a, 151), and will be prolific between the middle of the twelfth and fifteenth centuries.

Editors traditionally retain:

- N⁴⁸ (or *Laurentianus Notatus*). Copied around Rome at the turn of the twelfth–thirteenth century, it contains Spirensian additions and corrections.
- A⁴⁹ (or *Aginnensis*). This manuscript, which groups together the three Decades in a single volume, originally contained only the third up to 30.41.6. This part, written, similar to N, in the twelfth–thirteenth century, was corrected and completed from a Spirensian source in Books 26–30 in the fourteenth century.

The *Aginnensis* was made famous by Billanovich's research (1951). According to him, Petrarch was the one who, in his youth, had corrected and complemented and also supplemented it with copies of the first and fourth Decades, in order to possess the most complete Livy of his time (Billanovich 1951, 145–151; 161–163; 203–205). Billanovich was thus reducing the number of A correctors to two: in the fifteenth century, Lorenzo Valla, whose hand had been identified by Walters in 1917 (de Franchis 2000, 29, n. 66), and in the fourteenth century, Petrarch. The identification of the main fourteenth-century annotator as Petrarch is disputed today (lastly, Fiorilla 2012, 106–122). It confirms Reeve's doubts (1987b, 430–436) as to the place (Avignon) and strangely precocious familiarity of Petrarch with Livy's text, as assumed by Billanovich.

A new witness of this Italian branch, Q⁵⁰ (mid-twelfth century), containing the First and Third Decades, permits reconstructing with C the testimony of P for a few chapters at the end of Book 30.

Billanovich (1981, 227–229 and 308–309) found that Q was the ancestor of a large family of fourteenth–fifteenth-century manuscripts belonging to the α group brought to light by McDonald (1965) for the Fourth Decade, whose

oldest members also transmit the Third, following the *Puteaneus* tradition (Reeve 1987a, 141). Their particularity is that they go as far as 30.44.6, that is, nearly the end of the decade (30.45.7), with a lacuna between 30.41.6 and 30.42.15. Now, Billanovich found in Q the passage 30.42.15–44.6 put back at the end of Book 30 after 30.41.6, while it appeared in the First Decade within Book 5 (Oakley 1997, 233–237). Q therefore offers a text more complete than the other descendants of A. It is necessary then to determine whether the text of the last chapters of Book 30 in the Italian manuscripts comes from the *Puteaneus* tradition via Q or from the Spirensian one (Reeve 1987a, 141–149; de Franchis 2000, 25–26). Thus, in A, Valla's corrections on the last chapters of Book 30, which have been copied (by Petrarch?) from a Spirensian source, come from the α group (Reeve 1986, 155–163 and 1987b, 428 n. 2).

The so-called Spirensian Tradition (26–30)

The second tradition (Σ), which only intervenes from the Second Pentade, but we do not know exactly where, was brought to light as early as the sixteenth century by the humanist Beatus Rhenanus (1485–1547): he had found in Speyer Cathedral (Germany) a manuscript that contained Books 26–40 (with numerous gaps), and had used it with Gelenius for the edition Froben 2 (1535). Since the manuscript later disappeared, one had to wait for the German philologists' research work in the second half of the nineteenth century to accept the authenticity of this tradition, which was then named “Spirensian,” in memory of Beatus Rhenanus' manuscript (Reeve 1987b, 405; de Franchis 2000, 17–18). Yet, this denomination, now currently used, is improper, for the *Spirensis* turned out to be a mere witness of this tradition, and not its archetype. Moreover, this second tradition is not easily accessible, for it is known only sporadically or indirectly (Reeve 1989b, 107).

The first critical edition of Books 26–30 taking the two branches into account is that of August Luchs (1879). It remains decisive for the choice of the Spirensian witnesses because Luchs had dared defy the ostracism against *recentiores* since Lachmann by retaining several contaminated manuscripts (Timpanaro 1981, 87–88).

The stemma of the Spirensian branch (Figure 1.2) is particularly difficult to draw due to the fragmentary or contaminated nature of witnesses. I have based mine on Luchs' (1879, vii and lviii–lviii), and taken into account Reeve's conclusions (1987b, 416–424) on recent discoveries of fragments.

Editors consider that the oldest witness consists of seven folios of a palimpsest once kept in Turin (=Ta or *Taurinensis*), and destroyed in the fire of the library in 1904. It contained fragments of Books 27 and 29, written in the fifth century. The only survivors are the collations published in 1873 by Studemund, who had established the old age of the Spirensian tradition by showing that the palimpsest provided readings agreeing (in the truth) with the

Spirensis against the *Puteaneus*. Yet, this witness is not the ancestor of the Speyer manuscript, unlike what some editors sometimes give to understand (de Franchis 2000, 20–21).

Because of Reeve's questioning (1986, 152–153 and 1987b, 406) that the Turin fragments and the *Spirensis* belong to the same family, I have isolated it in the stemma. It could be the only late antique witness of a third branch.

According to Beatus Rhenanus, the *Spirensis* (S) “seemed to have been copied discontinuously from fragments of very old manuscripts” (*ex fragmentis vetustissimorum codicum saltuatim descriptum videbatur* [Froben 2, 33]). The two surviving leaves permit to date its writing, probably Italian, from the eleventh century (Munk Olsen 1991–2007; 1997, 57). The first, a fragment of Book 28 (=Folium Monacense⁵¹), was identified in 1869; the second, a fragment of Book 30,⁵² only some 30 years ago (de Franchis 2000, 18 and 30).

One must add the readings of the manuscript transmitted in Froben 2. They are of two kinds, both difficult to interpret: those quoted by Beatus Rhenanus in his notes (=Sp), which stop without any explanation at the third of Book 30, in 30.16.1 (Pfeifer 2000), and those printed by Gelenius (=G), who supervised the edition (Oakley 1997, 169–170). The latter are obtained from the collation of differences between the two Froben editions and confrontation of the results with the readings of other witnesses.

In B, the end of Book 30 (from 30.42.21) has been added, probably in Bamberg in the eleventh century (=B^s), by one hand (or two?) very close to those that copied the Fourth Decade (Reeve 1987a, 149–150).

Luchs had happily spotted in H,⁵³ copied in Florence in the second half of the fifteenth century, that a long passage of Books 29 and 30 (between 29.3.15 and 30.21.12) presented pure Spirensian text, derived from a model close to S (Luchs 1879, XXXIII–XXXVIII; de Franchis 2000, 32). Being the only known manuscript that transmits the Spirensian tradition in a continuous way and on such a long portion of text, without any sign of contamination, H is the most important witness of the branch. In the rest of the manuscript, the text belongs to the P tradition (Reeve 1989b, 110).

In N, Reeve (1987b, 408–409) has established against Billanovich that the Spirensian corrections and additions (=N^s) are almost contemporary with the copy of the manuscript on the P tradition. They are dated at the latest 1225 (Reeve 1989b, 100), and therefore prior to Petrarch (Reeve 1987b, 408–409). N^s fills in the original P lacuna in Book 27, but not that in Book 26, and complements Book 30 from 30.41.6.

O,⁵⁴ discovered in 1985, helped to specify the links between the witnesses (=Y in Reeve 1987b, 416–424). They are fragments of Books 27, 29, and 30 written in Italy in the eleventh century. They have undergone numerous

corrections—difficult to date (Reeve 1989b, 103)—which come from the P family, and have often erased or made illegible the first text portions.

Its lost descendant ϵ derives from O in its least corrected state ($=O^1$). One must reconstruct it with two contaminated manuscripts of the second half of the fifteenth century: V,⁵⁵ copied in Rome, whose interest had been acknowledged by Luchs (1879), and E,⁵⁶ a new witness indicated by Reeve (1989b, 107–108).

In A, the complements and corrections introduced in the fourteenth century by an annotator identified as Petrarch since Billanovich's publication in 1951 ($=A^p?$) are assumed to derive from a later state of O ($=O^2$), more corrected on the tradition of P (Reeve 1987b, 422). $A^p?$ notably fills in the two original P lacunae (Book 26, Reeve 1986, 147–149, Book 27), and the end of Book 30.

The θ family ($=Luchs'$ R) is believed to have come from the same state of O ($=O^2$) as $A^p?$, but is independent from Petrarch, unlike what Billanovich thought. Its ancestor must be reconstructed from five contaminated manuscripts of the fourteenth–fifteenth centuries. The most important witnesses are X⁵⁷ and J.⁵⁸

L⁵⁹ (or *Codex Landulfianus*) is a very fine manuscript written and decorated around 1310 (lastly Ciccuto et al. 2012, with an edition of Landolfo's annotations by Giuliana Crevatin, 59–173, and of Petrarch's by Enrico Fenzi, 203–546). L contains an historical anthology and, notably, the three Decades. It has been produced for Landolfo Colonna, a rich Italian prelate, canon of the Chartres cathedral, and uncle of Giovanni Colonna, Petrarch's patron and friend. Petrarch bought it in 1351.

L clearly derived from the most largely corrected state of O ($=O^3$), which makes it less interesting than V and the θ family (Reeve 1987b, 409–413). The comparison with O confirms the early datation of the historians of art (very beginning of the fourteenth century; Ciccuto et al. 2012, 175–176) against Billanovich, who thought that L had been made in Avignon for Landolfo Colonna, one generation later, from a copy, in Books 26–40, of the *vetus Carnotensis*, the mythical ancestor of the *Spirensis*. Chartres and Livy's illegible manuscript, which Landolfo Colonna had consulted in that place, are therefore a wrong track to reconstruct the Spirensian tradition (Reeve 1989b, 98–99). L is not its most important witness, but an Italian-contaminated manuscript, a further sign of the circulation of the Spirensian tradition in Italy before Petrarch.

If the *Puteaneus* tradition is better known today, the transmission of the Spirensian one remains largely mysterious, mainly because the witnesses are so exiguous. It seems always to have held its ground in Italy, without ever replacing the P tradition though. In passages for which editors can use the two branches, the differences often turn out to be minute: different word order, absence or presence of a prefix, use of synonyms. The Spirensian tradition has

therefore mainly helped to fill in lacunae of the *Puteaneus*, original or acquired, and to limit conjectures in Books 26–30.

Books 31–40

The history of the transmission of Books 31–40 abounds in new developments. This Decade has survived in about 100 manuscripts, mainly Italian *recentiores* minus Book 33 and the end of Book 40. They are the ones on which the *editio princeps* was based. The missing Books have been partly restored by Nicholas Carbachius in the edition he published with Wolfgang Angst (Mainz, 1519), thanks to his discovery in Mainz cathedral of a manuscript lost today, the *Moguntinus* (=Mg), which transmitted the text of the Decade from 33.17.6. Readers could only have access to the whole of Book 33 in the edition of Gaspar Lusignanus (Rome, 1616), which restored the beginning of this book, thanks to a manuscript just found in Bamberg (*Bambergensis* = B⁶⁰).

Following Billanovich's brilliant hypotheses (1951), already mentioned for the third Decade, McDonald (1965) investigated in depth the very numerous *recentiores* and organized them into families. His distribution was questioned by Billanovich's later research (1981), which set off the early circulation, as early as the thirteenth century, of the three Decades in the north-east of Italy without giving up the idea, though, that Petrarch had played a decisive part in the Livian manuscript tradition. The difficulties that appeared then in the reconstruction suggested by Billanovich were at the origin of M. Reeve's research, which led to two fundamental conclusions: first, the impossibility to localize and date the archetype from which the families identified by McDonald come, which amounts to giving up the hypothesis that the *vetus Carnotensis* played any part in the transmission of Books 26–40; and second, the setting off, for the fourth Decade, of the independent authority of one of these families—the α group which I mentioned in connection with the Third Decade.

I shall therefore present the manuscript tradition from Reeve's stemma (1989b, 99), which has been confirmed by later editions (Figure 1.3).




Figure 1.3 Stemma for the Fourth Decade

We know three modes of transmission for the Fourth Decade, but only the one that led to *recentiores* was widely spread.

One tradition is acknowledged by a single, badly mutilated late antique witness: fragments of Book 34 (Chapter 34–39), written in uncials in Italy in the fourth or fifth century, R⁶¹ (*Fragmenta Romana*), and found in Rome in 1906 in the basilica of St. John of Lateran. They had been wrapped around relics of the Holy Land since the eighth century. They offer a text without word separation, highly corrupt and independent of all the other manuscripts.

A second tradition, also known through a single manuscript (lost), the *Moguntinus* (=Mg), allowed Nicholas Carbachius to partly restore the missing parts of the Decade. His edition is our only source for the text of the last third of Book 40 (from 40.37.3). The *Moguntinus* was again collated by Gelenius for the Froben 2 edition where he noted some misreadings of Mg by Carbachius.

It has been assumed since Traube that the manuscript was copied in the ninth century in insular writing, difficult to read for humanists (McDonald 1965, xxxix, n. 1). It is admittedly an independent witness, but Tränkle noted, in his review of McDonald's edition (1965, 373), that Mg agreed in error with B, a member of the third tradition. The branch of Mg and that of B therefore descend from a common archetype (Briscoe 1991, xix).

The third tradition, to which B belongs, is totally dominant, since it groups together all the manuscripts except R and Mg. It descends, as shown by Traube (McDonald 1965, xi, n. 1), from a late antique archetype (*Fragmenta Placentina* or *Bambergensia* = F),⁶² which reappeared in Bamberg at the beginning of the twentieth century, reduced to fragments of Books 33, 34, 35, and 39 found in bindings.⁶³ They are what is left of an uncial manuscript copied in Italy in the fifth century. Emperor Otho had obtained it at Piacenza and bequeathed it to his successor, Henry II, who gave it to the Bamberg cathedral in the eleventh century.

B transmits the decade up to 38.46.4. It was copied from F in Bamberg in the eleventh century and read at that period by a few readers who mention Book 33 (Billanovich 1951, 185, n. 2). When it was rediscovered in 1615, it only helped to restore the beginning of that book. It will really be fully exploited only in the nineteenth century, notably by J. Kreyssig, who includes in his edition of Book 33 (Meissen, 1839) his collations of the rest of the Decade.

F also produced another manuscript—lost—from which the *Spirensis* and χ , the ancestor of Italian manuscripts, descend.

The *Spirensis* is not as important for the Fourth Decade as in Books 26–30, where it represents another tradition than the dominant one of the *Puteaneus*. Indeed, we know, thanks to Gelenius (Froben 2), that it contained the same books as the Italian manuscripts (absence of Book 33 and end in 40.37.3). With Books 31–40 completely lost, it is known only through the readings (Sp) quoted by Gelenius in his notes and, with less certainty, as for Books 26–30, by the collation of differences between the two Froben editions.

Within this third tradition, almost all witnesses, apart from B and Sp, are then those Italian manuscripts, mostly *recentiores* of the fourteenth–fifteenth centuries. Their complicated history was gradually made clearer in the twentieth century.

The lost ancestor of these *recentiores* (=Traube's ϕ) was named χ by McDonald (1965), for he identified it with the *vetus Carnotensis* revealed by Billanovich (1951). According to the Italian scholar, this lost Chartres codex (χ) had presumably been the exemplar of a copy (ϕ)—also lost—which Landolfo Colonna was assumed to have brought to Avignon in the late 1320s. Landolfo had presumably had Books 26–40 transcribed from ϕ for his own volume (named L in the Third Decade, and P in the Fourth). Petrarch had presumably corrected and complemented from ϕ Books 26–30 in his A manuscript and had Books 31–40 transcribed from the same source, to finish gathering the three Decades then available in his manuscript, which originally contained only the third.

The identification of χ with the *vetus Carnotensis* has been abandoned since Reeve (1986–1987). It must be admitted that its date and origin are unknown.

The best witnesses to reconstruct ϕ remain those used by McDonald (1965), namely P, A, and E, a manuscript kept in El Escorial, Real Biblioteca, R. I. 4. They group together the three decades in a single volume, and all date from the fourteenth century.

P, which was copied at the beginning of the fourteenth century and not in 1328–1329, was abundantly annotated and corrected by Landolfo Colonna, and then by Petrarch, who acquired it in 1351.

A is extant only to 38.24.11. It has been first annotated (maybe by Petrarch?), then, in the fifteenth century, by Valla and by a reader contemporary of Valla (Briscoe 1991, xi).

In his classification of the numerous *recentiores*, which was reshaped by Reeve (1986), McDonald had distinguished three groups (α , β , and γ) among the descendants of ϕ . The α group derived, according to McDonald, from ϕ and from Landolfo Colonna's and Petrarch's corrections in P and A.

Besides, McDonald had isolated another family (ψ) older than ϕ , notably because five manuscripts of the fifteenth century agreed in error with B against ϕ (Briscoe 1980, 316–318). The old age of ψ is confirmed by an amazing amount of false word-division in its descendants, a sign that the exemplar was in continuous writing (Briscoe 1991, xii). Its family is composed of manuscripts that were all copied in Florence during 1412–1413, and presented the three Decades in sets of three volumes (de la Mare 1971, 177–179, and 185–186).

McDonald therefore considered that χ had two descendants: ψ , older, even though it is represented by more recent witnesses, and ϕ . The best witnesses of ψ are N⁶⁴ and V⁶⁵ (Briscoe 1991, xi–xiii).

M. Reeve has shown the necessity to reconsider both the position of α in relation to ϕ and that of ϕ in relation to ψ : the α group does not descend from ϕ , but, though highly corrupt, it has its own authority (Reeve 1986, 138–143). As to ϕ , it is not ψ 's twin, unlike what McDonald thought. It descends from a lost manuscript, which led to α and ϕ (Briscoe 2008, 14).

Indeed, the α family contains a text known before Landolfo Colonna and Petrarch, which Lovato Lovati (1241–1309) would read in the region of Padua in the second half of the thirteenth century (Billanovich 1981, 6–10). This Paduan notary had access to the three surviving Decades.⁶⁶ Actually, it had already been known since 1914 that the Fourth was read in Italy in 1320 (Reeve 1986, 138).

The place of α in the stemma has been disputed: some consider it to be independent of the source of ϕ and of ψ (Walsh 1999, XII–XIV and XIX; Mineo 2003, XLI–XLIII and XLV), but this objection was turned down by Briscoe (2008, 14, n. 38), who supports Reeve's position (1989b, 99), as reproduced in the stemma shown in [Figure 1.3](#).

The best witnesses of α are Holkham Hall 344, Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek Rep. 1. Paris, Bnf, lat. 5740, El Escorial, Real Biblioteca g. I. 8, and Leiden, Vossianus Latinus F. 66 (Reeve 1986, 140–142). They date from the fourteenth century, but for Holkham Hall 344, perhaps from late thirteenth century (Reeve, 1986, 140, n. 2).

The independent authority of α is important for the last books of the Decade, when B disappeared, namely after 38.46.4, for the agreement of ψ α against ϕ allows us to know the text transmitted before corruption (Briscoe 2008, 14).

All the other manuscripts are only useful for their conjectures, namely McDonald's groups β and γ that descend from ϕ (Briscoe 2008, 14, n. 40).

The investigation of *recentiores* has therefore been particularly fruitful for the Fourth Decade, since it revealed the part that the manuscripts of the fourteenth–fifteenth century had to play to reconstruct Livy's text.

Books 41–45

The Fifth Decade is only partially known to us (Books 41–45) and, apart from a few lines (41.18.16) in Priscian, through a single manuscript, V,⁶⁷ written in uncials in Italy at the beginning of the fifth century (Lowe 1934–1971, 10, n. 1472; 1971, 65). The presence of the *incipit* of Book 46 just after the *explicit* of Book 45 shows that V originally contained the whole of the Decade. A note of possession from the eighth century, which appears in the same place, reveals that Books 46–50 were already lost at that date.

The manuscript had by then crossed the Alps and was in Holland. It belonged to a Theutbert, who claimed to be bishop of Dorostat, a village near Utrecht (Briscoe 2012, 3). This owner had noticed the muddle and lacunae in his copy and attempted to remedy the situation by numbering the quires. The manuscript then passed into Germany, in the Lorsch abbey, where it was only found in 1527, still more damaged, by Simon Grynaeus, who gave out the *princeps* edition in 1531 (=Froben 1; Marrone 2009). V finally reached Vienna in 1665, with its second quire missing this time, which contained the first nine chapters of Book 41 (according to today's numeration). The text of these chapters therefore depends only on Froben 1. Actually, the Froben 1 edition served as the basis of studies on this part of Livy's *History* for nearly four centuries. Not until the end of the nineteenth century was it deemed useful to re-examine the manuscript whose text is often very difficult to interpret.

Thus, if the history of the transmission of this Decade is much simpler than that of the preceding ones, it is far more difficult to edit its text: on top of the muddle and losses that affected V over the centuries, it contains or transmits numerous errors and corruptions, particularly difficult to elucidate. Some of them are even thought to have been inherited from the transcription of a

model in early cursive script, known to have been used until the third century for literary texts (Zelzer 1972; Paschoud 2012, 362).

My thanks go to Clara Auvray-Assayas, Pierre Petitmengin, Stephen Oakley, and Michael Reeve for their most useful comments on the first part of this chapter and on drawing the Third Decade stemma. I am also greatly indebted to Josette Florent for having translated this chapter.

Notes

- 1 It only compares with the contemporary Greek historian Nicolaus of Damascus' 144 books (Parmentier-Prometea Barone 2011, xxiv).
- 2 On Livy's first readers, see de Franchis (2012 and forthcoming).
- 3 The individual practice of *excerpta* is attested by Pliny the Younger, 6.20.5. On *Periochae*, see Chapter 33.
- 4 One of the first to mention 142 books is Petrarch (1304–1374), *Rerum memorandarum libri*, I, 18, 1 (written in 1343–1345), and *Familiars* 24, 8, 2 (written in 1351). He seems to have deduced it from the *Periochae* (Reeve 1991, 462–463). The oldest manuscripts transmit the summaries up to Book 142, except those of Books 136–137. Their *explicit* indicates: *titi liui periochae omnium librorum ab urbe condita*.
- 5 Or perhaps his predecessor, Pope Felix III (483–492). See Paul Jal (ed.), *Fragments*, Paris, 1991², 211 and 245.
- 6 These Italian manuscripts transmit neither Book 33 nor the end of Book 40. Holkham Hall 344 is perhaps our oldest witness of a practice of which Petrarch is only a famous example, not its initiator (Reeve 1987a, 146).
- 7 Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana (=BAV), Palatinus Latinus 24* (*refers to manuscripts available online). Livy's text (a passage from the war against Sertorius) is dated in the fourth century (Fohlen in Pellegrin et al. 1982, 20; Ogilvie 1984).
- 8 Funari (2011, 239–258). Pseudo-discoveries of lost parts of Livy have regularly been in the news till the middle of the twentieth century (Ullman 1973/1955; Freller 2005).
- 9 To be absolutely consulted.
- 10 This method, which is based on the genealogical classification of manuscripts from shared errors, permits building families by eliminating the manuscripts whose ancestor survives (*eliminatio codicum descriptorum*). See Reeve (1989a).

- 11 A few complements to Reeve's list in Oakley (2005, 494). On his method, which combines whole and partial collations, according to witnesses, see Oakley (1997, 153 n. 3, 2005, 494).
- 12 V transmits fragments of Books 3–6, which proves that it originally contained the whole Decade.
- 13 Oxford, Bodl. Lat. class. f 5 = P. Oxy. XI 1379.
- 14 Verona, Biblioteca Capitolare XL (38).
- 15 Symmachus, Letters, 9.13: *Munus totius Liuiani operis quod spopondi etiam nunc diligentia emendationis moratur* ("The present I promised you—the whole of Livy's work—is delayed again today, its revision requiring particular care"). The manuscripts only transmit the indication of this revision for the first Decade through the signature, at the end of Books 1–9, of a certain Victorianus, who made it for the Symmachi (*emendabam domnis Symmachis*).
- 16 The manuscripts transmit, along with Victorianus' signature, that of Nicomachus Dexter in Books 3–5, and that of Nicomachus Flavianus in Books 6–8.
- 17 The Greek sigla (which by convention refer to lost manuscripts) are borrowed from previous editors (Oakley 1997, 162), but converted into capitals, except for the μ family, obviously to avoid any confusion with the sign of an extant manuscript (M). They are in square brackets, only in the First Decade, for the same reason.
- 18 Giovanni Andrea Bussi, Rome, Sweynheym and Pannartz, 1469 or 1470 (ISTC number il00236000). It contained Decades 1, 3, and 4, but for Book 33 and the end of Book 40.
- 19 Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana (=BML), Plut. 63, 19*.
- 20 London, British Library (=BL), Harley 2493*.
- 21 London, BL, Harley 2672. It stops a few words before the end of the book, in 8, 40, 5 *scriptor*.
- 22 I leave fragments of Books 5 and 6 aside, Marburg, Hessisches Staatsarchiv, Waldecker Handschriftenreste 147 (=W), not significant enough (Oakley 1997, 265).
- 23 København, Det kongelige Bibliotek, Fragm. 2813–2814* (olim Kapsel 19/IX).
- 24 From its owner's name, the humanist jurisconsult Jacques-Auguste de Thou (1553–1617). Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France (=Bnf), lat.

- 25 His hand was identified in 1929–1930 (Oakley 1997, 157, n. 14).
- 26 Paris, Bnf, lat. 5725*.
- 27 Leiden, Bibliotheek der Rijksuniversiteit, Vossianus Latinus F. 21.
- 28 Valencia, Archivo Catedral 173.
- 29 Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 3329.
- 30 Leiden, Bibliotheek der Rijksuniversiteit, B.P.L. 6A.
- 31 Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, San Marco 326.
- 32 Oakley (1997, 219–263) classified into families its very numerous descendants.
- 33 London, BL, Harley 2493*. Through D's oldest Italian descendant, Q (Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale, Vindobonensis Lat. 33–1), copied in mid-twelfth century (Oakley 1997, 219–220). On the importance of Q in the circulation of the Third Decade in Italy, see p. 11.
- 34 U (Uppsala, Universitetsbiblioteket, C.908) can be eliminated (Oakley 2005, 499–500).
- 35 Paris, Bnf, lat. 5725*.
- 36 Paris, Bnf, lat. 5724*.
- 37 Bamberg, Staatliche Bibliothek, Class. 34*. One must also exclude another descendant of P, S (or *Sorbonicus* = Paris, Bnf, lat. 16023) retained by Bayet 1940, LXXXV–VI (Reeve 1996c, 79).
- 38 Einsiedeln, Stiftsbibliothek, 348.
- 39 Oxford, Bodleian Library, Auct. T.1.24.
- 40 Kenney 1974, 18–19. On the genealogy of Livian incunables, see Oakley (1997, 284–285).
- 41 Paris, Bnf, lat. 5730*.
- 42 = *Antidotum in Facium*, IV (ed. Regoliosi 1981).
- 43 Città del Vaticano, BAV, Reginensis Latinus 762.
- 44 Firenze, BML, Plut. 63.20*.
- 45 Paris, Bnf, lat. 5731.

- 46 Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek Msc. Class. 35*.
- 47 Cambridge, Trinity College 637.
- 48 Firenze, BML, Plut., 63.21*.
- 49 London, BL, Harley 2493*.
- 50 Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale, Vindobonensis Lat. 33.
- 51 München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 29224(2)*.
- 52 Stuttgart, Württembergische Landesbibliothek, Cod. Donaueschingen A. II. 16.
- 53 London, BL, Harley 2684.
- 54 Nancy, Archives départementales de Meurthe et Moselle, I F 342 n. 3.
- 55 Città del Vaticano, BAV, Pal. Lat. 876*.
- 56 Modena, Biblioteca Estense, Lat. 385.
- 57 Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Lat. Z 364.
- 58 London, BL, Burney 198.
- 59 Paris, Bnf, lat. 5690 (=P in the Fourth Decade).
- 60 Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek Msc. Class. 35*. It also contains part of the Third Decade.
- 61 Città del Vaticano, BAV, Vat. Lat. 10696. Lowe 1934–1971, 1, n. 57 and 1971, 44.
- 62 Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek Msc. Class. 35a*.
- 63 Lowe (1934–1971, 8, n. 1028 and 1971, 60). New fragments of Book 34 have been published in 2000 (Briscoe 2008, 14, n. 39).
- 64 Oxford, New College 279.
- 65 Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Lat. 3331.
- 66 Several manuscripts of this group change their allegiance from one Decade to another (Oakley 1997, 222, n. 229).
- 67 Wien, Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek, Lat. 15*.

Cross-References

See CHAPTER 31: THE PERIOCHAE; CHAPTER 32: LIVY'S

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Further Reading

Reeve (2011) collects several fundamental articles on the principles and aims of the stemmatic method. The easiest access to the transmission of the First Decade is Reeve (1996c), and for the Third and Fourth Decades, Reeve (1989b). For the Fourth, Briscoe's synthesis (1993, updated in Briscoe 2008,

13–16) can also be used, and, for Books 41–45, his latest (2012, 3–4). Billanovich's fascinating presentation 1951 (aptly reviewed by Fraenkel 1952) succeeded in arousing Livy's editors' interest in *recentiores*. It remains as stimulating as ever and is still essential for understanding subsequent research, even though his results have been questioned. Reeve (1986, 132, n. 1) helpfully selects, among Billanovich's many publications until 1985, those that regard Livy's transmission. Lastly, Oakley (1997, 152–327 and 2005, 494–501) offers the most complete presentation of the transmission of the First Decade. He can also be profitably consulted for the other Decades and for the history of the reception of Livy's text.

Chapter 2

Historical Context of the *Ab Urbe Condita**

Barbara Levick

* I am greatly indebted to Dr. Geraldine Herbert-Brown for reading, commenting on, and refining this chapter.

Introduction: Lives and Writings

R. Syme observed in his magisterial paper of 1959 (reprinted 1979, 400) that Livy's quiet existence provided little biographical material and "no temptation for research or invention." The political outlook of an historian is another matter, and a didactic purpose makes it legitimate for his readers to infer political views from his relation of past events. Of course, as Syme observed (1979, 422), Livy did not want to "disfigure the annals of early Rome ... by the obtrusion of modern names and modern incidents," and he illustrates Livy's subtlety with a reference to the speech that he puts into the mouth of Canuleius (4.3ff.), who, urging the claims of *noui homines*, argues that new forms of authority, *noua imperia*, must be expected to emerge. Nor does it follow that Livy, extolling Camillus, had his eye on contemporary conservatives. Earlier writers had treated this precursor of the Scipios and Sulla. As to the sensibilities of other contemporaries, such as Livia Drusilla, Livy has no qualms about slating the behavior of her ancestor the censor Salinator (29. 37).

There are difficulties here too, due to the varying distances of authors from their events. The Catilinarian conspiracy and the Flavian dynasty, the subjects of Sallust's monograph and Tacitus' *Histories*, were roughly contemporaneous with Sallust and Tacitus' adult lives. With Livy, only the last decades of his history would have been revealing in the same way. What might be revealed by surviving earlier books and epitomes is more shadowy. Livy's time of writing extended over decades, necessarily so. Nor did the political upheavals that Sallust and Tacitus lived through compare with the definitive revolution—the "Happy Ending"—that Augustus claimed to have achieved, even while he denied that it was a revolution at all.

Earliest Memories and Livy's Date of Birth

Political events, even if not personally experienced but only discussed in the home, can make an impression at an early age, perhaps even at 5–6 years. For a future historian, they might be particularly significant, and it is worth asking

what young Titus' memories might be. It is unfortunate, then, that we cannot be certain of the year of his birth, nor that of his death (Eus.-Jer. *Chron.* pp. 164, 171 Helm, with Syme [1979, 414] arguing for 64 BC–12 AD). His arguments were ingenious but fragile, resting on linked mistakes of the chroniclers, such as Badian (1993, 10ff.) I shall accept the conventional 59 BC–17 AD, but a range of 59–54 BC for the dawn of political consciousness still places it in years that saw the emergence of the “First Triumvirate” and of senatorial resistance to the usurpation of collective authority by dominant individuals. The year 54 BC saw more of the same as Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus took up, for 5 years, the provinces that were to become the core of the Princes' *imperium* (Gaul, Spain, and Syria); by 52 BC, authority had broken down in Rome, Pompey accepted a sole consulship, and the surviving dynasts were moving toward confrontation. The essential issue remained the same throughout and would have been the talk of Italy and the provinces: the commonwealth (*res publica*), or, as some would have put it, an oligarchy that styled themselves as champions of excellence (*optimates*), or simply “sound men” (*boni*), was challenged by overambitious individuals relying on popular support (*populares*) and on their armies. The issue survived, for all Augustus' shifts of position, throughout Livy's lifetime; the prospect of violent confrontations as an outcome of Augustus' death was reviving in the last two decades of his principate. Whatever the historian's relations with the ruler, it must have lived in his mind throughout (cf. already the aspirational 9.19.7).

Political catastrophe for Romans came from moral failure, as Sallust made clear, by which he meant greed and extravagance (*avaritia, luxuria*), sexual decadence being only a part of it. Nowhere would this perspective be adopted more readily than at Livy's Patavium, which was noted, as the younger Pliny tells us (*Ep.* 1.14.6, cf. Martial 11.16), for its stern morality. It is manifest in Livy's introduction to his history (10), where he expresses doubt as to whether the decline could be reversed. Perhaps before embarking on that history he devoted himself to another serious genre: the philosophical dialogue (Sen. *Ep.* 100. 9).

Livy's Time of Writing

Organization into pentads and decades emerges from Books 1–9 and the second preface in 6, and from the distribution of the Second Punic War over the third decade. However, for the history of the late Republic and the civil wars, Syme (1979) devised a flexible scheme: three large groups (“Ten Years' War,” post-Sullan order, and civil wars, made up of seven units of approximately equal length), with an Augustan appendix of nine books. That does not tell us how the work proceeded. The *Praefatio* may well have been composed after the first pentad. Those books, perhaps including a second edition of 1, belong to the 3–4 years leading up to 27 (Badian 1993, 18), though some passages may be later insertions. A flexible scheme: three large

groups ("Ten Years' War," post-Sullan order, and civil wars with an Augustan appendix of nine books). That does not tell us how the work proceeded.

Many suppose that Livy maintained a stable rate of production throughout (say three and a quarter books a year), and Scheidel (2009), adhering to this scheme, argues that the censuses mentioned in Book 3 (3.9) and *Periocha* 49 were topics of interest at about the times the Augustan censuses took place in 28 and 8 BC. Clearly, 3 was composed within shouting distance of 28 BC, and, on the three and a quarter books *per annum* hypothesis that Scheidel accepts, 49 falls within the years 9–6 BC, while 28 (12.12), the conquest of Spain, could belong to 19–18 BC. Flexibility is required, given the variety of source material and the delicacy required toward the end in selecting and treating it; and that is without allowing for illness and fatigue or for a gap if a revised closing date was chosen. Syme (1979, 415) assigned only two or three weeks for 31. He himself (1979, 413; 415ff.) maintained that Livy quietly laid aside his pen for several years before death supervened, and thought that Livy, beginning in about 29 BC, had reached 133 and the end of the civil wars by AD 1. The pause ended when the adoption of Tiberius in AD 4 encouraged him to resume, with the nine-book epilogue on the Augustan principate down to 9 BC.

A superscription to the *Periocha* of Book 121 claims that it was published ("editus," not written) after the death of Augustus, suggesting that 122–142 may also have emerged after AD 14. One is reminded of the specious claim of the elder Pliny, who said in his preface (20) that he had declined to publish his completed *Histories* in case he should seem to be currying favor. If Syme were right about the date of Livy's death, it was not the author himself who published the books; as it is, Livy himself will have labeled them so (Badian 1993, 23–28), holding them back for reasons different from Pliny's; 120 itself ended with a proscription.

Clearly, attempts to go beyond the general in embedding Livy in the history of his own time would be hazardous, but as we shall see we are well informed about the context of most of it. We have to ask if Livy paused (and why, in Syme's hypothesis, the adoption of Tiberius encouraged him to resume), why he held back 121, and why he eventually stopped at 9 BC.

The evidence for Syme's pause is another remark from Pliny's preface (16): Livy said that he had earned sufficient glory (*gloria*) and could have taken his leisure (*desidere*), had not a restless spirit been greedy for work. That suggests a remark written at a natural break, even at the point of the original conclusion, but not necessarily after a pause, rather the reverse: he did not take his leisure. Here, as Herbert-Brown points out, Livy uses politically charged language, subtly distinguishing himself from the failed politician Sallust. Badian's interpretation (1993, 38 n. 59) is also attractive: it may belong to the beginning of 121.

The Events of Livy's Writing Years

The period from Octavian's final victory over Antony and Cleopatra in 30 until his "First Settlement," completed in the January of 27 BC, was one of uncertainty and apprehension. What form of government would the victor impose? Dictatorship had been abolished on Caesar's death, but Octavian never laid down his powers as a triumvir, and was, in his own words, "in supreme charge" ("potens rerum omnium," *RG.* 34.1). This was a problem for Octavian as well as the ruling class: a new Caesar or Romulus (one of the names he is allegedly called in the post-Actian period) might meet his fate at the hands of senators—as Livy reports of Romulus (1.16). On the contrary, in a brilliant stroke, completed in the January of 27 BC, he resolved the conflict by putting the *res publica* at the disposition ("arbitrium") of the Senate and People. He had turned the clock back to the pre-Sullan era of senatorial supremacy in the second century and to the decade that followed the Sullan restoration. However, this magnificent gesture was patently ambiguous. What was the public *arbitrium*? Senatorial timidity left the way open for development of the modest powers that remained to him: the annual consulship, and a 10-year grant of the original triumviral provinces in Syria, Spain, and Gaul, with the new acquisition of Egypt naturally added. Accepting the *cognomen* Augustus and dropping "Julius" made him a new man, and one to venerate. His success, power, and magnanimity allowed him, through his influence (*auctoritas*) to initiate action far beyond the normal limits of any office.

This settlement was greeted with relief and joy, both by those who believed in it and by skeptics who realized that there would at least have to be the appearance of working Republican institutions and, perhaps more importantly, that the Princeps, as he was called, a, but ultimately *the*, leading man in the State, would have to live up to his claims, essentially that of allowing *arbitrium* to the Senate and a docile People. Poets knew what they could do by lauding him. Debates over the "sincerity" or "flattery" of literary figures were misplaced and have given way to more sophisticated analyses. One approach is to suggest that literary men were presenting him with a model. Livy's impulse to epic history, however it originated as a literary enterprise, grew out of the end of the triumviral period, civil war, and Octavian's transmutation into Augustus. The first books of the *History* belong to this period of tentative hope; 6–15 BC in Syme's view is a decade with unitary subject: resurgent Rome conquers Italy.

Disillusion and discontent, already manifested in M. Lepidus' abortive conspiracy of 30 BC, soon grew even where it had been absent before, especially among senators who found the Princeps encroaching on their functions and, in particular, commanding the whole direction of the state, making war and peace on his own initiative, imposing, trying, and deposing dependent monarchs. First came M. Crassus' bid for the *spolia opima* in 27 BC

(see the following text) and the disgrace and suicide of Cornelius Gallus, the first equestrian governor of Egypt, that prize for which senators had already competed under the Sullan regime. Besides, Augustus' increasing favor to his nephew M. Claudius Marcellus in the years 25–23 BC (a military tribunate in Spain at his side, marriage to his daughter Julia, premature access to office as aedile in 23 BC) led to suspicions that the new regime, as now developed by its author, was intended to survive him. That led to a crisis. In late 24 BC, a governor of Macedonia was prosecuted for making war without orders—except, as he claimed, from Augustus, perhaps transmitted through Marcellus; then came a conspiracy against Augustus led by a former loyal supporter, a Murena, who had acted as defense counsel for the ex-governor, and by a known malcontent, a man with “Republican” antecedents, Fannius Caepio. These men tried to flee abroad and were killed before they could stand trial at Rome, but nonetheless had verdicts of guilty pronounced against them. In both cases, the mixed senatorial and equestrian jury's majority verdict was narrow.

In mid-23 BC, then, Augustus took off his velvet glove: he resigned his consulship and assumed the menacing power of a tribune of the *plebs*, the office held by the dissident *populares* at odds with the dominant senatorial clique: the Gracchi (133; 123–2; 58 attributes *furor* to Tiberius, 59ff. *seditiones* and *perniciosae leges* to Gaius), Saturninus (103; 100; *Per.* 69 denounces him), Sulpicius (88; *Per.* 77 offers more ruinous laws), and Clodius Pulcher (58). He also secured an *imperium* (power of command) that gave him control over the army throughout the Empire even when he was in Rome. The settlement of 28–27 BC was in ruins, and Augustus was exposed once again as the ruthless adventurer that C. Octavius had always been. It was precisely this exposure that enabled him, through followers in the Senate, to take new powers even when he was so discredited. The remainder of the House was cowed, and senatorial resistance collapsed.

In 19 BC came the final “settlement” (significantly along with the last triumph by a non-relative), which gave Augustus back the consular power he had had to drop and which enabled him both to purge the Senate of undesirables and to establish, for the first time, a firm line of succession through his ally M. Agrippa (now married to the widowed Julia and made colleague in the tribunician power) and Agrippa's sons Gaius and Lucius, whom Augustus adopted in 17 BC. Annual office was transformed into perpetual power; the accusation of *regnum* leveled against Appius Claudius in 310 BC for refusing to lay down his censorship (9.34.16) comes to mind. From 19 BC onward, there could be no systematic resistance, only abstentions from politics (noticeable in the following decade), and wry ironies from individual senators. Having celebrated the Secular Games in 17 BC to mark the beginning of a new epoch, Augustus found it necessary to go to Gaul the following year. When he returned, pacific relations were established with the Senate's construction from

12 BC onward of the Altar of the Augustan Peace, dedicated in 9 BC.

For Augustus' difficulties at home were countered, and only occasionally aggravated, as by the losses of M. Lollius and P. Quintilius Varus, by Roman activities in the field. Augustus himself had already escaped to the Cantabrian Wars in Spain from 27 to 24 BC. When Livy came to write this part of his history, he could rely on the Princeps' own *Autobiography*, which concluded here. It required more finesse to deal with the fact that it was Agrippa who completed the work 5 years later. Activities in Gaul occupied Augustus while his stepsons Tiberius and Nero Drusus carried out the conquest of the Alps. Then Drusus took on the tribes beyond the Rhine, operations that were to provide a nascent province in their territory, and Tiberius operated in the Balkans. Augustus, with his family, was to justify his massive powers with these new acquisitions of territory and revenue; even the Parthians had been forced to return the standards they had captured from the triumvir Crassus and from Mark Antony, and could be left for later attention. The military successes celebrated in dispatches to the Senate and made so much of in Augustus' *Res Gestae*, and by Suetonius in his friendly biography, would have provided Livy with quantities of the rich material of the kind savored by Roman historians. They would have eclipsed any tactful accounts of domestic difficulties.

It was just now, though, that fresh problems shook the imperial family and necessarily the entire political class who were attached to one member or another by friendship or marriage. In 9 BC, the triumphant consul Nero Drusus was fatally injured in a riding accident in Germany. The death of Agrippa 3 years earlier had deprived Augustus of a colleague, and brought Drusus and his elder brother Tiberius responsibility and honor. In particular, it brought Tiberius the hand of Julia, widowed once again. On Drusus' death, Augustus, now in his mid-50s, realized that only his life stood between Rome and renewed civil chaos. He promoted Tiberius, in the words of Velleius Paterculus (2.99.1), to near equality with himself: another consulship (7 BC) followed by tribunician power was the crucial sign, but he also received *imperium* over the eastern provinces.

This advancement provoked demonstrations by the supporters of the Princeps' adopted sons Gaius and Lucius; Tiberius, indignant that intentions toward his stepsons were doubted, withdrew to the island of Rhodes. However, Gaius, who took over Tiberius' eastern command, and Lucius too, died on foreign service, and in AD 4 Tiberius was adopted by Augustus and again given tribunician power and *imperium*, which by Augustus' death was fully equal to that of the Princeps. Nothing remained for him to take but the name of Augustus, the supreme pontificate, and the title "Pater Patriae"; the name he used rarely, the title he refused. Augustus had accepted it from all the social orders in 2 BC. That year, intended for unanimous celebration of his supremacy, is remembered rather for the disgrace of his daughter Julia

(Tiberius had to divorce her) in a new episode of the succession struggle. The year AD 4 did not bring an end to the feuding between the children of Augustus' first wife Scribonia and his second, Livia: Augustus' granddaughter, another Julia, fell in AD 8, along with the poet Ovid; her brother Agrippa Postumus, who had been adopted alongside Tiberius in an attempt at compromise, was already in exile; he was put to death immediately after Augustus died.

These political traumas were accompanied by failures abroad, though not at first, for the work of Nero Drusus and the exiled Tiberius was carried on by imperial legates whose glory was naturally muted. After AD 4, Tiberius had continued his brother's campaigns in Germany, and a viable province was in view, if not already in being (archaeology confirming intimations in Velleius Paterculus and Tacitus). However, he had to give up a large offensive projected in AD 6 because of the massive rising in the Balkans known as the Pannonian Revolt, which took 3 years to quell, and in AD 9 P. Quintilius Varus, in command in Germany, was lured into a trap by the Cheruscan leader Arminius and was lost along with his three legions. In the same period, the last 15 years of Augustus' rule, there were signs that economic advance in the provinces was slowing after the first flush of peace and the confidence it brought. Overspending and ruthless taxation involved the provincials in debt and brought complaints and even rebellions elsewhere than in Germany. Military expenditure would hardly be outweighed by revenues from acquisitions east of the Rhine and on the Danube.

The Ends of Livy's History

What was Livy's original terminal date? Surely one that made sense of his *Praefatio*—or one that the preface made sense of—that is, something upbeat for Rome. Earlier successes had been used and the destruction of Carthage had been associated with the origin of precisely the moral sickness that troubled Livy. In his *Praefatio*, he announces his intention of going on until recent and troubled times. The most satisfactory closure was the Battle of Actium and the end of the civil wars.

At some point, Livy decided, or was induced, to bring the finale down. There was a good precedent: Polybius, who originally intended to end his work with the defeat of Antiochus, but later took it on to the downfall of Carthage. For a voluntary continuation, Syme cites the quotation in Pliny's *Praefatio*, but it is surprising that Livy should have been willing to write up the Augustan principate at all, given the way it developed. Victories won and provinces acquired; there were plenty to fill glorious pages—the more or less peaceful acquisition of King Amyntas' realms in Asia Minor; the Parthian surrender in 20 BC of standards taken from Crassus and Antony, with the settlement of Armenia under a Roman nominee; the final conquest of Spain; the advance in

the Balkans in the following decade, along with the pacification of the Gauls; the massive invasions of Germany that began in 12 BC and lasted until AD 9—indeed, all the events craftily expounded in Augustus' *Res Gestae* might be included, even the failed Ethiopian and Arabian ventures, which at least explored the bounds of the Empire. Successful foreign wars divert attention from embarrassments at home. At the same time, some domestic events that Augustus felt free to pass over in his *Res Gestae* could not be so treated by a serious historian.

The submissive attitude that Livy apparently adopted when he had to emend a passage in Book IV (see the following text) may be postulated once again when we consider whether Syme was right in supposing that Livy had completed Book 133 by AD 1. If Livy was persuaded then to carry on from, say, 30 BC, what would have been the new terminal date? Augustus would have wanted a substantial portion of his Principate to be included—to have his own achievements as part of an epic history of Rome written by one of the *decora ingenia* who in the early years, according to Tacitus (*Ann.* 1.1.2), were fit to celebrate it without undue flattery.

Livy could not “decide” to continue until the end of Augustus' principate, when there was no guarantee who would survive the other, and a man born even in 59 BC might well have lacked the resolution to go on so far. Better, any decision of AD 1 set the ending of the work at some propitious moment. Closely focused on the achievements of the Princes in bringing about a happy state of affairs at home and abroad was the grant by the Senate, *equites*, and People, mooted beforehand in spontaneous demonstrations, of the title “Pater Patriae” (2 BC), which forms the climax of the *Res Gestae* and balances an opening that shows the young leader acting unsanctioned and using his own funds. The preliminary proposals and the February ceremony would have been enough; unhappy events of the rest of the year, notably the disgrace of Julia, would fall beyond the close of the work. Earlier embarrassments, the withdrawal of Tiberius to Rhodes, could quickly be passed over with an “official” reason—education and repose for the tireless general, even his selfless wish not to overshadow Gaius and Lucius' advancement (for such considerations, see Tac. *Ann.* 2.26.4).

In the event Livy chose an earlier date, one that actually avoided the disorderly elections of 6 BC, in which Gaius Caesar was an irregular candidate but still won the title *Princeps Iuventutis* (“leader of the youth”) the following year. That title, according to Ovid (*Ars Amatoria* 1. 194), entailed that he would one day be *Princeps Senum* (“leader of the seniors”—including the Senate).

Unless 9 BC was forced on Livy by illness or death (Badian 1993), his choices—the consulship, victories, and death of Nero Drusus—would have been his own, whether he pressed it on Augustus (he might have had an ally in Livia, the dead hero's mother), or simply drew to a close without fuss. That death

meant the opening of a series of events that were catastrophic and humiliating for the *Principes*, and eventually, by AD 9, for the entire Roman People. Even the victories came to an end. Livy could not tell that later story, to Augustus' face or after his death. We cannot determine what fear or mere delicacy contributed to his decision. The whole narrative might reflect badly, not only on the *Principes* himself, who in a later (but not disinterested!) view was tolerant and ready to listen to Livy's praise of Brutus and Cassius (Tac. *Ann.* 4.26), but on one side or another, if not both, which were engaged in a deadly struggle for the succession. Drusus' tragic death screened off political squalor and imperial failure. The Principate of Augustus was coming to an end on a melancholy note, presenting any well-disposed historian with an intolerable problem in bringing his work to a close.

It is hard then to accept Syme's hypothesis that Livy paused after AD 1 and resumed work in AD 4, when the terminal date of 9 BC became "felicitous." That is, the resumption came when Tiberius had achieved his final position of Augustus' declared heir, suggesting that Livy was a partisan—for which there is no evidence—and that the last books, on the events of 12–9 BC, concentrated on the German wars waged and won by Tiberius and the brother to whom he was devoted. Those who had been defeated in the factional struggles of the last decade BC were not silent after AD 4. The more Tiberius was glorified (however much against his will), the greater his opponents' resentment. They had not all been disgraced with the elder Julia and her coterie in 2 BC. Her daughter Julia remained, and her son Agrippa Postumus had also been adopted, without the honors that were accorded Tiberius and soon after his adopted son, Drusus' boy Germanicus Caesar; the younger Julia and her friends were not finally dispersed until AD 8, remaining vocal and formidable.

The *Spolia Opima* and the Corselet of Cornelius Cossus

Syme presented a smooth, even rapid composition of the history ending in AD 1; the later books were more problematical, notably those of the "epilogue." Progress may not have been quite as smooth at any time if contemporary issues were broached. The story of the *spolia opima* (4.20.5, cf. 32.4) is too much discussed to demand detailed treatment. We need only to interpret it as evidence for the relations between Livy and Augustus. After 30 BC, Augustus was still afraid of rivals. M. Licinius Crassus, grandson of the triumvir and consul in 30 BC, had, as governor of Macedonia in 29–28 BC, defeated the Bessi—as had Augustus' own father Octavius 30 years before. He was saluted *imperator*, but in 27 BC claimed not just a triumph but an honor awarded only to those who had killed an enemy leader with their own hand, that of dedicating to Jupiter Feretrius the *spolia opima* ("most opulent spoils"; the "most exalted military honor," says Flower 2000, 34). Octavian had never

achieved anything approaching that. Displays of military valor (*virtus*), and rewards for it were dangerous; the Princes meant to monopolize that prowess. The claim, perhaps withdrawn, as Rich (1996) argued, came to nothing, and coincidentally nothing further is heard of Crassus' career, though the constitutional problems that Augustus met in 24 BC and the following years began with another war in Thrace, in which people whom Crassus may have taken under his protection were attacked.

Then we read that the *spolia opima* allowed to A. Cornelius Cossus in the later fifth century, the first occasion since Romulus had won them, had been awarded when he was consul (*cos.*), as “Caesar” had discovered when he went into the temple and read the report of the award, which was inscribed on a linen corselet. Despite the acutely argued skepticism of Rich (1996), it is hard not to associate this story with the refusal of the *spolia* to Crassus. Cossus the consul was acting under his own auspices, and could not be a precedent for a grant of the same distinction for Crassus, who, as a proconsul, might be seen as subject to the auspices of the consul, *viz.*, Augustus. That disallowed his claim. Why should Augustus have noticed the corselet or remembered noticing it if the question was simply an antiquarian one?

Livy opens his account by stating unequivocally that Cossus was a military tribune, whose role in the victory procession cut out that of the triumphing dictator Cincinnatus. It is only at the end of his narrative, in a kind of footnote, that he admits that he has followed previous writers in giving Cossus the lower rank. However, he was aware of the rule about the auspices, and he had heard that Augustus himself had said that he had read the inscription when he entered the temple, which he rebuilt. The visit was thought by Ogilvie (*ad loc.*) to have taken place in 32 BC, when Augustus was advised by Cornelius Nepos to undertake the restoration of Rome's temples. We are not told how Livy “heard” this; it was not directly from Augustus. Badian (1993, 16) suggested that it may have been said in the Senate or a *contio*; indeed, such a mention may have been the occasion for Crassus to withdraw his claim. On the strength of this eyewitness testimony, the hapless scholar was then obliged to ask how the *Annales* and the *libri lintei* cited by Licinius Macer put Cossus' consulship 7 years later—a year without records of any war; it was in the third year after the consulship (says Livy) that Cossus, military tribune with consular powers and master of the horse, fought another distinguished cavalry action. Livy concludes that there is room for conjecture, though it is hardly necessary when the hero himself, in the visible presence of Romulus and Jupiter, witnesses whom no forger would take lightly, inscribed his title as “A. Cornelius Cossus, Consul.” Livy left the original version in a later passage (4.34.4).

The passage may tell us something of Livy's relations with Augustus at the beginning of the Principate, when Augustus was in his early thirties and Livy at most 4 years younger. Livy took no steps to alter his own narrative, and, in

Ogilvie's view (*ad loc.*), he could afford to neglect the historical niceties that meant so much to Augustus and so little to himself. However, while elaboration betrays Livy's concern to please, he cannot bring himself to gloss over the difficulties that Augustus' discovery caused historians, perhaps because he had already read his original version in public and would be despised for making a wholesale alteration. And his very ambiguity over the way he was informed of the discovery suggests that they were not intimate.

Livy has been faulted for not going to the temple to see for himself what was written on the corselet. Apart from differences between the practice of ancient and modern historians (Livy was not the researcher that Suetonius was to prove), the particular nature of Livy's dilemma has to be considered. If he had gone to the temple and found Augustus in error, saying so would have brought him into conflict with the most powerful man in the world. If he had found Augustus' reading correct, he would have won no credit with the Princesps, whose epigraphic competence he had doubted. Exactly the same considerations may have inhibited other Romans, even high-ranking senators, from making the same visit. They would likely have found the garment exactly as Augustus described it: he had artists at his disposal. In other words, Livy can be seen experiencing the grip that the Princesps already had on what could be done and said, perhaps even thought, if he were prepared to deceive himself, in the opening years of the new dispensation. It would be good to know how Livy treated the consul Drusus in his final book, as he too strove for the *spolia* (Flower 2000, 58).

A Possible Gap within the Narrative

For Livy's missing books, we have *Periochae* and the summary of a dozen preserved in the *Oxyrrhynchus Papyrus*. For the years 25–15 BC, we have nothing from the *periochae*; 136–137 are missing (see Badian 1993, 22ff.). On a straightforward interpretation, when the Epitomator made his summaries of Books 136–137, two books had been lost from the manuscript. It was the view of C. E. Stevens, put forward in tutorials in Magdalen College, Oxford, that this lack was due to the fact that Livy had never composed, or never published, those books. He could not find a way to narrate events that encompassed the worst crisis of Augustus' principate, led to the death of at least two prominent politicians, destroyed his credit for having restored the *res publica* to working order, and led to the humiliation of the Senate in 19 BC. The outcome enabled Augustus to take a tighter grip on politics and institutions (shown by the purging of the Senate in 19 BC) and to ensure the permanence of a dynastic regime. These were two changes achieved in 19 BC, fundamental to the future of the Principate, and the events were excruciatingly difficult for any writer who knew or cared for the Republic. This makes Stevens' view highly attractive. And we may remember the holding back of 121.

Another attested instance of omission comes from a later writer. The future emperor Claudius attempted, interestingly at Livy's instance ("hortante," Suet. *Claud.* 41. 1–3), a history of the triumvirate and Augustan Principate, presumably not before the age of about 18 years, that is, from AD 8 onward, and in an increasingly repressive political climate. His mother Antonia and his grandmother Livia dissuaded him, and after writing two books on the 2 years after Caesar's murder, Claudius put aside his manuscript, and resumed it only from the end of the civil wars in 30 (41 books, taking him to the death of Augustus at the rate of one book per year). Again, we see Livy in a possible historical conflict with the Princeps, this time through a proxy. He knew the dangers and yet encouraged an inept idealist (on whom see T. J. Cornell et al. in *FRHist*) to proceed. Having covered the period, he may have expected to guide the novice. Young Claudius, however, was the grandson of Mark Antony, always thought for himself, and in any case found another adviser.

Other historians must have treated the years 24–19 BC, including Claudius eventually, and we can see how Velleius Paterculus carried them off (2.91.2–92.5), a writer well into the age of adulation. Tacitus makes that failing one for which only the writers were responsible. He does not make allowance for the fact that, as time went on, writers were losing power: the Principate was entrenched, the rulers safe. There was little that writers could do to induce, press, or blackmail them into acceptable conduct. Cassius Dio (54.1–10) presents an account that is chronologically mangled and with conflicting judgments on the conduct of the Princeps. At least two authors used by Dio covered these years, and with different points of view. One of them might have been Livy, but he is not traceable elsewhere in Dio's Augustan books. Again, the want of *Periochae* cannot prove the absence of the original text; those that surround the missing sections are already thin and devoted to imperial achievement, and hence Badian's explanation of the ragged gap (1993, 22ff.) as the work of late epitomators themselves, censoring work critical of monarchs.

If Livy had refused to write, or to publish, an account of the years 24–17 BC, it would have been a subject of comment, which Augustus himself would have taken badly. Excuses would have to be made—the need for more polishing, or the like. It could have caused at least a temporary rift in relations, though less than one that would have resulted from publishing a candid account.

Relations with Augustus

The historian is described as enjoying good relations with the Princeps (Tac. *Ann.* 4.34.3; Badian 1993, 11ff.), who apparently entrusted this supremely learned man at least with advising his bookish step-grandson Claudius on history-writing. Two remarks made about him by contemporaries may be mentioned in this connection. One was made by Augustus himself, who

referred to him as a “Pompeian.” Evidently, he took Livy's praise of Pompey, perhaps in 112, and, by implication perhaps, some detraction from the reputation of Julius Caesar, in good part. He could afford this, having consigned Caesar to the realm of the divine and repudiated some Caesarian and triumviral politics.

More critical apparently was the comment of the ostentatiously independent politician and historian C. Asinius Pollio, who had been warned by Horace (*Odes* 2.1) that, in writing history from the beginning of the First Triumvirate, he was treading hot ash. Pollio had once penalized Patavium for resistance to Mark Antony (Cic. *Phil.* 12.10; Macr. 1.11.22). Stylistically, and perhaps politically, Livy was an admirer of Cicero (Sen. *Suas.* 6; Syme 1979, 428ff.). Certainly, the accusation of *Patavinitas*, “Paduanness,” should not be taken to refer to “provincial” deference to the autocrat. Pollio, in the context in which he was reported by Quintilian (8.1.3), seems to be censuring mere failings of language in his rival.

Readers may feel that there are too many signs of ruffling on the surface of Livy's relations with Augustus for them to be passed off. Cumulatively, the championship of Pompey, which, evidently, and remarkably, did not damage the relationship; the retention of 121; the exposure of the problem over the corselet; other deviations from Augustan versions, such as the *elogia* of his forum (Luce 1990), the conjectured omission of the years 23–19 BC, and the conclusion at the uncontroversial 9 BC; and, finally, the contrasting egging on of Antony's grandson to write up the triumviral period—all suggest an unstable and perhaps increasingly difficult relationship.

Rather than a pause ending with Tiberius' promotion in AD 4, Badian (1993, 27ff.) postulated a historian who wrote at Patavium continuously from AD 10 onward—the last repressive years of Augustus—and was free to publish on the accession of Tiberius; that is, to neglect the continuity between the two reigns, and the crisis that accompanied the changeover. Not dying in harness, Livy had brought his work to an end with the heroics of Tiberius' brother and Germanicus' father.

Livy on the Principate

By the end, Livy must have realized that his view of Augustus' principate as necessary, but only as a short-term measure (John Briscoe in *OCD*⁴), had been vindicated: freedom was lost, politics were savage, and the conspiracies continued, as Suetonius attests (*Augustus* 19). However, in one sense, Livy would have been wrong in his pessimism. Certainly, politics did not change for the better in the wake of some moral improvement, as both Livy and Augustus hoped. The misgivings expressed in the preface about Romans' ability to bear the cure is not necessarily to be taken as evidence that the Princeps was already attempting reform through legislation: Badian (1985)

cast doubt on that idea. Augustus' social legislation of 18–17 BC failed, as Tiberius admitted in AD 21 that it had (Tac. *Ann.* 3.54.2), and Tiberius' own reign, and that of his Julio-Claudian successors, was stained with scandal as well as with blood. However, the new system survived, reluctantly taken on by Tiberius, and it ushered in manifold improvements in the government of the Empire. In the calmer waters of the Flavian period, when sober families from the provinces arrived at the centers of power, there was a rise in moral tone as well (Tac. *Ann.* 3.55), which reached culmination in the age of the Antonines. Certainly, historians and the Princeps shared aims: Livy wrote “exemplary history” (see Chaplin 2000)—and so did the latter in his *Res Gestae* (8.5), recording his revival of ancient practice and his provision of *exempla* for posterity.

Cross-References

See INTRODUCTION: LIVY; CHAPTER 11: LIVY'S HISTORICAL PHILOSOPHY; CHAPTER 31: THE *PERIOCHAE*

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Further Reading

The works cited in text (with their reference list entries) are worth reading, but some may be more specialized than students require. The papers of Syme (1959) and Luce (1977) must be put at the head of the list. For an understanding of the Augustan principate, the papers in Raaflaub and Toher, eds. (1990) are often useful; and for a recent interpretation of Augustus, see Levick (2010); but nothing beats reading the ancient sources, in particular Suetonius, *Life of Augustus*, and Cassius Dio, *Roman History* 54–56; also, Velleius Paterculus' historical work (all available in Loeb texts and translations, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA). Velleius is as partisan as Augustus' own epigraphic account of his achievements (see A. E. Cooley in the reference list). For Livy's own work, the commentaries of R. Ogilvie (I–V; 1965), S. Oakley (6–10, 1997–2005), and J. Briscoe (31–33, 1973; 34–37, 1981; 38–40, 2008) are indispensable.

Part II

Ideological and Historical Aspects

Chapter 3

Portraits of Peoples

Jacques-Emmanuel Bernard

The *Ab Urbe Condita* names around 342 different peoples and 2,000 individuals, but it also helped create the almost unique concept of the *populus senatusque romanus*. The work also popularized the heroes who were created out of this construct. This paradox can be easily explained by the fact that Livy was recounting the epic sweep of Roman history, in which the Rome city had become master of the world through conquest; however, it also reveals the ambiguity of the work, whose considerable scope gives rise as much to the overall interpretive scheme as to the portraits of different peoples analyzed in detail and with greater nuance.

Foreign Peoples

Determined to deal with foreign matters only as far as they are related to the history of Rome, Livy mentions foreign peoples in the course of his narrative without bothering to dwell on their origins or their customs, with a few exceptions.¹ He has Astymedes, leader of the Rhodian embassy, give the following speech before the Senate in 167:

Tam ciuitatium quam singulorum hominum mores sunt : gentes quoque aliae iracundae, aliae audaces, quaedam timidae, in uinum, in Venerem prouiores aliae sunt. (Both cities and individuals have their customs; even among peoples, some are angry, some bold, some timid; some are more prone to wine, some to lust.²)

At this general level, the characterization of foreign peoples becomes a cliché, a cursory note, a turn of phrase, a simple apposition that defines them in one brief formulation; such descriptions are drawn from a traditional source of platitudes, notable due to their “longue durée.”³ We can give an overview of the catalogue of foreign peoples in the *Ab Urbe Condita*: Africans are a “people shifting at every breath of hope, and unfaithful” (29.3.13: *gente ad omnem auram spei mobili atque infida*); the Carthaginians are arrogant and greedy (29.6.17: *superbia atque auaritia Poenorum*); the Gauls are a “fierce nation and naturally eager for battle” (7.23.6: *gens ferox et ingenii audi ad pugnam*), a “savage nation” (8.14.9: *gens efferata*); the Aetolians are “more defiant than usual for a Greek nation” (27.30.5: *ferociori quam pro ingenii Graecorum gente*); and the Athenians make war “with letters and speeches, their only strengths” (31.44.9: *litteris uerbisque, quibus solis ualent*).

Thanks to stereotypical expressions such as “Punic [bad] faith” (22.6.12:

punica fides) or “Gallic ferocity” (7.12.10: *gallica ferocia*), these ethnic descriptions are a logical reflection of Livy's characterization of individuals from these same cities or peoples. Foreign persons are, above all, representatives of their nations. Precisely because the collective portrait of a group consists of platitudes, it is sometimes extended into individual portraits, while on other occasions the generalized individual portraits serve as a basis for the collective portrait. We can illustrate this reciprocity between foreign individuals and groups of peoples using the examples of the Numidians Syphax and Massinissa, who are described using the same stereotype:

Accensum cupiditate (et sunt ante omnes barbaros Numidae effusi in Venerem) sensit (29.23.4). (He saw him [Syphax] burning with desire [because the Numidians, more than any other barbarians, are overcome by lust].)

Memor ... quam uana et mutabilia barbarorum ingenia essent ueritus ne ... paruum uinculum eae nuptiae essent (29.23.6). (Remembering that the barbarians were vain and fickle, he feared that this marriage was a weak link [about Syphax].)

Ut est genus Numidarum in Venerem praeceps, amore captivae uictor captus (30.12.18). (Since the Numidians are naturally inclined to lust, the conqueror [Massinissa] was seized by love for his captive.)

Even if we are justified in speaking of ethnographical “topoi,” we can nevertheless still wonder about their permanence and extent. Because foreign peoples are mentioned throughout the narrative, their characterization can be nuanced, or can change entirely, depending on the circumstances; such is the case with the Hispani, who are described often in Books 21–43. Livy passes an overall judgment on the savage and bellicose character of the Spanish (34.9.4: *Hispanis, tam fera et bellicosa gente*), but distinguishes between the different tribes of Hispania when they are mentioned in various books: Carpetani, Olcades, Vaccae (21.5.12), Lacetani (34.20.2), and Turdetani (34.17.2), sometimes qualifying their abilities based on the circumstances of the military campaigns that were being waged against them by the Roman legions. So it is with the Turdetani: “Of all the Hispani, the Turdetani are regarded as the least bellicose...”⁴ In these modified platitudes, we can also note that Livy has taken geography into consideration, when he says that the nature of the land and its inhabitants makes this region of the world more suitable for war than any other.⁵ However, the fact remains that this characterization, in the end, does little more than repeat the same platitudes about their natural ferocity and their warlike zeal: at first, the Hispani are portrayed as essentially nothing more than warriors engaged on the field of battle during the Second Punic War, and afterward they are the nations who put up the strongest resistance to Roman conquest. This characterization appears only in a military or diplomatic context, and does not take into account women, children, or the elderly: Livy's field of vision is evidently

narrow. Furthermore, his Roman point of view leads him astray concerning certain realities of life for the people that he mentions: the mobility and speed of the Spanish troops is not considered to be a specific tactic, but is taken to be a typical example of disorder in the barbarian world, as opposed to the *disciplina romana*; similarly, he explains the successive retreats of the Ibergetes as an aspect of their barbarity, because they are “turbulent by nature and eager for change.”⁶ Nor does Livy take into consideration the network of local alliances that was profoundly destabilized by the conflict between Rome and Carthage, or the personal nature of such federations in the Hispanic world, where an act of allegiance was made to a particular chief, with no commitment offered either to his successors, to a city, or to an entire people, unlike the Roman concept of *fides*.⁷

Whatever the people, whether Gauls, Africans, or Asiatics, the overall impression remains rather disappointing. Livy has often been criticized for ignoring ethnography.⁸ This missed opportunity was doubtlessly unavoidable from the moment that Livy adopted an essentially moral point of view to describe foreign peoples and to compare them with the Roman people.

Populus orbis terrarum princeps

For Livy, ethnic history is foremost an ethical history, which recognizes the *mores* of individuals and of peoples. Livy emphasizes the constants of human behavior, the universality of the psychological spirit in all peoples. He does not take into consideration race, properly speaking, since he also accords virtues to other peoples.⁹ A man, in and of himself, who realizes his entire potential, is truly a universal ideal.¹⁰ Livy emphasizes the constants of human behavior, the universality of the psychological spirit, placing a rational element in opposition to an irrational one. Man is confronted with his passions, which are movements of the soul, *motus animi*, such as pleasure, anger, desire, fear, sorrow, or glory. Livy classes and judges each individual, and also each people, depending on whether or not they have mastered these passions.

Basing himself on this moral framework, Livy moves from characterizing different peoples to placing them into hierarchies, clearly affirming in the preface his intention to recall the “accomplishments of the leading nation of the world,” whose history, so rich in examples of good morals, he will trace from the beginning.¹¹

With this undertaking, Livy offers his readers an exemplary and moral vision of the Roman identity, which explains the superiority of the *populus princeps*.¹² He presents an idealized portrait of the Old Roman, embodied by legendary figures such as Brutus, Horatius Cocles, or Cincinnatus, and perpetuated by figures from the historical period, all of whom exemplify such values as *pietas*, *patientia*, *prudencia*, and *fides*; through this portrait,

“Romanness” is transformed, in the first 10 books, into a timeless essence, which allows Livy to analyze the behavior of Romans and foreigners alike.¹³

Those who illustrate this ideal belong to the Roman world, while those who contradict it are defined as non-Romans and are placed along a progressive scale ranging from barbarism to the “other,” the foreign; but the scale is perfectly reversible, in conformity with Livy's unitary conception of human nature. The universal axis of Romanness is matched by the universal axis of barbarity in such notions as “savagery” (*feritas*), indomitability (*ferocitas*), perfidy (*perfidia*), temerity (*temeritas*), pride (*superbia*), and vanity (*vanitas*).¹⁴ In this binary system, Romans incapable of mastering their passions are unworthy of Romanness and become non-Roman; on the other hand, individuals or peoples who overcome their barbarity become almost Roman. Based on this moral dichotomy, Livy's patriotism, which needs no emphasis, is the definitive source of his narrow point of view toward foreign peoples, which is itself subordinate to his point of view toward Romans.¹⁵

However just this analysis, which is largely shared by commentators on Livy, it nevertheless raises difficulties. How, in effect, can we reconcile the Livian ideal of Romanness with the complex reality of conquest and colonization, of assimilation and displacement of populations, of diplomatic treaties and alliances, as well as of military confrontations? How also can we explain Rome's rise at the same time as its fall, recognized by Livy himself in his preface, using an interpretive model that would leave no room for nuance? The Romanness described in the *Ab Urbe Condita* is a timeless quality, a literary and cultural construction; but it is also, as we will see, the reflection of a real historical process, which leads Livy to inquire about the changing identity of different peoples throughout his long history.¹⁶

Identity and Alterity

The first nuance in this general Romanocentric plan, and in the interchangeable stereotypes mentioned in the preceding text, is that Livy accounts for geography when characterizing foreign peoples, which allows him to introduce a kind of specificity. As we have seen in the example of the Hispani, Livy sometimes discusses the geographical and topographical situation of a people. He starts with Rome: in a famous speech, Camillus praises the merits of the city's location.¹⁷ Following the Greek theory that the physical and climatic conditions of a territory influence the character of its inhabitants, Livy introduces geographical determinism into his anthropology.¹⁸ At the end of his description of the four parts of Macedonia, Livy concludes:

Frigida haec omnis duraque cultu et aspera plaga est ; cultorum quoque ingenia terrae et similia habet. (The whole country is cold, and life is harsh and difficult: the same is true for the character of those who inhabit

the land.¹⁹⁾

In this perspective, the distinction between peoples who live in the mountains and agricultural peoples plays an important role. The gentleness of the plain is contrasted with harshness of the mountain, as we see in the example of the Campani, whose loose morals are contrasted with those of the rough Samnites; or in that of the Raeti of the Alps, erstwhile Etruscans turned savage by the austerity of mountain life:

Maxime Raetis, quos loca ipsa efferarunt ne quid ex antiquo praeter sonum linguae nec eum incorruptum retinerent. (The Raeti, especially, were made so savage by the land itself that they retained nothing of their ancient character except the sound of their language, and even that was not uncorrupted.²⁰⁾

This last example allows us to introduce another motif of the *Ab Urbe Condita*, namely, the risks, physical as well as human, encountered by peoples after being transplanted into a new environment. Livy takes interest in such peoples, who change their identity after coming into contact with others.²¹ Speaking before the Senate in 189 BC, during the conflict between Rome and Antiochos, the leader of the Rhodian embassy mentions Massilia as an example of a Greek colony that has been able to preserve its identity despite its unfavorable surroundings:

Massiliensis, quos, si natura insita uelut ingenio terrae uinci posset, iam pridem efferassent tot indomitae circumfusae gentes, in eo honore, in ea merito dignitate audimus apud uos esse, ac si medium umbilicum Graeciae incolerent. Non enim sonum modo linguae uestitumque et habitum, sed ante omnia mores et leges et ingenium sincerum integrumque a contagione accolarum seruauerunt. (We hear from you that the Massilians, who, if their inborn nature could be conquered by the nature of the land, would have long ago been made savage by the numerous unconquered peoples living around them, are held in the same esteem and are worthy of the same dignity as if they lived in the belly of Greece itself. For they keep pure and intact not only the sound of their language, their clothing, and their habits, but above all their customs, their laws, and their character, free from contamination by their neighbors.²²⁾

This speech must be contrasted with the opposing point of view put forth by the consul Gnaeus Manlius Vulso; comparing the Gauls of Gaul proper to the Gallo-Greeks, he thought that the process of colonization necessarily alters a people's identity:

Hi iam degeneres sunt; mixti, et Gallograeci uere, quod appellantur: sicut in frugibus pecudibusque, non tantum semina ad seruandam indolem ualent, quantum terrae proprietates coelique, sub quo aluntur, mutat. Macedones, qui Alexandriam in Aegypto, qui Seleuciam ac

Babyloniam, quique alias sparsas per orbem terrarum colonias habent, in Syros, Parthos, Aegyptios degenerarunt. Massilia, inter Gallos sita, traxit aliquantum ab accolis animorum. Tarentinis quid ex Spartana, dura illa et horrida disciplina mansit? Generosius in sua quicquid sede gignitur; insitum alienae terrae, in id, quo alitur, natura uertente se, degenerat. (They are now a degenerate and mixed race, truly Gallo-Greeks, as they are called: as with fruits and livestock, it is not so much the seeds that preserve the character of the species as the properties of the soil and the climate, under which they are nourished and grow. The Macedonians, who inhabit Alexandria in Egypt, Seleucia, Babylonia, and other colonies spread throughout the world, have degenerated into Syrians, Parthians, and Egyptians. Massilia, located among the Gauls, has adopted a few of the traits of its neighbors; among the Tarentini, what remains of their harsh and difficult Spartan discipline? A custom adopted in one's own homeland is nobler; in a foreign land, however, nature turns against itself, and whatever is adopted there degenerates into that which nourishes it.²³)

Such considerations were of direct concern for Rome, which was not only similar to Massilia, a Greek city among foreign peoples, far from the “belly of Greece,” but was also the pre-eminent city-state whose conquests had placed it at the head of the Mediterranean world. We know that, in his preface, Livy wondered about the underlying causes of Rome's grandeur as well as its decline, and attempted to give an answer throughout the work, especially in Books 34–45, since it was above all through contact with the rich Greek kingdoms in the east in the second century that Rome began to feel the repercussions of its expansionist policies. Little by little, an excess of power and wealth corrupted Rome's long-preserved morals; corruption came from outside, like a disease.²⁴ Contradictorily, the conquests brought both glory and decline; they attested both to Rome's supremacy and to the loss of its identity.

We must take account of this contradiction in order to understand how Livy viewed the foreign peoples who entered into Rome's sphere of interest. While there is a strong moral and ideological cohesion to Livy's characterization of peoples and individuals in Rome,²⁵ his ethnocentric vision leaves more room for ambiguity than it would appear, as recent research has shown.

The relationship between ethnocentrism and imperialism, about which Livy hypothesizes in the preface, becomes a theory in the famous parallel between Alexander the Great and the Roman people in Book 9.²⁶ The entire digression attempts to show that Alexander, although invincible everywhere else, nevertheless would not have been able to conquer Rome, which had the advantage of military superiority and continuity over time.²⁷ The parallel between Alexander and the *Res publica* underlies the consistent idea in Livy that the *Urbs* was growing organically. This idea of continuous and indefinite

growth along three lines (territorial, ethnic, and moral) is the ideological basis for the politics of conquest.²⁸

Rome, from its foundation, was in fact capable of assimilating non-Roman forces. Were some of its kings not of foreign origin? Was the city of Romulus not at first a simple refuge for vagabonds of any origin, who were neither natives nor immigrants?²⁹ Far from hiding the tradition of “Romulean Asylum,” of Rome as a place of refuge for the inhabitants of other cities (which was a theme of Greek anti-Roman propaganda), Livy celebrated it with pride, and, influenced by a sort of ethnocentrism, suggests that the Greeks who claimed to be autochthonous, such as the Athenians, were lying about their proper origin.³⁰ There is thus a reversal of values: if autochthony was in Greek ethnography proof that one people were superior to another, and the justification for that people's claim to hegemony, in the *Ab Urbe Condita*, it gives way to the conception of an open city, capable of forming a new ethnic identity. Rome was represented by its status as a place of asylum. Livy admits that Rome is the result of a coalescence of ethnic elements that were once heterogeneous, but have since been integrated into the values that constitute “Romanness.”³¹

The sharp distinction between Romans and barbarians seems to soften in favor of an open conception of the *ciuitas* in the Ciceronian tradition, permeated with the idea of a universal city under the influence of both Posidonius and Panaetius. In such a city, Rome's intrinsic qualities justify its hegemony, which is founded on respect for the law and for *humanitas*.³² Better still, it is in the interest of conquered peoples to enter into Rome's sphere of influence, to accept its moral and political *patrocinium*: “Do you not see,” asks Cicero, “that nature itself has given dominance to those who are best, which is in the highest interest of inferior peoples?”³³ Livy, however, less of an idealist than Cicero, has Canuleius say in Book 4: “thus, as long as we expressed no distaste for anyone, provided that virtue was conspicuous in them, the power of Rome grew.”³⁴ It is in this clause, “provided that virtue was conspicuous in them,” that we find Livy's stumbling block, his reluctance, his contradictions in the face of Roman expansionism and its consequences for Rome's original identity.

To illustrate this inherent complexity in Livy's vision of foreign peoples, we will examine the characterization of Greeks and Italians in the *Ab Urbe Condita*. For the Greeks, Livy could not hold to the Roman/barbarian distinction, and for good reason: the very concept of “barbarian” originated with the Greeks, and on closer inspection, it was indeed the Romans themselves who were considered barbarians. This can be seen in the speech of the Macedonian ambassador, who, claiming to speak for all Greeks, evokes the insolence and the frivolity of the Romans, vices that Livy eagerly applies to foreign peoples:

Aetolos, Acarnanas, Macedonas, eiusdem linguae homines, leues ad

tempus ortae causae diiungunt coniunguntque : cum alienigenis, cum barbaris aeternum omnibus Graecis bellum est eritque. (Aetolians, Acarnanians, and Macedonians, men who speak the same language, are divided and joined together from time to time by trivial concerns; but with foreigners and barbarians, all Greeks are and will always be at war.³⁵)

The Greeks are certainly not immune to being portrayed with simplistic stereotypes, such as the view that they are “more powerful in language than in deeds.”³⁶ However, in reality, their depiction is more complex, because they occupy a central position in Books 31–45, where they are at the heart of expeditions led by Rome against Philip V, Antiochus III, and Perseus; and because, at the end of the third century, and the beginning of the second, they were a collection of very different cities and peoples: Greeks from continental Greece; the cities of Asia (Smyrna, Lampsacus, etc.); the Rhodians; the Greeks of southern Italy; and occasionally the Greeks of Spain and Gaul. The books mix praise for “the most erudite of all nations” with criticism, depending on the cities and on the alliances made and broken during conflicts, and on whether the subject is a people in general or their aristocratic class, each with their varying sympathies toward the Romans, Carthaginians, or Macedonians.³⁷

In this picture, it is especially interesting to observe how Livy takes note of the mutual influences of Rome and the Greek world. In 34.4.3, Greece is blamed for the decadence of Roman morals in a judgment attributed to Cato; Livy, speaking in his name, attributes this decadence to *Asia* alone, the *copia rerum* of the Greeks of Asia having been introduced to Rome upon the return of the expedition there.³⁸ On the other hand, he does not hide a certain admiration for the Greek civilization, praising, for example, the beauty of its monuments in Attica, and Greece and Rome are sometimes considered allies in the struggle against the kings of Macedonia or Asia. The Romans act in order to liberate Greece, and the Greeks are quite conscious of this generous policy.³⁹ Livy's work reflects both the Philhellenism of his age and moral opposition to Greek character traits, which some Romans believed had led to the decline of Rome.

Livy's vision is thus more nuanced than is usually believed, as we can see particularly in the case of the Greeks of Magna Graecia; the characterization of these Greeks must be compared with that of the Italians, precisely because they are colonies very recently planted in the territory of southern Italy. The heterogeneous character of the Italian peoples is especially clear, since Livy sometimes uses the term “Italy” in the wider sense that it had in the Augustan age, in its greatest geographical extent from the Alps to Bruttium, and sometimes in the restricted sense that it had during the period of conquest, where it refers only to the south of the peninsula, or even to a small part of Bruttium.⁴⁰

The Samnites, a people of central Italy, hold an important place in this picture due to the exceptionally long war that the Romans waged against them, which is described in Books 7–10. They are depicted ambivalently: they are a rustic mountain people, living off pillage, far from urban civilization, repulsive in their backwardness; but they are also a brave warrior people, capable of putting up fierce resistance to Rome, and in some ways they recall the ancient *virtus*, consisting of austerity and courage, which evokes the *mos maiorum* of the Roman world. Although he does not hide the savage character of these people, who are mesmerized by shining armor and who make archaic sacrifices, Livy never quite considers them fully barbarian, excluded from common civilization.⁴¹ On the contrary, the Sabines are less fierce than the Samnites. Faithful to the Roman historiographical tradition, Livy mentions, in reference to Numa, “the strict and austere education of the old Sabines, who were once the most uncorrupted of all peoples.”⁴² In distinction to the Veians, Fidenates, or Antemnates, they act without haste and without anger. Living further from the harshness of the mountains, the Etruscans represent an ancient and refined civilization. The image given by Livy is more positive than that found in Greek sources, surely because the Romans were aware that they owed much to this nation; the Etruscans were considered powerful on land and on sea, and the most religious of all nations because they excelled in cult practices.⁴³ Still further from the savagery of the Samnites are the Campanians in the south, whom Livy criticizes for their softness, their lack of loyalty, and their pride. Their characterization is complex, and we detect in it indigenous as well as Greek and Etruscan elements, especially in the case of Capua, which was both distant from and near to Rome.⁴⁴ Extended to all the populations of the peninsula, this cleavage between the Roman and Italian worlds proceeds by degrees in the *Ab Urbe Condita*, where Livy reports on the Roman/non-Roman duality, but never in an absolute manner. Thus, we see generals such as Fabius address Aemilius Paullus with the following words: “We make war in Italy, in our homes and on our soil; all around us there are citizens and allies”;⁴⁵ in Spain, Livy notes that Roman soldiers, fighting far from home, are easily persuaded by the generals that they are fighting “for Italy and the city of Rome.”⁴⁶ In southern Italy in 212, facing the Carthaginian troops of Hanno, the Paeligni, Italian allies of Rome, gave the weakened legionaries an example of courage and ardor in combat.⁴⁷ On the opposite side, we see the Carthaginians call for Italy to unite against Rome, and Livy reports on the historical reality of Italian defections to the Carthaginian cause, giving a meticulous list that includes, among others, the Samnites, almost all of Magna Graecia, the Tarentini, the Metapontines, the Crotonians, and the Locrians—that is, all the Italiotes whose attachment to luxury and duplicity is constantly highlighted by Livy.⁴⁸

Livy was aware of the ethnic diversity of southern Italy, where there were both indigenous peoples with savage morals and Greek cities symbolizing civilization; these same cities showed signs of acculturation, as well as

disagreement over the policy they should adopt toward Rome.⁴⁹ Thus, several themes appear in the description of the southern Greeks: opulence, softness, arrogance, deceit, and political instability; here, Livy takes up the topos of the decadence of the Greek cities in Italy.⁵⁰ The result of this is a colorful picture, in which the populations conquered by the Republic, and the Greek world with its prestigious history, are mixed within the national territory of a now-unified Rome.

In the period when Livy was writing the *Ab Urbe Condita*, such a description, far from being unequivocal, was chronologically and ideologically ambiguous; the term *Italia* itself is used in reference both to the historical battles waged by Rome to conquer the territory of Italy, and to the Augustan policy of unifying the peninsula based on its Italian character. For Livy, although he was himself of Italian origin, the incorporation of non-Roman Italians into Rome was probably a somewhat dangerous idea.⁵¹ However, he takes care to give a balanced image of these populations, in accordance with his intention to paint a grandiose fresco in support of this unified vision of Rome.

This balance is also found in the description of the great figures of Roman history, contrary to what we have seen for secondary individuals who are named only within the collective portrait of their people, whether they are worthy representatives or not. One of the most emblematic examples is surely Scipio Africanus, in whom the ideal of Romanness converges with foreign influences. In this vast construction of the people of Rome, which Livy builds around the *mos maiorum*, Scipio occupies a singular place. We know that Livy contrasts the unity and continuity of the Roman people with the prestigious but unique and isolated figure of Alexander the Great, who would not have been able to conquer Rome, birthplace of so many illustrious leaders. Livy includes the *gens Cornelia* of the Scipios in his enormous list of the leading families of Rome, but in many respects, the portrait of Africanus goes far beyond the collective portrait of the *gens Cornelia* and of the Roman people.⁵² Africanus' characteristics are reminiscent of the Macedonian conqueror: youth, spectacular military success, skill in portraying himself as a descendent of the gods, and so forth. Livy does not hide the influence of Hellenism on Scipio, who was denounced by his enemies because he dressed in Greek style and divided his time between his books and the palaestra.⁵³ Such accusations are not clearly denied by Livy, who considers them partly true and partly a mix of truth and fiction, (and, therefore, probably true).⁵⁴ His portrait avoids the usual characterization of Roman generals, such as Fabius; it is instead closer to that of Alexander the Great as well as of Hannibal himself, the formidable Punic leader, Scipio's adversary at Zama.⁵⁵ If he is at first the antithesis of Hannibal, the incarnation of the *uirtus romana* against the deception and bad faith of the Carthaginians, he ends up being placed on the same level as the Punic leader, adopting the same strategy of attacking the

enemy on their own territory, with identical stratagems; and after the war, he underwent a kind of metamorphosis, drifting away from Romanness in his relationship with the Republic, especially during his violent conflict with the tribunes at the end of his life, just as Hannibal was criticized by the Carthaginian Senate. Even in Syracuse, while his army was resting, or in his cruel repression of the Locrians, it is not certain that he was the perfect antithesis of the Carthaginian.⁵⁶ His portrait is thus ambivalent: on the one hand, there is the official Roman portrait, the idealized prototype of the *senatus populusque romanus*, with its traditional virtues, *clementia*, *comitas*, *uerecundia*, and *temperantia*; on the other, we have the heroic and individual portrait, inspired by Hellenism, placed in parallel with Alexander the Great or, even more worryingly, with Hannibal. In this sense, Scipio is surely the person in Livy who best illustrates the stakes and risks of imperialism in the dialectic of identity and alterity.

Conclusion

The *Ab Urbe Condita* is therefore presented to us as one of the most important means of transmission for the ideology of Roman ethnocentrism, illustrating the prophecy of Romulus reported in Book I: “Announce to the Romans that it is the will of heaven that my Rome become the capital of the world (*caput orbis terrarum*)”;⁵⁷ however, it is also a work that, by not hiding the risks and consequences of imperialism for Roman identity, reflects the complexity of the regard that the Romans of the Augustan era could have for the people that they had conquered. If the patriotic vision of Livy leaves no doubt about this, in conformity with the Augustan ideology, and gives a strong sense of unity to the *Ab Urbe Condita*, the work itself lets us see different levels, which can be explained—by Livy's use of contradictory historiographical sources, sometimes Romanocentric, sometimes Greek; by the superposition of different eras, the conquests of the past and Livy's contemporary period; and by the accumulation of nuances and developments, imperceptibly but inevitably, from one book to another, one decade to another. Whatever its ethnographic insufficiencies, Livy's book remains a literary and documentary source of the highest order, still capable of being analyzed in depth when it comes to peoples and individuals considered in and of themselves.

Notes

- 1 Especially the digression dedicated to the expansion of the Gauls into Italy, in 5.33–35, or the description of the Germans mentioned in *periocha* 104; on the priority given to Rome in his history, see 33.20.13; 35.40.1; 39.48.6; 41.25.8.
- 2 45.23.14–15.

- 3 Bohak 2005, 231: “the *longue durée* aspect of ethnic stereotyping in the ancient world.”
- 4 34.17.2: *omnium Hispanorum maxime imbelles habentur Turdetani*. On the *insita feritas* of the Hispani, see 34.20.2; 21.5.12; 21.23.5; 21.30.5; 21.43.12–13; 28.43.14–16; 34.20.2; 43.4.5.
- 5 28.12.10–12.
- 6 22.21.2: *quod ipsorum Hispanorum inquieta auidaue in nouas res sunt ingenia*.
- 7 Moret 1997, 160, on the Ilergete chief Indibilis, noting the difference from his source, Polybius; see also Bedon, 2009b, 92, on the pact between the Ilergete Mandonius and Scipio Africanus.
- 8 Walsh 1961, 108–109; Luce 1977, 276 and 286; Levene 2010, 165–166; Mineo, 2006, 31; Mahé-Simon 2011, 339.
- 9 See Mineo 2006, 29–31; Moore 1989, 158.
- 10 Daugé 1981, 541 and 543.
- 11 *Praef.*, 3: *rerum gestarum principis terrarum populi*; see also *ibidem*, 11.
- 12 Bernard 2000, 282.
- 13 See Haffter 1964, 236–250; Bernard 2000, 299; Mineo 2006, 67–71, on the “timeless paradigms of the *uirtus Romana*.”
- 14 Daugé 1981, 175, 560 and 578. On the ideological construction of the portraits, see Bernard 2000, 247–303.
- 15 See, for example, Walsh 1961, 36 and 64–65.
- 16 See the reflection of Bohak 2005, 232: “Ethnic stereotypes were not just literary constructs, slavishly copied from one text into another, they were also influenced by social forces and by the types of contacts between Greeks and Romans and members of different ethnic groups.”
- 17 See, in particular, 5.54.4.
- 18 Mineo 2006, 22–28; Mahé-Simon 2011, 354.
- 19 45.30.7.
- 20 5.33.11. For the Samnites, see, for example, 9.13.7: *Samnites, ea tempestate in montibus uicatim habitantes, campestris et maritima loca contempto cultorum molliore atque, ut euenit fere, locis simili generi ipsi montani atque agrestes depopulabantur*. (“The Samnites at that time lived in villages in the mountains; these savage mountain men used to devastate

the plains and coastal areas, in contempt for the softness of the inhabitants, whose character, as often happens, had become similar to the land.”)

21 Luce 1977, 281.

22 37.54.21–22.

23 38.17.9–12.

24 See Luce 1977, 279.

25 See Walsh 1961, 82–109, and Bernard 2000, 298.

26 9.16–19.

27 9.16.19; 9.17.8.

28 See Mineo 2006, 20–82, on Livy's biological and cyclical conception of history, where Rome is a “city-organism.”

29 On the threefold division in Greek ethnography between autochthones, immigrants, and vagabonds, see Briquel 1994, 67–78.

30 Briquel 1994, 72.

31 Mineo 2006, 37.

32 Mineo 2006, 73.

33 *Rep.* 3.28.39, frg. 1: *An non cernimus optimo cuique dominatum ab ipsa natura cum summa utilitate infimorum datum?*

34 4.3.13: *Ergo dum nullum fastiditur genus in quo eniteret uirtus, creuit imperium Romanum.*

35 31.29.15.

36 8.22.8: *lingua magis strenua quam factis.* See Moreschini 1984, 33–34.

37 39.8.3: *eruditissima omnium gens.* This is contrasted with, for example, the characterization of the Aetolians, a people of northwestern Greece, whom Livy, under the influence of Polybius, described negatively by portraying them as barbarians, almost as animals who are not Greek at all except in language, merely resembling humans, and living according to savage and barbarous morals and practices (see 34.24.3–4).

38 39.6.7. See the clarification by Achard 2002, 5.

39 See 34.4.3; 33.20.1; 33.27.6; 33.33.5.

40 On Italy in Livy, see Mahé-Simon 2011, 49–160.

- 41 On the complexity of the image of the Samnites in Livy, see Dench 1995, 9–10; 20–21, and 100–102; 114: their description reflects the ideological vision that the Greeks and Romans could have for these peoples in the fourth century as well as more recently in the period of the Social War. See also the general conclusion, 220: “Roman literary portrayals of Italian are peculiarly complex.”
- 42 1.18.4: *disciplina tetrica ac tristi ueterum Sabinorum, quo genere nullum quondam incorruptius fuit.*
- 43 5.1.6.
- 44 See Levene 2010, 224–225.
- 45 22.39.11: *In Italia bellum gerimus, in sede ac solo nostro. Omnia circa plena ciuium ac sociorum sunt.*
- 46 23.29.7: *pro Italia atque urbe Romana.*
- 47 25.14.4–6.
- 48 22.61.11–12.
- 49 Mahé-Simon 2011, 342.
- 50 Mahé-Simon 2011, 380.
- 51 Levene 2010, 227.
- 52 Bernard 2000, 325–330; see also the observations of Smith 1993, p. 10, on Book 29 of the *Ab Urbe Condita*: Livy's characterization takes account of the legend of Scipio, of Greek origin, but also of Polybius' rationalism and the Roman tradition.
- 53 29.19.11: “he was criticized for not living like a Roman” (*non Romanus ... cultus iactabatur*); see also 29.19.12.
- 54 29.20.1: *partim uera partim mixta eoque similia ueris.*
- 55 As paradoxical as this reproach might seem, when we remember the negative traits of the Carthaginians listed by Livy in the third decade, it must, however, be noted that the Punic leaders were never explicitly designated as barbarians, except in polemic contexts; on the contrary, in certain passages, it is the Carthaginians who know “how vain and fickle is the character of barbarians” (29.23.6: *quam uana et mutabilia barbarorum ingenia essent*).
- 56 Levene 2010, 235.
- 57 1.16.7: “*Nuntia ... Romanis caelestes ita uelle ut mea Roma caput orbis*

Cross-References

See CHAPTER 4: ROME, MAGNA GRAECIA AND SICILY IN LIVY FROM 326 TO 200 BC; CHAPTER 11: LIVY'S HISTORICAL PHILOSOPHY

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Further Reading

P. G. Walsh's (1961) *Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, is still a good starting point for a comprehensive understanding of the ideological aims of *Ab Urbe Condita*. See, in particular, Chapter 4 "Roman Morality Historically Characterized." This can be completed by T. J. Luce's (1977) *Livy: The Composition of His History*, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 7 "The Roman National

Character and Historical Change” confirms Livy's patriotic outlook and his narrow conception of foreign peoples. More recently (2006), B. Mineo has written *Tite-Live et l'histoire de Rome*, Paris: Kincksieck, with original ideas about the composition of the decades and Augustan ideology. J. E. Bernard published in 2000 *Le portrait chez Tite-Live: Essai sur une écriture de l'histoire romaine*, Bruxelles: Latomus, 253, in which the author studies the way Livy characterizes individuals and peoples and the principles on which this characterization is based from a literary and ideological point of view; Chapter 3 (223–245) deals more particularly with the way peoples are described; the annexes offer a repertory of personality traits as they are found in Livy's extant books. It would be too long to mention the numerous specialized studies concerning individual peoples; among the most original works in that field, one will benefit from reading D. S. Levene's *Livy on the Hannibalic War* (2010), Oxford, and particularly Chapter 3, entitled “Persons and Peoples,” which presents a more balanced interpretation of the traditional so-called Livian Romanocentrism. See also M. Simon-Mahé's (2011) *Le rivage grec de l'Italie romaine: la Grande Grèce dans l'historiographie augustéenne*, Rome. EFR 442, and, in particular, Chapter 7 on the Greeks of Italy in the *Ab Urbe Condita*.

Chapter 4

Rome, Magna Graecia, and Sicily in Livy from 326 to 200_{BC}

Kathryn Lomas

Rome's relationship with Italy is a key theme of Livy's histories, particularly in those books that cover the conquest of Italy and the Punic Wars. Those sections that deal with Magna Graecia and Sicily form only a small part of this and are very episodic, but nevertheless throw interesting light on how he viewed Italy and Rome's relationships with allies, as well as how he viewed the Greeks.¹ Most of them occur as part of the history of the Samnite Wars and the Hannibalic War and its aftermath, a period in which many of the Greek areas of the Mediterranean, both in the west and in Greece itself, were at war with Rome. This association with periods of conflict and opposition to Rome shapes Livy's presentation of the Greeks of Italy and Sicily, which is, in general, an unfavorable one. He depicts them principally as unreliable allies and politically unstable communities that were no longer significant powers. Some of this may, of course, reflect what Livy found in the earlier histories that he used as sources,² but his emphasis on character—both personal and collective—as a central factor in the success of Rome and the failure of Rome's enemies suggests that this may be Livy's own interpretation of the Greeks and their actions. This chapter will explore some of the ways in which Livy represents the Greeks of the western Mediterranean, and possible motives for the ways in which he characterizes them.

Livy and the Greeks in the Fourth Century: Themes and Narratives

Although there are passing references to contacts between Rome and Cumae, the most northerly of the Greek cities of Italy, in Livy's account of regal Rome, the first significant narrative concerns the outbreak of the second Samnite War and the short conflict with Naples in 327–326_{BC}, which took place early in the war. In addition to Livy, the other surviving sources for the war are Dionysios of Halicarnassus and fragments of Dio, preserved by Zonaras. All three broadly agree in their outline of events, although there are some interesting differences of emphasis and causation. Dionysios, the only other surviving source to treat this in detail, corresponds to Livy's account in many respects, but it is less stridently anti-Greek, and presents both a more detailed and more nuanced picture of the internal politics at Naples.³

In 327_{BC}, according to both Livy and Dionysios, Rome accused Naples of

harassing Roman settlers in the Ager Falernus, but Naples, encouraged by military support from Nola and a promise of assistance from Tarentum, rejected these diplomatic protests and declared war (Liv. 8.23.1–3; 23.7; Dion. Hal. 15.5.2–6.5). The Roman army, commanded by Q. Publilius Philo, raided Neapolitan territory and laid siege to the city. Livy describes Naples (which he refers to throughout as Palaepolis) as being physically divided between the older settlement, Palaepolis, and a newer one, Neapolis, and says that Publilius weakened the city by preventing communication between the two districts.⁴ However, he describes the successful conclusion of the war as the result of political unrest and instability of the part of Naples' allies rather than military action. He also pins part of the blame on the Campanian troops from Nola, which were not wholeheartedly welcomed by the Greek population, and on the failure of Tarentum to send the promised reinforcements (Liv. 8.25.8). Early in 326 BC, a group of disaffected Neapolitans, led by the Greek Charilaus and the Oscan Nympsius, staged a coup and opened the city gates to the Roman forces (Liv. 8.25.9–6.4; Oakley 1998, 676–85). The city, under its new pro-Roman regime, was rewarded for its timely change of heart by an exceptionally favorable treaty, described by both Livy and Cicero as a *foedus aequissimum* (Liv. 8.26.6–7; Cic. *Balb.* 8.21), although neither gives any details of its terms.

This episode introduces many of the themes that run through Livy's descriptions of Magna Graecia. He identifies the Greeks, along with the Samnites, as the aggressors and adopts a notable anti-Greek position—particularly in respect of the Tarentines. He focuses on political divisions within Naples, and, in particular, associates political factions with ethnic divisions.⁵ In doing so, he creates a series of binary opposites—Greeks versus Samnites in Naples, Neapolitans of both origins versus Romans, reliable aristocrats versus the fickle mob—that are used to dramatize events and validate Roman actions. They also serve to demonize the Samnites and Campanians, to demonstrate the superior stability of Rome as compared to Naples or Tarentum, and to establish the firmer character and moral purpose of the Romans, as compared to the Greeks.

It is clear even from his own narrative, however, that by imposing this framework, Livy oversimplifies a much more complex situation. His attempt to pin the blame for the Neapolitan War on the Samnites, alleging that they subverted a city that was otherwise inclined to support Rome, is undermined by the fact that Naples moved against Rome independently of external influence (Liv. 8.23.1–2; Dion. Hal. 15.7.3; Oakley 1997, 96–97). The political landscape of Naples was also more complex, and the divisions he describes do not fit a simple pattern of Greeks versus Oscans or elite versus people (Liv. 8.25.5–9; Dion. Hal. 15.4.1–5; Frederiksen 1984, 208–212). The names of the leaders of the *coup* that led to the surrender of the city to Rome suggest that they were drawn from both ethnic communities.⁶

Nevertheless, the general outline of events is consistent from what we know from other sources, suggesting that the outline of events may have been widely accepted. The general narrative of a war triggered by Roman expansion into northern Campania, a siege complicated by internal unrest within Naples, and a treaty following a seizure of power by a faction favorable to Rome, is historically plausible, but we should be wary of accepting Livy's picture of a city dominated by ethnic tension and conflict (Frederiksen 1984, 208–212; Lomas 1993, 46; Oakley 1998, 676–685). Although a Greek colony in origin, Naples had absorbed a significant amount of Campanian immigration during the late fifth century, and, by 327 BC, it had a mixed population of indigenous Neapolitan Greeks, descendants of Cumaean Greeks who had fled to Naples in 421 BC following the Campanian invasion of their city, and Campanians who had migrated to Naples and settled there (Str. 5.4.7; Dion. Hal. 15.6.4). Both Strabo and the epigraphic record suggest that this was a city with a mixed population, in which Greeks and Campanians co-existed and intermarried, rather than a city riven with ethnic divisions (Str. 5.4.7; Lomas 1997). However, it clearly suited Livy's moral purpose to present the Campanians, who were ethnically related to the Rome's enemies (the Samnites), as the culprits in stirring up hostilities and causing political strife.

The same themes of hostility to both Oscan-speaking Italians and to the Tarentines run through two other incidents in Books 8 and 9. Both of these suggest that Tarentum, the most powerful city of Magna Graecia at this date, was increasingly concerned by Rome's encroachment in southern Italy, but both are given a notable anti-Tarentine spin by Livy. The first of these is related to a proposed alliance between Rome and the Lucanians in 326 BC. The Tarentines were said to be so alarmed by this that they colluded with a group of Lucanians opposed to the alliance to derail it. According to Livy, they did so by staging a fake attack on the Lucanian envoys, which the Lucanians blamed on a group of Romans, thus stirring up feeling against the alliance (Liv. 8.27.1–28.11; Lomas 1993, 47–48; Oakley 1998, 680–682). This episode is very garbled, and although contact between Rome and some Lucanians is not impossible, it is not plausible as it stands.⁷ Rather, it seems to be an illustration of Livy's anti-Tarentine agenda as well as dramatizing and personalizing the fluid pattern of alliances in southern Italy at this date. It is also notable that, in Books 8 and 9, Livy presents Rome's moral qualities and, in particular, the promotion of political harmony at home and a moderate and inclusive policy toward Italians as central to its success in conquering Italy (Lipovsky 1981, 102–104). By emphasizing the disharmony in Naples and Lucania, he is drawing a contrast with Roman stability, and by blaming the Campanians, Samnites, and Tarentines for stirring this up, he is putting them in the wrong, both practically and morally, as well as implicitly suggesting a reason why Rome prevailed.

The only other Roman contact with Magna Graecia recounted in Books 5–10 occurred in 320 BC (Liv. 9.14.1–9). After the disaster of the Caudine Forks in 321 BC, Rome concentrated on northern Apulia in an attempt to surround the Samnites with hostile territory, making alliances with many Daunian settlements that became Roman allies and moving Roman influence further toward Tarentine territory (Liv. 9.26.3; Dion. Hal. 17.5.2; Lomas 1993, 48–50; Oakley 2005, 156–67). In 320 BC, the Roman and Samnite armies met near Luceria, but before the battle took place, a Tarentine delegation intervened and offered to arbitrate between the two sides, with the inducement that the Tarentine army would fight against the side that refused. According to Livy, the Samnites agreed, but the Romans replied in scornful terms that the Tarentines were not strong enough to dictate terms, and in the ensuing battle the Samnites were defeated (Liv. 9.1.4.1–9; Lomas 1993, 49–50; Oakley 2005, 160–167).

As with the previous incident, this seems to be a very garbled account and its reliability has been questioned, but in both cases, there seems to be a core of historical plausibility underneath the anti-Tarentine rhetoric. Rome was increasingly involved in northern Apulia from 321 BC onward. The picture that emerges is one of shifting patterns of alliance, as the emerging city-states of the region sought to exploit the Roman–Samnite conflict for their own advantage (Lomas 1993, 49–50; Fronda 2006, 414–417). It is not implausible that Tarentum, as an established power in southeast Italy, took a close interest in any Roman involvement in the area. Whether this would extend to attempting to impose arbitration (a common diplomatic device in the Hellenistic world: cf. Gruen 1984, 96–101) by military force is another matter, but it is not impossible that there may have been some sort of diplomatic intervention. Livy's anti-Tarentine viewpoint is not surprising, since the Tarentum was the most powerful city in Magna Graecia and had participated in several Roman defeats during the Pyrrhic War. Attempting to discredit Tarentum is consistent with Livy's tendency to obscure incidents in which Rome was at fault.

Magna Graecia and Sicily in the Hannibalic War

Livy's books covering the Pyrrhic War and the conquest of Magna Graecia and Sicily are lost, and his coverage of the region resumes with the Hannibalic War, by which time most of the cities of the region were Roman allies, although Cumae had been directly incorporated by Rome with the status of *civitas sine suffragio* (338 BC: Livy 8.14.10–11; Vell. Pat. 1.14.3; Fest. 126L) and a Latin colony had been founded at Paestum (273 BC: Livy Per. 14; Vell. Pat. 1.14.7). The Greek city Campania remained loyal throughout the Hannibalic War, and Naples and Cumae fought off several attempts by Hannibal to capture or subvert them in order to gain access to a port in the region (Liv. 23.15.1, 23.35.1–36.10). Further south, however, there was

considerable hostility to Rome. Rhegium remained a Roman ally throughout, but most other Greek cities repudiated their alliances, ejected their Roman garrisons, and joined Hannibal between 214 and 212 BC, and were gradually recaptured in 209–205 BC, as the war began to turn in favor of Rome (Lomas 1993, 62–76; Lomas 2011; Fronda 2010).

Livy presents these events as a complex interplay between competing pressures. Greek indecisiveness and political instability are mentioned as factors in many cases. In others—such as the defections of Croton and Locri—pressure exerted by the Bruttians, long-standing enemies of the Greeks who were mostly allied with Hannibal from 215 BC onward, was as much a factor as positive enthusiasm for either Carthage or Rome (Liv. 24.1.1–3). The Bruttians, for instance, attacked Locri in 215 BC, but the Locrians negotiated an alliance with the Carthaginians—allies of the Bruttians—which forced the Bruttians to withdraw. The Bruttians then attacked Croton, having first attempted—unsuccessfully—to obtain assurances from Hamilcar, the Carthaginian commander, that they would be allowed to occupy the city if they were successful. They captured the city, which was predominantly hostile to Rome, but were unable to capture the acropolis in which a pro-Roman minority had taken refuge. After a certain amount of negotiation, it was agreed that the city would surrender and admit the Bruttians, but that the Greek population who wished to do so could evacuate to Locri. The whole episode, therefore, hinges on a complex interplay between Bruttians, Greeks, and Carthaginians—a plausible scenario, given the endemic conflict between the Greeks and their neighbors in the fourth and third centuries, although there are also difficulties with some of the detail of Livy's account.⁸

The chief villain of his narrative of the war in southern Italy, however, is undoubtedly Tarentum. This is perhaps not surprising, since Tarentum was a very powerful force in southern Italy in the fourth century. It was strategically valuable, since it controlled a large harbor and a key crossing point to Greece, and was potentially a serious threat to Roman interests. The recent history of conflict between Rome and Tarentum, a prime mover in the Pyrrhic War, may have influenced Livy's views, as he goes out of his way to present the Tarentines as disloyal and ineffective.

Livy's account of the war in Sicily is dominated by the defection of Syracuse in 214 BC, an event prompted by the death of Hieron II, king of Syracuse and a long-standing ally of Rome. He was succeeded by his underage grandson Hieronymos, and the subsequent power struggle opened up opportunities for Carthaginian envoys of Syracusan descent to intervene and provoke a change of sides. Its subsequent recapture, after a long siege, took place in 212 BC and led to the Roman annexation of the former kingdom of Syracuse and the absorption of the Greek parts of the island into the Roman province of Sicily. These events are told through a series of dramatic set-pieces, some of which have clear echoes of Thucydides,⁹ detailed and complex descriptions of the

internal politics of Syracuse, and comment on the character and actions of the Roman general Marcellus (Jaeger 2003; Flower 2003; Marincola 2005).¹⁰

Several recurring themes run throughout these episodes. One is the political state of Magna Graecia and Sicily, which Livy presents as highly unstable, although in contrasting ways. Another is the character of the Greeks themselves, which is presented unfavorably, although again with interesting contrasts between the Italiotes and Sicilians. The implied contrast with Rome, as the model of civic virtue and good government, is consistent with Livy's wider aim of presenting a moral history in which Rome's virtues are closely linked with its political and military success, and, conversely, the weaknesses of its enemies are instrumental in their own failure.

South Italian and Sicilian Politics

A key element of Livy's narrative of Roman relations with southern Italy is his distinctive view of Italian politics. He has a clear model of how political and social relationships worked at this period, which underpins most of his narrative of Italian behavior during the Hannibalic War. He asserts that:

All the cities of Italy were sick with the same illness, namely that the common people were at odds with the upper class, the senate inclining to the Romans, the common people drawing the state to the side of the Carthaginians. (Liv. 24.1.2)

The specific city in question is Croton, where a vigorous debate between various factions was under way in 215 BC over whether to remain loyal to Rome or to defect to Hannibal, but this binary division between *optimates* or *boni* (characterized as virtuous and responsible) and demagogic and irresponsible *populares* is not peculiar to Livy's views of Magna Graecia. He uses it as a general model to explain patterns of loyalty to Rome or defection to Hannibal throughout central and southern Italy, attributing pro-Roman sentiments to groups that he identifies as *optimates* and characterizing pro-Hannibal factions as opportunistic and irresponsible demagogues. His approach to *populares* is almost entirely pejorative, conflating popular politics with irresponsibility and disloyalty to Rome.¹¹ Aristomachos, the main advocate of defecting to Hannibal, is accused not just of treachery toward Rome, but also of political opportunism and irresponsibility toward his own people. *Optimates*, in contrast, are by definition pro-Roman and morally serious and reliable.

This is, in effect, an extension to Italy of a general analytical framework that Livy applies to many aspects of Roman politics. He presents much of the history of the early Republic as a struggle between Patricians and Plebeians, even when this does not fit the logic of his narrative, and a variant of this—tension between *optimates* and *populares*—is employed in his muddled explanation of the elections of 216 BC (Gruen 1978). Throughout his history,

Livy imposes an artificial and anachronistic binary divide in which he associates political tension with strife between two clearly defined parties, to which he attributes specific moral characteristics as a means of clearly signaling a distinction between “good” and “bad” politicians. His political vision is refracted through later Republican politics. He refers to the pro-Roman factions in Magna Graecia and elsewhere as *optimates* or *boni*, and to the Carthaginian supporters as *populares*, and much of his objection to the latter is clearly related to the instability of late Republican Rome.

This means that his account of political aims and motivations in Magna Graecia, and of southern Italy more generally, must be treated with caution. The general pattern he describes, of prominent men competing for power and seeking to exploit the situation to enhance their own political influence and undermine their opponents, is entirely plausible and is consistent with other evidence for how Italian society operated in the fourth and third centuries. Italian states at this date were mostly controlled, politically and socially, by groups of aristocrats who were in constant competition against their peers for power and dominance, so it is very likely that this was a factor in patterns of alliance and defection.¹² The difficulty lies in Livy's suggestion that these were struggles between elites and the lower social classes, stirred up by populist leaders. The factional politics he describes are clearly power struggles within the elite, often consisting of two or three prominent families vying for control. Livy's general point that there was fierce and often violent political rivalry in many Italian states, and that decisions about whether to support Rome or secede from the alliance may have been driven by political opportunism, seem very plausible, but is sometimes distorted by his attempts to cast this in the terms of the late Roman republic.

His representation of internal affairs in Sicily is markedly different. Here, he frames his discussion of Syracusan politics mostly in terms of the city's Greek past. The defection and recapture of Syracuse are explained with reference both to its long history of tyranny and to its failure to take the opportunity to establish *libertas* in the aftermath of Hieron's death (Liv. 24.4–8, 21–33; Jaeger 2003, 213–217). Hieronymos is described in terms that reference the stereotypical tyrant figure, assuming the dress and trappings of royalty and demonstrating arrogance, cruelty, decadence, and incompetence (Liv. 24.4–5; cf. Pol. 7.7.9 for an alternative view on Hieronymos). He and his guardians, Adranodoros and Zoippos, Hieron's sons-in-law, form a stark contrast to Hieron, and continually remind the reader of Syracuse's long history of tyranny. Without Hieron as a benign father figure, the population in general is represented as politically immature and ineffectual. Even after the assassination of Hieronymos, a number of leaders emerge, but none manages to challenge Adranodoros and his supporters effectively. Attempts to establish democracy are made, with numerous appeals to *libertas*, and Livy includes several speeches delivered from the altar of Concordia, symbolizing attempts

to restore political harmony.¹³ Ultimately, the Syracusans were unable, left to themselves, to form a stable government, and order was not restored until Rome, in the person of Marcellus, gained control of the city. Livy's account of this seems to contain deliberate echoes of the fall of the Tarquins and the establishment of the Roman republic, especially in the prominent role of women and the rhetoric of liberation.¹⁴ The outcome, however, is very different, and as Jaeger observes, the effect is to demonstrate the failure of the Syracusans to liberate themselves from tyranny and establish a democratic government, in contrast to the striking success of Rome in 509 BC.

Although Livy presents a contrasting vision of the political landscapes of Sicily and Magna Graecia, the overall result is the same. The warring factions of Magna Graecia demonstrate the volatile and unstable nature of these states. The emphasis on the undermining of the *boni* by the forces of instability is particularly telling, as one of the key elements in Livy's moral view of history is the importance of civic virtues and *bona artes*, the failure of communities that allowed these to be undermined (Walsh 1961, 272–273). The inability of the Syracusans to move away from their past history of tyranny and establish a democratic government is a demonstration of their unfitness to rule themselves, and their need for Roman supervision. In both cases, Livy's treatment of the political life and motivations of both Sicilians and Italiotes is designed to demonstrate their unfitness to govern themselves and to provide a validation of Roman rule.

Ethnic Characterization

Ethnic characterization is an important aspect of Livy's history of the Hannibalic War, and is not by any means peculiar to his coverage of the Greek world. The incorporation of people of different ethnicities was a central part of Roman culture. It was enshrined in the traditions of the foundation of the city, which featured Romulus' asylum to attract new population to his city, and the forcible seizure of the Sabine women (Dench 2005, 11–22; Levene 2010, 214–215). Willingness to absorb new peoples, and even to incorporate them as citizens under some circumstances, was also central to Rome's conquest of Italy and the wider Mediterranean world. It is not surprising that Livy was deeply concerned with questions of otherness and how to represent non-Romans. This is particularly true in the era of the Hannibalic War, in which a mixed army of Romans and various Italian allies faced a foreign enemy (Levene 2010, 220–246; Russo 2010).

In his treatment of the Sicilians and Italiotes, Livy demonstrates a considerable degree of ambiguity toward their Greek ethnicity and culture. He habitually refers to the changeability and fickleness of the Italiotes, emphasizing their untrustworthiness as Roman allies. The pro-Carthaginian factions at Croton and Locri in 215 BC are described as lightweights

(*levissimi*).¹⁵ The same accusation is leveled at the Neapolitans who opposed Rome in 327–326 BC, who are described as “stronger in words than in deeds” (Liv. 8.22.8: “...gente lingua magis strenua quam factis...”). He also consistently presents the Greeks as ineffectual in practical matters and sometimes lacking in courage. After the defection of Tarentum in 212 BC, for instance, the Tarentines are presented as being at a loss as to how to deal with the Roman garrison in the acropolis, and have to be instructed by the Carthaginians in how to free their trapped fleet from the harbor and pursue the siege of the acropolis.

Livy repeatedly underlines the unfitness of the Greeks to hold a position of influence in Italy. Tarentine attempts to arbitrate between Romans and Samnites in Apulia in 320 BC was scathingly dismissed by the Roman commander (Liv. 9.1.4.5):

... uanissimam increpans gentem quae, suarum impotens rerum prae domesticis seditionibus discordisque, aliis modum pacis ac belli facere aequum censeret. (... reproaching that most foolish of people [i.e., the Tarentines] who, powerless to organize their own affairs because of internal plots and discord, decided to arbitrate the limits of peace and war for others.)

He repeatedly refers to instability and class warfare in Croton and Locri, and the inability of the Syracusans to establish a stable government after the death of Hieron and assassination of Hieronymos (24.1–2, 22–32). In both cases, the Greeks succumb to tyranny, indecision, and instability. Both communities (Tarentum) and individuals (Aristomachos of Croton, Phileas of Tarentum) are depicted as faithless allies, who are happy to defect from Rome out of irresponsibility and self-interest (24.3; 25.8–9).

The fall of Tarentum and its aftermath in 209 BC is a striking example of how Livy creates and manipulates ethnic stereotypes. Tarentum was betrayed to Fabius, the Roman commander, by a Bruttian officer who was persuaded to do so by a Tarentine woman with pro-Roman connections (Liv. 27.15–16). In the ensuing fighting, the leaders of the rebellion died bravely, but the Tarentine army as a whole is described as inferior to the Romans in equipment, skill, and courage. After the loss of Tarentum, Hannibal induced the Metapontines to help him trap Fabius by pretending that Metapontum also wished to change sides, thereby luring him into an ambush (Liv. 27.16), but the scheme failed. Locri was also recaptured by a trick, as pro-Roman Locrians were persuaded to betray the city to Rome in 205 BC (Liv. 28.7–9). The central themes are Greek and Carthaginian duplicity and trickery; Greek cowardice, ineffectiveness, and essentially unwarlike character; and a lack of moral strength symbolized by the subversion of a Bruttian officer by his Tarentine mistress. The Syracusans are also undone, first by tyranny and the manipulations of the royal women, which lures them away from Rome in 212 BC, and then by mass drunkenness at the festival of Artemis in 212 BC, which

leads to Marcellus' sack of the city.¹⁶

Many of these stereotypes are not peculiar to Livy. The notion of decadence and decline of Magna Graecia is a common *topos* found in fourth- and third-century Greek historiography. This centered on the idea that the Greek cities of the west, some of which had been among the richest cities of the Greek world, had been guilty of *hubris* and had consequently fallen into a cycle of decadence and decline (*tryphe*) (Momigliano 1959, 529–556; Pearson 1987, 1–3, 37–51; Lomas 1997, 32–33). There was also a perception that this was in part a result of barbarization and demographic instability. Some Greek cities in Italy and Sicily absorbed significant quantities of non-Greek population, and this was regarded as undermining both their Hellenism and their moral strength (Str. 5.4.7, 6.1.2; Aristox. 14.632a). Livy, in contrast, seems less interested in this aspect, but he consistently presents the western Greeks as decadent and ineffectual. His moral purpose is declared in his preface when he praises the thrift, plain living, noble deeds, and good citizens of earlier Roman history and their freedom from avarice and luxury, in contrast to the recent past, which he regards as having abandoned the qualities that made Rome great (Liv., *Praef.*; Walsh 1961, 272–273). The Greeks, in contrast, are presented as the antithesis of this—weak, impractical, verbose, and fickle. They are also depicted as a potential danger to Roman values. Livy's account of Marcellus' dealings with Syracuse is generally approving in tone, but he is very critical of his confiscation of Greek statues. He personally removed a large number of valuable art works to decorate a new temple of Honos and Virtus that he built outside the Capena gate in Rome (Liv. 25.40.2–3). The objection was not to the looting itself. Fabius, who is not subject to adverse comment, removed a very large amount of plunder from Tarentum in 209 BC, but left the statues of the gods (Liv. 27.16). Livy's main objection was to the placing of Greek statues into the temple of a Roman cult, and it was instrumental in triggering the Roman admiration for all things Greek that developed during the second century, and which meets with Livy's disapproval.¹⁷

As Levene (2010, 216–217) notes, Livy's ethnic characterizations are rarely subtle and often verge on caricature. These ethnic stereotypes were clearly intended to serve a moral and literary purpose rather than reflect historical reality. There is no basis for Livy's assertion that the Greeks of Italy and Sicily were particularly ill-suited to self-government or were militarily weak and ineffectual—Naples was effective in defending itself from Hannibal and still had a significant navy until the first century BC, and Tarentum was a major power in the fourth century and a formidable enemy for Rome during the Pyrrhic War, also making a serious bid for independence in 212 BC.¹⁸ By consistently presenting the Greeks in terms that underline unfitnes to govern themselves effectively, however, Livy validates Rome's takeover of these regions in a manner that is very reminiscent of the discourses of eighteenth-

and nineteenth-century western imperialism (Lomas 1997, 38–40).

This emphasis on the less-than-flattering aspects of the Greek character and Greek motivations may also owe something to the fact that Livy wrote his history during the reign of the emperor Augustus, a period in which Rome's relationship with the Greek culture was an important but uneasy one (Zanker 1988; Wallace-Hadrill 2008, 28–36). Augustus promoted traditional Roman customs as a way of distancing himself from Antony, who became characterized in Augustan literature by an unacceptable level of Hellenism and orientalism (Zanker 1988). Despite this, Hellenism played an important role in reshaping Roman culture, and Augustus was an enthusiastic participant in Greek customs and rituals during his stays at Baiae and on Capri (Suet., *Aug.* 98.3). This ambivalent relationship, together with the fact that many cities of Magna Graecia and Sicily had proved to be stubborn enemies of Rome during the third century BC, may account for some of Livy's unflattering comments.

This focus on ascribed character traits is significant because, for Livy, character—whether individual or collective—is central to determining effectiveness and success or failure (Luce 1977, 230; Lipovsky 1981, 144; Foulkes 1999, 70–71). Some character traits also determine civilization or barbarism. Greeks occupy an uneasy middle ground in this respect. They were clearly not barbarian, in the way that the Gauls or Carthaginians were routinely depicted (Foulkes 1999, 70–72), but it was also important to depict them as being un-Roman, and, in so doing, validate Roman conquest and rule of the Greek world. They were regarded as culturally prestigious by many (although by no means all) Romans, but also politically unstable and inferior to the Romans. The Greeks of the Western Mediterranean, and in particular those of Magna Graecia, occupy a particularly ambivalent position in the Roman mind. They were closer at hand than the rest of the Greek world, and this made them, at one and the same time, both more of a direct threat to Rome and also less foreign and more easily assimilable. Their long contact, and, in some cases, cohabitation, with other Italian peoples such as the Campanians and other Oscan-speaking groups, meant that they were less definitively Greek than the Greeks of the eastern Mediterranean. Livy's narrative of conquest, such as survives, and his treatment of this area during the Hannibalic War reflects this tension, and also emphasizes Roman moral superiority and validates Roman rule of Magna Graecia and Sicily.

Notes

- 1 Coverage of Rome's fourth-century contacts with Magna Graecia survives intact, as does his narrative of the Hannibalic War, but his coverage of the Pyrrhic War and conquest of Magna Graecia is lost, apart from short summaries.

- 2 Livy made extensive use of Polybios as a source for Books 31–45 (Walsh 1961, 115–128; Oakley 2009; Briscoe 2009), but there is much less consensus about whether his sources for Books 21–30 included Polybios, another source (possibly Coelius Antipater) who also had access to Polybios, or a common source that he shared with Polybios (Walsh 1961, 124–130; Levene 2010, 126–129). Levene, however, makes a persuasive case that Polybios was a major source for Books 21–30, although not by any means Livy's only source (Levene 2010, 135–163).
- 3 Livy's sources for Magna Graecia in the fourth century, and especially for the war with Naples, may have come from Fabius Pictor, but he cites variations and alternative traditions that demonstrate that he also consulted a wider range of other writers, including Cincius Alimentus, Licinius Macer, and Claudius Quadrigarius (Oakley 1998, 14, and 20–23; Oakley 2009). He may also have used non-Roman sources. Dionysios of Halicarnassus may well have used a Greek source for his account of the war with Naples, and Oakley speculates that Livy may also have had access to it this (Frederiksen 1984, 208–212; Oakley 1997, 38).
- 4 There is considerable debate about whether Livy's description of fourth-century Naples is reliable. He seems to associate the two settlements with the Athenian colonization of the fifth century (Neapolis) and an earlier settlement (Palaepolis). The idea of a physically divided city is not unknown in the western Mediterranean. Emporion (mod. Ampurias) was divided between an old and a new city, possibly as a result of urban sprawl as the original settlement outgrew its walls (Strabo, *Geog.* 3.4.8; Lomas 2006, 186–187). Archaeological evidence pre-dating the fifth-century foundation suggests that this was not the first Greek settlement at Naples, but the precise details of this are sketchy. On the urban development of Naples, see Greco (1985).
- 5 Livy himself (8.26.6) refers to an alternative tradition that a group of Samnites betrayed Naples to Rome, but he rejects this, casting the Samnites as the diehard anti-Roman faction (Lomas 1993, 45–48; Oakley 1998, 684–685).
- 6 The leaders of the revolt against the Samnites are described as *principes civitatis*, which implies that they were of the elite, although he is vague on whether these were the city's magistrates or not (Livy 8.25.9; cf. Dion. Hal. 15.6.2; Frederiksen 1984, 148 and 208–212).
- 7 As Oakley notes, the Lucanians are consistently pro-Samnite in the rest of Livy's narrative, so the idea of an alliance with Rome that had to be forcibly disrupted by underhand means looks rather odd (Oakley 1998, 686). It is possibly that the source for this episode may have been Claudius Quadrigarius (*HRR* fr. 15 Quad.), but even this is unclear.

- 8 There are chronological problems with the timing of the defection of Locri. Livy records that Carthaginian reinforcements landed there, and were admitted in defiance of the Roman garrison, earlier in 215 BC, but the actual defection of the city took place later in the same year (Liv. 23.30.8, 23.41.12). On the defections of Locri and Croton, see Lomas (1993, 64–70) and Fronda (2010, 159–178).
- 9 For instance, Marcellus is described as meditating on Syracuse's past and on the Sicilian expedition as he observes the capture of the city in 212 BC (25.25).
- 10 Marcellus is presented as a particularly contradictory character who becomes almost a father figure to the Syracusans and weeps over the fate of the city, yet permits his troops to savagely sack Achradina (Liv. 25.24.11–15, 31.8–10; Jaeger 2003; Marincola 2005).
- 11 This is a more general characteristic of Livy. His account of early Roman history also depicts popular politicians in an unfavorable light, and one that often seems to be based on the behavior of the Gracchi or the tribunes of the late Republic (Seager 1977).
- 12 The Campanian town of Compsa defected when the pro-Roman elite, led by the Mopsii, lost power to their political rivals, led by Statius Trebius (Liv. 23.1), while Nola was evenly split between two political factions, one of which wished to remain allied with Rome, while the other saw defection to Hannibal as a possible means to take power (Liv. 23.17–19), and similar scenarios are found elsewhere too. A group of Campanian nobles approached Hannibal after Trasimene, and offered to defect from Rome if they could gain power at Capua (Liv. 22.13.10). When the city finally did defect in 216 BC, Pacuvius Calavius, the leader of the revolt, negotiated with Hannibal as a means of gaining power, for undermining his political rivals, and also to secure treaty terms more advantageous than those granted by Rome (Liv. 23.2–4). For other examples, see Liv. 24.1.1–3.15, 25.8.3–13.10, 25.15.2–5. See also, Pol. 8.24.7; Lomas (1993, 60–63); and Fronda (2009, 2010).
- 13 Livy 24.21–22. Livy's use of the topography of Syracuse is clearly symbolic, contrasting the royal palace and the plotting by Hieron's daughters with the speeches urging democracy and *libertas* delivered from the altar of Concordia (Jaeger 2003).
- 14 The plotting and manipulation by Demarata and Harmonia recalls the influential role of Tanaquil and Tullia, and the murder of Heraklia has close parallels with the rape and suicide of Lucretia (Jaeger 2003, 213–214).
- 15 Livy 24.1.7 (“... *vocataque extemplo contione, cum et levissimus quisque*

novas res novamque societatem mallent ...”). See also, Liv. 9.14.5. A similar idea of democracy as the root cause of political instability is also highlighted by Polybios (Pol. 8.24.1), and by Strabo (Strab. *Geog.* 6.3.4).

- 16 Female influence is often presented as a sign of moral decadence or lack of integrity. The backstage manipulations by wives and daughters are a feature of Livy's account of both the Tarquins (e.g., 1.41, 1.48) and of the defection of Syracuse in 212 BC (24.25–26). Undue female influence on public affairs is characterized as both un-Roman and as associated with despotic regimes. In the Augustan period, this was a particularly prevalent stereotype, with clear echoes of Antony and his association with Cleopatra. The drunkenness at the festival of Artemis further demonstrates Greek decadence, and may echo the outbreak of the Pyrrhic War, which was triggered by a drunken assault on Roman ambassadors to Tarentum who had arrived during the Dionysia (App. *Samn.* 7.1).
- 17 Livy 25.40; Springer 1952, 262–265.
- 18 It was eventually destroyed by Sulla in revenge of Naples' support of Marius (App. *BC* 1.89).

Cross-References

See CHAPTER 3: PORTRAITS OF PEOPLES

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Further Reading

The fullest account of Livy's narrative of the Hannibalic War is D. Levene (2010), *Livy on the Hannibalic War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). A detailed account of the war in southern Italy, which ranges considerably beyond Livy, can be found in M. Fronda (2010), *Between Rome and Carthage. Southern Italy during the Second Punic War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Magna Graecia in the period of Roman conquest is covered by K. Lomas (1993), *Rome and the Western Greeks and Roman Italy, 338 BC–AD 200* (London: Routledge).

Chapter 5

Urban Landscape, Monuments, and the Building of Memory in Livy

Mary Jaeger

Ancient historians work with space: with such abstractions as center and periphery, up and down, boundary and bridge—or breach; and with more specific categories, such as those of east and west, public and private (Kraus 1994; Riggsby 2006, 21–45, 2009; Spencer 2007). They also work with place, with generic settings for archetypal acts, such as city walls or the conjugal bedroom;¹ and with specific locations made meaningful by particular events, Thermopylae, for example, or the Caudine Forks or Lacus Curtius (Chaplin 2010; Morello 2002; Spencer 2007).

Livy inherited from his Greek predecessors a tradition of using space as an organizing element of narrative and of using the narrative to imbue specific places with meaning. As a historian of Rome who paid homage to predecessors writing in the annalistic style (Rich 1997), Livy alternated between center and periphery by discussing events at home and in the field (*domi militiae*), with the center fixed at Rome and the periphery generally expanding at points of conflict with foreign enemies. As it progresses from the past toward the present, Livy's text records the layers of memory accruing at its fixed center, so that the city becomes a collection of places made increasingly meaningful by events (Bonfante 1998). This ordered space and meaningful landscape together emphasize major stages and reinforce central themes of Livy's history: Rome's growth from small settlement to great empire, its development as a frugal and freedom-loving people, and its gradual and then precipitous moral decline.

As it describes the origins of specific places and uses them as settings for important events, the text constructs a written city, one with its own internal order (Kraus 1994; Jaeger 1997). As Christina Kraus observes, “Like the city it describes and constitutes, then, the *Ab urbe condita* is a growing physical object through which the writer and reader move together. Like that city, too, it is constructed of places—that is, of commonplaces, *topoi* or *loci communes*, the typical scenes of which much ancient literature is composed” (Kraus 1994, 270). Moving through the text, the narrator and reader journey together through both space and time, with many readers being in more of a hurry to reach recent events (*festinantibus ad haec noua*; Moles, 1993). As he guides them through the past, Livy's narrator reminds readers, repeatedly, of his and their position in the present. He does so by means of first-person intrusions, references to variants among sources, prolepsis, and explicit comparisons

between then and now. Monuments and places serve as portals in time, reminding readers of “here and now,” as they read of “there and then.” Such physical reminders include buildings or other structures, versions of which were still standing in Livy’s time (e.g., the Lacus Curtius or the Temple of Jupiter Stator), and places whose locations were either still known in Livy’s time or identifiable in relation to a familiar place: when the Senate recalled him, Cincinnatus was plowing, his four *iugera*, “across from the very place where the dockyards are now, the meadows called Quinctian” (3.26.8); when Caedicius heard the voice instructing him to “tell the magistrates that the Gauls are coming,” he was “in the New Street, where there is now a little shrine above the temple of Vesta” (5.32.6).

The first pentad introduces major Roman geographical and topographical features, and returns repeatedly to them. These include the Tiber, the Palatine and Capitoline, the other hills, the Forum, the city walls, and their gates. The Tiber, for example, appears first as the boundary between Latium and Etruria (1.3.5). It receives its name from the drowned Tiberinus (1.3.8), floods and subsides opportunely to land Romulus and Remus safely on its bank (1.4.3–6), and is crossed by Hercules according to ancient legend (1.7.4). Ancus Marcius bridges it in order to join the Janiculum to the city, just in time for Tarquin, the first Etruscan king, and his wife Tanaquil, to use that bridge to enter Rome (1.33.6; 1.34.8). In Book 2, the Tiber provides a physical and conceptual barrier protecting freedom-loving Romans against the return of Etruscan kings: Horatius destroys the bridge; Mucius Scaevola swims across the river to attack Lars Porsenna; and the hostage Cloelia crosses it to freedom (2.10–13). In the story of Cincinnatus, the Tiber serves again as a barrier both conceptual and physical: in self-imposed exile, the impoverished Cincinnatus works his land across the Tiber (*trans Tiberim*; 3.26.8) until, recalled to resume his political life, he is ferried across (*transuectumque*) on a ship provided at public expense (*navis Quinctio publice parata fuit*; 3.26.11; Feldherr 1998).

The Palatine serves as the initial focal point of the foundation narrative: Romulus and Remus come to shore near the *figus Ruminalis* at its base (1.4.4–6); the Lupercalia at which Remus was captured takes place there (1.5.1–3). Romulus chooses the Palatine as the place from which to take auspices (1.6.4); he builds Rome’s first wall around it (1.7.2–3) and, with the help of Jupiter Stator, repels the Sabines from its flanks (1.12.3–9). Finally, Livy’s first extended description of a religious ritual involves the Palatine (1.7.3–15).

As the city expands and increasingly confronts outsiders, however, Livy’s topography shifts its emphasis from the original settlement on the Palatine to the Capitoline as “head” of Rome.² With Romulus’ establishment of the Temple of Jupiter Feretrius (1.10.5), the Capitoline becomes the repository of spoils taken from outsiders. During the construction of the Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the Capitoline, the god Terminus’ refusal to accept

relocation testifies to the endurance of the settlement centered on this place (1.55.1–4); and the giant human head discovered there portends Rome's future greatness as center and “head” of an expanding empire. As the only place in the city to escape the Gauls, the citadel, *arx*, on the summit of the Capitoline, reaffirms the city's endurance. The battle against the Sabines incorporates the forum area into this schematized landscape (Jaeger 1997; Spencer 2007). Together with the account of the construction of the Temple of Jupiter, the description of another great project, the draining of the forum and building the Cloaca Maxima (1.56.1–2), brings closure to the narrative of the regal period.³

Walls and gates play an important structural role in Livy's narrative: Romulus killed Remus, who breached his city wall (Konstan 1986). His declaration (“*sic deinde quicumque alius transiliet moenia mea*”), the first direct speech in the narrative, which defines the difference between friend and enemy, appears just after the text records the fact that the sacred space of the city has recently been made distinct from the outside (*Remum novos transiluisse muros*). Likewise, when Horatius kills his sister for mourning her Alban fiancé (1.25.6), his words, “so perish all who mourn the enemy,” spoken as he confronts her before a city gate (*ante portam Capenam*), draw a firm distinction between Roman and non-Roman in a story that otherwise emphasizes the close connection between Alba and Rome (Solodow 1979).⁴

Some major topographical features result from critical events in the city's political development. In Book 2, for example, after the expulsion of the Tarquins, the crop of grain from the *Ager Tarquiniorum* is condemned and dumped into the Tiber, where it forms the *Insula Tiberina* (2.5.3–4). The *Ager Tarquiniorum* itself, mentioned here for the first time, and defined as a place “between the city and the Tiber” (“*inter urbem ac Tiberim*”), is dedicated to Mars and becomes the Campus Martius, now formally introduced into the narrative through this etiology (2.5.2–3).

Within this more large-scale general topography, Livy uses specific buildings and places in order to commemorate specific events. Consider, for example, Tullia's vicious behavior after her father's death (1.48.6–7):

When she was returning home and had reached the top of the *uicus Cyprius*, where there was recently a temple of Diana (*ubi Dianium nuper fuit*), as she was turning her carriage right into the *clivus Urbius*, so that she might ride up the Esquiline, her driver halted in terror, checked the horses, and showed his mistress the prostrate body of the murdered Servius. A loathsome and inhuman crime is said to have then occurred, and the place serves as a reminder—they call it the *uicus Sceleratus*, where raving, with the furies of her father and sister in pursuit, Tullia is said to have driven her carriage through the body of her father, and with the gory vehicle to have brought part of her father's bloody corpse to her own household gods and those of her husband.

Livy marks this place precisely, using street and neighborhood names (*uicus Cuprius*, cf. Varro *Ling.* 5.159, *clivus Urbis*), and a temple that had only recently (*nuper*) disappeared. Aside from the Esquiline, no place named in the passage reappears in the extant text of Livy. The uniqueness of the topographical description reinforces the impression that this is a singularly evil crime. To reinforce the associations of the setting, Livy explicitly presents the place and its name as a reminder, *monumentum*.⁵

Thus, by the end of Book 5, when Camillus tries to persuade the Romans not to abandon their ruined city for Veii (5.51.1–54.7), Livy has set down a basic topographical template to which his narrative returns again and again, and the urban landscape has accrued rich layers of meaning and memory (on repetition, see Kraus 1998).

Livy's use of a place later in the narrative relies on this early topography. These later uses sometimes reinforce and sometimes undermine the original memory associated with it.⁶ Throughout the rest of the narrative, the Capitoline is the “head” of Rome and serves as the point from which generals depart for the field and as the endpoint of their triumphs when they return. At the close of Book 21, for example, the consul-elect, C. Flaminius, fearing that his political enemies will keep him from fighting Hannibal, departs for his province without waiting to take auspices on the Capitoline. The senators interpret this as an insult to the gods as well as to themselves, and their criticisms, which make a number of references to the Capitoline, bridge the divide between Books 21 and 22. Moreover, Flaminius' failure to observe ritual on the Capitoline (and elsewhere) is seen as a harbinger of the disasters that follow, culminating in Cannae (Levene, 1993; 2010). Book 26, which opens the second half of the Hannibalic War narrative, opens with the Senate meeting on the Capitoline (26.1.1) At the close of Book 30, which concludes the war against Hannibal, Scipio returns to Rome in a triumph, a return to the Capitoline that also brings closure to the narrative of the Hannibalic War (30.45.2). The appearance of the Capitoline at the ends of Books 1, 5, and 30, and at the beginning of Book 26, reinforces the architecture of the text, and its divisions into books, pentads, and decades (Stadter 1972/2009).

The Tiber appears infrequently after the first pentad, but the account of the suppression of the cult of Bacchus at Rome in 186 BC has the god's devotees plunging torches into its waters, an act all the more shocking to readers because of the river's active role in Rome's foundation myth (39.13.12); likewise, when the victorious Aemilius Paulus returns from Macedon, he sails up the Tiber (*aduerso Tiberi ad urbem est subuectus*) on a great ship decorated with booty (45.35.3). His fleet would have docked at the *naualia*, where in 338 BC the ships captured from Antium were brought, possibly as the nucleus of the Roman navy (8.14.12; Oakley 1998, 569–570). Readers considering the influx of wealth after Paulus' victory at Pydna might recall Livy's first reference to the *naualia*, in the passage identifying the location of

Cincinnatus' meager farm, “across from the very place where the dockyards are now” (*contra eum ipsum locum ubi nunc naualia sunt*; 3.26.8). This passage immediately follows the historian's explicit criticism of modern Rome's obsession with wealth (3.26.7). Paulus' enormous ship, decorated with booty, forms a sharp contrast with this early simplicity.

When Livy's characters use space and place rhetorically, their usage too draws upon the place's meaning in the greater narrative. In Book 6, for example, Marcus Manlius Capitolinus refers rhetorically to saving the Capitoline, an event narrated in Book 5, and a virtuous act whose memory is undermined by his ambition (Jaeger 1997); Hannibal encourages his men to anticipate as their final goal the schematized Rome of Books 1–5 (21.30.11): “Rome, the head of the world” (“*caput orbis terrarum*”), “which the Gauls once captured”; their goal is “the plain lying between the Tiber and the Roman walls.” Other passages closely intertwine a speaker's use of place with the narrator's: at his trial, Africanus reminds his listeners of his defeat of Hannibal, and then leads them around to all the temples, including those on the Capitoline (38.51.12–13); the narrator explicitly compares this day to his triumph over Hannibal (38.51.14); the tribunes accusing him then claim that Scipio has both triumphed over the Roman people and led a secession of the plebeians to the Capitoline (38.52.5; Jaeger 1997).

Earlier Roman writers had already exploited Rome's urban landscape. Cicero in particular used to advantage the historical and religious associations of specific places—such as when, for example, delivering his first speech against Catiline, he made much of the fact that the Senate was meeting in the Temple of Jupiter Stator. This temple at the base of the Palatine had been vowed and built by Romulus in order to turn the tide of battle against the Sabines. Cicero emphasized its origin in Rome's first great military crisis so as to convey the urgency of the present situation and link his own leadership and heroism to that of the city's founder (Vasaly 1993, 41–49).

There is no question that Livy's presentation of urban topography owes much to Cicero's (Gaertner {}⁷). Unlike Cicero, however, who used features of the urban landscape to make rhetorical points specific to individual speeches or dialogues, Livy incorporated topography into an account that ran from Rome's mythical beginnings (*a primordia urbis, Praef.* 1) to his own time, a period of well over 700 years, an account that altered and reshaped its image of Rome so as to fit the context of a steadily expanding empire. These repeated references to places; the narrator's setting out a coherent topography, in which the space of the city—and indeed the growing empire—and the space of the text reinforce one another; the rhetorical references made by characters to places and to their meaning acquired from events earlier in the text—all these reinforce the importance of reading Livy's monuments and his references to places both intertextually and intratextually (Kraus, 1998; Chaplin 2010). What follows gives three examples to illustrate this point.

After the Roman defeat at Cannae (22.51.1–4), Maharbal urges the victorious Hannibal to march directly on Rome. When Hannibal hesitates, expressing amazement at his own success, Maharbal says, according to Livy: “on the contrary, so that you understand what has been accomplished by this battle ... the fifth day from now, you will banquet as victor on the Capitoline [*uictor in Capitolio epulaberis*]. Follow me. I will go in advance with the cavalry, so that they [the Romans] learn of my being arrived before the news of my approach reaches them.”

This anecdote was famous. Both Cato and Coelius give similar versions, which Aulus Gellius preserves (10.24.6–7). Gellius quotes Coelius first:

Si uis mihi equitatum dare et ipse cum cetero exercitu me sequi, diequinti Romae in Capitolium curabo tibi cena sit cocta. (If you are willing to give me the cavalry and follow me yourself with the rest of the army, I will see to it that on the fifth day from today dinner is cooked for you at Rome on the Capitoline.)

Gellius says that Coelius took this information from Cato's account in *Origines* 4: “Send the cavalry with me to Rome. On the fifth day from now, dinner will be cooked for you on the Capitoline” (“*Mitte mecum Romam equitatum; diequinti in Capitolio tibi cena cocta erit*”). Livy's version recalls both: his imperative (“follow!” [*sequere*])) recalls Cato's (“send!” [*mitte*])); and Livy's explicit suggestion that Hannibal should follow Maharbal and the cavalry recalls Coelius'. However, Livy's version differs from the others in some important respects. Cato says “*diequinti in Capitolio tibi cena cocta erit*,” which Coelius follows closely to produce “*diequinti Romae in Capitolium curabo tibi cena sit cocta*.” The shared expression “*cena cocta erit/ cena sit cocta*” draws attention to the process of meal preparation. In contrast, Livy's expression, “you shall banquet [*epulaberis*] as victor on the Capitoline,” draws attention to the consumption of food in a celebratory feast. The addition of “*uictor*” and the change in diction are small alterations, but they heighten the threat to the Capitoline. Hannibal will not just eat atop the “head” of Rome; he will celebrate there as “*uictor*.”

Moreover, these changes also bring the threat to the Capitoline in line with Livy's representation of the place elsewhere in his history. A number of *epulae* in Livy either take place on or are otherwise connected to the Capitoline, and they have religious significance. For example, *epulae* are an important part of Cincinnatus' triumph (3.29.5): “they say that banquets [*epulae*] were set out in front of everyone's house, and that the banqueters [*epulantes*], singing a song of triumph and making ritual jests, followed the chariot in the manner of revelers.” Presumably, the banqueters followed Cincinnatus' chariot up the Capitoline. In Book 5, Camillus uses the banquet of Jupiter on the Capitoline as metonymy for all ritual banquets held in specific places at Rome, when he asks (5.52.6), “surely the couch cannot be set up for Jupiter's banquet [*in Iouis epula*] anywhere else but on the

Capitoline [*in Capitolio*]?” In Book 38, Scipio Africanus dines with the Senate on the Capitoline, where he is asked during the banquet [*inter epulas*], to engage his daughter to Tiberius Gracchus (38.57.5–8). Arguing for Aemilius Paullus’ triumph (45.28.13), Servilius refers to “those banquets of the senate [*illae epulae senatus*], which are set out neither in a private place nor one that is both public and profane, but on the Capitoline [*in Capitolio*],” and then asks rhetorically, “will the gates be closed to Paullus’ triumph?” (Pelikan Pittenger {, 258–270).

Aulus Gellius preserves these brief passages of Cato and Coelius for their use of the term “*diequinti*.” Without more context than he gives, it is impossible to gauge exactly the extent to which Livy altered his predecessors or to understand completely the effect of his references to them. We can say, however, that Livy’s Maharbal promises Hannibal more than just a dinner cooked, that elsewhere in Livy *epulae* are associated with triumphs, and that an *epulum* on the Capitoline is a ritual meal. For Livy’s readers, the prospect of Hannibal’s banqueting there would place him where great Romans celebrated triumphs and, with the rest of the Senate, honored Jupiter, an affront both to them and to the Roman god. Livy thus alters the historical and historicized memory of this event in a way that reinforces the consistency with which he represents the Capitoline; and the result of that adjustment is to emphasize the sacred nature of the urban Roman landscape.

The memory of a place can itself influence events. My second example of the engagement of Livy’s text in rich intertextual *and* intratextual relationships involves a monument that was not at Rome and which never existed. In Book 26, among the events of 210 BC, Livy writes that the Acarnanians, learning that the Aetolians were planning to attack them and knowing they were unequal to them in strength, prepared to fight to the last man: they sent their non-combatants away into Epirus; their men of military age swore not to return from battle unless victorious; and the people pronounced a curse on anyone who extended hospitality to the survivors of a defeat. In addition, they asked the people of Epirus to bury their battle dead, cover them with one grave-mound, and place over them the following epitaph (26.25.14):

Hic siti sunt Acarnanes, qui adversus vim atque iniuriam Aetolorum pro patria pugnantes mortem occubuerunt. (Here are buried the Acarnanians, who met their death fighting for their fatherland against the force and wrongdoing of the Aetolians.)

These precautions proved unnecessary. Livy says that, “first the report [*fama*] of the Acarnanian oath delayed the Aetolian attack, then the news of Philip’s arrival [*auditus Philippi aduentus*] drove them even to retreat within their borders” (26.25.16).

Livy’s source for the story of the Acarnanians was probably Polybius (9.40.4–6). The fragments from the *Suda* that preserve Polybius on these events refer

to the Acarnanians' anger and desperation, their resolution to treat survivors harshly, and their curse on anyone, especially Epirots, who received fugitives. We do not know if Polybius quoted a proposed epitaph. At any rate, Livy's passage presents an epitaph that was never inscribed on a *tumulus* since the *tumulus* was never built, and it does so as if quoting that epitaph verbatim, with no mention of a source or even the fact that the intended inscription would have been in Greek.⁸

Livy's epitaph, however, also recalls a passage from Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*. The passage (Book 1.101–102) discusses brave men facing death: the legions Cato records marching off to certain destruction; the Spartans at Thermopylae, for whom, according to Cicero, Simonides composed an epitaph (“Stranger, tell how you saw us lying here, obedient to the sacred laws of our fatherland” [“*Dic, hospes, Spartae nos te hic uidisse iacentis, Dum sanctis patriae legibus obsequimur*”]); and Leonidas' telling his men to “go on boldly, Lacedaemonians, for perhaps today we shall dine among the dead.” Cicero concludes with the story of the Spartan mother, “who when she had sent her son to battle and had learned that he had been killed said, ‘I bore him for this reason, that he would be the kind of man that did not hesitate to meet death for his country’” [“*quae cum filium in proelium misisset et interfectum audisset, ‘idcirco’ inquit ‘genueram, ut esset, qui pro patria mortem non dubitaret occumbere’*”]. Livy's direct quote of an epitaph (without even the qualifying *ferme* he uses elsewhere, as at 6.29.9; Oakley 1997), and the final phrase of his epitaph, “*pro patria pugnantes mortem occubuerunt*,” together allude to the beginning and the end, and thus recall the entirety, of Cicero's description of courageous Spartans.

Moreover, the reference to the Cicero passage, and the combination of oath, epitaph, and harsh treatment of survivors, together call to mind the most famous literary version of an outnumbered party's fighting to the end, that is, Herodotus' account of the Spartans at Thermopylae, who died almost to a man and were buried in a common *tumulus* under suitable—and directly quoted by Herodotus—epitaphs. The few who avoided death in battle suffered the very fate stipulated in the Acarnanians' oath (Hdt. 7.228). An allusion to Cicero seems unnecessary here, because, by themselves, Livy's references to sanctions, tomb, and epitaph together call to mind the Herodotus' account of Spartan courage.

However, the allusion to Cicero had another effect besides reminding Livy's readers of Thermopylae. Not only does Cicero use the Spartans' death as an *exemplum*, he also reports Simonides (the very exemplar of memory) commemorating it. Livy's allusion makes a statement about the memory of the past and its exemplary force. In its immediate context in 26.26.16, *fama* means “report”: the “report” of Acarnanian resolve deters the Aetolians; but the passage as a whole brings into play its other meanings: “tradition,” “reputation,” as well as “fame,” “glory,” and “renown.” The directly quoted

titulus produces on Livy's readers the same impression of Acarnanian resolve that the *coniurationis fama* made on the Aetolians, but it does so by invoking tradition. While the Aetolians feel the oath's effect (or rather the effect of the *fama* of the oath) as that of an intimidating display of angry resolve, Livy's readers feel it doubly: on the one hand, the direct quotation makes it possible for readers to share with the Aetolians the impression of the news in all its unfiltered immediacy; on the other, readers reminded of Herodotus also feel the impact of this *fama* multiplied by weight of the *fama* of the Spartans' stand at Thermopylae, a weight that has accumulated for centuries, starting with the epitaph and continuing on through Herodotus, Polybius, and Cicero. The inscription that Livy quotes never existed as words carved into stone, precisely because the very report—and tradition—of other words was so efficacious. The power of memory preserved in stone gives way to that of memory preserved in literature.

Livy's readers can engage with this “monument” intratextually as well. The Romans' own treaty with the Aetolians, says Livy, was placed on the Capitoline (*in Capitolio*) at 26.24.14. Livy does not quote this treaty, probably because there was no need to. It still existed in his time, and, indeed, fragments still exist (Levene 2010, with references). More important, however, is Livy's later use of the site of Thermopylae, for in 207 BC the Aetolians blockaded the pass but did *not* prevent Philip from getting through (28.5.8; Chaplin 2010, 55). The success of the Acarnanians' Spartan-like resolve, their ability to defend themselves with *fama*, is more impressive when set against the Aetolians' fickleness as allies and their failure to defend the pass with physical fortifications. Discussing the battle against Antiochus at Thermopylae in 191 BC, Jane Chaplin points out the many memories associated with the place, and the self-conscious evocation of those memories (36.15.12): “The place is called Thermopylae, famed for the death of the Spartans fighting against the Persians, a death more memorable than the battle” (“*Thermopylae locus appellatur, nobilis Lacedaemoniorum aduersus Persas morte magis memorabili quam pugna*”). Indeed it is, for Livy has shown that even the *fama* of their death can deter an enemy attack. Thermopylae has become, as Kraus (1994) puts it, both a place and a commonplace.⁹

My third example returns to the heart of the Roman landscape. On the one hand, Livy's Roman contemporaries could picture events at Rome taking place in a *generically* familiar and largely consistent setting, partly because Livy uses general terms (e.g., houses, walls), or major features of topography (e.g., Tiber, Capitoline, Palatine), and partly because, when he refers to specific places and buildings, they either still exist in his own time or their former positions can be plotted using places and buildings still existing in Livy's time.

This consistency helps set off specific cases of change. When Livy draws

attention to change in specific places, he sometimes interprets that change explicitly, as in the case of the spoils of Syracuse whose presence in—and disappearance from—the temples of Honor and Virtue, Livy says, signified a greed for booty that undermined the Roman character (25.40.1–3; Levene 2010). Sometimes he relies on other references to a place—both within and outside of his text—to help readers grasp what he leaves implicit. The treatment of the Curia Hostilia shows how Livy's text presents and encourages interpretation of change in the urban landscape through the use of a specific detail, a place's name. Once again, this interpretation relies on both an intertextual and an intratextual reading.

Livy's first reference to the Curia Hostilia appears in Book 1. Tradition ascribed the construction of the building, which was right off the Forum Romanum, to Rome's third king, Tullus Hostilius (Livy 1.30; Varro *Ling.* 5.155). According to Livy, Tullus built the Curia Hostilia immediately after the war with Alba Longa, which determined whether Rome would rule Alba, or vice versa. The construction of the Curia appears among several changes that Livy introduces with the heading “Rome, in the meantime, grew from Alba's ruins” (1.30.1). According to Livy (1.30.2), Tullus “made a meeting place for the Senatorial order, which he had increased in number, the Senate House, which was called the Curia Hostilia until the time of our fathers” (*“templumque ordini ab se aucto curiam fecit quae Hostilia usque ad patrum nostrorum aetatem appellata est”*). The phrase “until the time of our fathers” leads readers' minds from the distant past directly to the relatively recent past and, via “our fathers,” to the narrator's present.

The second reference to the Curia Hostilia appears in Book 5 after the Gallic sack of Rome. The Senate met here in order to decide whether the surviving Romans should rebuild the city on its ruins or move to Veii. Although Camillus speaks persuasively in praise of the current location, Livy says, “what decided the matter was a chance word: when the Senate was meeting in the Curia Hostilia a little afterward, in order to discuss these things, and the soldiers returning from guard duty were marching across the Forum, as they reached the *comitium*, a centurion cried out ‘Halt the standards; we shall stop here’.” (5.55.1–2).

In Book 22, Livy writes that, in response to the news of Cannae, the praetors summoned the Senate to meet and discuss defending the city, since the victorious Hannibal was surely on his way. The moment was one of supreme crisis. Livy emphasizes its importance by naming fully both the praetors and the meeting place (22.55.1): “P. Furius Philus and M. Pomponius, the praetors, summoned the Senate into the Curia Hostilia [*in Curiam Hostiliam uocauerunt*] and took counsel concerning the defense of the city.”

Although the senate house appears frequently in Livy's narrative as the setting for important events (e.g., the overthrow of Servius 1.48.1–4), Livy names the Curia Hostilia in only these three passages, and each instance follows

immediately an account of a critical moment when the city's sovereignty or survival is at stake. Naming it both highlights the importance of the moment and affirms Rome's permanence. Yet, standing in the Roman Forum, Livy's Roman readers would not see a Curia Hostilia; imagining the Forum with which they were familiar, only the oldest might with their minds' eye envision a Curia Hostilia. Readers who knew Rome only through Livy's text would not imagine a contemporary Rome with a Curia Hostilia. They had already been told not to: as Livy said in Book 1, the *name* of the place endured "until the time of our fathers." Livy's contemporary readers would imagine or see a Curia, but they would note a difference.

What happened to the building? And what happened to the name? It is hard to say exactly, but we know that, in 81 BC, the dictator Sulla, victor in one round of the late Republic's bloody civil wars, restored and (possibly) enlarged the Curia to accommodate his enlarged Senate (Dio 40.50.1–3; Cic. *Fin.* 5.2; Coarelli {}). It does not seem to have become officially known as the Curia Cornelia, but it probably had Sulla's name on it somewhere. In 52 BC, after political enemies murdered P. Clodius Pulcher, his supporters carried the body into the Curia, used the furniture to construct a funeral pyre, and burned the place down on top of it. (The surviving summaries of Livy's lost books suggest that this was among the opening events of Book 107. Cicero makes much of the burning in his defense of the killer, Milo, in *Pro Milone* 90–91.) According to Dio, Sulla's son Faustus then rebuilt the *curia* (Dio 40.49.2–3).

In the beginning of the fifth book of the *De Finibus* (written in 45 BC, but set in Athens in 79 BC, not long after Sulla had both sacked Athens and rebuilt the Curia at Rome), Cicero (*Fin.* 5.63–65) has Piso invoke the Curia, as he strolls toward Plato's Academy with the other participants in the dialogue. The speakers remark on how the landscape and monuments of Athens call to mind the great philosophers who once lived there (Vasaly 1993, 63–65). Turning thoughts toward Rome, Piso says:

Indeed, looking upon our Curia [*curiam nostram*]*—and I am talking about the Curia Hostilia, not this new one, which seems diminished, although it has been enlarged [*Hostiliam dico, non hanc nouam, quae minor mihi esse uidetur, posteaquam est maior*]**—*looking upon our Curia, I used to think of Scipio, Cato, Laelius, and yet especially of my grandfather. So great is the force of reminding [*admonitionis*] in places, that it is not without reason that the practice of memory was drawn from them.

The old Curia Hostilia evokes for Piso the memory of great Romans now dead. Even as Piso invokes its memory, Cicero reminds readers that the place has changed, and that the *Curia Hostilia* is gone.

The Senate house that Piso describes was pulled down in 44 BC. Dio says that the ostensible reason was Lepidus' wanting to build a temple of Felicitas, but

that the real reason was so that the name of Sulla would no longer be preserved on it, and it could be rebuilt anew as the Curia Julia (Dio lists this among the excessive honors granted Julius Caesar in his lifetime). Dio calls it the Curia Hostilia in this passage (*to hostilion*). Julius Caesar did not live to build this Curia; in fact, the Curia Julia, on a different site from the Curia Hostilia, is the first building that Augustus mentions in the *Res Gestae* among his completed construction projects (RG 19). He does not mention this building by name, a noteworthy omission, considering the concerns expressed by the *Res Gestae* about the names on the Porticus Octavia and Theatre of Pompey. Livy and his contemporaries saw Augustus' new Curia Julia near the Basilica Julia, and a Temple of Felicitas where first the Curia Hostilia, then Sulla's Curia, once stood.

In Book 1, Livy explicitly expresses interest in the place's name and that name's endurance. Cicero and Dio suggest that the name of the place was a topic of discussion in “the time of our fathers”—that is, during the last decades of the Republic. Together, the sources suggest that the place stirred memory, the name stirred emotions, that Livy did not use it carelessly anywhere, and that he expected readers to notice it.

Livy's reference in 1.30 to the Curia's name, to the “age of our fathers,” and to the increase in the Senate's size, together suggest a specific allusion to *Fin.* 5.2, which, after all, shows the very generation referred to by Livy's “our fathers” discussing the Curia in a way that implies a name change, and remarking on the increase in size. If this is so, then, in alluding to *De Finibus*, Livy (1.30) recalls specifically the discussion about the “diminished” impression left by the new and enlarged Curia (and the new and enlarged Senate); consequently, it invites readers to think about this change as one for the worse. At the same time, ideas expressed in this passage of *De Finibus* pervade Livy's narrative: specific places call to mind the actions of great men; moreover, as Piso points out (5.6.1), sightseeing motivated only by curiosity is pointless unless one emulates the great men whose memories reside in such places (Edwards 1996, 17–18; Vasaly 1993, 29–30; Rutledge 2012, 86).

A name change is a small detail, and the Senate house is only one building, but a prominent one, with a distinguished literary pedigree. Mentioning the name of the Curia Hostilia in the aftermath of the Gallic sack and in the aftermath of Cannae alerts readers to the change in the place. It directs attention to one particular way in which Rome has changed physically, politically, and morally—for the place holds the memory of great men. The city of Livy's time was very different from the nascent empire of Book 1; it was very different from the Rome that survived the Gauls; and it was very different from the Rome that survived Cannae and won the Second Punic War. In his books on the Second Punic War, Livy credited the Senate for wisdom, the people for their willingness to work with the Senate in a time of crisis, and in most cases people and Senate alike for their willingness to honor

authority and experience. In Book 1, when Livy discusses its construction and name, the Curia commemorates Rome's preserved and increased sovereignty. In Book 5, it symbolizes continuity. It testifies to effective Senatorial leadership and Roman solidarity in the mid-republic (Book 22). However, the civil strife of the first century BC altered and then destroyed the building. The positive growth under Tullus Hostilius gave way to the excessive size that made the late republic totter (*Praef.* 4). The Curia Julia, built in Livy's time and on a different site, became a credit to Augustus and to the tenuous stability brought about by the rule of one man. In his *Preface*, Livy says that Rome could now tolerate neither its faults nor their remedies. If the remedy for Rome's character were a return to monarchy rather than to clashing dynasts, the new Senate house, with its new name, would have been a bitter pill to swallow, especially for the Senatorial aristocracy.

Livy faced a daunting subject: seven centuries of events; a place growing from a small town into the center of the empire; a place crammed with temples, shrines, statues, paintings, and the houses of great men, all artifacts that were subject to destruction and whose meaning was open to debate;¹⁰ and a place whose every street and neighborhood had a name, and every name pointed to a story. He confronted a literary tradition that included both Greek and Roman historians, who offered both sources and inspiration. That tradition also included Cicero's memorable representations of Rome in the dying years of the republic. Livy faced this formidable challenge by weaving Rome's history into a textual meditation on place and memory: the narrative was a journey through time; it expanded as Rome did; it followed various temporal rhythms, but always returned to the city; above all, it asserted the power of the written word to preserve, contest, and question the past.

Notes

- 1 For example, in Herodotus 1.9.1–1.13.1, the conjugal bedroom serves as the central site of a regime change and plays the same role in Livy 1.58.1–59.2.
- 2 After Book 1, the Palatine drops out of the surviving narrative, except for the occasional annalistic notice. The important exception is the arrival of the Magna Mater and construction of her temple (29.14.14, 29.37.3, 30.38.9, 36.36.3). The Palatine probably resurfaced in Livy's account of Augustus' reign.
- 3 On the Cloaca Maxima and its metaphorical significance, see Gowers 1995.
- 4 Livy says it is not known which set of triplets was Roman and which Alban. He expresses this confusion with spatial metaphors (1.24.1): “*nominum error remanet ... auctores utroque trahunt; plures tamen inuenio qui Romanos Horatios uocent; hos ut sequar inclinat animus.*”

- 5 See also, the only other place pronounced *sceleratus*, from 8.15.8, the story of the Vestal Virgin Minucia, interred alive by the Colline gate, in a place called the *Sceleratus campus*. Livy adds, “I believe that the name was created for that place from unchastity” (“*credo ab incesto id ei loco nomen factum*”).
- 6 For a reading of the multiple memories associated with the Lacus Curtius, see Spencer 2007.
- 7 Not just Rome's topography: Livy models his Syracuse on Cicero's in the *Verrines* as well as Thucydides' (Jaeger {, 2010).
- 8 See also, 28.46.16, where Livy says that Hannibal's inscription at Croton was written in Punic and Greek.
- 9 Chaplin (2010, 55–56) also points out the footnote-like references to *fama* in 36.16.7 and 36.17.11.
- 10 As Stephen Rutledge aptly puts it (2012, 5), Rome in antiquity functioned as a “repository of historical clutter.”

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Further Reading

On ancient conceptions of space, see J. S. Romm, *The Edges of the Earth in Ancient Thought*, Princeton University Press 1992; on Roman authors and the urban landscape, see Edwards, 1996. On landscape in Livy's Latin prose predecessors, see Vasaly 1993 (Cicero) and Riggsby 2006 (Caesar). On landscape and monuments in Livy, see Kraus 1994 and 1998, Jaeger 1997. On urban monuments and art, see Rutledge 2012. On Livian inter- and intratextuality, see Levene 2010. Although it deals with a different continent and culture, Keith H. Basso's *Wisdom Sits in Places: Landscape and Language among the Western Apache* (University of New Mexico Press, 1996) insightfully probes the depth of meaning behind place names.

Chapter 6

Livy and Religion

John Scheid

Two points of view have dominated when trying to ascertain Livy's religious position. One group of historians maintained that Livy believed in the supernatural (Steele 1902, LXIV–LXV; Reichart 1938; Stübler 1941), while another held the opposing view that Livy's thinking indicated skepticism (Fabricius 1865; Bornecque 1933, 59–67; Bayet 1947, XXXIX–XLI; Kajanto 1957; Liebeschuetz 1967). P. G. Walsh (1958; 1961, 46–64) tried to amalgamate the two approaches by implying that Livy was a Stoic on a general level, but a Skeptic about the details. D. Levene (1993) took up this overall question again by showing that it is impossible to apply the same characteristics to Roman religion that we would apply to religion today. For Levene, Livy's belief and faith in the intervention of the gods in this world is conveyed by religion. In order to examine the problem of Livy's faith, he has studied four aspects of his work: the supernatural, piety, skepticism, and Livy's idea of fate and fortune.

Levene uses the prodigy system for this, as described and commented on by Livy, in order to discover the way in which the gods are supposed to intervene in this world. Levene, however, uncovers an undeniable skepticism on the part of the historian, as opposed to a faith in supernatural intervention in this world, in regard to prodigies and signs. To explain this paradox, Levene evokes the juxtaposition of a double-parallel causality (divine and human) that can be found, for example, in the works of Homer and Herodotus, to highlight the two levels of action—divine and human. Livy always expresses the two beliefs simultaneously, juxtaposing the sign itself with skeptical remarks about its significance, as if he wishes to deny divine intervention after having reported it (see 43.13.1–2, the passage following half a page of incredible prodigies). To explain this attitude in the least paradoxical way, it could be supposed that, by this, Livy was conforming to the reservation of final judgment, as was appropriate according to the Academy, and which can also be found in, for example, Cicero. Levene, however, prefers to consider that Livy was leaving the responsibility of choosing between explanations to the reader. In his opinion, it is anyway pointless to search for accounts about Livy's personal faith in passages where Livy is describing divine causality and his doubt over true intervention by the gods.

In his account of Levene's book, W. Liebeschuetz (1995) has contested the idea that Livy was leaving the responsibility to the reader for deciding if the prodigies mentioned were true interventions by the gods in human history, or not. Liebeschuetz prefers to place Livy's critique in the context of the

divination system itself. He suggests that, according to ancestral Roman tradition, skepticism was part of the management of signs and prodigies, as a sign was hardly ever accepted as one. It was always the subject of conflicting debates between individuals and in the Senate before being deemed as such. In these discussions, skepticism also played a vital role. The presentation of prodigies, which seems paradoxical to us, could, in fact, refer to the customary institutional debate about signs. According to Liebeschuetz, D. Levene's work more importantly emphasizes Livy's freedom as regards signs and prodigies. Throughout Roman historiography, the prodigies generally announce and explain success or disaster. In Livy's history, this use of the prodigies is also very present, but it is neither naive nor unconditional. Livy also links the success or failure of the consuls, dictators, and praetors to observe these signs, and the piety (or otherwise) with which they ignore them or disconnect them from the events they could have determined. Levene demonstrates that Livy uses the prodigy lists as an element of literary composition to compile *exempla* of the effects of piety and impiety. However, it could be added that, through the ritualistic interpretation of this literary technique, he behaves like the Roman politicians who used interventions by the gods to justify their ventures, or to discredit an opponent. They were allowed to do this, and it was the political context and opportunism that determined recourse to this kind of argument. It certainly was not simplistic and automatic behavior.

Moreover, D. Levene is certainly correct in asserting that all these passages are unable to reveal Livy's faith, whatever that may be. Similarly, in 1967, W. Liebeschuetz (1967, 45–55) had already decided to highlight the very traditional character of Livy's view of religion, by studying several anecdotes. He noticed that Livy does not base his conception of religion on philosophy and contemplating the movements of the sky, or on a natural religion. For him, religion is an ancestral tradition with its own rationalism, which is very close to Roman legal thinking. Liebeschuetz, when he emphasizes Livy's capacity to fathom the rituals a little further on, again specifies the distinctive and typically Roman nature of that attitude. The capacity and depth are not the results of him wishing to intellectually grasp the importance of the religious factor in the account, but of the thinking behind the rites that the religion of his day practiced. He adds (1967, 54): "For a reader whose conception of religion is derived from the Bible, it is almost impossible to assess the relative strength of strictly religious, as opposed to political, antiquarian, or literary elements in his outlook." J. Linderski (1993, 53–70) expresses the same idea, in a more incisive manner, in a text published in 1993. When criticizing P. Walsh's presentation (1958, 49), J. Linderski (1993, 54) notices that "this makes Livy a member of a protestant church; but his history is not about god in men's lives, but about the rise of Rome, *dis auctoribus*." He continues (1993, 55–56): "Roman state religion was not interested in individual salvation; its only concern was *salus publica*, the security of the Roman State,

or, in Roman terms, the preservation of *pax deorum*, the peace between gods and the state.”

It is therefore worth examining the description and portrayal of religious acts, in order to learn more about religion in Livy's work. The way in which Linderski deals with his subject regarding prodigies and auspices in Livy is also what should be done on a wider scale regarding sacrifices, vows, the sacerdotal games, or priestly roles. However, Livy is neither a technical author nor a priest who could explain all the facts of a given rite. He describes an episode and gives, in this context, part of a rite that possibly had created a problem, or that was particularly significant. By bringing together the different descriptions of sacrifices and vows taken from Livy's 35 surviving books, it is possible to create a small manual on Roman religious practices. This is not the place for doing that, so we will limit ourselves to a certain number of important facts in order to understand Roman rituals, as described by Livy.

The Origins of Roman Religion

According to Livy, Roman religion is a system of rites celebrated according to ancestral custom. This ritual system was established by ancestors and not by the will of a revealed divinity. The gods and temples are part of the rites that are already there when Romulus and his companions establish Rome. There is not the creation of a regulated system that could be called religion, but a renewal, followed by a limited development, of what was already there. After the founder kings, a religious system develops. It is partly completed with guidance from the Sibylline Books, which were interpreted by specialist priests. Finally, a passage dating back to the time when order was being restored after the Gauls had taken Rome (6, 1, and 9) describes debates that regularly provoked the rules of the oral religious tradition, sometimes determined by punctilious decisions, which were not, however, automatically welcomed. At this time, the pontiffs wished to keep the dictates of the ritualistic order concealed from the masses, as they wanted to have the ritual dictates as a means of curbing the minds of the masses. According to Livy, discussions in fact focused on the suitable or unsuitable status of days for taking action, rather than on information based on experience and reasoning. Uncertainty over all this knowledge can also be perceived in this text, not only after the sacking of Rome, but also in Livy's time itself. There are customs, which are regularly updated, and scholars try to recreate the reasons for the customs. This does not mean that the customs are meaningless and forgotten, and that Roman religion is vacuous, but that the customary apparatus has to be regularly reinstated, as well as the means for discussing a variety of justifications. These are always numerous, as would be expected from a religious system where only the rite itself is unique and necessary, but where there are multiple interpretations, not dependent on a revelation.

In other words, the dividing up of these initiatives, of which several are, however, simply there like the gods they serve, is the result of a religious system without revelation or dogma. The important thing is the rites themselves and the timing of the obligations, as well as the method that allows for consultation of the gods and understanding the prodigies.

The Aim of Religion

The aim of Roman religion is always the earthly and material benefit of the Romans, whatever the portrayal of signs of future grandeur (e.g., 1.45.6) or of prayers that Livy communicates. It is never a question of the salvation of an individual soul, but of a citizen's material assets as a member of the Roman community. The Roman gods partake in this alliance on the basis of mutual respect. One only has only to re-read various prayers (29, 27, 1; 31, 5, 1–4) to realize this. The vows expressed every year, from the start of the year to the Roman census, do not differ greatly. These vows all concern the salvation and success of the Roman people in all that they do.

The gods are, to some extent, the Romans' earthly allies. They live in the city of Rome. The dictator, Camillus, in his long speech in 385 BC, referred to this community of gods and men united in the site of Rome (5.52–54). It is hardly surprising that Livy refers to the public games, which concluded the great sacrifices, as *coetus hominum deorumque*—a meeting of gods and men (2.37.9).

Public and Private

Even if the bulk of Livy's works is about the rites of public religion, individuals are not missed out entirely. Most concern the heads of families, within the context of their domestic religion. The historian cites the celebration of some private family rites among members of the aristocracy as the result of an event that has usually occurred among them (see 39.46.1–4). Moreover, this episode provides one of the reasons why Livy mentions private rites, as a prodigy occurs that perhaps relates to a public prophesy. This same combination of private events and public rites is substantiated by the story of Sempronius Gracchus and of Scipio Africanus (38.57.5–6). In another passage, we learn of a magistrate privately offering sacrifice at the temple of Fortune in Praeneste (42.1.7–8). More important, for our line of questioning, are several passages which show that domestic religious duties prevail over public functions (41.15. 9–10; 42.32.1–2; 43.11.1; 43.23.6). What is more, in the context of the struggle between the plebeians and the patricians, Livy attributes the comparison of private religious power with that of public religion to certain protagonists (10, 7, 4–5. 12), after which there are then two identical religious paths for Livy—that of domestic worship and that of public religion.

Does this mean that, according to Livy, the only religious practices that Romans knew were the positive rites of public religion and those of domestic religion? Absolutely not. Livy describes other practices in two passages, which he considers a deviation in some form from normal “religion.” The first example is found in 213 BC, when Roman military prospects were in turmoil. The historian writes an entire chapter (25, 1) describing the despondency that took hold of the authorities and the troubles that followed. In his description of this panic, Livy combines what was happening in private houses with what took place in the public spaces. And what changes are the *ritus*, and what is meant by that is not the rites themselves, but the way of celebrating the rites, the ancestral custom of sacrifice and prayer, in accordance with the way the historian annotates the term *ritus* (25, 1, 7: *abolebantur Romani ritus, sed in publico etiam ac foro Capitolioque mulierum turba erat nec sacrificantium nec precantium deos patrio more*). The cultural role of women is something else that changes. They normally take part in worship, but in a very specific way. They were usually invited by the Senate and magistrates to plead with the gods or to celebrate any atonements. At home, they also had their own tasks. However, when they pervaded the most formal places to officiate there, with the help of the people who carried out the sacrifices and augurs foreign to gods who were not the ancestral gods, it was deemed disgraceful. And then, on top of all that, were the rural plebeians, taking refuge in the city. Here is a description of what, in Livy's eyes, was a poor religious attitude. People whose sex and social standing did not permit them to act in an independent way were taking the lead in public religious acts, and in order to do so were not seeking permission from tradition and ancestral authorities, but from people with no status—preachers and charlatans from goodness knows where, who were exploiting the superstitions of the worried masses. Such superstition consisted of thinking that the gods and ancestral rites had abandoned the Romans and of independently turning to other gods, who were venerated in a new manner.

However, this has nothing to do with an internalized religiosity, but concerns personal initiatives that are at odds with the general trait of ancient piety. Nevertheless, this behavior is firmly rejected by the historian. It is interesting to note that the “superstitious” and the charlatans were apparently using written texts, prophecies, and rituals. Some have considered this as the start of the decline of Roman religion (Springer 1952). It is, on the contrary, a negative *exemplum*, written two centuries later to show poor piety as something that ignored ancestral tradition, and, according to Livy, the population of Rome reacted and put pressure on the authorities to end the scandal. A similar example is the notorious Bacchanalia in 186 BC (39, Chapter 8–20). This *exemplum* of major superstition has some similarities to the case of 213 BC. Some of the Romans, in the atmosphere of panic and disorder created by the war, which had seriously affected spirits and the authorities, were tending to forget their traditions and throwing themselves

into new religious experiences. The fact that the authorities initially paid little attention also reveals the fact that these religious behaviors were private and did not affect them. It was only when the practices intruded on public space, or even created problems with public order, that the authorities intervened.

In any case, even if these *exempla* are considered as testimonies of the official opinion during Livy's era, nowhere in these events can be found a sign of searching for a new religion, similar to modern religions. It is always about the rites, the ritual practices that obey, in one case, paradigms other than the ancestral models, and which, in the other, obey rites that gathered together people who, according to tradition, should not have been meeting at night and in secret and of whom some, in addition, were terrorized and abused. All this is certainly not a true indictment of these practices, but it is a fact that neither of the two practices survived. After the Bacchanalian thiasoi of 186 BC, similar rites were not experienced in Rome or in Italy.

Livy describes another event that is the first hint of a quest for spirituality similar to that of Christianity. In a passage dealing with Scipio Africanus' vanity and pretense at being superior to others (26.19.3–9), he describes Scipio as being in the habit of going to the Capitol early in the morning in order to sit alone in the *cella* of Jupiter, where he remains for some time. Close examination of sources describing Scipio's strange initiative (Val. Max. 1.2.2; Gell. 6.1.6; Dio 16.39 = fr. 57.39; cf. Anonym. *De vir. ill.* 49.1–3) do not reveal any reference to a philosophy or new form of piety. The only comment by way of explanation that Livy gives is in the sentence proceeding our own (26.19.4: “*pleraque apud multitudinem aut per nocturnas uisa species aut uelut diuinitus mente monita agens, siue et ipse capti quadam superstitione animi, siue ut imperia consiliaque uelut sorte oraculi missa sine cunctatione exsequerentur*”). Livy does not mention an elevation of the soul, but a *superstitio animi*, which could be seen as a criticism of a new religious behavior based on a philosophy that is, however, never raised by any subsequent philosophers. In fact, Livy and the other sources are given to understand that he is engaging in a private oracular practice. Scipio was consulting Jupiter before every public or private action and decision. Moreover, it is not this consultation that surprised the Romans and gave rise to a partisan interpretation, but the ostentatious manner with which he carried out the consultation.

If the way in which Livy presents relationships with the gods is re-examined, several facts stand out. A series of conflicts over the definition of good religious behavior is found—piety in the face of impiety, piety in the face of superstition, and also that the place assigned to emotion in religion was not the same as it is today.

Piety in the Face of Impiety

D. Levene, and the majority of those who have written about religion in the Republican Age, have emphasized that the fundamental principle in Livy's history is that the gods support the pious and abandon or fight the impious. Piety is not an inner disposition of submission to divine will, but is made up of very specific actions that show proof of piety and the realization of it. This piety is mentioned throughout the narrative and is expressed at length in the exemplary cases.

There are a number of hints dealing with treaties that were not adhered to and were broken since the founding of Rome. The greatest examples come after the Republic's foundation. The first major speech about piety is linked to the willingness of some Romans to abandon Rome after the invasion by the Gauls in 390 BC (5.50.1). During this speech, the dictator Camillus recalls that the Romans won as they did not renounce their piety. He describes the tangible signs of honored and disregarded divine power, or, in other words, piety and impiety. And, in this specific case, public and private impiety consisted of abandoning the ritual obligations linked to the city of Rome—the center of the Roman community, which was established by auspices and omens (*auguria*). Such an agreement between gods and humans cannot be evaded.

This is indeed how Livy defines piety and impiety. Impiety is not disbelieving in God, but is neglecting the honors to which the gods have a right. The impious Roman intentionally neglects the ritual obligations because they think they can get on by their own. This kind of *exemplum* regularly occurs. In the narrative about the battle of Aquilonia (10.40.3–5), Livy points out the treatment of an assistant to the consul, who had reported false auspices. In a description of the first months of the Second Punic War, the behavior of the consul Flaminius is to blame (21.63.6–10). He reports on Pleminius, a legate of Scipio, at the end of that war (29.19.5–8), and, during the wars in Greece, even a censor, Fulvius Flaccus, is involved (42.3). In all these cases, the guilty suffer the same fate: a shameful death, and their behavior is contrasted with that of one or more of the pious protagonists.

As for impiety arising from an intentional failure in the basic code of social relationships regarding the keeping of promises and good faith in particular, Romans are described as a people of *fides*. The phrase, even when it comes from the lips of a Roman enemy—Nabis, the king of Sparta—expresses, without irony, this watchword of the Roman order (34.31.4). The narrative covering the Punic Wars is full of perjury and broken treaties, and it is usually Hannibal who violates the agreements and treaties (26.8 and 5). Nevertheless, there are some anecdotes that appear to provide evidence of a less inflexible attitude toward keeping promises and the clever manipulation of that notion. In 321 BC, when the Roman army was encircled and captured without a battle in the Caudine Forks defile by the Samnites, the consuls and the Samnites agreed not on a treaty, but on the promise of a treaty, for which they alone were responsible (9.5.1–2; 9.9.4–10). In this way, they could give their word

of honor without involving Rome. After having lashed the consuls at the Comitium because they had committed themselves without the approval of the Senate and of the people, the Roman authorities turned them over to the Samnites, using the fetials. While the fetial was turning the two impious individuals, who had made a promise that they could not keep, over to the Samnites, one of the consuls kicked him in the knee, crying out that he now was a Samnite and had abused a Roman messenger and that the Romans had, therefore, a pretext for going to war. This less-than-glorious episode is partially repeated in 136 BC, when Gaius Hostilius Mancinus is forced to agree to a treaty with Numantia in Spain after successive disasters (*Per.* 56.3).

As opposed to these manipulations of given promises, there are instances where the Romans seem to be uncompromising. After the Battle of Cannae, Hannibal sent a delegation of prisoners to Rome to negotiate the terms of an agreement on the transfer of prisoners. One of the prisoners dreamt up a strategy to break the promise of returning to Hannibal's camp after his mission in Rome. He left the camp and returned to collect something he pretended to have forgotten and considered himself free of the oath. The affair divided Romans, but it appears that, at the end of the day, contempt prevailed (22.58.6–9; 22.61.4; 24.18.5–9). To our eyes, if the custom itself is credible (Crawford 1973), the people of *fides* often behave with clear dishonesty. However, it must be remembered that, in this ritualistic society, playing with the formal basic principles of a rite is the rule, even if it might spark off debates. This is why Livy can characterize Romans as being pious, who, in fact, seem to have violated promises.

Piety and Superstition

Another contradiction, which is always at the heart of correct religious behavior in Livy, is the separation between well-understood piety and superstition (Rüpke 2011, 1–17). There are numerous examples in the 35 surviving books, ranging from religious panics, as in 428/7 (4.30.8–11) or in 213 BC, to uncontrolled activities, such as the Bacchanalia scandal in 186 BC, which were connected to the upheaval following the Roman victory over the Carthaginians. For the Romans, superstition was not about venerating a false god or practicing a false religion, but was about the veneration of gods, whichever ones they might happen to be, in an erroneous manner, largely out of fear of their anger and jealousy, and which involved the superstitious, in the eyes of the Romans, in excessive and intolerable behavior. It is fashionable to consider such behavior as testimonies of the reaction of individuals to the hold of communities who always claimed themselves to be mediators between the gods and humans. In fact, for Livy, and, undoubtedly for Romans in the past, these events demonstrated that the city's mediation was respected and even demanded.

The narrative demonstrates that the Roman authorities were, in fact, hardly interested in the ideas and practices of those whom they considered superstitious. They certainly considered that their attitude attributed a tyrannical and dominating aspect to the gods, which they did not have in the Roman customs, as the gods were largely considered to be in partnership with the Romans in the manner of “citizen gods.” However, this deviant opinion was not the main reason for the troubles. These ideas, such as they were, were in fact scorned, but, as with the foreign gods, they were only pursued if they caused problems with public order, and even this only happened sporadically. Once order was established again, the authorities forgot about the new gods and excessive religious practice. That is to say that they attached no importance whatsoever to them, and that it is pointless to search their condemnation of superstition for an aristocratic discourse that is unconnected to the religious reality. For that, a different concept of religion is needed than that of the Romans.

Emotion in Roman Religion

The excessive religious practice resulting from fear of the gods and from anxiety provoked by perils and the prodigies leads to questions about the place that emotion holds in Roman religion. Can it be deduced from reading Livy that Roman religion was familiar with emotion?

Insofar as ritualistic religion is concerned, the part given over to emotion is, of course, negligible. Reading Livy shows that searching for a Christian kind of religious emotion is a real problem in this kind of ritualistic religious society. However, this does not mean that emotion does not exist in Livy, or in Roman religious practices.

If the episode concerning the exemplary Battle of Aquilonia in 293 BC is looked at again, it can be found that emotion is, in fact, ever present. On the eve of the battle, the entire army, from general to simple soldier, is eager to fight, and are all inflamed with *ardor*—the passion for war (10.40.3–4). A *pullarius* responds to this passion and misrepresents a divine ritual. *Laetus* (filled with joy) at the news of a favorable auspice, the consul decides to attack. However, in the meantime, the other *pullarii* have some misgivings, or, in other words, are afraid of the consequences of this transgression. The consul's nephew, who has to pass on these misgivings, reacts according to tradition (10.40.9). Even though Livy describes him as a young man born before the doctrine of being contemptuous of the gods, and therefore a man who respects the gods and the rites, he does not panic, but conducts an investigation in order to verify the facts, which he later reports to his uncle. The latter complies with the ritual practice. He does not worry, and remains sure that the correctly performed rites will give him salvation or victory. And he is filled with renewed joy, announcing that the gods support him

(10.40.13–14).

The troubles in Rome, which were sparked off by the disaster at Cannae and the capture of Tarentum, and by Hannibal being a mile from the walls of Rome, provide another example of the conflict between feelings and piety. According to Livy, the anarchic superstition of the panicked masses provoked the anger of the *boni*, followed by that of the Senate, until the authorities, who appeared at first to be giving way to the panic, pulled themselves together, triggering a clampdown of the “superstitious.” In the same way, following the disaster at Lake Trasimene in 217 BC, the Romans founded the Temple of *Mens* to the goddess of reason—a divine task that conveyed their attachment to the religious tradition that remained calm and assured, with a cool detachment and disinclination to allow emotion to dominate, even after a terrible defeat. The *Bacchanalia* emphasize the split between a criminal use of emotion among the superstitious and the anger of the “pious,” who are shocked by the intrusion of emotion into religious practice.

If all these facts are brought together, it can be concluded that, for Livy, piety consists of not giving way to anxiety and fear when dealing with the gods. It is best to be rationally devoted to achieving the basic principles of the rites, without fear of either the gods or of the future, even if that means exploiting to the full any play with the details. The Temple of *Mens* was a very fitting expression of the Romans' religious and political behavior at the darkest moment in their history: instead of giving way to panic and despair, they held on to reason and to their arsenal of rites in order to maintain their good relations with their gods. The victories that followed would, of course, show them that this confidence, this *fides*, was rewarded. It was perhaps a discourse, but a discourse that mirrored, on both a public and a private level, exemplary actions. Admittedly, one can have doubts about such beautiful logic. In certain situations, the Roman heroes had been less than magnificent and more fainthearted. However, Livy is glorifying a norm—conduct that brought the Romans world domination—and not giving a specific description of all the possible types of religious behavior.

All this leads onto the context in which Livy wrote his books. The question that can be posed is about the relevance of this religious ideology. Is it an idealized interpretation of the past, which must favor the purposes of the moment, or is it only a description contained within Livy's source material?

Roman Religion According to Livy—Allegory or History?

What is the connection between Livy's *History of Rome* and the history of the past or contemporary history? Did Livy re-transcribe what he had collected from his research into earlier ancient archives, annals, and other scholarly treatises, or did he rely on a selection of data to reconstruct a past that referred,

in fact, to the tendency of influential Romans to recall what they called the early Roman Republic? In particular, what is the connection with the reforming work of the triumvir Octavian?

We are lacking a great deal of data. Not only is the lion's share of the third century BC missing, which would have allowed us to understand the introduction of *Graeca sacra* into the cult of Ceres, and the gradual development of the auspicial system during the First Punic War, but also, equally tragic, are all the missing books about the 130 final years of the Republic and the birth of the Empire. With the account of Sylla's and Caesar's accomplishments, and the attacks on the *obnuntiatio* system before Octavian–Augustus' assemblies and reforms, one of the ways of verifying the kind of religious system that is described by Livy in the first decades, and that Cicero had rebuilt with his declarations and treaties, is lost. The only way of answering the questions asked is through the 35 surviving books, which, of course, lessens the chances of being confident in the answers.

The only vaguely specific answer that can be given is shown by the general approach given to past history and the connection with memory in Livy's work. The 35 surviving books not only allow the reader to detect the trends of that era in the composition and broad outlines of the narrative, but also to glimpse the author's stance from a number of hints. With the exception of the rites of the fetials, to which Livy gives a lot of space in the first books in particular, few references are given with which to establish a direct connection with Octavian's initiatives. The absence of any other reference to the other Augustan reforms shows that, without doubt, they were evoked in the books that have been lost. It is possible, however, that mentioning the fetials from Book 1 could be because of the reinstatement of their rites between 34 and 32 BC—the years that undoubtedly correspond with the historian's editing of the first book. Is it a favorable and straightforward reference to the triumvir's work?

Livy uses, in fact, the same “places of remembrance” as Octavian's counselors—the *monumenta*, which had, moreover, not ceased to be used since the annalists, as they are about the mythical topography of Ancient Rome (Jaeger 1997) or the great figures of the past: Romulus and Numa, Camillus, Flaminius, Fabius Maximus, Papirius Cursor, the Decii, Scipio, Flaminius, or Lucius Aemilius Paullus.

In this way, Camillus, the triumphant victor figure, and his speech, which was intended to discourage the Romans establishing themselves in another place, are one of these *monumenta* that would be successively used, with differing ulterior motives, by Cicero, Pompey, Caesar, and Octavian throughout the first century. Does this mean that Livy assumes the Augustan point of view? It is probably not as simple as that. As with the other great men, whose statues and accolades are found in the Forum of Augustus, Camillus was part of the ideological heritage of all Romans, and it was somehow normal for the

historian to be in his service. However, as has already been emphasized, Livy's Camillus is a little different to any previous portrayals of him, which feature him as a man less unique among his peers (Gaertner 2008; Miano 2011, 5–70). Did the historian wish to make the allusion of an autocratic Octavian even more explicit? It is possible. Finally, this way of relating key figures in Roman history with imperialism brings to mind yet another Augustan theme. The Forum of Augustus built up the same (Luce 1990) relationship. And Octavian–Augustus' other religious reforms perhaps did the same thing. Livy mentions them without criticizing them, and, in so doing, is following, in all likelihood, the general tendency of the last century of the Republic, and is not necessarily submitting to celebrating a prince.

Unfortunately, there is not enough evidence to support this theory in detail. For that, Livy's lost books would be needed. One thing can, however, perhaps be considered as certain. The fact that the core elements of Livy's report focus on emblematic figures does not mean that Livy is a fan of the new political regime. It only shows that Livy was not totally against the new power, and that, more broadly speaking, he was living in his day. And, similar to his contemporaries, he shared some of the values and ideas with the person who was trying to create a new political regime.

Cross-References

See CHAPTER 7: LIVY'S LITURGICAL ORDER: SYSTEMATIZATION IN THE HISTORY; CHAPTER 10: LIVY'S POLITICAL AND MORAL VALUES AND THE PRINCIPATE; Chapter 11: LIVY'S HISTORICAL PHILOSOPHY

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Chapter 7

Livy's Liturgical Order: Systematization in the History

Frances Hickson Hahn

If it were the practice for us historians as it is for poets, I would instead quite willingly commence with favorable omens and vows and petitions to gods and goddesses that they grant a propitious outcome to the beginning of so great a task.

With these words, Livy concludes the preface to his history *Ab Urbe Condita*. Despite the *recusatio*, Livy has in fact begun his history with an invocation, asking that Rome's deities favor his undertaking. This invocation foreshadows a distinctive feature of Livy's history: the prevalence of ritual and prayer in developing the narrative of Rome's foundation and growth. It also gives a foretaste of Livy's famed ability to adapt his language to fit the occasion—here, by using religious diction and style. For the study of civic religion in Rome, Livy's history is indispensable. Livy presents a panoramic view of religious practice, from the city's foundation under Romulus' auspices and Numa's establishment of the public priesthood to suppression of the Bacchanalian rites in the early second century BC. We read the solemn words of vows and oaths, auspices and supplications, together with instructions, as it were, for regal inaugurations, declarations of war, and propitiatory vows. Familiar prayers and rituals recur from book to book in the annual cycle of ceremonies and festivals as well as in occasional but routine rites. Readers, both modern and ancient, experience the workings of Roman civic religion as a monument of continuity, even in the midst of dramatic changes in government.

In this chapter, my concern is not Roman religion *per se*, but Livy's representation of Roman religion, in particular, the civic liturgy. The extant books of Livy's history span a period of six centuries, from the city's foundation to the early second century BC. Yet, in Livy's telling, liturgical practice of the regal period and early Republic differed little from that attested at the end of the first century, thus creating an impression of stability, conservatism, and continuity. While the annalistic material preserved in the history provides a generally “sound outline” of archival information concerning religious occasions such as propitiations, celebrations of victory, and introductions of new cults and rituals (Oakley 1997, 72), the details of Livy's liturgical order, especially in the first decade, however, prompt recollection of Livy's own words: “who could claim certainty in matters of such antiquity?” (1.3.2). Anyone attempting to write a history of Roman

religion or even to examine a single ritual is stymied by lack of contemporary evidence for early cultic practice. Not before the mid-first century do we find independent witnesses other than fragmentary texts, excepting Plautus' parodies and Cato's agricultural rituals; no literary texts whatsoever predate the late third century. Sadly, the epigraphic corpus too preserves relatively little to aid in our reconstruction of archaic religion. Hence, scholars recommend caution when assessing Livy's accounts of historical events and institutional practices prior to the third century, when Romans began writing history. Speeches from any period represent plausible reconstructions in accordance with the practices of ancient historiography. Documentary evidence too, such as inscriptions, reveals the historian's reworking to suit stylistic or narrative requirements, as seen in Livy's version of the decree on the Bacchic rites (39.18.8–9). So it is with Livian liturgy.

Scholars have long acknowledged the adaptation and reconstruction of rituals by the historian or his annalistic sources, themselves often turning to antiquarian reconstructions of the second century. And yet, Livy's imaginative reconstruction of Rome's civic religion with its formulaic words and ritual actions defies suppression in readers at all levels of knowledge. We continue to hope or assume that some “nugget” of authentic detail found its way into Livy's account.

Documents and direct evidence from the early Republic, and even the regal period, are almost certainly preserved in the scholarly and antiquarian tradition of historical writing at Rome in the late Republic and early empire (Beard, North, and Price 1998, 8). The challenge, of course, is determining which pieces of information are authentic survivals and then interpreting them without context. There can be no certainty.

I would like to take an alternative approach to Roman religion in Livy's history. I argue that Livy systematizes the Roman liturgical order and thus provides a stable counterbalance to an historical narrative of change. Beard comments on the necessity of any ritual summary to “systematize the messy improvisations and the day to day changes that inevitably characterize ritual as practiced, even in the most conservative and tightly regulated society” (Beard 2007, 82; cf. Rüpke 2012, 2, 82–93). Just so, the historiographical presentation of the Roman civic cult inevitably involves systematization. Livy accomplishes this, in part, through selective patterns of repetition and variation of content and language. At the same time, Livy favors another form of repetition in the construction of normative ritual types through the compilation of details in different passages. In his selection of ritual details and language, Livy relies predominantly on cultic practice familiar to his contemporary audience and thus available for mental expansion of suggested images. Finally, the historian legitimates his constructed liturgical order by contextualizing it within a conservative religious system based on written texts and priestly authority. This perspective is closely bound to the annalistic

tradition within which he wrote; hence, I begin with an overview of that tradition of historiography.

Annalistic Tradition

When Livy chose to organize his historical narrative on a year-by-year scheme and to include regular announcements of elections, prodigies, temple dedications, triumphs, and the like, he associated his history with the dominant genre of Roman historiography of the second and early first centuries, often termed “annalistic history.” To understand this decision purely in terms of format and content is to miss the larger significance; Livy chose to identify with a continuous tradition of historiography that gained authority by alluding to the much older tradition of pontifical chronicles (Beck 2007, 262). These chronicles, compiled by the *pontifex maximus*, preserved a yearly record of important public and religious events probably dating back to the early Republic. It was also in reference to these records that the second-century poet Ennius styled his epic history of Rome the *Annales*, a poem to which Livy makes several allusions. Similarly, a compilation of pontifical chronicles, published according to Cicero in the latter second century, received the name *annales maximi* (*De or.* 2.52–3). Hence, Livy's decision to employ certain annalistic features identified his history with a centuries-long tradition of record keeping, and, in so doing, imbued his history with an aura of continuity and stability, as well as a certain pontifical authority.

Yet, it was not a foregone conclusion that Livy would write a history from the origins of the city and employ the annalistic scheme, as Piso, Hemina, Gellius, Quadrigarius (in part), Antias, Macer, and Tubero had done. At the end of the second century, Sempronius Asellio turned to contemporary history, using the title *historia*. Others followed, including Livy's most immediate predecessors; Julius Caesar and Sallust chose to write two different types of monographs on contemporary events. In choosing annalistic history *Ab Urbe Condita*, Livy elected to look back not just to the deeds of the past but to the literary genres of the past, one that was actually coming to a close with the end of republican government (Beck 2007, 265).

Patterns of Repetition and Variation

One almost-too-obvious implication of Livy's choice to write within the annalistic tradition is repetition. By nature, a certain amount of repeated content is unavoidable. Thus, each year opens with the names of magistrates and their assigned provinces and concludes with elections for the following year. Quite frequently, the ceremonial year begins with the performance of religious rituals, especially expiations of prodigies. Prodigy notices appear sporadically in the first decade but become a regular feature in the third decade (Levene 1993, 126). While they vary in length and specifics, the

number of lists guarantees the repetition of details; the procedures for handling prodigies too are similar. Although Livy never gives all of the formal stages in any one account, the frequency of accounts and limited possibilities necessitate repeated references, for example, to the consultation of *haruspices* or Sibylline books, and expiatory rituals such as games, *lectisternia*, or *supplicationes* (Linderski 1993, 613). The same is true for other ritual occasions that filled Roman civic life, including departure vows, victory celebrations, auspices before assemblies, and temple dedications.

Livy underscores the repetition of content through linguistic repetition; hence, accounts of similar events regularly employ similar or identical wording. So characteristic is this that scholars have sought explanations beyond similarity of situation. Ogilvie refers to Livy's "reliance upon clichés—almost formulaic phrases" in descriptions of recurrent military activities, and attributes this feature of Livy's style to the historian's lack of engagement with his material and terms the practice "mechanical and careless" (1984, 120). While accepting this assessment of some battle scenes, Oakley finds repetition in "constitutional matters" more effective and observes that "the impression of rituals satisfactorily performed is enhanced" (1997, 149). Writing on triumph notices, Phillips concludes that "the yearly pattern ... is meant by Livy to be seen as subsuming the vicissitudes of men and events to itself" (1974, 273). In other words, repetition of form and content gives the reader a sense of continuity of Rome's institutions.

Given Livy's propensity for formulaic wording throughout his history, it is to be expected in accounts of ritual performance. I have singled out three petitionary formulae for discussion because of their similarity in meaning and because of their frequency. These formulae, together with close variants, constitute the most commonly repeated prayers in the history. Livy's use, for example, of the blessing spoken before public assemblies—"may this be good, propitious and fortunate" ("*quod bonum, faustum felixque sit = qbff*")—shows particular consistency; eight occurrences show only one minor variation (*atque* for *que*) in the list of three synonyms. This is especially striking when compared to the variations in other textual sources. Plautus adds a fourth synonym in a parodic prayer requesting blessings that include the wife's disappearance: "*ut nobis haec habitatio/bona fausta felix fortunataque eveniat*" (*Trin.* 40–41). Varro, citing the censorial tablets, substitutes "*fortunatum*" for "*faustum*" and appends "*salutare*" (*Ling.* 6.86). All five synonyms appear together in the imperial records of ritual activities of the *Fratres Arvales* (*CIL* 06, 32367, 02068). Not only does the prayer vary in different sources, but, even within the Arval *acta*, we find a variable list of synonyms (Beard 1985, 127, 131). Hence, Livy's precise repetition stands in marked contrast to the pattern of usage elsewhere. Scholars have applied the term "clustering" to Livy's tendency to repeat a recently used phrase (Oakley 1997, 150, 365). Thus, the formula "*qbff*" appears six times in the first decade,

twice within Books 1 and 3.

Livy was not, however, insensitive to the negative effects of excessive repetition; another seemingly contradictory characteristic of his writing is a marked fondness for *variatio* (variation). For civic occasions in the first decade, Livy employs two different prefatory prayers, “*qbff*” and “*bene verat*” (may it turn out well). Only one distinguishing factor other than “*variatio*” seems operative: four times, “*qbff*” opens public meetings, called “*contiones*.” More significantly, Livy consistently alternates the two prayers in four books containing multiple prefatory blessings (14 times, Hickson 1993, 75–76). In the third decade, Livy introduces another prayer for civic business, “*bene ac feliciter eveniat*” (may it turn out well and favorably). Five of six exact repetitions are linked to a specific occasion, the formal preparation for war. (Hickson 1993, 70–72). For example, in 201 BC, the Senate directed the consuls to sacrifice and pray that “matters of state interest and new military action being considered by the Senate and Roman people might turn out well and favorably for the Roman People, allies and Latin people” (31.5.4).

On the sixth repetition, Livy describes this as a typical prayer of magistrates, here as a typical prayer of a newly elected censor, who will offer this “prayer for the state, himself, and his colleagues in almost all prayers” (40.46.9). Similarly, Cicero calls it the customary prayer offered at assemblies of the *comitia*, in this case one that he himself spoke at a consular election (*Mur.* 1).

Even variation can turn into repetition, as seen in the preceding prayers. Another feature that combines these dual characteristics of variation and repetition is Livy's formation of new phrases by recombining the vocabulary used in formulaic expressions, for example, a prayer that the Romans are sending out their army “*faustum atque felix*” (2.49.7). Alternatively, Livy may make small variations in grammatical structure and vocabulary, as in this prayer before the third Macedonian war: “that the war being considered by the Roman people might turn out *prosperum*” (42.28.7). The effect gives a sense of continuity even while introducing stylistic *variatio*.

Normative Ritual Types

Another Livian method for systematizing the liturgical order involves the composition of ritual models that help the audience to develop a mental construct to accompany future references to the same ritual. Livy's treatment of religious rituals, like other public spectacles, employs the rhetorical device of *enargeia* or *demonstratio*, defined by the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* as “an event ... expressed in words in such a manner that it seems to take place before our eyes” (4.68). Feldherr writes (1998, 11):

for the historian, the reproduction of the spectacle provides in the fullest sense the connection between past and present that I have suggested is a

central function of the historian's use of *enargeia*, a chance to make his audience's experience approximate those of their ancestors.

Such visual accounts often appear in the early books, where they can serve as reference points for later occurrences. For example, although there are a total of 33 records of gratulatory supplications, the first three records establish the model image evoked by later references. The first record combines a day of official ritual and a second day of spontaneous thanksgiving, in which “the people went in great numbers to offer prayers” (3.63.5). The second record describes another spontaneous thanksgiving, again characterized by crowds of worshippers, but this time Livy calls attention to their female gender. He also specifies the setting: “before the senate made its decree, all of the temples were full with Roman matrons giving thanks to the gods” (5.23.3). The third record offers the most sensory details. Here, the father of Fabius Rullianus is making an impassioned speech, pleading for revocation of his son's punishment for disobeying orders to refrain from battle (8.33.20):

On account of Quintus Fabius, the state rejoices in victory, with prayers and thanksgivings and, on his account the temples of the gods stand open, the altars smoke with sacrifices, and are heaped up with offerings of honor.

In these first three passages, Livy uses almost all of the visual components that appear in later descriptions. The worshippers assemble in great numbers, especially of women, who flock to temples throughout the city, where they make prayers and offerings. In later passages, Livy varies the vocabulary occasionally, but recalls similar features. Twice, he adds reference to *pulvinaria*, the couches placed in front of temples to display images of the gods. In another passage, he comments on the women's fine clothing. In the fourth decade, Livy, probably reflecting his sources, adds another detail to the basic image by regularly specifying the number of sacrificial victims decreed.

In her analysis of triumph notices from the third decade on, Phillips also observes “a basic structure for the standard or ‘ideal’ triumph notice. All the parts together account for the whole constitutional procedure of a triumph” (1974, 269, 272). At its center is the announcement that the triumph has taken place, for example, “P. Cornelius consul triumphed over the Boii” (36.40.11). The essential verb first appears in the bare notice given to the victory of Tarquinius Priscus over the Sabines, “triumphing Tarquinius returned to Rome” (1.38.3). In the tenth chapter, however, Livy's description of Romulus' dedication of *spolia opima*, spoils taken from the defeated enemy leader, has already established a prototype for triumphs. In this passage, Livy avoids explicit identification of the ritual as a triumph, but expands his account with the primary features found in later triumph notices: return of the army, procession with commander, and display of captured spoils (1.10.5):

With the return of the victorious army ... he suspended the armor of the

dead enemy leader on a frame built specially for that purpose. Then, carrying the spoils, he climbed the Capitoline Hill, where he placed them near an oak sacred to the shepherds.

The fact that other authors assign the first triumph to Romulus supports identification of this passage as a prototype (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.34, Plut. *Rom.* 16.5–8). Furthermore, Plutarch identifies Romulus' first triumph with the dedication of *spolia opima*. Both ritual processions concluded on the Capitoline Hill with an offering to Jupiter. In the case of the *spolia opima*, however, this was Jupiter Feretrius, whose temple predated that of Jupiter Optimus Maximus. Triumph notices, especially in later books, vary in length from a bare statement of occurrence to expanded descriptions of preliminary requests and debates, detailed listing of procession components, and triumphal dedications (Phillips 1974, 271). As Rome's enemies became more powerful and wealthy, the lengthier descriptions show increasing elaboration of the spoils on display (Oakley 1997, 444). Livy describes the triumphal procession of Aemilius Paullus (39.5.14–15):

Carried before the chariot were crowns of gold weighing 112 pounds, silver weighing 83,000 pounds, 243 pounds of gold, 118,000 Athenian *tetrachmae*, 12,322 Philippic coins, 785 bronze statues, 230 marble, considerable armor, weapons and additional spoils taken from the enemy.

Through the use of such models, Livy creates a normative image in the mind of readers and thus eliminates the necessity of repeating the details of a ritual each and every time it occurs. Instead, the retrieval of mental images becomes the reader's response to a familiar phrase such as “the senate decreed a supplication.” The historian need only note deviations from the normative type, such as a greater or lesser degree of some feature than expected. For example, Livy comments that Camillus's triumph over Veii “greatly exceeded the customary manner of celebrating the day; he himself, the most conspicuous of all, was drawn into the city in a chariot pulled by white horses” (5.23). Furthermore, the construction of a normative image actually makes it possible for Livy to avoid describing (or even knowing) the changes that naturally occur.

Dominance of Contemporary Cult

At the same time that Livy's visual descriptions help “to make his audience's experience approximate those of their ancestors,” a similar but inverse phenomenon takes place. The audience's personal experience as spectators and participants in contemporary rituals also contributes to their literary experience. In this way, the ancestral experience approximates that of their descendants. Livy's systematization of civic liturgy depends heavily on the experiential knowledge shared by the historian and his audience. From its

earliest appearances in the first book, the liturgical order would have seemed familiar to Livy's contemporary audience.

Despite the extreme antiquity of the alleged events, Romulus' activities reveal a decidedly modern system of cult practices, including augury, public games, temple vows, and dedications. Livy gives particular attention to the foundation of temples, a favorite political activity of generals in the first century, with two fairly lengthy prayers attributed to Romulus. In the first, he combines the foundation of the temple of Jupiter Feretrius with the dedication of the first *spolia opima* (1.10.6):

Jupiter Feretrius, I, Romulus victor and king, bring you this kingly armor and I dedicate a *templum* with the boundaries that I have just now traced in my mind, to be the location of *spolia opima* which posterity following my example will bring, when enemy kings and generals have been cut down.

Livy's reference to posterity explicitly ties the legend to a contemporary structure. His description of the framework on which he hangs the enemy armor is notably confusing for modern readers, but the first-century audience would have brought to the passage their own experience of seeing similar trophies displayed in triumphal processions and on coins (e.g., Crawford 1974, no. 426/3). Two chapters later, Romulus vows a temple to Jupiter Stator (1.12.3):

Father of gods and men, drive off the enemy at least from here; remove fear from the Romans and stay their shameful flight. I vow here a *templum* to you, Jupiter Stator, to be a reminder to posterity that the city was saved with your present aid.

Again Livy links past and present with reference to posterity and to Rome's sacred topography. The temple of Jupiter Stator was the site where Cicero delivered his first Catilinarian oration in 63 BC, with the concluding prayer (*Cat.* 1.33):

You Jupiter who were established with the very same auspices with which this city was founded by Romulus, whom we truly name Stator of this city and empire; you will drive off the enemy from the buildings and walls of the city.

Vasaly points to Cicero's "verbal echo of that (vow) of Romulus" and notes the "markedly similar" diction in Livy's later story (1996, 53–54). The temple remained standing until destroyed in the fire during Nero's reign.

The subsequent account of Numa's establishment of civic religion and priesthoods also describes familiar cults (1.19–20). Already, at the end of the eighth century, there are flamens, Vestal Virgins, and the pontifex. Particularly striking is the "anachronistic and exaggerated" role of the pontifex (Ogilvie 1965, 100). This is the same elite hierarchy that Cicero

flatters in his speech before the pontiffs (*Dom.* 1.1):

Much that our ancestors created and established was divinely inspired, pontiffs, but nothing more excellent than that they wished the same men in charge of worship of the immortal gods and the highest public good, so that our most noble and notable citizens might preserve the state by managing well religious matters and preserve religious matters by wisely interpreting the public welfare.

Numa also receives credit for building the shrine of Janus with gates to stand open in times of war and closed in peace. Here, Livy inserts an explicit comparison to Augustus, the second man since Numa to close those gates. While it is impossible to precisely date the composition, Livy was likely writing the first pentad during the turbulent years of civil war and the rise of the new regime, before Octavian's assumption of the title "Augustus" in 27 BC (Oakley 1997, 109). Hence, references to Augustus would have been added after the initial composition. Rome's ritual history was changing so rapidly that Livy felt it necessary to revise previously composed accounts. Numerous scholars have examined explicit references and allusions to Augustus; therefore, more detailed discussion is not needed here (Scheid 2005; Badian 1993). It may not have been, as some have suggested, that Livy wished to flatter the current regime. Since the linking of past and present was a central objective, Livy needed to ensure that his reconstruction kept pace with constantly changing ritual practice.

Antiquarian Touches

My discussion of the modernization of liturgy does not deny the occasional but striking appearance of antiquarian rituals and prayers in Livy (Hickson 1993). They represent a relatively small proportion of the total number mentioned or described; out of more than 100 petitions employing prayer language, only a handful show the detail suggesting antiquarian sources: the inauguration of Numa (1.18.9), fetial oaths (1.24.7–8, 1.32.6), evocation of Juno from Veii (5.21.2–3), self-devotion of Decius Mus (8.9.6–8), vow of a sacred spring (22.10.2–6), and vow of Scipio Africanus as he embarked from Sicily (29.27.2–4). These accounts likely derive from second-century antiquarian activity preserved in contemporary historiography. It is striking that several of these rituals can be linked with ritual revivals of the second century, such as those associated with the Third Punic War (Ogilvie 1965, 674; Rawson 1973, 168–172; Beard, North, and Price 1998, 110–113). Macrobius preserves lengthy accounts of the evocation of the patron deity of Carthage, and the devotion of the Carthaginian armies and city that he attributes to "the very ancient book of a certain Furius," likely L. Furius Philus, member of the so-called Scipionic Circle surrounding Scipio Aemilianus (*Sat.* 3.9.6–11). They are by no means identical to the accounts of

these rituals in Livy, but the archaic language and detail of the historian's accounts strongly suggests such a second-century source (Oakley 1997, 484–486). Livy's elaborate accounts of fetial rituals may also be traced to second-century interest in the activities of this archaic diplomatic corps (Ogilvie 1965, 128; Rawson 1973, 166–168). Here again, Aemilianus and friends were actively involved in rejection of the treaty with Spain in 136 BC and the accompanying surrender of Mancinus to the Numantines with fetial ritual. Livy's account of the fetial spear rite as well as Octavian's use of the allegedly archaic rite in 32 BC to commence war against Antony and Cleopatra may very well find their inspiration in second-century antiquarian activities (Rawson 1973, 167). Varro reports that the fetials in his day still officiated at sanctification of a treaty, but no longer were involved in declaring war or demanding restitution (*Ling.* 5.86).

Scipio's prayer offers an excellent example of Livy's insertion of antiquarian details and one that is usually overshadowed by the more peculiar rituals of devotion, evocation, and declaration of war. As such, it is a fitting last offering from Livy's liturgical order. As Scipio Africanus prepares to depart from Lilybaeum, Sicily, to invade Africa, he offers this prayer for the success of the expedition before tossing a sacrificial offering into the sea (29.27.2–4):

You gods and goddesses who inhabit these seas and lands, I pray and beseech you that those acts that under my command have been accomplished, are being accomplished, and afterwards will be accomplished may turn out favorably and that you may prosper them all and cause them to succeed for myself, the Roman people, the allies and the Latin peoples who follow the leadership, command and authority of the Roman people and myself on land, sea and rivers. I pray that you may preserve us safe and unharmed and that, with the enemy conquered, these soldiers as conquerors together with me may return home triumphant, adorned with spoils and laden with loot. Grant us the opportunity to avenge our enemies, personal and public. And whatever the Carthaginian people have attempted to do to our state, grant to me and the Roman people the ability to do to the Carthaginian state as an example.

This prayer contains several archaisms, some attested in the work of second-century dramatists (Flores 1994; Hickson 1993, 69, 72, 77). The unusual verbal triad “have been accomplished, are being accomplished, and afterwards will be accomplished” suggests the influence of Pacuvius, who employs a similar tripartite pattern in a prayer for success (fr. 217). In addition, Livy chooses three archaic synonyms for the elaborate threefold request that Scipio's deeds turn out favorably; these occur in no other Livian prayer: *verruncare* (Pac. fr. 217; Acc. 5, 36), *iuvere* (Pl. *Per.* 755), and *augere* (Pl. *Ep.* 192, *Men.* 551). The prayer contains other archaisms in diction (*perduellibus*) and formation (*faxitis*, *auxitis*). At the same time that Livy

incorporates striking archaisms, he employs familiar prayer structure and generally contemporary diction here and throughout his history (Gries 1949, 6–7).

Textual and Institutional Sources of Legitimacy

Livy establishes the legitimacy of his systematized and modernized liturgical order by grounding it in written documentation and priestly authority. The historian introduces these twin guarantors among the acts of King Numa, who, under the guise of divine authorization, establishes the ritual worship of the gods, together with major flamens, vestals, Salian priests, and lastly the pontifex. To the latter, Numa entrusts *sacra omnia exscripta exsignataque*, written and certified procedures for all religious ritual (1.20). These priestly books were stored in the pontifical archives, accessible only to the pontiffs (9.46.5, cf. Linderski 1985, 222). The term “*exsignata*” is rare, appearing only one other time—in Plautus. Besides the archaic tone that the participle contributes, it focuses attention on the significance of written documents as guaranteeing the correctness of civic ritual from the beginning. This concern for authoritative written documentation was much evident in the first century. Cicero stresses its importance when he addresses the pontiffs, asking them to invalidate the dedication of the shrine to Liberty because the inexperienced priest “spoke and performed everything otherwise than you yourselves maintain in the record” (*Dom.* 139–140).

In Livy's history, Numa's priestly *sacra* dominate; all other written texts are subordinated. This is made abundantly clear by Livy's omission of any reference to the acquisition of the Sibylline books, a story fully elaborated by his contemporary Dionysius of Halicarnassus (4.62). This is striking. Although Livy often notes consultation of this collection of Greek verses in times of dire prodigies, the books themselves receive little attention. Livy does not even use the term “Sibylline” in the first two records (3.10.7, 4.25.3). Instead, he directs attention to the process of consultation and, in particular, the two men (later 10 men) entrusted with that task. The third record gives a fuller explanation: “following a decree of the Senate, the *duumviri sacris faciundis* (two men for performing sacrifices) approached the Sibylline books” (5.13.6). They then reported their findings to the Senate, which alone could determine what expiatory action, if any, should be taken (Linderski 1993, 613). In this case, the result was the introduction of a new ritual, the *lectisternium* or banquet placed before images of the gods. In this way, Livy emphasizes the strict senatorial control over any ritual innovation. Even consultation is placed in the hands of Roman officials. Hence, while the source of ritual information is a written Greek document, its interpretation and use are subjected wholly to Roman control.

Following another prodigy notice, Livy comments simply “an *obsecratio* was

performed by the people with the *duumviri* dictating” (4.21.5). As is usual with Livy's reports of expiation, much is left to the imagination or knowledge of the reader. Reference to *duumviri* indicates consultation of the Sibylline books, as described earlier. During an *obsecratio*, the populace visited temples with prayers and offerings. Dictation by *duumviri* most likely refers to an official prayer and offering by a magistrate at the opening of this day of prayer. In civic rituals, priests regularly dictated the prayer to the magistrate from a written text. The elder Pliny describes exactly this: “our highest magistrates have prayed with fixed prayers and lest any word be omitted or spoken out of place, someone dictates from a written text” (*NH* 28.10). While Pliny calls attention to the written document, Livy generally leaves the reader to recall the physical text. As with Livy, Pliny describes the process of dictation as a guarantee of ritual legitimacy and an essential feature of Roman religion: “this practice has been proven effective over 830 years of such preservation.”

This procedure to preserve approved ritual forms did not, however, eliminate all deviation; Livy makes some 40 references to *instauratio*, the practice of repeating a ritual, if some flaw should occur in performance. Livy's first account of such a repetition seems almost a digression, occupying an entire chapter in the midst of the Coriolanus episode (2.36, cf. Levene 1993, 154–157). The Romans had performed games for Jupiter in the Circus Maximus, despite the beating of a slave there just before, “as if no religious offense had occurred.” In a dream, Jupiter appeared to a certain Latinus to announce his displeasure and ask that the magistrates be informed. Only after the death of his son and his own illness did Latinus do so; then the Senate decreed repetition of the games as elaborately as possible. The incident does not advance the narrative in anyway, but does provide Livy an opportunity to illustrate the terrible consequences of ritual negligence in this first account of *instauratio*.

It is a familiar picture of Roman religion: once a procedure or prayer is shown to be effective, it must be repeated in the future exactly as on previous occasions. It is a rigidly conservative approach: dictation and *instauratio*, written texts and priestly authorities. Livy engages a familiar discourse among scholars of Roman religion, as seen in such synonymous titles as *Continuity and Change* (Liebeschütz 1979), “Continuity, Conservatism, and Innovation” (Scheid 2005), *Continuity and Innovation* (Haeussler et al. 2007), and “Conservatism and Change” (North 1976). A related discourse was taking place among the political elite, poets, historians, and other intellectuals in the second and first centuries. On the one hand, this discourse reflects the natural process, especially in a polytheistic religion, of adaptation, neglect, and innovation. On the other, third-century military expansion into the Mediterranean world brought about massive changes in Roman culture and society. In the midst of dramatic change, the Roman elite of the late third and

second centuries sought to preserve or reconstruct the story and culture of their ancestors (Rawson 1973, 161–174; Beard, North, and Price 1998, 108–113; Rüpke 2012, 179). This antiquarian activity left its mark on Roman historiography, as well as civic cult. Livy's response to the contemporary discourse on “continuity and change” was to (re)construct a traditional liturgical order anchored in textual and priestly authority and protected against change by procedural safeguards.

Cross-References

See CHAPTER 6: LIVY AND RELIGION

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Chapter 8

Livy's Use of Exempla*

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Introduction

An episode during the siege of Falerii in 394 BC subsequently entered the canon of Roman *exempla* (Liv. 5.27.1–15).¹ The man appointed to teach the sons of the city's leading citizens lured his charges well outside the walls and delivered them into the hands of the Roman general, Marcus Furius Camillus. Camillus, offended by the schoolmaster's betrayal of his duty to his pupils and their parents, told him that he had violated the laws of warfare; the Roman then had the schoolmaster bound and provided the children with goads to drive and whip him back to the city. The grateful Faliscans surrendered to the senate, saying that the war's outcome would provide humanity with two beneficial models of conduct: the Romans' prioritizing of *fides* over expedient victory, and the Faliscans' concession of victory when presented with that *fides* (“*eventu huius belli duo salutaria exempla prodita humano generi sunt: uos fidem in bello quam praesentem uictoriam maluistis; nos fide prouocati uictoriam ultro detulimus*,” 5.27.13). With their pronouncement, the Faliscans echo and reinforce Livy's assertion in his preface that history furnishes examples of good and bad conduct that one can imitate or avoid for oneself and one's state (“*hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli documenta in inlustri posita monumento intueri; inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu foedum exitu quod uites*,” Praef. 10).

This kind of *exemplum*, a self-contained episode with an explicit and moral message delivered by the historian's surrogates, is an obvious type of exemplarity. Equally familiar are the examples in the speeches Livy crafted for his historical agents; this is the kind defined in rhetorical handbooks (e.g., *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 4.62). Livy's deployment of *exempla*, however, goes far beyond these two obvious and easy modes. What makes his history truly exemplary is the depth and pervasiveness of its *exempla*.² This chapter will use Camillus to illustrate those qualities, for he generates *exempla* (as with the Faliscan schoolmaster), and both receives and cites them; further, as an *exemplum* himself, he demonstrates their pliability, embodying in turn success in warfare, the ultimate *deus ex machina* of Roman history, swift retaliation, endurance of injustice, transformation from exile to savior, and *moderatio*. Livy highlights all stages of Camillus' public life, going beyond the sieges of

Veii and Falerii, the storied exile and return that resulted in the expulsion of the Gauls, to the years after 390 BC, when Camillus continued to wield command, especially in military contexts. His appearances throughout Livy's grand history demonstrate that *exempla* embody legalistic principles as well as moral qualities, that their speakers and audiences count, as do the ways they are shaped and grouped, that their meaning and potency shift over time, and, above all, that Livy's great genius lies in narrative.

Camillus as Audience and Speaker of *Exempla*

While the tale of the Faliscan schoolmaster readily comes to mind when one thinks of Livy and *exempla*, Camillus' decision to resign from his dictatorship in 368 BC is far more obscure (6.38.3–13), and yet it too reveals Livy's view of history as a source of lessons. The context is the conflict of the orders. Patricians and plebeians are at loggerheads, and the former resort to the dictatorship, to which Camillus is then named. When Licinius and Sextius ignore his instruction to stop the voting, he threatens to summon the youth to military service and lead them on campaign. The tribunes are more determined than ever, but before conflict breaks out, Camillus abruptly resigns, Livy says, either because there was a faulty procedure in his appointment, or because he was frightened off by an unprecedented legislative action (“*noui exempli rogatione*,” 6.38.10). Livy prefers the first explanation and gives many reasons why the second cannot be true. The entire passage is jumbled, and the events almost certainly never took place, but the point is that Livy can and does use the word “*exemplum*” in the sense of precedent, and he depicts the Romans as exercising scrupulous care when creating, observing, and discarding practices handed down from the past. Thus, *exempla* are not only moralistic tales, but also rules of procedure, less dramatic, perhaps, but equally worthy of attention.

In that particular episode, Camillus is the putative recipient of an *exemplum*: he may have abdicated because this new kind of lawmaking deterred him from remaining in office. At other moments, when delivering speeches, he identifies *exempla*. For instance, in his long oration against the proposed move to Veii (5.51.1–54.7), in addition to reviewing the events that led to the Gallic invasion and highlighting the need for piety, he says that in their conquest, capture, and repayment to the gods, the Romans are an object-lesson for the world: “*igitur uicti captique ac redempti tantum poenarum dis hominibusque dedimus ut terrarum orbi documento essemus*” (5.51.8). Camillus here shares the Faliscans' self-conscious knowledge of how history works: people become *exempla* that model behavior for others. This passage illustrates also that, as the collocation “*omnis ... exempli documenta*” in Preface 10 suggests, *exempla* and *documenta* are closely related in Livy's thinking, and he uses both to label lessons from the past. Further, he routinely includes historical examples without either of these tags.

Another interesting aspect of Camillus' speech is that it does not prove decisive; the Romans do not elect to keep Rome as their home until they receive a sign. However, they are not the only recipients of Camillus' argument. Livy's own audience, the audience outside the text, also absorbs the position that Camillus articulates. The external audience in fact receives a larger lesson, seeing both the importance of piety and the sanctity of Rome's location and the process by which the historical actors came to accept those ideas. An important aspect of Livian exemplarity is the way it reaches multiple audiences, both internal and external.

Another speech that Camillus delivers showcases yet another feature of Livian exemplarity (6.7.3–6). Addressing his dispirited troops before a battle against the Volsci, Latini, and Hernici, Camillus glides over his most famous accomplishments with a nice *praeteritio* (“*ut Falerios Veiosque captos et in capta patria Gallorum legiones caesas taceam*,” 6.7.4) to remind the soldiers that they have defeated these enemies before and that since all the players are the same, the outcome will be the same. Camillus and his army are thus *exempla* for themselves. After a brief address, Camillus hurls himself and the nearest standard-bearer into battle, and the sight of their aged commander rouses the men to action. The effect of the speech is not persuasion—Camillus' bold behavior accomplishes that—but the characterization of a skilled and experienced general; the *praeteritio* was the point. Throughout Livy's narrative, an individual's selection and deployment of *exempla* may tell the external audience as much about their user as about the course of action under consideration (see further in the following text).

Camillus as *Exemplum*

Camillus' invocation of himself leads conveniently into his most important exemplary function: he is cited by other people eight times in the extant books of the *Ab Urbe Condita*. This is an unusually high frequency; most people, events, and precedents are invoked just once. Apart from that atypicality, Camillus provides handy access to the ways in which *exempla* functions in Livy's narrative. This section of the chapter reviews seven of his appearances, reserving the eighth for later. Treated sequentially, these seven illuminate how malleable *exempla* are, how different speakers bring out different aspects for different reasons, how different audiences respond, and how the relative antiquity or novelty of *exempla* affects their applicability.

While Camillus is still alive and the Licinian–Sextian legislation dominates internal politics, Appius Claudius delivers a speech hostile to those laws (6.40.1–41.12). In his case against a plebeian consul, he poses a hypothetical: suppose that the Romans were facing a war such as when Porsenna occupied the Janiculum or when the Gauls held everything but the Capitoline, and suppose that Sextius were the only plebeian candidate for consul, but that

Camillus had patrician rivals for the other spot—would not the Romans be distressed that Sextius was guaranteed victory, but Camillus was not (6.40.17)? Certainly, Camillus is being cited as a great general and the savior of the city, but in a curious fashion, under a hypothetical scenario. A non-factual *exemplum* seems less than fully convincing, and, in fact, Livy prefaces Appius' speech by saying that he spoke more from hatred and wrath than from hope of persuasion.

The great general is again invoked in a quasi-hypothetical way when the Samnites trap the Romans at the Caudine Forks. Faced with total surrender and the humiliation of being sent beneath the yoke, the Roman leaders are too downcast even to deliberate. Finally, Lucius Lentulus makes the case for compliance, by relating the Capitoline siege in a way that both adds to and departs from Livy's account in Book 5. Lentulus avers that only his father (not mentioned in Book 5) had opposed paying ransom when the senate agreed to redeem Rome from the Gauls; the senior Lentulus' argument was that an assault from the Capitoline meant great danger but not certain death. To his son, however, the army at Caudium faces annihilation. Further, it is the sole defense of all Romans, for the urban masses cannot protect the city, and what if they beg for an army and Camillus to come from Veii? The question is rhetorical, and Lentulus urges his comrades to submit to the yoke (9.4.7–16). His closing words—“*Ite, consules, redimite armis ciuitatem, quam auro maiores uestri redemerunt*” (Go, consuls, redeem with your weapons the city your ancestors redeemed with gold)—highlight another departure from the earlier narrative. When Livy recounted the Gauls' siege, the barbarians did not get the gold because Camillus arrived and voided the transaction through his superior power as dictator. Hence, while Lentulus' *exemplum* rests on what Livy presented as true, that Camillus came from Veii to rescue Rome, Lentulus contradicts the narrative in other respects. His immediate audience accepts his version and adopts his position, with the consuls proceeding directly to negotiations with the Samnite general. Anyone outside the text familiar with Livy's version of events, however, might wonder which account to follow. The gap suggests that Lentulus is not a reliable guide to the past and its applicability to the present. People who read Livy primarily to reconstruct Roman history should be especially alert to such inconsistencies between the original narrative and subsequent retellings; they do not automatically make Livy a poor historian or source, but attest rather to his capacity for nuance and attention to context.

The third invocation of Camillus as savior of Rome comes from an equally questionable speaker. Gaius Flaminius, the impatient consul of 217 BC, refuses to sit and watch Hannibal pillaging Italy and making his way unopposed to the walls of Rome. Sarcastically expressing his resentment when his advisers counsel him to wait for his colleague, Flaminius says that Hannibal will reach Rome before he will be summoned from Arretium as Camillus was from Veii

(22.3.10). Taken with the previous two citations, this episode reinforces the idea that Camillus represents Rome's secret defensive weapon, the outstanding general who exists to come to the rescue. Flaminius, by contrast, does not wait, but leads his troops into Hannibal's ambush at Lake Trasimene, where the force is wiped out. In effect, he knows his history but not how to use it.

Flaminius' successor in the role of impatient general (both are characterized by *temeritas*, e.g., 22.3.4, 9.7, 23.3, and 27.8) is Marcus Minucius Rufus, second-in-command to the dictator Quintus Fabius Cunctator after the disaster at Trasimene. In his eagerness to fight, Minucius too cites Camillus. Initially, he seems to be assimilating the current and former dictators, but, unlike the previous speakers with their counterfactual arguments, Minucius goes on to stress what Camillus actually did. His hypothetical statement—that if Camillus had campaigned against the Gauls in the same indirect way Fabius is tackling Hannibal, Rome would now belong to the Gauls—is followed by the point that Camillus, a real Roman man (“*uir ac uere Romanus*”), reached Rome on the day that he heard he had been appointed dictator, and, on the following day, he defeated the Gauls in battle. Minucius further develops the scenario by giving Camillus two exemplary comrades: many years later (“*post multos annos*”), after the disgrace at Caudium, did Lucius Papirius Cursor transfer the yoke from Roman to Samnite necks by traversing Samnium or by attacking Luceria? And, just recently (“*modo*”), Gaius Lutatius achieved victory through speed, by attacking the enemy the day after he spotted their ship (22.14.9–13). The additional examples bring out a new aspect of Camillus the general and savior, namely the swiftness of his retaliation. Interesting too is the chronological progression. It shows Minucius' expectation that his audience wants fresh examples. If too much time has passed since Camillus saved the day, there is Papirius Cursor just a century earlier and, even better, Lutatius' success at the end of the first Punic war, presumably within living memory. Minucius' words are directed at open ears, and the soldiers prefer him to Fabius. Subsequently, however, Livy reveals to the external audience that both Minucius and his auditors were mistaken. Minucius falls into another of Hannibal's traps, and Fabius has to save him. The younger general publicly acknowledges his lack of *consilium* and subordinates himself to the latter (22.28.1–29.11). Again, the external audience sees that a speaker can be mistaken in his interpretation of the past.

After this episode, Camillus is cited not for his generalship and the rescue of Rome, but because of his exile. In the midst of the Second Punic War, Livy relates a compressed and intricate episode involving a state contractor, one Marcus Postumius Pyrgensis. Pyrgensis is systematically defrauding the public treasury by claiming false losses on vessels carrying military supplies. The Senate initially does not prosecute from fear of antagonizing other contractors, on whose services the war-effort depends, and when two tribunes indict Pyrgensis, the contractors' scare tactics nearly start a riot. The Senate

takes up the matter. Livy does not specify who is speaking, but Camillus is the first of three examples of compliance that contrast with Pyrgensis' and his colleagues' conduct: although the city's ruin followed his exile, Camillus nonetheless allowed himself to be condemned by the angry citizens; so too the decemvirs, under whose laws they are still living, as well as many subsequent leading citizens (25.4.1–3). The constellation of *exempla* is weak in many ways. The third element is vague (“*multos postea principes ciuitatis*”), and because the decemvirs are associated with the corrupting influence of power, it is awkward to couple them with Camillus. Then again, it is part of the flexibility with which Livy regards *exempla* that unconventional aspects of canonical figures can be invoked as readily as their more familiar features. It is worth noting as a pendant that this episode includes also the idea of an *exemplum* as a precedent: the Senate decrees that the contractors' use of force against the state was a ruinous one (“*pernicioso exemplum*,” 25.4.7).

A few years later, Camillus proves to be a highly apposite example for Livius Salinator (27.34.1–15). According to Livy, in 208 BC, the senators were seeking to find an appropriate colleague for Gaius Claudius Nero, whose character would benefit from some tempering. The obvious candidates are either patricians such as Claudius (shades of Appius' speech here), or unavailable. The choice settles on Salinator. After his successful consulship in 219 BC, he had been charged with peculation and fined. He went into voluntary exile, but after 7 years was brought back to Rome to resume his senatorial responsibilities. When the senators propose him as a candidate and the people seem willing, Salinator scornfully resists, charging them with hypocrisy for seeing him first as dishonorable and then as worthy of public trust. The senators take him to task and remind him that Camillus was recalled from exile and rescued the state; their argument is that just as children put up with the rage of parents, so must that of the fatherland be endured (“*et M. Furium memorantes reuocatum de exilio patriam pulsam sede sua restituisse. Ut parentum saeuitiam, sic patriae patiendo ac ferendo leniendam esse*,” 27.34.14). Communal pressure results in Salinator's election to the consulship. He and Claudius go on to hand Hannibal a crushing setback, with Claudius racing up the Italian peninsula with his army to join Salinator at the Metaurus, where they defeat the reinforcements that Hasdrubal has brought from Spain. While not quite the equivalent of expelling the Gauls from Rome, this battle is an important turning point in the war. Camillus and Salinator have much in common.

Camillus makes his final appearance in Book 45, in a debate over Lucius Aemilius Paullus' right to a triumph after defeating Perseus. In a lengthy defense of Paullus, Marcus Servilius Geminus contends that whether or not he is allowed to triumph matters less to Paullus and more to the reputation of the army and Roman people. To cheat him is to imitate the fickleness of the Athenians toward their leaders; enough wrong was already done by the

Romans' ancestors to Camillus, who rescued the city from the Gauls even after he was mistreated, and more recently to Scipio Africanus, since, to their shame, he ended up calling Liternum home and being buried there, though he had conquered Africa for them (“*satis peccatum in Camillo a maioribus uestris est, quem tamen ante receptam per eum a Gallis urbem uiolarunt. Satis nuper a uobis in P. Africano; Literni domicilium et sedem fuisse domitoris Africae, Literni sepulcrum ostendi erubescamus,*” 45.38.7). As with the previous case, Camillus is being invoked as a famous exile, but here the emphasis is on injustice to one who deserved better from his fellow citizens. To bring out that aspect, Scipio Africanus also is introduced: both men accomplished great military deeds and yet suffered disgrace, to the discredit of the Romans. Servilius is thus adapting Camillus to his own purposes.

As with the rebuke to Pyrgensis, the additional *exemplum* does not quite fit: Camillus' exile preceded his greatest deed on Rome's behalf, while Scipio first defeated Hannibal and then many years later was charged with embezzlement. Nonetheless, Africanus serves to reinforce Servilius' presentation of Camillus. Further and importantly, he is a fresh (*nuper*) example, so fresh that Servilius can blame his listeners themselves. The vividness compensates for the slightly awkward pairing. Still, it is interesting to consider together these three instances where exile is the relevant part of Camillus' story. With Pyrgensis and the contractors, his exemplary companions are the decemvirs and anonymous leading citizens, because the point is that in the past everyone, no matter how powerful, accepted exile. For Salinator, Camillus' exile and return fit beautifully, so he is cited alone. Servilius by contrast wants to illustrate mistreatment of war heroes and capitalizes on the recent downfall of Scipio. Taken together, the three episodes show that an *exemplum* can shift its meaning and that a speaker can create nuance by electing to include other *exempla*, which themselves can vary depending on the circumstances.³

Patterns

This point leads to the question of the patterns that become visible when Camillus' exemplary appearances are viewed collectively. The sequential presentation highlights an interesting shift in usage, namely that the first four speakers (Appius, Lentulus, Flaminius, and Minucius) enlist Camillus primarily as a general, while the final three citations center on his exile. The *exempla* that appear alongside him offer a possible explanation. On the one hand, consistent with Livy's sensitivity to the freshness of *exempla* is his attentiveness to chronological suitability: his speakers give examples that the audience of the time can be expected to recognize; as time passes, the examples change. Simply as a successful general, Camillus is meaningful to his contemporaries (as in Appius Claudius' speech), but, in Rome's militaristic culture, he is easily and necessarily replaced over the course of the narrative (there is one important exception, explored further in the following text,

namely, military contexts involving a rash young commander and a senior, seasoned one). On the other hand, exile of prominent individuals, whether voluntary or not, did not occur annually, and so examples of it are harder to come by. The earlier passages indicate that, until Scipio Africanus, Camillus was the best shorthand for exile. Livy's speakers have no other comparandum. Particularly telling is Servilius' reference to the Athenians, for Livy rarely draws on Greek history for *exempla*. His inclusion of Athens' practice of ostracism here may well indicate that, in 167 BC, the dramatic date of the speech, Rome could not provide good specific instances beyond Camillus and Scipio. Interestingly in this regard, though Cicero employs *exempla* heavily throughout his lifetime and oeuvre, he does not use Camillus until after his own exile and return, a fact suggesting that, in the first century, these were Camillus' strongest associations.⁴

It is also worth noting who invokes which attribute of Camillus. The men who cite him as a general differ qualitatively from those who focus on his absence from Rome. Appius Claudius, Lentulus, Flaminius, and Minucius all turn out to be wrong, whether in the judgment of history or Livy. However sympathetic Livy may be to the patrician side, he knows that the consulship will be opened to plebeians and, as noted earlier, while Appius' speech presents the case for Rome's elite, it is not supposed to be a tour-de-force of rhetorical persuasion. Also, as noted earlier, Lentulus may undermine the credibility of his position when he gives his own version of the Gallic siege. When the Romans subsequently renege on their agreement with the Samnites, Livy questions their conduct, noting that, while they may have fulfilled their personal obligations, it is not clear that the public ones have been met (*"forsitan et publica, sua certe liberata fide,"* 9.11.13). Many elements of the Romans' conduct at Caudium are morally problematic, and while Livy allows Lentulus to articulate a justification for the initial surrender, he by no means endorses Roman behavior. Flaminius and Minucius are simpler cases. Livy makes them responsible for Roman defeats, and their inability to cite the past correctly is part and parcel of the foolish recklessness that leads to catastrophe for Flaminius and a major misstep for Minucius. They belong to a wider phenomenon in the *Ab Urbe Condita*, where the speakers who misread the past are foreigners or villainous Romans or simply those on the wrong side of history.

In contrast, when Camillus is cited as an example of exile, Livy seems to be siding with the speakers: the senators who wish to quell the disorder triggered by the contractors, the senators who want Salinator to be consul, and Servilius, exhorting the Romans to give a triumph to Paullus, whom the historian treats as an old-fashioned Roman hero. It might seem that we should conclude that Livy thinks it is right to cite Camillus' exile and wrong to invoke his generalship, but both the chronology of the citations and yet a third use of Camillus make that conclusion inadequate.

Chronologically, Camillus is first invoked in an exemplary context in 394 BC, when the Faliscans praise Roman *fides*, and last identified as one in 167 BC (when the extant books of Livy end), but the distribution of subsequent references is uneven: two in Book 6 (386 and 368 BC), one in Book 8 (325/4 BC, discussed in the following text), one in Book 9 (320 BC), two in Book 22 (both set in 217 BC), one in Book 25 (212 BC), one in Book 27 (208 BC), and one in Book 45 (167 BC). One gap here is textual, caused by the loss of Books 11–20. The other is both textual and temporal, the 40 years between Books 27 and 45. In Livy's narrative, *exempla* come, and then they go. Camillus would be anachronistic before Book 5 and becomes increasingly irrelevant over the years. In Livy's view, *exempla* are not timeless, but keyed to circumstance and chronology. To return to the point about which speakers employ which aspect of Camillus, their temporal distance from him partially explains their usage. As a general, he resonates powerfully with his contemporaries, but is subsequently eclipsed; as an exile, he proves more durable.

Moderatio

With the exception of a few episodes (Camillus' resignation of the dictatorship and the unscrupulous contractor Marcus Postumius Pyrgensis), most of the material so far has revolved around Camillus' famed role in Book 5. The sieges of Veii and Falerii, the Gallic invasion, and Camillus' rescue of the city are standard in all extant accounts of early-fourth-century Rome.⁵ However, Livy continued to develop the war hero's exemplary capacities and, in the second pentad, employs him to create one of his regular topoi—conflict between two commanding officers: one old, experienced, and restrained, the other young and hotheaded. Considering Camillus as a model of restraint (*moderatio*) opens up yet another way in which Livy uses *exempla*, namely to bind together the complex and sprawling narrative that he chose to write.

And here, the eighth citation of Camillus becomes germane. It has its roots in a central episode in Book 6 when he holds a joint command with his young kinsman, Lucius Furius (6.22.6–25.6). They share the rank of military tribune with consular power, but where Camillus is elderly (he is introduced with “*exactae iam aetatis Camillus erat*,” 6.22.7; and throughout the episode there are numerous references to his age: 23.4–7, 9–11, 24.7), Lucius is youthful and hotheaded (“*ferox ... cum aetate et ingenio*,” 6.23.3), and the rashness that he and the soldiers exhibit (“*temeritas*,” 6.22.6 and 24.9) results in a near-disaster, which only Camillus' good judgment (“*consilium*,” 6.23.1, 8, 11) can avert. In brief, the Volsci are aggressively challenging the Romans, and Lucius and the army want to fight, while Camillus prefers to wait. However, the two generals have equal authority, and Camillus steps aside, taking charge of the reserves and keeping a close eye on the battle. Lucius and his forces are drawn into an unfavorable position and routed, at which point Camillus rallies the remaining troops and saves the day. Everyone, from Lucius to the soldiers

to those on the home front, recognizes that Lucius was wrong and Camillus right, and yet Camillus responds with the utmost generosity. When he has to go to Rome to tell the Senate about an Etruscan defection, he leaves Lucius in charge of the camp. Livy comments: “*documento unus dies fuerat, ne sua consilia melioribus praeferret*” (one day had been a lesson to him not to prefer his own plans to better ones, 6.25.3). In other words, the near-loss is an *exemplum* for Lucius, a model of behavior to avoid. Camillus further proves his *moderatio* by selecting Lucius when the Senate entrusts the Etruscan war to him and allows him to name his own colleague (6.25.5–6).

Clearly complete in itself,⁶ the episode becomes relevant over half a century later when the Romans are fighting the Samnites. Camillus' grandson is one of the consuls in 325 BC. When he becomes too ill to perform his duties, he appoints a dictator, Lucius Papirius Cursor, who in turn selects as his second-in-command Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus. A quarrel between Papirius and Fabius dominates their tenure (8.30.1–35.12). The acrimony begins when Papirius has to return to Rome to take the auspices again. Although he instructs Fabius not to act in his absence, Fabius engages in battle with the Samnites and executes a perfect victory. Livy explains that either the hot-tempered young man (“*ferox adulescens*,” 8.30.4) was irked by the dictator, or the opportunity was too good to miss. Papirius hears about the illicit success and comes storming back to camp. Disorder erupts when he publicly rebukes Fabius and attempts to have him punished. Fabius escapes to Rome and puts himself under the protection of his father, Marcus Fabius. At a public meeting the following day, first the elder Fabius, and then Papirius speak. Finally, the latter accepts the general plea for mercy, and the campaign resumes.

The episode instantly becomes an *exemplum* for others. Livy reports that the ironic consequence of Papirius' severity toward Fabius is that his junior officer, keeping Fabius' fate in mind (“*ceterum in oculis exemplum erat Q. Fabius M. Valerio legato qui castris praeerat, ne quam uim hostium magis quam trucem dictatoris iram timeret*,” 8.35.10), never fights during Papirius' absences, though those are the times when the Samnites are on the move. In addition, *exempla* run throughout the episode, demonstrating how thoroughly Livy embeds *exempla* in his narrative. As Papirius charges back to camp to chastise Fabius, he keeps muttering about Titus Manlius (8.30.10–13), thereby acting as a focalizer for the episode's exemplary foil: Manlius' execution of his son for engaging in single combat with a Gaul, against orders.⁷ When Marcus Fabius first addresses Papirius, he cites the example of Tullus Hostilius, noting that even that king respected *provocatio* (8.33.8). And Papirius' final words recall Livy's assessment of Lucius' misadventure in Book 6:

Populo Romano, cui uitam debes, nihil maius praestiteris quam si hic tibi dies satis documenti dederit ut bello ac pace pati legitima imperia possis. (You can supply the Roman people, to whom you owe your life,

nothing greater than if this day has given you sufficient proof that in war and peace you can obey constitutional power.)

It recalls 8.35.7 as well, with “*hic tibi dies satis documenti dederit*” echoing “*documento unus dies fuerat*” at 6.25.3 for the alert reader. In keeping with his overall truculence, Papirius expresses much less confidence in Fabius than Livy did in Lucius, but the idea is the same. Once again, a man can learn from his own experience, which furnishes a *documentum* of behavior.

The key passage in terms of Camillus, however, comes in Marcus Fabius' longer speech, in the public meeting (8.33.13–16):

Quantum interesse inter moderationem antiquorum et nouam superbiam crudelitatemque! dictatorem Quinctium Cincinnatum in L. Minucium consulem ex obsidione a se ereptum non ultra saeuisse quam ut legatum eum ad exercitum pro consule relinqueret. M. Furium Camillum in L. Furio, qui contempta sua senectute et auctoritate foedissimo cum euentu pugnasset, non solum in praesentia moderatum irae esse ne quid de collega secus populo aut senatui scriberet, sed cum reuertisset potissimum ex tribunis consularibus habuisse quem ex collegis optione ab senatu socium sibi imperii deligeret. (How great is the difference between the restraint of the ancients and modern arrogance and cruelty! After the dictator Quinctius Cincinnatus rescued the consul Lucius Minucius from a siege, he was no more harsh with him than to demote him to a legate. Marcus Furius Camillus not only restrained his anger at Lucius Furius (who scorned Camillus' age and authority and fought with a dreadful result) such that he did not write anything about his colleague to the people or senate, but also when he had returned and the senate let him choose one of his colleagues to share his command, he made Lucius the most powerful of the consular tribunes.)

Citing Camillus not for generalship or exile, but for his restraint, Marcus summarizes the episode from Book 6. He also amplifies it in one respect, saying that Camillus did not write a letter publicly blaming Lucius. While this statement has no basis in Book 6, it differs from Lentulus' re-casting of the Gallic siege in that it is consistent with Livy's original narrative. The new information thus seems to be merely an embellishment by Marcus Fabius, and not a signal of unreliability. Camillus here exemplifies *moderatio*, and so has yet another exemplary companion, Quinctius Cincinnatus. The episode being referred to is more familiar as the occasion when Cincinnatus was called from his plow, swiftly resolved the emergency (the Aequi had encircled the consul Minucius and his army), and resigned in 16 days (3.26.3–29.7). This occasion is less apposite than Lucius' imprudence, because there was no strain between the main characters as there is between Lucius and Camillus or Fabius and Papirius. Further, the quarrel between the latter two has some of the generational conflicts found in Camillus' and Lucius' story. While Papirius is not identified as old in the way that Camillus is, the youth of Fabius and the

age of his father are mentioned repeatedly (Fabius Rullianus' youth at 8.30.3, 32.15, 35.2, and 35.3; Marcus Fabius' age at 8.33.7 and 11). Fabius resembles Lucius, being *ferox* (8.30.4) and acting out of *temeritas* (8.33.17), and Papirius' advisers want him to avoid behavior inappropriate for age and prudence (8.32.16).

As discussed in the preceding text, age matters for *exempla*, and the passage from Marcus Fabius' speech encapsulates a related tension central to Livy's view of them. The claim that studying the past is valuable because history is full of *exempla* immediately implies respect for age: one looks to older things for lessons. Respect for age runs throughout the Fabius–Papirius episode. Marcus Fabius contrasts the restraint of the ancients (*moderationem antiquorum*) with the new arrogance and cruelty (*nouam superbiam crudelitatemque*), clearly presenting antiquity as superior to modernity. And Cincinnatus, a hero of the republic's first century, is certainly an ancient. At the same time, Marcus Fabius dwells far longer on Camillus, who is not just more applicable, but also closer in time. For, as the citations of Camillus as a general and an exile revealed, *exempla* tend to become less efficacious as they age. Livy acknowledges this both through his speakers' claims to have recent material and through his own constant cycling in and out of *exempla*. Thus, old and new *exempla* have competing claims, the former partaking of the authority of the past, the latter the immediacy of the present. Livy has room for both kinds.

Conclusion

Livy's incorporation of old and new works on at least three levels throughout *Ab Urbe Condita*. At the finest level are *exempla*. They instantiate respect for the past; they are its lessons. However, they also change over time, and Livy's assertion of their value in his preface makes clear that the reader plays an active role: the insistent use of the second-person singular (*te, tibi, tuaeque, imitere, capias, uites*) requires not mechanical imitation, but thoughtful sifting, matching knowledge of the past with present exigencies. On the level of narrative, Livy exploits topoi, as shown by the rivalry between the wise old and young over-eager commanders considered here. The quarrel between Fabius and Papirius is the annalistic precursor of that between Fabius Cunctator and Minucius in the Second Punic War. There is an attenuated version in Lucius Aemilius Paullus' relationship with his junior officer Publius Scipio Nasica (44.36.9–14 and 38.1–3). Presumably, the lost books contained still other variations. Recurrence helps the audience by unifying the narrative and establishing patterns, and Livy was dealing with a vast amount of material; a certain amount of familiarity rendered it more digestible.⁸ Finally, on the conceptual level, the tension between new and old, the struggle between change and continuity, is the driving force of *Ab Urbe Condita*. It is hard to think of another ancient historian who chronicles as much change in

an equally meaningful way. Book 1 is utterly different from Book 31. To read Livy consecutively from the monarchy to the middle republic is indeed to see a city created, grow, face annihilation, and expand exponentially. However, the historical agents of that change, Livy's Romans, are constantly looking to the past as they create the future. *Exempla* are that process in a nutshell.

Notes

- 1 See Ogilvie (1970, 685) for a list of its occurrences in other texts.
- 2 The discussion here largely corresponds to the ideas I laid out in *Livy's Exemplary History*, and the interested reader may wish to consult the more extensive treatment there. For the present purpose, I have tried to use fresh material as much as possible.
- 3 There is an excellent discussion of the “situational variability” of *exempla* by Rebecca Langlands (2011). She demonstrates how *exempla* require keen self-knowledge and ethical judgment. Though her discussion deals with Valerius Maximus and Cicero, her analysis holds equally well for *exempla* in Livy.
- 4 See Walter (2004, 396–398).
- 5 See Gowing (2009) for Camillus's treatment by the Greek historians of Rome.
- 6 See Oakley (1997–2005, vol. 1, p. 581) on the ring composition.
- 7 Note also the reference to this episode at 8.35.9; for the event itself, see Livy 8.7.1–8.2 and Oakley (1997–2005) ad loc.
- 8 For Livy's concessions to his readers, see Levene (2010, 63–74) and Kraus (1994, 350)

Cross-References

See Chapter 11: LIVY'S HISTORICAL PHILOSOPHY

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Further Reading

This discussion has skipped lightly over complex episodes. Those in Books 6–10 should be read with the rich discussions of Oakley (1997–2005) as well as Kraus (1994) for Book 6. Camillus seems to have been developed far more by Livy than by previous Roman authors, and many readers have seen connections between his Camillus and Augustus. Miles (1995) is a good starting point. Plutarch's biography is the longest extant treatment of Camillus in Greek. Walter (2004) is excellent on Camillus, and Coudry and Späth (2001) contains several thoughtful discussions of his place in Roman culture. The best analysis of Livy as an author of gripping narrative is Levene (2010).

For Livy's use of *exempla* generally, see Chaplin (2000). For *exempla* in Roman culture, see Langlands (2008 and 2011) and Roller (2004 and 2009).

Chapter 9

Roman Wars and Armies in Livy

Yann Le Bohec

Armies and wars are omnipresent in Livy's narrative. In the remaining books of the *Ab Urbe Condita Libri* of Livy (1–9 and 21–45, to which we must add the summaries, called the *Periochae*), there are many passages about wars waged by the Romans during the period from early Rome to 293 BC and from 218 to 167 BC; the *Periochae* cover the years between 148 and 9 BC. However, here it is more difficult to find explanations of the structural aspect of the army; nevertheless, through the narrative, we may examine the evolution of the units, the way men were recruited, the weapons that were used, the tactics, and the strategy. Modern historians usually complete the Livian text, especially for the early period, by using Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *Antiquitates Romanae*.

Early Rome

In the first books (1–5), Livy depicts the birth of an army, emerging from a local militia (Rich 2007, 7–23). Though the narrative for this period mostly consists of legends, a fact Livy himself is perfectly aware of, we may find part of the truth in it. It is therefore necessary to criticize those legends and compare them to the archeological artifacts.

The first Roman army was, as we have said, a local militia. However, it was soon organized into a unique legion, consisting of 3,000 foot soldiers and 300 horsemen (Fraccaro 1957, 287–306, 1975; Brizzi 2008, 31–37). This structure was modeled on that of the state and society: the free inhabitants were divided into three *tribus*, and each *tribus* into 10 *curiae*. Each *curia* had to provide the army with 100 foot soldiers, one *centurio*, 10 horsemen, and one *decurio*. On the battlefield, they followed a Greek tradition—that is, the phalanx of hoplites: each soldier was equipped with a sword, a spear, and a round shield, and was separated from his brothers-in-arms by a distance of 1–2 meters; all the men would run together toward the enemies, and then the battle was transformed into manifold duels.

During the sixth century BC, Rome was ruled by kings (Liv. 1), six of them after Romulus, according to tradition. Tullus Hostilius was said to like wars, and he fought against the inhabitants of the Sabine territory and of Alba Longa, during which conflict the famous duels between the Horatii and the Curatii took place. The wars against their neighbors, Latins and Etrusci, especially from Veii, were never ending. During this period, Rome had to endure a permanent struggle for survival: each year saw a new war, and every

time the ongoing war could have been the last one, ending with the destruction of Rome, should it have been defeated.

An important transformation took place under King Servius Tullius, a great reformer, if we believe the texts (especially Liv. 1.43, but also Dion. Hal. 4.16–17; Fraccaro 1975, 29–40; Forsythe 2007, 24–41), who reorganized both the state and Roman society. Free men were supposed to have been divided into five levels then: the five Roman *classes* with their 193 (or 195) centuries (the Livian description of the Servian system is, in fact, anachronistic and depicts the fully developed system as it existed during the Middle Republic). Military service was compulsory and reserved for rich people. Hence, the first three *classes* (1–2–3) had to furnish heavy infantrymen—that is, soldiers with a helmet, a shield, an armor, a sword, and a javelin. The lowest *classes* (4–5) provided light infantrymen. First, there remained a unique legion of 6,000 men at a *praetor's* disposal; later on, two legions were at the consul's disposal; each consisted of 3,000 heavy infantrymen and 1,200 light infantrymen. Some important innovations were a consequence of the long siege, which lasted 10 years, in front of the Etruscan city of Veii. Because peasants could not go back home and work in their fields, a form of monetary compensation was created; it was the ancestor of wages (4.59–60; 5.7). Because the siege continued during the winter, the soldiers built themselves winter quarters using earth, wood, and stone, which were called *hibernacula* (5.2).

During the sixth and the fifth centuries BC, there are many well-known heroes (especially Liv. 2–5), such as Horatius Cocles, Mucius Scaevola, and Cloelia. Caius Marcius was given the name “Coriolanus” after the successful siege of Corioli. A family, the Fabii, is supposed to have furnished a unit of 306 men to fight against Etruscan Veii; all of them were killed at the battle of Cremera. And Cincinnatus fought victoriously against the Aequi.

Then there came new enemies, the Gallic invaders of Northern Italy (Liv. 5–7), who carried out at least three raids against Rome. During the first one, they defeated a Roman army on the Allia River; then they reached the city and besieged it. Trying to take the Capitol, they climbed the wall by night, but the sacred geese of the goddess Juno set up a rumpus and woke up the Roman soldiers; thereupon, Camillus arrived and repulsed the barbarians, according to the Livian version, which hides the fact that Rome most surely was entirely captured by the Gauls.

New problems were caused by Latins, Samnites, and Campanians (Liv. 7–8). The Samnites, a poor mountain folk, used to plunder the rich Campanian territory, compelling its inhabitants to ask the Romans for help. During this period, there existed a permanent state of war between Romans and Latins. Livy gives the reader a vivid description of the Roman army at the time.

The Roman Army in 340 BC

By about 340 BC, the situation became very dangerous: all the Latin peoples had come together and forged an alliance to destroy Rome—the city, its inhabitants, and its army. Livy gives his readers an astonishing description of the Roman army at that moment in time (8.8). It is difficult to see why exactly he wrote this passage; he may have found as his source a complete document, and wanted to give an account of it, or he may have thought that it would be useful to include this description here.

For the first time, we can visualize the *triplex acies*, the disposition in three rows of the soldiers: from the front to the rear, they were called *hastati*, *principes*, and *triarii*. This *triplex acies* is now also called the manipular tactics (Brizzi 2008, 45–50; Fraccaro 1975, 42–58 and 59–64; Le Bohec 1997, 14–18).

There were 15 maniples of *hastati* in the first row. A maniple was two centuries added together, and a century consisted of only some 60 soldiers. They were chosen from among the younger men, so as to find the most daring. They were divided into two sections, light infantrymen in front and heavy infantrymen behind. First, the light infantrymen would surge forward and throw javelins at the enemies, in order to wound some of them and to bring chaos to their defense system. Then, they would withdraw to give room to the heavy infantrymen. The latter began the actual fighting, a lot of one-to-one duels. And when they were tired, they would withdraw behind the *principes*, who would then enter into the fray.

As their name indicates, *principes* were formerly in the first row, and they were the richest of the Roman soldiers. At an unknown period, and for unknown reasons, they moved to the second row, behind the *hastati*. Being the richest, they could equip themselves entirely, and so they furnished a very heavy infantry. Similar to the *hastati*, they were also divided into 15 maniples, but all of them similar.

The rear section was particular, and was made up of three types of soldiers. All of them were known as *triarii*, but those who occupied the first of the three rows were specifically called by that name. In the middle row were the *rorarii*, who bore a mysterious-sounding name: what did it mean? What was their specificity? We do not know. At the rear of the rear, the *accensi* were the poorest men, without weapons; each of them waited for a Roman soldier to be killed, so as to take his sword and javelin, and enter into the fray. Usually, the *triarii* did not fight: the battle was won by the *hastati* and the *principes*. Therefore, the Romans had a proverb: when somebody said that “the case comes to the *triarii*,” it meant that the situation was very dark.

As one can see, this organization gave the Roman army great flexibility, because there was space between the maniples. When they got to marshes or woods, the units could pass round them without being separated from each other. And it was hard for the enemies to withstand the flow of soldiers

coming in waves, one after the other. It is probable that the maniples were created during the wars against the Samnites, waged in a most mountainous country.

Because the order of battle was different from the ancient phalanx, the weaponry also changed. The soldiers no longer used the old *clipeus*, a round shield, but received a *scutum*, which was longer, rectangular or oval-shaped. Hence, they were all better protected. To kill the enemy, they had a *gladius* instead of the old *ensis*: the *ensis* was long, and only one side of it was sharp; the *gladius* was sturdier as well as shorter, narrower, and double-edged. It caused horrible wounds, but it was necessary to learn fencing in order to use it. Finally, the javelin called *hasta* was replaced by a *pilum*. The *hasta* was a long wooden stick with a short iron head; it was held in both hands and required an elementary knowledge of fencing. The *pilum*, light and long (about 1.7 meters), was made of two parts, a short wooden stick and a long and thin iron head, so that it could pierce flesh easily and, on impact, the iron was twisted; as a consequence, it was not possible for the enemies to use it again against the Roman soldiers.

With this order of battle and these weapons, the legionaries became the best soldiers in the world. Some people seem to hesitate as to which of those two, the Macedonian phalanx or the Roman legion, was the most skillful. However, this is an intellectual game. When they fought against each other, the Roman legion always defeated the Macedonian phalanx (Brizzi 2008, 45–50 and 99–107; Sekunda 2007, 330–333 and 336–339).

In 340 BC, the Roman legion defeated the Latin army and saved its fatherland. However, after the victory, the Roman Senate did something incredible. Instead of turning the Latins into slaves, it gave Roman citizenship to most of them. This was probably possible because noble families, on both sides, had had ties with one another for a long time, through business and marriages (as one can see, marriages were often the consequence of business deals). This political attitude was of great significance, since the Roman state could from then on raise a considerable number of legionaries. Whereas from its beginning until 340 BC the very existence of the Roman state had been in jeopardy every year, it always remained secure after 340 BC.

The efficiency of the Roman army can be explained by the manipular tactics and by the equipment. However, other factors had their importance, especially strategy and psychology. As regards the latter, religion played an important part: victory was given to the Romans because they were the most pious people in the world. We can thus observe the power of religion over the Romans at the beginning and at the end of the Second Punic War. After Cannae, the public priests offered sacrifices every day, and each sacrifice was renewed several times, lest some rites should be forgotten. Later, as the Senate wished to know by what means they could win, they decided to have recourse to the oracle of Apollo, in Delphi. The answer given was quite

simple: it was necessary to move the Black Stone, a representation of the Anatolian goddess Cybele, to Rome. The king of Pergamum authorized the transfer, and the goddess was received with ostentation in Rome. A great procession accompanied her from Ostia to Rome, in which it was possible to see all the ladies from the upper classes (Liv. 29).

Two questions may be asked about the Roman wars of this period: why and how were they waged?

Roman imperialism can be explained by economic and psychological factors. As to the economic aims, it is anachronistic to imagine any intention to control the means of making money or the source of wealth. When going to war, the soldiers and the officers were looking for money, for booty. Booty, which is abhorrent in our day and age, was normal in Antiquity, according to “international” laws, unwritten laws, which sprang, not from agreements, but from custom. After a battle, the prisoners and their families became the slaves of the victorious people, who also took all their goods. The state had, evidently, other aims in sight, in particular the tribute, a yearly payment made by the vanquished city. However, psychological factors were probably more important than economic ones. The ancient peoples had not much knowledge of their neighbors, and they feared them; they preferred to command than to obey; they wanted to protect a recent conquest by another conquest. Sociopolitical causes could also interfere: if he hoped to go into politics, a man had to prove his *uirtus*—that is, his devotion to the state (the translation of “*uirtus*” as “courage” is a mistake). Livy never explains this clearly, but it is always apparent in his books (Serrati 2007, 461–497; Lendon, *ibidem*, 498–516).

As for the manner of waging wars during this period, Romans expected even their enemies to respect some values, mainly *fides*. This word is not easy to translate. It covers decent behavior in battle, and excludes, in particular, any form of stratagem, used by the Greeks and Carthaginians, especially by Hannibal (Billows 2007, 303–324; Brizzi 2008, 37–44).

We are surprised when we read about Roman wars by the fact that most of them seem to have been started by their enemies. In reality, it was difficult for Romans to start a war. War had to be a *bellum iustum*, a war permitted by law and by religion. First, a magistrate or a priest had to tell the enemy that he had done wrong and that he had to make amends for it. Romans could only attack if they got no answer, or a negative answer. Diplomacy was used to avoid crises: ambassadors negotiated treaties, and friendship (“*amicitia*” in Latin, or “*philia*” in Greek) was considered a moral value by everyone.

We are also surprised to see that Rome never seems to have had strategic plans to conquer the world. The domination of Mediterranean countries was quite empirical: each war was decided after the previous one. Nevertheless, not all modern authors agree on that point, and some believe that there had

been such a strategy (Roth 2007, 368–380).

After the year 340 BC, there began a conquest that soon built up speed (Rawlings 2007, 45–62). During the first three centuries of its existence, Rome was every year about to be destroyed. However, then, the whole of Italy was conquered within half a century, between 340 and 272 BC (ancient Italy was only the peninsular part of the modern country bearing this name). Some wars are mentioned (Liv. 8–10): against minor peoples and cities, Ausonii, Privernum, Paleopolis; and against more important peoples, the Apulii, Etrusci, Umbri, Marsi, Peligni, and Aequi (Liv. 9). However, the most dangerous enemies were the Samnites, who lived in the mountains of central Italy (Brizzi 2008, 45–50). The Romans experienced victories and defeats. The most famous disaster led legionaries to pass under the yoke, at the *Furcae Caudinae*; but, later, the Samnites also had to pass under the yoke (Liv. 9.2.6; 11.3). In 272 BC, the whole of Italy became Roman, after a long but victorious conflict against King Pyrrhus and the Greek city of Tarentum. However, Livy's narrative goes on until the year 293 BC; the following parts are lost, and we must return to his writings only for the period after 218 BC.

The Second Punic War (218–201 BC)

If Livy's depiction of early Rome was devoted to the great Roman families, his books depicting the Second Punic War celebrate the part played by the Senate at that time. He demonstrates that Rome was about to be destroyed by Hannibal, and that many people in the city were about to surrender to the Carthaginians, even at the price of being sold into slavery. It was only the courage and tenacity of the members of the Senate that saved Rome. Livy, though his hometown was Padua, in Northern Italy, was more Roman than the Romans of Rome and, in the main, a supporter of aristocratic power. In fact, we know that people in Northern Italy preferred Pompey and the traditionalist aristocrats (*optimates*) to Caesar and the more modern nobles (*populares*). The Second Punic War was for the Paduan a great moment, since the whole nobility was then united to fight for freedom.

When Livy's narrative starts again in 218 BC (Brizzi 2008, 57–97), Hannibal has left Southern Spain, crossed Northern Spain, traveled across Southern Gaul, climbed up the Alps, and won two victories, near the Ticinus and the Trebia rivers. However, it does not stop the author from describing the heroic behavior of the Roman nobility, despite its failures, and it also does not stop him from mentioning the intervention of Scipio's father and uncle in Spain and in Italy (Liv. 21). The following book (22) describes two major disasters for Rome when their armies lost the battles at Trasimene in 217 BC and at Cannae in 216 BC. Livy's purpose is to show how the Romans, too proud of their legions, were about to lose their freedom, but were finally saved thanks to the senators' wisdom.

In the following episodes, Livy alternately depicts failures and successes. When he describes the life of the Carthaginians at Capua, it is to teach virtue: men achieve victory as long as their way of life is simple; they lose their courage and their fighting spirit when they prefer pleasure. It is a eulogy to tradition, with virtuous men making Roman history. This viewpoint is very similar to that of the Stoic philosophers. Conversely, and during the same period, the Romans who agree to adopt a more austere way of life are victorious against the Carthaginians in Spain, Sicily, and Sardinia (Liv. 23).

However, new enemies soon appear when they see that the Romans are in trouble. The kingdom of Syracuse and another kingdom, Philip V's Macedonia, decided to side with Hannibal. However, at the same time, as if to counterbalance these bad omens, the two Scipios were successful in Spain (Liv. 24). Soon after, another success was counterbalanced by another defeat. The Romans took the city of Syracuse (the scientist Archimedes was killed by a Roman soldier, a telling reflection on the harshness of war), but problems cropped up in Spain (Liv. 25), and there would always be, afterward, the same swing of the pendulum between defeat and victory. On the one hand, the Romans were afraid of Hannibal, who marched against their city: "*Hannibal ad portas!*" ("Hannibal is before the gates!"). They were also afraid because of the war declared by Philip V of Macedonia. However, Hannibal was helpless, and Philip V was too far away. On the other hand, the legions entered Capua and, at the same time, the young Scipio, later to be known as "Africanus," was sent to Spain by the Senate. He promptly seized New Carthage, the capital of the Carthaginians in Spain. It was the turning point of the war (Liv. 26).

After Cannae, the dictator Fabius Maximus Cunctator, "the Delayer," invented a new form of tactics (the title "dictator" was very honorable at that time; it lost its aura after being used in a perverse way by Sulla and Caesar). He decided to refuse to enter into any battle on open ground against Hannibal, and to use those stratagems that were contrary to virtue, to *fides*. To make possible such a psychological revolution, he invented a goddess, *Mens* ("Mind") (Brizzi 2008, 75–79). As a consequence, the Romans found once again a way to achieve victory. They entered the city of Tarentum, which had sided with Hannibal. Scipio vanquished the Carthaginians in Spain, and the battle of Baecula was particularly decisive. The Punic general Hasdrubal was killed. For the Romans, it was the first time they had not been defeated since the beginning of the war (Liv. 27). Since both heroes, Fabius Cunctator and Publius Cornelius Scipio, were members of the senatorial order, the Livian narrative may rightly appear as an indirect eulogy to the Senate and of its members.

The way to total victory was open. The Romans defeated Philip V and booted the Carthaginians out of Spain. Scipio understood that it was necessary to fight in Africa; the Cunctator, who preferred to destroy, first of all, Hannibal's

army, which was still in Italy, did not agree with him. However, Scipio went to Africa and signed treaties with the kings and chiefs of Numidia against the Carthaginians, especially with King Massinissa (Liv. 28). War spread everywhere, to Spain and to Italy. However, good news came to Rome: Philip V was seeking peace, and he obtained it. Ambassadors were sent to Africa, to once again meet the Numidian authorities (29), whereupon Scipio asked the people of Rome for permission to wage war against Carthage in Africa, and this was granted. He landed in Africa with legions, so that the Carthaginian senate had to recall Hannibal. After having lost a great battle at Zama, in 202 BC, Hannibal suggested to his countrymen that they should put an end to the war. An armistice was signed the same year, followed by a peace treaty in 201 BC (Book 30).

This brought the Second Punic War to an end. And this victory had numerous consequences. For about 20 years, the whole of the Mediterranean world had been watching this conflict, waiting to see who would come out on top and rule the Mediterranean. By 202–201 BC, they knew. No country whatsoever could challenge Rome's power. Romulus' city had turned out to be the state that could control the entire known world.

The World Controlled by Rome (201–168 BC)

The following period is also described in Livy's remaining books (31–45). There are two points worthy of note in this part of the text. First, the author considers that Rome had a right to decide for all the peoples around the Mediterranean. Second, he describes the continuation of wars and of conquest. Certainly, Rome could not declare war in any which way and whenever it wished to; every war had to be a just war, a *bellum iustum*. However, sometimes, the Romans were the ones who were attacked and not the aggressors; and, at other times, they had agreements with the gods.

Soon after the conclusion of the Second Punic War, problems arose in Macedonia. And some Gallic peoples living in Italy, the Insubrians, tried to rebel against Rome (Liv. 31). However, Philip V was defeated and, at the same time, so were the Insubrians (32). The victorious general in the Macedonian war was Flamininus. This man, who had great admiration for Greek culture, declared that “it could not be possible to treat the Greeks like the Spaniards.” After a great victory (Cynoscephalae), he proclaimed the “freedom of Greece” (32). This notion of freedom has sometimes been misunderstood. It was not possible to give complete freedom to a people recently vanquished. The freedom granted was, in fact, only self-government, for internal purposes, and not complete independence.

However, from then on, Rome's military action shifted progressively to the eastern part of the Mediterranean world, to Asia, which now became the new target. However, to have a *bellum iustum*, it was necessary to have just causes.

These were given by Hannibal, who had fled to the court of Antiochus, king of Syria. Antiochus himself thought that, after Greece, the Romans would land in Anatolia, and after Anatolia in Syria. Accordingly, he raised a great army, with a Macedonian phalanx. The Romans must have had their work cut out. They had to send Cato to Spain and Flamininus again to Greece—this time to fight against a partisan of revolution, called Nabis. He may have thought that the Greeks were being ungrateful (Livy 34).

During the years that followed, the Romans had to fight against Antiochus, the Macedonian king of Syria, but also in Italy, against other Gallic peoples called Boii, and also against the Ligurians. On their way to the East, the legions encountered Celtic peoples, who had established themselves in the central part of Anatolia, the Galatians (Livy 35–38).

The last few years before 168 BC saw some important wars being waged, and also some lesser ones (Liv. 39–45). Two great wars are mentioned, in Spain and against Macedonia. The new king of Macedonia, Perseus, tried to throw the Romans out of his country. In the end, he was vanquished by the legions. In the Iberian Peninsula, the fighting was different. The Spaniards would practice guerilla warfare in little groups (at least, it is what Livy says; modern scholars have shown that the Spaniards could also fight on open ground and wage big battles). However, other peoples also tried to rebel: the Ligurians, Sardinians, Histrians, and Corsicans.

For Livy, these years were punctuated by victories, which were a consequence of good government on the part of noble families and on the part of the Senate.

The Roman Army *circa* 160 BC

When one reads Books 31–45 of the *Ab Urbe Condita*, it is possible to observe the way the structure of the Roman army was evolving. In this respect, it is necessary to compare Livy and a Greek historian, Polybius (Pol. 6.21–23; Cagniard 2007, 80–95; Le Bohec 1997, 18–21). We can then see that two types of tactics existed side by side, manipular (but a newly organized manipular) and cohortal.

As formerly, the *triplex acies*, a disposition along three rows, remained unchanged; it was the specificity of Roman armies until the end of the Empire. We must remember that each row was made up of several soldiers, one behind the other. However, a few alterations were made. From then on, each row would be made up of 10 maniples instead of 15, and the light infantrymen, placed at the front of the army, would be separated from the heavy infantrymen. One legion consisted of 4,000 men: 1,200 in the first row (*hastati*), 1,200 in the second (*principes*), 600 in the third (*triarii*), and 1,000 light infantrymen at the very front (*leues*). As regards the third row, we no longer find any mention of the *rorarii* or of the *accensi*.

On the battlefield, the light infantrymen played their part before the real fighting began. Their aim was to kill a few enemies, wound others, and, generally speaking, disorganize their front line. As before, *hastati* and *principes* fought alternatively: when the *hastati* were tired, they were replaced by the *principes*. The *triarii* had a new major function, which was to kill those who could be tempted to desert. If we look at their small number, we understand that they would play a very minor part if the two first rows (2,400 men) were destroyed.

The equipment changed as well. The *leues* had both defensive and offensive weapons; they wore a helmet and held a round shield for protection; they fought with a sword and, essentially, several javelins. The heavy infantrymen possessed the famous Spanish sword, or *gladius hispaniensis*; in fact, this particular weapon is rarely mentioned by the two historians, there are more numerous allusions to it in the modern texts than in the older ones. It was probably a short sword, with a blade some 70–75 centimeters long and 4–5 centimeters wide; its use involved a good knowledge of fencing. They were also in possession of several javelins, of the *pilum* type (about 1.75 meters), to throw at the enemy during the assault and just before the hand-to-hand fighting. They were better protected than the *leues*. Though they had the same helmet, they sheltered behind a great shield, oval-shaped or rectangular, and wore armor. The less rich among their number who could not afford such a shield bought, instead, a modest piece of metal, called a “heart protection.” Because of the specific part they had to play in the battle, the *triarii*, who had, otherwise, the same weapons as the *hastati* and *principes*, used heavy spears instead of light javelins.

The most striking change is the appearance of the cohortal tactics, which were, at first, meant to complement the manipular tactics, which disappeared later on. We do not know with any certainty when the cohort was created: it was a little unit of three maniples or six centuries. Some authors think that it was created during the wars against the Spaniards, who were used to fighting in little groups. Others have stated that it was invented earlier on.

A cohort consisted in an amalgam of three maniples or six centuries: one maniple of *hastati*, one of *principes*, and one of *triarii*. Its invention may have been due to two factors. Traditionally, many historians have written that it was a little legion, and that, accordingly, it could be used, for instance, in narrow valleys or against little groups of enemies. It was therefore probable that the existence of cohorts was a consequence of the wars waged against the Spaniards. However, it also presented a great advantage on a major battlefield because of its flexibility. The cohort could find its way around a marsh or a grove; it could also more easily maneuver and change directions, to the right or to the left, if necessary. Livy often mentions cohorts, but some historians believe that it was sometimes a mistake, an anachronism (Liv. 25.39, 1; 27.18, 10; 28.13.8; 28.14.17; 28.23.8; 28.25.15; 28.33.12; 39.12.6; 39.14.1; 39. 7;

On the Usefulness of the *Periochae*

Livy's books covering the period after 168 BC have been lost, and we must use summaries called *Periochae*. From a literary point of view, these short texts are not very interesting. However, a historian cannot neglect them. As a matter of fact, they essentially give us information on the chronology of events; more rarely, they contain specific details about military organization, and when that is the case, it can prove to be particularly interesting.

After 168 BC, the Roman legions had to face rebellions in Spain, from 154 to 133 BC (*Per.* 47–59), and in Greece until 146 BC, the year when Corinthus was sacked. They besieged Carthage for 18 months, from 148 to 146 BC, and destroyed the city; this enterprise was called the Third Punic War (*Per.* 48–51).

The year 133 BC is particularly interesting. At the same time, Rome received the kingdom of Pergamum as a legacy and elected Tiberius Gracchus as tribune of the *plebs*. The first event shows that Rome was not always a conqueror. The second one was more serious, and it inaugurated a century of civil wars. Tiberius Gracchus, who belonged to the upper senatorial class, was conscious that many legionaries, when going back home after years of war, found that they had lost their fields. He suggested passing a bill, a land law, a land reform bill. Some nobles thought that he was right, and they formed the *populares*, a sort of political party. Other nobles did not want to even hear of such a law; they were the *optimates*, another political group. From 133 to 31 BC, they continuously fought one another.

During the last century of the Republic, the Roman legions had to face four types of problems: conquests, rebellions on the part of peoples they had subjected, aggressions, and civil wars.

The conquest was extended first to Gaul: the southern part of the country from 125 to 121 BC (Liv. 61); the northern part from 58 to 51 BC (103–108); then to Anatolia (77–88) and Syria (59; 100), from 88 to 63 BC. Finally, Egypt became a sort of gigantic farm for Octavian in 30 BC (133).

The Italians rebelled against Rome, because they did not receive enough booty and, above all, because they wanted to be granted Roman citizenship; this was called the Social War, “Social” from *socii*, “allies”; it lasted a short time, from 91 to 89 BC, but the struggle was a bitter one (71–76). Then it was the slaves' turn to rebel, between 73 and 71 BC, and that gave rise to the famous war of Spartacus (95–97).

A great fear spread all over Italy from 113 to 101 BC (63–68). German peoples, essentially the Cimbri and the Teutones, invaded Gaul. They vanquished a Roman army near Orange in 105 BC; later, they were themselves vanquished,

the Teutones at Aix-en-Provence in 102 BC and the Cimbri at Vercellae in 101 BC. Another enemy, a chief of the Numidians, Jugurtha, waged war against the Romans in Africa from 112 to 105 BC; he too was finally vanquished (64–66).

However, the most awful events for the Romans were the civil wars, first between *populares* and *optimates*, then between generals, Marius (in favor of the *populares*) against Sylla (in favor of the *optimates*), especially in 83–82 BC; Caesar (in favor of the *populares*) against Pompey and, after Pompey's death, against the Pompeians (in favor of the *optimates*), from 49 to 45 BC; Octavian against Anthony (a form of internecine fighting since they were both in favor of the *populares*) from 43 to 31 BC (77–80; 109–123).

When it comes to the Early Empire, the summaries are less specific. As everyone knows, Octavian became Augustus in 27 BC, and he created a monarchy that arose from the ashes of the aristocratic Republic. However, many authors have underestimated the military role of the first emperor (see especially Brizzi 2008, 137–189; Gilliver, in Erdkamp 2007, 183–200; Gilliver, in Sabin et al. 2007, 122–157; Goldsworthy 2007, *ibidem*, 76–121). He created an army, which was professional and permanent. He also extended the empire by about a quarter of its surface (Liv. 134–142, except 136–137, which are lost). He added to it Egypt, Galatia, Danubian provinces (Retia, Noricum, Pannonia, and Moesia), and provinces of the Alps, and he conquered Spain. The last known book (142) narrates the attempt to conquer Germany beyond the Rhine, the death of Drusus in 9 BC, and, in a short passage, the disaster of Varus in 9 AD.

One final question remains: which was the last year whose events were described by Livy? Was it 9 BC (the death of Drusus) or 14 AD (the death of Augustus)? From a military point of view, to end a historical book in 9 BC is quite unlikely, it would be devoid of any meaning. The year 14 AD is, on the contrary, an important moment: the extension of the Roman world had reached its limits, after expanding by about a quarter of its surface. In this case, it may be surmised that Books 143–150 are lacking.

Cross-References

See Chapter 31: THE *PERIOCHAE*

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Chapter 10

Livy's Political and Moral Values and the Principate

Bernard Mineo

Livian political philosophy and its potential relationship with the political ideology accompanying the establishment of the principate may only be understood within an organicistic framework, the reality of which has long been demonstrated (Ruch 1968, 123). Indeed, the organicistic metaphor pervades Livy's work, and allows for the evocation of cities by attributing them with a morphology (a head, a body), or by alluding to the reality of their biological rhythms, their birth, their development, their maturity, their decline, and their death (Mineo 2006, 81–82). The historian once again draws from the medical lexis in order to depict the evils suffered by Rome each time its political unity is threatened, for example, when the Gauls took the city in 390 BC or during the major defeats of the Second Punic War (24.18.2; 22.53; 24.2.8).

Here, Livy is conforming to the Hippocratic logic of the treatise on *Airs, Waters and Places*, comparing the city to a living organism. This analogy, of medical origin, then entered philosophical vocabulary before becoming a *topos* of historical literature (Desclos 2003, 87–120). In the next chapter, we shall see how this organicistic conception is accompanied by a cyclical—which could be described as sinusoidal—representation of history.

Two basic political principles can be associated with this organicistic representation, which had already been illustrated in Rome by Sallust (Mineo 1997, 45–60)—the necessity for a dualistic distribution of political and social roles, and the essential nature of national unity (*concordia*) in order to ensure the good health of the civic body. Incidentally, these notions have precise ideological implications and a specific resonance with the actuality of the establishment of the principate. Moreover, based on these two foundations of his political philosophy, Livy provides a veritable template, thanks to his famous apologue “The Belly and the Members,” which the historian credits to Menenius Agrippa during the secession of the plebeians in 494 BC (2.32.7):

The senators certainly considered no hope left, save in the concord of the citizens; this should be restored to the state by fair or by unfair means. It was resolved therefore that there should be sent as ambassador to the people, Menenius Agrippa, an eloquent man, and one who was a favourite with the people, because he derived his origin from them. He, being admitted into the camp, is said to have related to them merely the

following story in that antiquated and uncouth style: “At a time when all the parts in the human body did not, as now, agree together, but the several members had each its own scheme, its own language, the other parts, indignant that every thing was procured for the belly by their care, labour, and service; that the belly, remaining quiet in the centre, did nothing but enjoy the pleasures afforded it. They conspired accordingly, that the hands should not convey food to the mouth, nor the mouth receive it when presented, nor the teeth chew it: whilst they wished under the influence of this feeling to subdue the belly by famine, the members themselves and the entire body were reduced to the last degree of emaciation. Thence it became apparent that the service of the belly was by no means a slothful one; that it did not so much receive nourishment as supply it, sending to all parts of the body this blood by which we live and possess vigour, distributed equally to the veins when perfected by the digestion of the food.” By comparing in this way how similar the intestine sedition of the body was to the resentment of the people against the senators, he made an impression on the minds of the multitude (Transl. D. Spillan, 1853).

Livian Political and Social Dualism

Firstly, Menenius Agrippa's apologue provides a good illustration of the dichotomic distribution of political roles: the industrious sector of the city is thus by nature dedicated to physical effort in order to satisfy the requirements of a vital center which, on the other hand, refrains from intervening in the mechanisms of execution and plays the role of transforming the energy provided by the masses. The very life of the city and its degree of power therefore depend upon this center, within which the Senate must obviously be acknowledged. The choice of the belly situated *in medio* to represent the Senate reveals, in actual fact, the priority that Livy confers to this institution: even though it needs the other organs in order to have an impact upon reality, it still remains the very essence of the city, its life force.

This dichotomic representation of the political arena, opposing a center and a periphery, again corroborates a vertical conception of political communication, metaphorically conveyed by the separation between a head of the State endowed with conscience (the Senate) and a body that obeys its injunctions. The senatorial precedence, its *auctoritas*, is therefore based on nature; if the organic unit of the city provides a natural link between the senators and the masses, their relationships are defined by a functional dichotomy that separates them and prohibits any intrusion by one in the sphere of activity of the other. The Senate is the organizing authority of an *imperium* delegated to the magistrates; the masses merely execute.

The consequence of Livy's adoption of this model of political and social

relations is evident in his work, notably through his elaboration of the classic examples of attitudes illustrating the functioning of the civic organism.

This theorization of attitudes first appears through the contrast between the physical behavior of the masses and that of the senators and magistrates—the former tending to succumb to unrest and panic, the latter manifesting a serious and controlled attitude (*gravitas*), their gestures measured and dignified, in the style of Q. Fabius when letting drop the fold of his toga before the Carthaginian Senate to mark the choice of war (21.18.13).

Moreover, numerous examples accentuate the need for the rulers not to yield to impulsive and disorderly movements, including that of Scipio, who remained seated at length, immobile, in front of the mutinous Spanish troops, thus imparting the image of an impassive god (28.26.15).

These stage effects conjure up the image of a masterful Senate, the space, time, and very nature of which appear quasi-divine—quite the opposite of the informal crowd of the masses. From that moment on, we can better understand the reason behind the extraordinary presentation made by Livy of the Gauls' entry into Rome in Book 5. In the hall of the patrician residences, they come across noble elders, all former magistrates of the *Urbs*—as still as statues and offering a sight whose majesty goes beyond a human scale—courageously awaiting the enemy, while the plebeians left in the city remain fearfully inside their homes (5.41). This demonstrates the very essence of political relations as conceived by Livy: ordinary citizens must manifest a religious respect (*religio*) toward the *imperium*, while the city's rulers must play a character role that will enable them to inspire this sentiment within the masses.

The masses rarely express their thoughts or feelings toward their rulers conceptually: this may only happen during assemblies or official audiences, where the very course of their involvement takes place within a restrictive framework. Outside of this context are only shouts, hubbub, insults, and angry mutterings that, by their very nature, demonstrate the absence of any rationally articulated thought. Both hostility (*invidia*) and goodwill (*fauor*) are also expressed physically rather than verbally: jostling, handshakes, prayer gestures, and processions constitute the usual means of expression of the masses (passim 25.1.7; 25.12.5; 27.50.6; 22.10.8; 22.60.1; 25.7.1), and are the conventional signs of a communication that remains under the control of the rulers.

The general attitude of the masses is characterized by the absence of rational self-control, as illustrated by the fierce attitude (*ferocia*) of the soldiers inappropriately clamoring for battle (passim 24.14.9; 24.29.10; 25.21.5), or the crowds emotionally invading the area devoted to political deliberation, thus at the same time compromising the quality of debate (27.50.9; 27.51.5). The intrusion of women within this arena (passim 26.9.7; 34.1–4) poses a

serious danger to the conduct of public affairs due to their inability to retain rational control (*impotentia*), often symbolized by the floods of tears they shed and the disorderliness of their bearing (untidy hair, uncoordinated movements).

Conversely, the entirely male ruling class is exclusively recognized for its theoretical capacity to organize time and space. Moreover, the fact that Livy carefully notes, each year, the provisions retained by the Senate cannot solely be explained by a recourse to annalists' technique; it is also a means of highlighting the efforts made by the Roman rulers to ensure a rational distribution of military commands and human and material resources across the Empire's territory.

The historian is also fond of underlining the way in which the governors attempt to organize moral and religious space. Their efforts, notably in warding off (*procurare*) numerous terrifying divine manifestations, fundamentally allow for the disorder within the relations between men and the gods to be remedied, and for the said relations to once again be organized in a harmonious manner (*pax deorum*).

On the other hand, Livy expects political leaders to have an aptitude for reflecting reality in the speeches they address to civilians or soldiers. By doing so, they position themselves as the keepers of a political wisdom (*prudencia*) based on the triptych of *memoria* (knowledge of the past), *intelligentia* (the ability to analyze reality), and *providentia* (foresight).

The smooth functioning of the political organism therefore implies the distinction between political and social categories and functions; moreover, the enemies of Rome often depart from this basic principle, leading their ventures to fail and to the establishment of Roman supremacy. And so the Roman ambassadors, appearing before a Gallic assembly in order to beseech them to prevent Hannibal from entering Italy, are inevitably astounded when faced with the scene before them: warriors and magistrates are not separated, and the mass of armed men determines the direction the discussions will take, greeting Roman claims with derisory laughter and thus preventing any rational analysis of the situation from taking place (21.20.1–4).

The same applies to the Carthaginian senate: at the crucial moment when Q. Fabius invites the Punic senators to choose between war and peace, they explode with indignation and fury (21.18.13–14). The sage, Hanno, who was expounding the juridical and moral reasons behind his conviction that it was wise to avoid a second conflict against Rome, was ignored (cf. also 30.24.10–11).

This is in clear contrast to the reaction of the Roman magistrates and senators who, following the announcement of the Cannes defeat, refuse to reprise their deliberations before having calmed the turmoil, the panic of the *multitudo* (22.55–58). Unlike Carthage, the Roman crowds thus simply listened to the

speech given in the Senate before being dismissed at the moment of deliberation.

The dichotomous principle is also reflected in the military domain, which shows the danger caused by entrusting command to subordinate officers or by yielding to pressure from ordinary soldiers in decision-making (25.19.12; 25.21; 44.34).

Functional division can again be found in the moral and juridical domain when it is a matter of drawing a boundary between Rome and the other nations. There is no shortage of examples where Livy contrasts, in the most unrealistic manner possible, the moral aberrations of nations outside of the Empire with the behavior of Roman fighters during the Second Punic War. Indeed, Rome's adversaries appear concerned with satisfying their passions above all else: money, power, and carnal pleasure. Prisoners of their senses, they are incapable of defining an ideal that would transcend their actions. The Carthaginians therefore only thought about getting rich, and their army of mercenaries epitomizes a city whose only motive appears to be financial. On the contrary, the patriotism of the Romans during the Second Punic War pushes individuals to voluntarily relinquish the reimbursement of loans; the former masters of slaves engaged voluntarily (*uolones*) refuse, for the time being, payment for their public emancipation before the end of the war; wards and widows entrust their money to the public authorities; in the army, knights and centurions refuse to receive their pay: the contrast is therefore clearly drawn with the mercantile nature of the Carthaginians, which is mocked by Hannibal at the end of the account (30.44.11). For the Romans, the state is an ideal transcending all other interests; nothing can therefore be wiser in their eyes than to entrust their money to the care of the Republic (24.18–14).

The moral and juridical dichotomy that separates Livy's idealized Rome from the rest of the world is therefore the basis of the legitimacy of the hegemony it exerts on these peoples: it underlines the very nature of the type of political communication established between the sovereign nation and the vanquished nations, consisting of a clientelism (Badian 1958) that takes the form of a paternalism that implies the moral minority of the subjugated peoples and the educating role of the victor. The historian provides a very suggestive example of this in the character of Massinissa, who only escapes from the beautiful Sophonisba's web of seduction thanks to the intervention of Scipio the African, a man capable of reasoning with him.

It is therefore evident that relations between the Romans and their subordinate peoples are fundamentally no different to those between the ruling class of the *Urbs* and the governed masses. In any case, we find the affirmation of a fundamental dichotomy that corroborates a patriarchal and clientelist logic: through analogies, the nature of the relationship of dependence seems identical on every level, and refers us back to a theory of the sameness of power.

The Ideological Wake of Livian Political Dualism

Philosophical Influences

This dichotomy of the Livian city, with its strict distribution of work, admittedly constitutes a reflection of Roman clientelism, but also lies within the continuity of Platonic dualism (*Phaedo*. 64 C–D; *Rep.* 441a; *Phaedra* 246a), which has often prevailed to describe the relationship between the functions of reason and sensitivity.

In *The Republic*, Plato had clearly provided a very well-developed illustration of this delimitation of social functions, by suggesting a transposition of the principle of the division of body and soul with the political model of the distribution of tasks (375b; 416d–417b; 412c–e). In this city, where the philosophers are kings—or the kings are philosophers (473c)—leadership thus reverts to those who show themselves capable of intelligence, assisted by the courage of the warriors (435b). The smooth functioning of the entirety of the civic body therefore implies the split between execution and command tasks in particular, while the respect of these rules assumes concord between the different classes (*Rep.* 370a–b; 432a; 434c). In this system, the health of the individual and that of the city depend upon a propitious hierarchy of the elements, with illness being generated by their disorderliness (*Rep.* 445c). A city in good health will therefore know civil concord, as it will have been capable of finding the necessary harmony between its constituent elements. The prerequisite of the harmonious functioning of a nation will therefore be the subordination of individual interests to the general interest (*Rep.* 420b; *Rep.* 342e; *Lois*, IV 715 ad), as described in Menenius Agrippa's apologue.

The continuation of Livian dualism with Stoic theories, and notably that of Posidonius, is also extremely probable (Edelstein and Kidd 1972 [1972] 31; 142). This philosopher, who incidentally was the author of a major historical work that perhaps revealed certain aspects of his thought, may possibly have influenced Livy—a historian with a keen interest in philosophy—when the latter reprised the principle of a dichotomic functioning of political relations. In any case, the Paduan must have been acquainted with Posidonius' work. However, it is without doubt more likely that Livian dualism reflects the specific expression of a cultural phenomenon that was very diffuse at the time, characterized by renewed interest in Platonic theories and which would soon be expressed by the rapprochement of the Portico and the Academy—to which Cicero would also later contribute.

Augustan Actuality

Given the historical context of the author's writings, it stands to reason that this model—which emphasizes the importance of a center of power, guarantor of the rational organization of the city, and of the fair distribution of

everybody's place within it—can only echo the hope, shared by many, of a return to order once the torment of civil wars has passed and, concurrently—the time it takes to remedy the chaos—the recognition of the utility of government by one ruler, meaning the prince, whose authority moreover emanated from the traditional center of power, the Senate. Livy was not alone in toying with this hope: the city of bees in Virgil's *Georgics* and the pyramidal organizational system of their “august home” (4.228), and its strict distribution of tasks, also reflect the political and social construction that the principate attempts to implement.

Following a century of political violence, which had disrupted social order and opened the way to the tyranny of dictators (Sylla and Caesar) and of the two triumvirates, the need for a rational reorganization of the city seemed imperative.

What is more, in Livy's account, the principle of government by one ruler (on the condition that this is provisional and dictated by circumstance) is therefore clearly not rejected, but what is dispelled is the principle of tyranny in any form: that of any magistrate who, at the expense of the laws, will go as far as resorting to force in order to satisfy his own desires (Lucretia and Verginia episodes), that of the *dominus* with regards to the slaves, or that of one people dominating another. The issue here is a denunciation of the dangers to which the keepers of the *imperium* expose the city when they allow themselves to be tempted to exercise this power, within or outside the city, in a tyrannical manner. Sensitive and attentive to anti-Roman propaganda—which is echoed in extracts of both Posidonius' and Cicero's work—Livy wished to demonstrate the mortal danger inherent to this type of political relations.

Throughout its long history, Rome had never ceased to incur this peril but, by underlining the danger of political and social dissoluteness characteristic of tyranny at the moment of the creation of a new type of power, Livy invited Augustus and the future Roman political leaders to be the wise rulers of which Plato had dreamed; the reign of reason to the detriment of the irrational was the promise of an end to the bloody cycle where the desire of one individual had plunged the city into the violence of civil wars and made Rome appear unbearable in the eyes of its provinces. The historian thus seems to legitimize the position of the *princeps*, who had refused all exceptional magistrature while the state of law (*res publica restituta*) was being re-established, to the point of ripping his clothes in despair when he was offered the dictatorship (for a full bibliography, cf. Hurllet and Mineo 2009, 9–19 *et infra*). Livy's portrait of Camillus, presented as being the new founder (*conditor*), the guarantor of the development of Roman power (*auctor*), and the savior of the fatherland (*pater patriae*) reminded his readers, thanks to the account's skillful analogical construction (cf. Chapter 9), of the qualities recognized in the *princeps*, either officially or on a more poetic level (the title *pater patriae* was only attributed to Augustus in 2 BC, but the poets had already acknowledged

that he possessed this dimension; see Mineo 2006, 232–237). This analogy indicates in some way the hope inspired in Livy by Augustus's project of restoring the rule of law, the moral values and social order jeopardized by the civil wars, as well as the wager he wished to place on its success.

The Requirements for the Good Health of the Civic Organism: The Quest of the *Concordia*

The functional dualism of the Livian city therefore reveals what should, according to our historian, be the general framework, the political and social architecture likely to guarantee the historical success of Rome as well as its durability. The other impact of the organicistic representation of the city consists in the necessity for perfect harmony between the different “members” of this city-organism. The historical future of Rome is, in effect, extremely dependent upon the degree of concord prevailing in the city, while the said concord depends upon the respect of moral values by individuals or by social groups. Before beginning to describe the evolution of the history of Rome, as outlined in the *Ab Urbe Condita* (*Praef.* 9), it is therefore important to specify the conceptual limitations of the cardinal values upon which Roman cohesion is based and to define their ideological reach. In order to do so, our analysis shall mainly, but not exclusively, be based upon examples taken from the account of the Second Punic War, where the city—which had attained its moral peak—can offer numerous examples of ideal behavior.

The Ethics of the Rulers

Besides the wisdom (*prudentia*) upon which, as we have already seen, the intellectual superiority of the ruling class over the population stands, Livy's account endeavors to illustrate through numerous historical examples the virtues that must be respected by the masters of Rome in order to ensure the cohesion of the civic organism (Chaplin 2000).

Among these virtues is, in particular, temperance (*temperantia*), which expresses the capacity to repress one's passions. A specific aspect of this is self-control (*continentia*), which invites the ruler to resist attempts at corrupt practices and prevents him from exploiting the citizens. The African provides a very accurate personification of this virtue: it suffices to recall the edifying anecdote of the beautiful Spanish captive and the moral lesson he gives to a love-struck Massinissa (26.50; 30.14.6–11).

The Livian account also made clemency (*clementia*) one of the cardinal values of the Roman rulers, with the indulgence shown toward vanquished enemies resulting in the conclusion of new client bonds. There are numerous episodes during which the Roman people are seen trying to win, or regain, the trust of populations thanks to their reputation for, or acts of, clemency

(21.60.4; 27.15; 26.49; 27.19; 28.34.9; 26.32; 26.15.7–10).

Fabius Cunctator may, in the account of the Second Punic War, seem to epitomize moderation (*moderatio*), both through his personal behavior and through his concern to be considered as the protector of the internal equilibrium of the city. Consequently, his opposition to Scipio's ambitious African expedition is not simply the expression of political rivalry: Cunctator's wisdom enables him to foresee the immoderation of young Scipio's venture, and the risks that the excessive glory of one individual may incur upon the city (28.40).

Another Livian cardinal virtue is that of justice (*iustitia*), which ensures both political cohesion within the city and the appeal of Rome with regards to the outside world. This is illustrated during the Third Decade by the granting of Roman citizenship to the heroic Muttines (27.5–7) and by the recognition of the title of king given by Scipio to Massinissa in reward for his collaboration in the battle against Syphax (30.15). The Romans' sense of justice is also demonstrated in the dramatized episode where we see Sempronius Gracchus set free the volunteer slaves (24.16), or when Scipio rewards deserving soldiers with the mural crown (26.48).

Good faith, loyalty (*fides*), is most certainly at the heart of Livian political philosophy, as shown by the account of the taking of Rome by the Gauls, where the violation of this value by the Roman ambassadors sent to meet them in Clusium provides the trigger for the ensuing disaster (Mineo 2006, 194–195; 228–229; 248–252; 299–301). Moreover, this virtue reflects the very nature of the clientelist functioning of the Roman city and implies benevolence, generosity, affability, kindness, humanity, and clemency toward the weakest—qualities that are often illustrated by Scipio the African in the account of the Second Punic War.

Alongside *fides*, piety (*pietas*) is the other great quality of Livian heroes and also one of the key concepts of the clientelist relationship. *Pietas* defines, in effect, Roman relations with those around them: *pius* applies to one who has fulfilled his duties toward the gods, the nation, and the family. This notion is fundamental in Livy's eyes, to the extent where the entirety of Book 5 is compiled in order to illustrate the progressive weakening of this value, the culmination of a historical tendency toward decline that leads Rome to its destruction by the Gauls (Mineo 2003, 341; 2006, 233–234; cf. Chapter 9).

It is the mastery of all of these qualities that imparts to the Roman rulers the dignity (*dignitas*) and gravitas (*gravitas*) that accompany their actions. The latter is illustrated within the account through a number of images: the wearing of the toga, the dignity of Q. Fabius Maximus's gesture when declaring war on Carthage, and the praetor Pomponius's dramatic and dignified speech from the rostrum when laconically announcing defeat. Finally, we can see how Livy's desire to bestow *gravitas* upon the Roman

leaders pushes him to refute that they might have any sense of humor or wit. The most striking example of these character roles is without doubt that of Flaminius, who is denied complicit laughter with Philip V during their encounter in Nicaea, despite Polybius's account, which was nonetheless used as a source by our historian (Liv. 32.34.4; Pol. 18.6.1).

This set of political and moral qualities constitute the *uirtus*, this value that the Roman leaders are capable of displaying both in execution and decision-making. This *uirtus* also includes bravery in battle, which moreover provides the foundation stone of this notion, and which is also applicable to ordinary soldiers.

The Ethics of the Masses

On the side of the masses, the eminent political virtues are docile submission to the magistrates and laws of the city (*modestia*) and blind obedience to the generals (*disciplina*): Livy's account frequently underlines the dramatic consequences of the excesses of the plebeians (*licentia*) who, when intoxicated by their successes, forsake these rules of modesty and compromise the traditional functioning of the institutions and of political relations, thus compromising freedom. Moreover, Livy defines the said freedom as being as far from subservience to a tyrant as it is from arrogant domination (24.25.8–9). For Livy, the freedom of the people coincides with the rule of law and, more particularly, with respect for the Senate's authority (*auctoritas patrum*), as shown by this passage where Livy expresses the point of view of the Roman optimates through the voice of an inhabitant of Capua (23.3.5: “for you must either have a king, which all abominate, or a Senate, which is the only course compatible with a free state”).

Counter-Values

If the respect of these political and moral qualities encourages progress in the concord in Rome and, consequently, its material and spiritual development, their oversight automatically creates the opposite effect: discord, the fruit of the tyrannical pride of the greats (*superbia*), and the hostility of the plebeians (*inuidia*) involve the city in infernal dialectics. Avarice (*avaritia*), cupidity (*cupiditas*), and rampant desire (*libido*) then rule, while the plebeians excessively make use of their freedom by multiplying attacks against the leaders, regardless of the laws and customs of the Ancients (*mores maiorum*).

Aristocratic Tradition and Philosophical Influence

The qualities (*uirtutes*) reviewed briefly in the preceding text, and which lie at the heart of the underlying mechanisms of Livian history, since they determine the degree of concord prevailing in Rome, primarily constitute the

moral foundation of the traditional patronage of the Roman nobility. However, the clientelist tradition does not exclude the influence of notions of political philosophy. There is notably an intersection between the terminology retained by Livy and some of the concepts widely cited by Cicero in his philosophical work, in particular *De Republica* and *De Officiis*, where the influence of the Academy and Stoicism is considerable (Walsh 1961; 1974).

The similarity between the Livian and Ciceronian systems of values is assuredly very strong. Indeed, similar to Livy, Cicero bases the power of the leaders on the prestige (*auctoritas*) of the city's first citizens (*De Rep.* 1.34; 2.32.56): their integrity (*honestum*) relies upon the quality of their advice (*consilium*), their political wisdom (*prudentia*), their capacity to control their passions (*temperantia*), and on their clemency. They must—through their sense of justice, moderation (*moderatio*), and their magnanimity (which leads them to consider the collective interest and not just their own, or that of a faction)—endeavor to ensure the prosperity of those under their rule (*De Off.* 1.85).

Indeed, all of the *uirtutes* evoked by Cicero paint a portrait of rulers whose actions would be inspired by a spirit of justice in order to ensure concord in the city (*De Rep.* 1.19.32; 2.42.69). Cicero's concern also marks a milestone in the definition of the *humanitas*. This notion opposes cruelty (*sævitia*) and barbarism, and encompasses the values specific to harmonious political relations: self-control (*continentia*), moderation (*moderatio*), justice (*iustitia*), and clemency (*clementia*), both within the city and with regards to the external enemy. Ciceronian *humanitas* also corresponds to loyalty in friendships and refers to the obliging attitude of one who wishes to be well looked-upon: it therefore encompasses kindness (*comitas*), affability (*facilitas*: *Cic. Fam.* 13.24.2; *De Or.* 2.362), deference (*obseruantia*: *Fam.* 13.17.2), and generosity (*liberalitas*: *Fam.* 1.9.12; *Fam.* 13.17.2).

The Livian virtues, the respect of which determines concord in Rome, are therefore part of both the interior of a social reality (clientelism) and of a philosophical tradition of which Cicero is the ultimate avatar. We will also keep in mind the fact that Roman historians, from the time of the Gracchi up until Sallustius, did not fail to show the central character of the concord–discord pairing in the history of the city.

However, the fact that the *concordia* lies at the heart of Livian historical philosophy is not unrelated to the contemporary historical events within the writings of Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita*. In reality, they give a new resonance to this notion ever since the *consensus* that supposedly united all of Italy around Caesar's heir. Once again, this refers us back to the political actuality of the *Ab Urbe Condita* and to the problem of ideological connivance between the historian and the *princeps* (Momigliano 1934, 45–56; Titone 1934; Starr 1954, 193; Badian 1993, 9–38; Zanker 1990, 104; Mineo 2006, 109–154; 2009, 298–308).

Concord and the Political Actuality of the Principate

The very Ciceronian moral values that form the basis of Livy's concord appear in fact to largely corroborate the values underlined by Augustus, for which he was personally recognized through the attribution of the shield of valor (*Clipeus uirtutis*) that proclaimed his valor, clemency, good faith and justice, and his piety (*uirtus, clementia, iustitia, pietas R.G.* 34.2). Indeed, these qualities form the ideological core of a principate to which the countenance of the *moderator rei publicae* of the Ciceronian *princeps* acted as a republican guarantee.

The precise nature of the Ciceronian “principate” has, as we know, been the subject of numerous studies (Gagé 1936, 44–45; Lepore 1954; Grenade 1961; Martin 1980; Ferrary 1984; 1995). What transpires is that the authority of the *princeps* as conceived by the orator was based solely on his personal qualities, which would make of him the most eminent of senators (*De Or.* 3.63). The *princeps* was therefore the best of citizens, the *optimus ciuis* (*Q. Fr.* 3.5.1). Through his talent, he would strive to achieve the appeasement of political quarrels (*De Off.* 1.86). Situated outside of all magistratures, he would have the rank of senator, whose *auctoritas* would be entirely in the service of the good of the Republic (*Tusc.* 4.51), and would ensure the harmonious functioning (*moderator*) of the government (*rector*) of the state (*Rep.* 4.6).

However, over and above institutional reality, the Augustinian ideology of the principate at the time of its implementation does in fact appear to follow quite closely that proposed by Cicero. The domination exercised by the *princeps* is, here again, only that of one of the *principes* of the city, who only has influence over his fellow citizens through his moral authority and not at all through his political power. At the end of his life, the emperor explained in his *Res Gestae* (34) that “after this time I excelled all in influence (*auctoritas*), although I possessed no more official power (*potestas*) than others who were my colleagues in the several magistracies.” This authority is also a result of his virtues, which can be found on the famous golden shield hung in the Julian Curia (*uirtus, clementia, iustitia, pietas RG*, 34.2).

It would certainly be over-simplistic to be satisfied with dressing the only portrait of the Ciceronian *optimus ciuis* from the qualities attributed to Augustus on the *Clipeus Virtutis*. It is likely, as K. Galinsky (1996, 81–82) very rightly notes, that it was primarily a matter of applying the qualities of courage, justice, and piety—which possibly refer to Octavian's performance during the war against Cleopatra—to recent events; *clementia*, for its part, can evoke the treatment given to certain opponents, such as Messala Corvinus (Vell. Pat. 2.71.1).

However, as well-founded as this analysis may be, it is difficult not to think

that Augustus, strong in the legitimacy bestowed upon him by his traditionalist views and his recent attitude, had also used Ciceronian concepts relative to the *moderator rei publicae* in order to obtain Republican backing for his work on restoring the state of law (*respublica restituta*), which in no way implied, moreover, the claim of re-establishing the old republic (Judge 1974), but simply the respect of Republican laws and rights, as shown by the inscription on the *aureus* struck in 28 BC: *leges et iura p[opulo] R[omano] restituit* (Rich and Williams 1999, 169–213; Eder 2005, 24). Grenade (1961, 176) defined the attitude of the prince with much clarity by indicating that Cicero was “more a question of Republican support used skilfully by the creator of a disguised monarchy than the instigator of a genuine attempt at the renaissance of the old Republic under the aegis of a Disinterested grand protector” (cf. also Martin 1979, 939; Bréguet 1989, 138; Wallace-Hadrill 1982; Cizek 1998, 85; Millar 2002, 264–270). Moreover, the fact that Cicero was used as a guarantor does not necessarily infer that we must look for a prefiguration of the institutions of the principate within the orator's texts. Indeed, it is independently of any institutional logic that Augustus seems to have wanted to confer the moral qualities that Cicero had ascribed to his Republican *optimus ciuis* to the image of the *princeps*. In actual fact, the emperor only made cosmetic use of the Ciceronian principate (Martin 1980, 878; Ramage 1987, 73–104; 113); nobody was fooled by the evolution toward the monarchy indicated by the very nature of Augustus' *auctoritas* (Millar 2002, 270). However, it was important, following the crisis that had resulted in the assassination of Caesar in 44 BC, that his heir take formal precautions in order to shield himself from the accusation of having brought about the demise of the *res publica libera* and of having established a *regnum* (Gruen 2005, 33–51). Institutional appearances were thus saved.

Incidentally, the Ciceronian influence is not the only one to have been wielded upon the prince: the general political context and the ongoing institutional debate—an example of which is (the possibly fictitious) Dio Cassius' Agrippa–Maecenas debate (52.1–40)—constitute important explanatory elements. Furthermore, some of the ideological concepts of the Ciceronian dream of a *princeps* are not Cicero's own inventions: the notion of *moderator* or *priuatus* rising to assist the state probably reverts to the time of the Scipionic Circle; the ideology of Romulus and that relating to the role of a savior of the country (*pater patriae*) had already been apparent with Marius and Sulla, and played a significant role in the legitimation of Caesar's monarchy. As J. Gagé rightly notes, the idea and the vocabulary of the “principate” were starting to form (Gagé 1936, 50).

Nevertheless, if Cicero was not alone in raising the idea, his voice was nonetheless still tinged with a particular *auctoritas*. Moreover, the benefit that the prince could gain from these Ciceronian echoes was doubtless significant within the context of his policy of national reconciliation (*concordia*) as is

shown by the fact that he exercised the consulate in 30 BC taking Marcus, the son of Cicero, as his colleague. What is more, one of Plutarch's anecdotes seems to confirm this hypothesis: according to the Chaeronean biographer, Augustus once caught one of his nephews reading Cicero. He apparently reassured him, telling him that Cicero was an eloquent man, driven by love for his country (Plut. *Cic.* 49).

Conclusion

To come back to Livy: what should be underlined is the fact that his education and intellectual output—and that he was initially drawn to philosophy—probably led him to adopt a very ciceronian philosophical interpretation of these *uirtutes* that Augustus had the intention of personifying, all the while remaining perfectly aware of their political exploitation at the time of the establishment of the principate.

Moreover, this philosophical and political dimension to his work seems to be confirmed by its didactic purpose and by the moral interpretation of history that Livy proposes through the characterization of the different actors featuring in his work (personalities, peoples: cf. Bernard 2002), and his suggested interpretation of events (Burck 1971, 42). In this tragic battle, which opposes Rome to the rest of the world, and on occasions to itself, the author incontestably chooses the side of law, whose triumph is illustrated by Livian dialectics, as shown by the victory of Rome over Carthage and its *mala fides* (21.10.9) or, *a contrario*, the failure of the city of Romulus when, neglecting its values, it was defeated by the Gauls in 390 BC. For Livy, moral strength—a consequence of harmony in political communication—is always at the origins of the final victory. It was up to his contemporaries to learn the political lesson and to accept the solution (*Praef.* 9) proposed to them by the new power, the *consensus omnium* around a *princeps* seeking to re-establish law and values by conforming to the actions of the great men of the past who enabled the preservation and growth of the *Urbs*. As for Augustus, it remains for him to conform to the model of the Republican *princeps* portrayed to him by the historian through the character of Camillus (cf. Chapter 9), by relying on the very actuality of some of the prince's watchwords, and to open up a new era for the Roman people under the auspices of Apollo.

Cross-References

See CHAPTER 3: PORTRAITS OF PEOPLES; CHAPTER 8: LIVY'S USE OF EXEMPLA; CHAPTER 17: THE COMPOSITION OF THE *AB URBE CONDITA*: THE CASE OF THE FIRST PENTAD; CHAPTER 18: READING LIVY'S BOOK 5

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Further Reading

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Chapter 11

Livy's Historical Philosophy

Bernard Mineo

Cyclical Concept of Roman History and Historical Background

Livy started writing his Roman history at a crucial moment in time. Indeed, evidence points to the year 27 BC as being his starting point, which is when the principate was beginning to come out of limbo after the battle of Actium. In his preface, Livy stresses the strong link between current events and the purpose of *Ab Urbe Condita*, since he self-avowedly explains that his aim is to describe the mechanisms that have led first to Rome's development and then to its gradual decline, ending in absolute chaos, which is the state of Rome at the time when the author is putting pen to paper (*Praef* 9):

What I should like each and everyone of us to do is to study attentively the life and mores of past generations, the great men and politicians who made it possible, in times of peace as in times of war, to establish our empire and to extend its boundaries, then to endeavor to picture to oneself, first some sort of moral dissension accompanied by a gradual slackening of discipline, becoming in its turn more and more apparent, and finally the onset of total disintegration down to our day and age when it is no longer possible to endure either our vices or their remedies.

Many have felt that the strong condemnation of contemporary mores contained in these lines was incompatible with sympathy for the new political regime. A passage from Tacitus, in which Augustus seems to be poking fun at Livy—calling him Pompeian—has also been taken as proof of the latter's resolutely republican outlook, and thus of his natural hostility toward Augustus's monarchy (Tac. *Ann.* 4.34). Nevertheless, it seems to us that Livy's supposed Pompeianism should be considered in the light of the political situation at the time, the restoration of a lawful state (*res publica restituta*) in the 20s, when the republican figures of Pompey and Cato seem to have been somewhat rehabilitated by the new regime, and Caesar's dictatorship glossed over (Mineo 2006, 112–134; Hurlet and Mineo 2009). Moreover, the passage from the preface previously mentioned and which has often been regarded as evidence of Livy's pessimistic outlook on the new regime seems, in fact, to hint at the historian's gamble that Augustus's policy of moral, religious, and political restoration might prove successful: the remedies mentioned are probably an allusion to the abortive attempt, soon after 27 BC, to pass laws encouraging marriage and repressing adultery (Prop. 1.8.21; 2.7–10; Dio

Cass. 53. 13.3; Miles 1995, 78–79; Moreau 2003, 462–469; Mineo 2006, 127–128), and perhaps, also, to the difficulties encountered when trying to present national unity based on the authority of one man as necessary in order to put an end to the chaos engendered by civil wars.

As for the reason why it is imperative that remedies be found and that vices no longer be endured, the explanation is to be found in a cyclical concept of history which shows that the present political nadir is but temporary, a form of chaos resulting from the civil war, which marked the end of the preceding historical cycle. A new Rome must now be reborn, and it will be a painful but necessary process ensuring a new cycle of life, as Augustus pledged when he asked Apollo for protection.

Cyclical Pattern

The establishment of the principate is in fact a crucial moment in Roman history, a milestone, but also the touchstone in Livy's cyclical concept of history whose mechanisms in *AUC* I have attempted to describe in a recent book (Mineo 2006). [Figure 11.1](#) will enable us to see the time scheme more clearly.




Figure 11.1 Livy's Cyclical Pattern

A first cycle spans the 360–365 years¹ between the foundation of Rome and the sacking of Rome by the Gauls, and its refoundation by Camillus. Between the city burning down and its refoundation by Augustus, we have the same length of time. Inside each cycle, the reader will notice two historical sequences of equal duration, one an ascending curve and the other a descending curve, depending on whether *concordia* or *discordia* is prevalent at the time.

To understand the dynamics and meaning of these historical sequences, one must remember that they reflect, above all other things, the moral qualities of the various political figures responsible for the future of the city: it is because national unity (*concordia*), peace between gods and men (*pax deorum*), military discipline (*disciplina*), and loyalty (*fides*) finally prevail that Rome

can prosper, but it is not without difficulty: its true victories are those obtained when the psychological factors that undermine harmonious political relationships can be restrained. Hostility (*invidia*), excessive freedom (*licentia*) on the part of the plebs, and arrogance and pride (*superbia*) on the part of the patricians must be checked in order that civic harmony may triumph. The individual's desire for glory must be subservient to the interests of the state; loyalty (*fides*), which is necessary to unite the *imperium*, is in full force only when Rome proves itself capable of clemency (*clementia*); and it is by renouncing cruel deeds that the Romans can hope to transform a temporary success into a final victory. Nevertheless, the latter is only possible if a harmonious relationship between men and gods (*pax deorum*) is maintained, and if the gods are given their proper due (*pietas*).

A Recurring Use of Analogies: The Past Sheds Light on the Present

The most noticeable result of Livy's use of this pattern is the way in which the historical events surrounding the two nadirs in Roman history perfectly echo one another. Rome's first annihilation—the Gallic sack of Rome—thus appears as the end result of a political evolution fostering *discordia*, which began with Tarquinius Superbus. Using as his sources annalists whose opinion of the prince was unfavorable, Livy had no difficulty in presenting the reversal of historical trends and in pinpointing the mechanisms that were to lead to the establishment of the Republic. Even if Rome was still not far from its first apex, the establishment of the republic found its logical place within a descending curve. With the passing of laws instrumental in granting freedom, first the *lex de provocatione*, and then the establishment of the Tribunes of the Plebs, the Plebeians grew more restless, and their freedom tended to become excessive (*licentia*), thus gradually exacerbating the pride and arrogance (*superbia*) of the Patricians. In accordance with the evolutionary pattern delineated in the preface, the downward movement toward decline, slight at first, gradually accelerated and led to a very serious crisis, which is described in Books 4 and 5. There, the author showed, in particular, how the decline of the city originated with the many unfair court cases against patricians, the growing arrogance of the latter, the weakening of military discipline, and the increasing risk of foreign invasions—internecine strife meant that not enough attention was being paid to the *metus hostilis*—and the Romans' laxity as regards traditional values, in particular, that of *pietas* and *fides* (see also Chapters 16 and 17).

Indeed, the Gallic sack of Rome is presented as a consequence of the lack of *fides* on the part of the Roman embassy and the military defeat at the Allia as due to the absence of the only man who could have stood up to the enemy: Camillus. The latter had voluntarily opted to go into exile following an unfair sentence largely passed because of the Plebs's hostile attitude toward him

(*invidia plebis*), which was then at its height. This episode in Livy's narrative is absent from all other previous extant sources. It would seem that Livy intended Camillus to be the man whose fateful absence from Rome as a result of internecine strife would precipitate Rome's disintegration. The historian's comment (5.33.1) "thus was a citizen who, had he stayed ... could have prevented the sack of Rome, dismissed" shows very clearly the causal link between the Gauls' ability to capture the city and Camillus's exile. In the same way, his spectacular return, following his reconciliation with Rome and in the midst of a new political climate favoring civic harmony, makes victory over the Gauls possible and prevents the Romans from emigrating to Veii, thus ensuring the beginning of a new historical cycle.

We can note a similar evolutionary pattern in the historical cycle leading to the civil wars and the establishment of the principate. It starts with the aftermath of the victory of the Metaurus in 207 BC, which was made possible by the triumph of Roman virtues, at their highest, allied to perfect civic harmony following the defeat of Cannae. Fear of the enemy started to recede, enabling Scipio to launch his successful African expedition, which heralded a new stage in Roman conquests, and very soon we witness renewed instances of the Patricians's *superbia* as a result of Roman successes, which also encourage the growth of *avaritia* and *luxuria* among the inhabitants of the city. As for the Plebs, free rein is given to their *licentia*, caused by the arrogance of leaders greedy for glory. Occasionally, they also fall under the spell of some great *imperatores* wishing to emulate Alexander the Great. The civil wars will be the consequence of this evolutionary pattern that will result, 180 years after the battle of the Metaurus, in the establishment of the principate.

Of course, Livy's description of the events between the battle of Pydna and the establishment of the principate is missing, but Books 28–45 already give clear indications of the new historical trend, thanks to the depiction of a succession of scenes whose significance is symbolic: instances of renewed rivalry between generals greedy for personal acclaim (30.38.7; 45.35), the first hints of *avaritia* and *luxuria* when the Roman troops penetrate into Asia in 186 BC (39.6.1), a growing absence of piety—temples pillaged by Pleminius but also by a republican Censor who does not hesitate to tear the marble slates off the roof of the temple to Juno Lacinia—and the dramatized narrative of the Bacchanalian conspiracy (39.17–9). We are also made aware of the growing lack of *fides* through the story of how the wise men's indignation at the new rules of diplomacy (*noua sapientia* 42.47.4–9), which they feel to be unfair, is not allowed to prevail. Moreover, the dramatized narrative of Cato's failure to oppose the abrogation of the Lex Oppia (34.4.3) proves that the city is resolutely set on embracing *luxuria*.

If the manuscripts we have do not allow us to go beyond Book 45, that is, the aftermath of the battle of Pydna, everything seems to imply that Livy must

have continued to accentuate the downward curve, especially after 146 BC, since he would then have been relying on a historiographical tradition that his predecessor, Sallust, had also made use of and that emphasized the decline of Rome. Using the *periochae*—with due care and attention (see Chapter 30)—as a basis for our research, and taking into account the internal logistics of Livy's narrative in the parts of his work that are extant, it may be possible to envision the way in which *Ab Urbe Condita* might have ended.

The relationship between Rome and the rest of the world could not but become more and more strained, just as the yoke from Carthage had finally become unbearable; exposed to the *avaritia* and the *saevitia* of the Roman rulers, the *fides* of the peoples that Rome had conquered would gradually diminish. Rome would then become the focal point of conflicting driving forces threatening the unity of the empire while internecine strife would develop and grow ever more tragic. Gracchus' and his supporters' actions would thus be held responsible for the increase in violence in the political sphere (*per.* 58.1; 59.7; 61.4) and the self-centeredness of the great charismatic leaders would certainly have appeared to be an even greater danger to civic harmony. Marius and Sylla—the former especially (*per.* 59.5)—would have spurred on the tendency for disintegration of the civic body in the midst of a social war that was tearing Italy apart. The triumvirate formed by Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus and the ensuing civil war would, viewed from this perspective, have been perceived as the end result of a long period of evolution finally bringing certain death to Rome's old crippled body but also enabling it to be reborn under the auspices of the young Octavian, as Livy and many of his fellow citizens wished to believe.

That people had placed their hopes in the policy adopted after Actium and Octavian's triumphal return to Rome in 29 BC is indeed evidenced by the *periochae* depicting the events of those years, and this is entirely consistent with the very positive account of the deeds of Caesar's young adopted son during the civil war, which is to be found in the Abstract. From the 134th *periocha*, dealing with Octavian's becoming Augustus, onward, the tone of the summaries is much more positive, highlighting the end of the civil wars and the restoration of order and of rules and regulations in the provinces. The *periochae* 138–141 depict an impressive number of victories, insisting, in particular, on the argument with the government of Parthia and the handing back of the legionary standards. Livy's Roman history ended in 9 BC (maybe even later, see Chapter 30) after a description of the very beginnings of the Rome refounded by Augustus under Apollo's auspices, a depiction of the hard struggle to emerge from the chaos brought about by the civil wars.

The Start of New Historical Cycles: The City Becomes Contaminated

Livy's cyclical concept of history, which places the establishment of the principate at the very center of his book, and which makes it the ideological focus of his narrative, is directly linked to the idea of the city as a living organism (see Chapter 10). Thus, the cycles, whether leading toward decline or toward renewal, seem both natural and unavoidable.

One aspect of this concept of the city as a living organism is that growth inexorably leads to decay; just before the city reaches its pinnacle of power, and because of it, the seeds of what will later develop into a disease and will compromise the moral health of the city are sown. The episode describing the arrival of Lucumo—the future Tarquinius Priscus—and his wife Tanaquil shows how Rome becomes diseased because of personal ambition and a taste for luxury (Liv. 1.34.1). In the same way, Livy underlines by a narrative comment (Liv. 25.40.2) the fact that the capture of Syracuse by Marcellus was the origin of:

this admiration for Greek works of art. It is the starting point for the indiscriminate and relentless pillaging of sacred and profane buildings. This passion would ultimately be prejudicial to the gods of Rome.

In both cases, coming into contact with a foreign body (Etruria, the Hellenistic world) whose main characteristic is its *luxuria* accelerates decay; because of its expansion, Rome cannot avoid contact with this world that Cato was so hostile to, this source of corruption.

In order to decipher the cyclical pattern of Livy's work, the contemporary reader could rely on very clear pointers left by the author in his narrative. The most obvious device used by Livy in this respect is the series of analogies between the leaders responsible for determining the fate of Rome, the *duces fatales*.

Evander, an Augustan Prototype

Evander has the honor of being a real Augustan prototype inside *Ab Urbe Condita* and of being the first of those *duces fatales* who were to lead, cycle after cycle, to Augustus. Livy's intention of building a temporal bridge spanning the life and times of the legendary king of Pallantea and those of the *princeps* shows itself in various ways.

First of all, it does so through the continuing practice of the “Greek ritual.” It is particularly striking in the passage where Evander is mentioned in connection with the sacrifices offered by Romulus to Hercules under *ritus Graecus* (1.7.3). We then have a stunning flashback (Paratore 1971, 281–282; Delcourt 2001, 839) that enables Livy to introduce in his narrative subtle mirror effects and comparisons between Evander, Romulus, and Augustus.

This flashback is first of all an opportunity to describe the original ceremonies of the *Ara Maxima Herculis*, which must have been of interest to the emperor

intent on renewing archaic cults of national deities. However, most of all, it seems that Livy, in this passage, wanted to hint at parallels between Evander's rights to hold power and those of Augustus (Liv. 1. 7–8):

At that time, Evander, a refugee from the Peloponnese, ruled over this land by virtue of his own personal authority rather than because of any officially granted form of power (*auctoritate magis quam imperio*). He was revered for his wonderful knowledge of writing, which was an unheard-of skill among these uncouth peoples; he was even more revered because his mother Carmenta who had been the object of general admiration before the advent of the Sibyl in Italy was said to be of divine origin.

Auctoritate magis quam imperio: what other phrase could best describe the basis for the principate itself as explained in *Res Gestae* 34.2—that is, as it being a form of power based first of all on moral authority and generating political *consensus*?

Post id tempus auctoritate omnibus praestiti, potestatis autem nihilo amplius habui quam ceteri qui mihi quoque in magistratu conlegae fuerunt. (After this time, I excelled everyone in influence, but I had no more power than the others who were my colleagues in each magistracy [trad. Alison E. Cooley].)

The allusion to the king's divine antecedents is clearly part of the Apollonian symbolism at the heart of the religious propaganda, thanks to which the principate is trying to establish its legitimacy. Even if, at first sight, it seems that the author is seeking to explain the origins of the name “Porta Carmentalis,” the choice of the word “Carmenta” itself cannot but be reminiscent of the similar-sounding “Carmina,” the famous Sibylline books whose transfer to the Temple of Palatine Apollo had been decided upon and then overseen by Augustus. Livy's making Carmenta a forerunner of the Sibyls stresses her link to those books, the source of knowledge of the *fata* now placed under the protection of the Delphic god (Delcourt 2001, 833). One will also remember that, later on, the priestly college responsible for consulting the Sibylline books were also put in charge of the Greek ritual. It is undeniable that there is a link between, on the one hand, the fact that Augustus was one of the *quindecimviri*, that the *Carmina* had just been moved to the temple, that the *Ritus Graecus* played a major part in the ceremonies surrounding the consecration of the Apollonian temple, this emblem of the new leadership, and, on the other hand, Livy's narrative (Mineo 1997, 44–55; 162–175).

Romulus

Analogies between Augustus and Romulus were at once easier and more difficult to draw: easier because Octavian had openly claimed that he was a

new Romulus, and more difficult because the legends surrounding the figure of Romulus were too elaborate to give a historian much leeway.

The allusion to the Palatine is, of course, one of the major pillars on which the author bases his analogy. It is, as one knows from reading Livy, the hill at the foot of which the twins were found and brought up and also the geographical location from which Romulus drew an imaginary map of his celestial *templum* to consult the auspices (Livy, 1.6.4). It is also, historically speaking, the hill where Augustus was born, where he elected to live, and where he was claimed to have seen 12 vultures when he consulted the auspices during his first consulate in 43 BC (Suet. *Aug.* 95). It is where, in the October month of 28 BC, he consecrated the temple to Apollo, the god under whose auspices the *princeps* intended to inaugurate a new era in the history of Rome. It is also on this very hill that the emperor had his modest-looking *domus* built, right between the new Temple of Palatine Apollo and the *Faustuli tugurium*. One will have noticed Livy's particular insistence on the link between choosing the Palatine as the site where to found a city and having been brought up there (1.6.3; 1.7.3).

It is also quite remarkable how Livy's Romulus has recourse to the Augustan "recipe" of using *concordia* to stimulate the growth of the city. In the stories passed down by tradition about the first battles he waged to establish the power of Rome, Romulus is not exactly depicted as a man who relied on a consensual and conciliatory approach. Therefore, Livy's efforts to portray him as such—showing the founder's ready acceptance of a policy of conciliation suggested by his wife Hersilia in order to reinforce the unity and power of Rome (1.11.2)—is all the more significant.

Livy also stresses the importance of *concordia* as part of Romulus' policy when he describes Romulus' and Tatius' joint rule after the Romans and the Sabines had become one community, insisting on the fact that "not only did they rule together, but they did so, moreover, in a spirit of complete harmony (1.13.4–8)." In this, Livy departs somewhat from a tradition that gave more emphasis to the tense relationship between the two kings (Cic. *Rep.* 2.7.13; Dion. Hal. 2.5.4).

To draw his analogy, Livy makes use of Romulus' religious practices, of a *pietas* whose characteristics can be compared to Augustus' religious policy.

Livy's description of the sacrifices offered by Romulus to Hercules, in accordance with the Greek ritual in the passage of his narrative devoted to the establishment of the cult of *Ara Maxima Herculis* by Evander that we have previously mentioned, also serves to herald Hercules' future Evhemerian apotheosis as the victor of Cacus and to link it to Romulus' own (1.7.15):

It was at that time the only foreign cult Romulus adopted as his: already he accepted that immortality could be obtained by merit, the immortality toward which his destiny was leading him.

This is exactly what the poets—Livy's contemporaries—say fate has in store for Augustus, the prince whose victory over chaos seems to ensure he should have his rightful place—among the gods—in the Roman Pantheon as befits a benefactor to the human race. Thus, it would appear that the series of apotheoses that are a mirror image of Hercules' in Livy's etiological narrative regarding the *Ara Maxima* are intended, by analogy, to hint at the prospect of the Emperor becoming a god, should he succeed in the mission that the fates have entrusted him with and save Rome. This is what is implied in Virgil's depiction of the meeting between Evander and Aeneas in *Aeneid* 8 (v.194ff.), as well as in two of Horace's odes (2.2.21; 3.3.9–16), which are texts written apparently at the same time as Livy was writing Book 1 of his Roman history.

Camillus, First Refounder of Rome

The other great historical figure in the history of the (re)foundations of Rome, Camillus, appears 360–365 years after the foundation of Rome by Romulus. The major role he played and his personal qualities, abilities, and skills make him, in Livy's narrative, the perfect precursor to the *princeps*. In fact, Camillus' moral qualities are not at all unlike those that the Roman Senate had granted Augustus in 27 BC, in particular the *uirtus*, *iustitia*, *clementia*, and *pietas* inscribed on the *clipeus uirtutis*.

Camillus is, first and foremost, similar to Augustus, a proponent of *consensus*. After the Romans are repeatedly defeated at Veii because of civic strife, his nomination as dictator restores morale and discipline (5.19), and the Etruscan city can be captured. An innocent victim of internecine strife, he was forced to go into exile (5.32), but once Rome had been sacked, he was the only one capable of rallying the Roman citizens. This reconciliation and return to civic harmony enabled Camillus to free Rome (5.46; 49) and to win a decisive victory over the Gauls, a victory whose consequences would erase those of the battle of the Allia.

However, more than anything else, what makes it possible to forge a very strong analogical link between Camillus and Octavian–Augustus is the former's Apollonian piety, and his desire to perform the necessary religious rites scrupulously and to reestablish national cults, all of which earn him the title of *diligentissimus religionum cultor* (5.50).

To see the analogy, one need only think of how important Apollo is to the new regime—the temple to Palatine Apollo was inaugurated in October, 28 BC—and how proud the *princeps* is when he writes in his *Res Gestae* (19–20) that he has had 82 temples restored in the year 28 BC alone. One may also recall Octavian's denunciation of Anthony for betraying the gods of his homeland and the measures he took to forbid the performance of Egyptian rituals inside the *Pomerium* (Dio Cass. 54.2.4).

The underlying implication of Camillus' piety—that Rome is and will always

be the geographical center of power—strengthens the analogical link between him and Augustus as an aspiring major historical figure: the savior of Rome remains loyal to Romulus' choice of a site for his city when he opposes, in a long discourse for which Livy uses direct speech, the tribune Sicinius' proposal to allow the Plebs to settle in the recently conquered Veii instead of rebuilding the city left in ruins after the Gauls' disastrous sack. The retelling of this episode, which, originally, was simply about plans for conquest and resettlement, could not but remind the reader of Octavian's accusations against his rival regarding his wish to transfer the seat of power to Alexandria (Sordi 1964, 80–100). And it is precisely because of his faithful adherence to the site where Rome was first founded that Camillus is rewarded by the Senate calling him “*deo Romulo, dei filio, parente et auctore urbis Romae*” (Liv. 5.24.11). After Rome has been freed, his personal virtues are again acknowledged: the Romans grant their savior the title *Romulus ac parens patriae, conditorque alter urbis* (Liv. 5.49.7; 7.1).

The analogy, clearly underlined, between Camillus and Romulus allowed Livy to point out another: that between Camillus and Augustus (Syme [1939] 1987, 305–306; Mazza 1966, 186–191; Martin 1992, 63–64; Miles 1995, 88–94; *contra*: Walsh 1961, 16–17; Burck 1992, 170–176).

One will remember that, before opting for Augustus as a *cognomen*, Octavian had hoped to be called “Romulus”—probably as early as his triumph over Egypt in 29 BC (Gagé 1931, 94)—and that, although he was unable to keep the name, he did retain the role of a refounder (Suet. *Aug.* 7.4). He was to be officially granted the title “*pater patriae*” in 2 BC, but, as early as 23 BC, it was a foregone conclusion, as is shown by one of Horace's odes in which he is symbolically granted the title (Hor. 1.2.50). Finally, the phrases “*dei filio*” and “*auctore urbis Romae*” could not escape the notice of Livy's contemporary readers, since they are to be found among Augustus' official titles.

Livy's epitaph devoted to Camillus would seem to confirm this analysis: after having reminded the reader that the latter could legitimately be granted the name of Romulus, founder of Rome, Livy adds that, indeed, he had been the *princeps* of the city in times of peace as well as in times of war (7.1.9–10).

Thus, thanks to a series of analogies, Livy manages to suggest that Romulus, Camillus, and Augustus were, all three of them, historical figures of equal importance, three heroes whose deeds had made it possible for a new historical cycle to begin.

Camillus' startling insistence on the 365 years of Rome's existence, in his speech to the Plebs asking them to remain loyal to the site chosen by Romulus after the turmoil caused by the Gallic episode, is also proof of this (Liv. 5. 54. 5–6).

It is J. Hubaux (1948, 343) to whom we are indebted for first noticing the important symbolic significance of this number, which corresponds to the end

of the first cycle in the history of the *Urbs*. This death of the city had also been symbolized by the episode, inside the narrative of the sack of the city, which features the old patricians. These representatives of Rome's past accompanied the youth of Rome on their way to the Capitol and on their way to ensuring the continuity of the city and then, turned back toward the lower part of the city where they were going to die, caught up in the fire that was going to engulf and destroy what is left of the old Rome (Liv. 5. 39. 8–40).

That Livy should have chosen this as a starting point for a new historical cycle is not, however, so very surprising. Indeed, the seriousness of the event, Rome's territorial withdrawal, could only make one feel that one was going back in time and had to start all over again. It seems that Ennius had already intended to bring a historical cycle to a close by mentioning—probably in that selfsame speech by Camillus in which he dissuades his fellow countrymen from emigrating to Veii—the 700 years of the city (Ennius, *Annales*, quoted by Varron, *R. R.* 3.1.2). Polybius had also settled on this date as his starting point for the continuous growth of the *Urbs* (Pol., I, 5, 3; Pédech 1964, 443). However, it is also true that, by drawing analogies with Camillus and the political crisis that Rome was undergoing at the time, as well as by insisting on the symbolic meaning of the number 365, Livy was, more than any of his predecessors, stressing the historical significance of present events. His contemporaries, well aware of Augustus' ambition to usher in a new era after the completion of a new cycle of equal duration, must have found the message easy to understand, especially as Livy was not the only one who chose to use a cyclical view of history to link Augustus to a mythical past, as M. Sordi so rightly shows when she writes about Virgil (1964, 80–100).

The Two Roman Apexes: Servius Tullius and Scipio Africanus

Thanks to the reforms he implemented, Servius Tullius embodies the accomplishment of the institutional and moral evolution of Rome initiated by Romulus, a first apex in the history of the *Urbs*. Moreover, Servius' political “constitution” enables Livy to call the king *conditor* (1. 42. 4). In the former's narrative, Servius Tullius is depicted as having a providential role; he is described as someone upon whom Fortuna has smiled, as is shown by the story of his birth, with its accompanying miracle and prophecy. It is only thanks to Tanaquil's help that he accedes to the throne and, in this passage, Tanaquil is the symbolic figure representing Fortuna (Mineo 2006, 187).

What indicates to the reader that Rome has achieved perfect political balance under the leadership of this prince are his moral attributes, the same as those possessed by Camillus, Scipio, or Augustus. According to Livy, he uses moderation and rules fairly, and it is this selfsame moderation on his part that leads to his being designated king by common consent (*consensus*) (1. 46. 1):

Servius is the sort of leader people rally around, just like Camillus, Scipio (26. 18. 5–10), and, of course, Augustus, the leader who relies on common consent *par excellence*. It is interesting, moreover, to note that, according to other traditions, such as that perpetuated by Dionysius Halicarnassus, for instance, Servius Tullius seems to be a rather forceful character, a forerunner of the *popularis*, profoundly disliked by the Senate (Dion. Hal. 4. 4. 4).

Because of the part he plays in the building of a temple to Diana on the Aventine, Servius Tullius is also, as are the other *duces fatales* of the city, surrounded by a muted aura of Apollonian symbolism. The sacrifice of a heifer of exceptional beauty and size in honor of the goddess holds, moreover, the promise of a remarkable imperial destiny for Rome (1. 48. 5).

The political figure representing the apex of the second cycle in the history of Rome is the charismatic Scipio Africanus, who, in Livy's narrative, is designated as the providential leader (*dux fatalis*) entrusted with the task of leading the city toward its new destiny. It is true that his many exploits in Spain, Africa, and Asia had already, during his lifetime, marked him out as exceptional, as a hero. Ennius' poem, written in his praise, bears testimony to this.

Nevertheless, Livy endeavored to add meaning to Scipio's mission in life: the latter remains, first and foremost, the future victor against Hannibal, but he also becomes the one who, by transporting the theatre of military operations to Africa, ushers in a new era. Scipio is an essentially ambiguous character, being, on the one hand, the Roman general whose personal virtues reflect the moral apogee that Rome has reached, but also the political figure whose immoderate ambitions, whether personal or imperial, open up a new and, in the long run, pernicious historical trend for his city. In this regard, the long debate as to the advisability of an expedition to Africa in which Scipio is pitted against another great symbolic figure, Fabius Cunctator, is a major pointer for the reader.

Indeed, Livy attaches great importance to this debate (28.40–4): he devotes a large part of his narrative to it and places it strategically at the end of Book 28, so that it will shed a different light on the last pages of the previous book, which depicts a city free, at long last, from the *metus hostilis*, thanks to the victory of the Metaurus (27. 51. 10).

Together with Fabius' speech, we are given indications of his emblematic status. In Livy's narrative, Fabius embodies total devotion to Rome; he epitomizes the individual totally subservient to the best interests of the community. Therefore, his opposition to Scipio is extremely revealing. In this passage, the Cunctator who says he is world-weary (28. 40. 13–4) obviously plays the part of the wise old man whose nearness to death (30.26) enables him to see, with incredible clarity, as if he were a *uates*, the significance of present events (Cic., *Div.*, 1.63–4).

The reason for Fabius' involvement becomes quite clear at the end of his speech, which is also its climax (28. 42. 22):

My opinion, Conscript Fathers, is that P. Cornelius Scipio was elected consul to protect the interests of the state and our interests, not for himself or to promote his own interests; it is to ensure the safety of Rome and of Italy that armies have been raised, not in order that consuls may march them into such and such a region of the Earth, wherever they wish, acting with the arrogance of kings.

These last few words introduce, in fact, very precisely, the characteristics of the new historical trend, which is just beginning to show in Livy's narrative, and the seeds of which Scipio's African escapade contains: a growing *superbia* on the part of the patricians that goes against the best interests of the community as a whole, a *cupido honorum* that sometimes causes the generals to act without a mandate from the Senate and the Roman people, thus to start unfair wars and so to use their position as consuls to promote their own interests and not those of the Republic, and finally to endanger national unity (*concordia*) by their tyrannical behavior.

In fact, the significance of this staged debate between Scipio and Fabius could not escape the notice of Livy's well-read readers. How could they not realize, indeed, that the author's aim was to draw a parallel between his narrative and that of Thucydides, and, more specifically, between this debate and the speeches delivered by Nicias and Alcibiades in front of the Athenian people, concerning the advisability of launching an expedition to Sicily against Syracuse (Tedeschi 1998, 90–91)? To the Greek historian, the expedition epitomized the mortal danger in which the great power that was Athens had been placed by the reckless imperialist ambitions that had propelled Pericles' city far from its natural boundaries (Romilly 1990).

Naturally, the history of Rome differs from that of Athens: instead of being defeated at the Assinaros, the Romans would be victorious at Zama. However, it is on this new historical trend, introduced by Scipio's African expedition, that the reader of *Ab Urbe Condita* was asked to reflect, as well as on the teachings of past experience that had shown how dangerous rampant imperialism could turn out to be.

Use of Rhetorical Devices to Highlight the Cyclical Patterns

When considering the work as a whole, the reader could perceive the way in which historical trends evolved through the worsening of political crises and their growing number—in particular, in Books 4 and 5—or, conversely, through their slow disappearance (Books 6–10) against a backdrop of miraculous occurrences whose number and impact varied according to the

historic importance of the episodes (Mineo 2006, 198–336).

Different rhetorical devices also enabled Livy to shine a spotlight on the important stages in his cyclical representation of history.

The great turning points, the sack of Rome by the Gauls and the battle of the Metaurus, are highlighted, as we have seen, by great speeches (Camillus) or debates (Fabius and Scipio) that attract the reader's attention because of Livy's use of direct speech and because of the inordinate length of these passages, which make them all the more dramatic.

Livy also constructs his narrative by adding little brushstrokes, by presenting in a very dramatic manner episodes or tableaux and stressing their symbolic or emblematic functions, either by amplifying one particular point or by adding comments to his depiction of events.

His use of numerous stylistic devices is particularly striking when we come to the turning point of 207 BC: in addition to insisting on the seriousness of the prodigies that had to be expiated by many sacrifices that year, Livy describes the expiatory ceremony of 207 BC (prescribed after Juno Regina's temple had been hit by a thunderbolt) using a wealth of detail and in such a way that his contemporaries could not but be reminded of the *ludi saeculares* of 17 BC (because of the manner in which the procession is organized and because the mention of Livius Andronicus' *carmen* may implicitly recall that of Horace; see Mineo 2000).

As for Livy's depiction of the battle of the Metaurus, it is remarkable for its epic proportions (Mineo 2000, 512–540; 2003, 40–47). Our attention is drawn, in particular, to the closing tableau in the last paragraph of Book 27, which features Roman ladies dressed in their finest apparel and giving thanks to the immortal gods, as if the war was over, free from fear as they now feel (27.51.9). Given how much had been written by Roman historians, at least since Cato, on the subject of the *metus hostilis*, this particular description could leave the reader in no doubt as to what Livy wished to suggest regarding the long-term implications and consequences of this victory. And to make this even more obvious, Livy adds a long narrative comment on the impact the Roman victory will have (27.51.10):

Statum quoque ciuitatis ea uictoria mouit, ut iam inde haud secus quam in pace res inter se contrahere uendendo, emendo, mutuum dando argentum creditumque soluendo auderent. (This victory also altered the situation of the city, so much so that one now dared to transact business by selling, by buying, by lending money, by paying back loans, just as if one was at peace.)

The “status” referred to here is, in fact, nothing less than the precarious dialectical balance that Rome had achieved. This passage, no doubt, points to the precise moment in time when the pendulum starts to swing back, when the

historical trend starts going in the opposite direction in a way that, though almost imperceptible, is, nonetheless, irreversible.

Conclusion

The cyclical structure of Livy's Roman history thus clearly indicates that the institution of Augustus' principate could very well be the starting point of a new cycle in the history of Rome, on condition that the *princeps* agree to be, in this *respublica* that he claims he can restore (*restituere*) to a lawful state, a sort of new Camillus and not a Manlius Capitolinus (Mineo 2009, 302–304), this other savior of Rome who was tempted into trying to establish a tyrannical regime and whom Livy uses as a foil for Camillus, who agrees to leave political center stage as soon as his services are no longer needed by the Republic (Liv. 6.1–24). On this point, Livy must have become increasingly disillusioned as the dynastic dimension of the new regime became more apparent and the importance given to the *principes iuuentutis* grew. Yet, in the part of the work that is extant, we can find no hint of bitterness toward Augustus, and the *periochae* that correspond to the beginning of Augustus' reign give, as we have seen, a very positive image of his regime. One of Livy's asides in his preface to Book 2 may tell us what his real feelings on the subject were. Indeed, when he states that Brutus' salutary intervention against Tarquin the Superb would have been premature had it been against the previous kings (2.1.3–4), Livy may be giving the reader his thoughts on the political necessities of the present age: he must have felt that the leadership of a prince was, for the time being, a better option than a return to murderous conflicts between warring *condottieri*, and that Augustus' enlightened attitude as a ruler would still be needed for some time in order to rebuild national unity on a solid base.

Note

- 1 Depending on whether one uses Livy's long chronology or short chronology: Bayet and Baillet 1947, CXIV; Mineo 2006, 106–107.

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Part III

Literary Aspects

Chapter 12

Livy and Indo-European Comparatism

Dominique Briquel

According to Livy: A Limited Historical Criticism

Even in his preface to Book 1, Livy felt that the beginnings of Roman history depended more on poetics than on actual facts (6: “such traditions are rather adorned with poetic legends than based upon trustworthy historical proofs”). He therefore distanced himself from certain aspects of the traditional story: he recalled the opinion of those who believed that the story of the she-wolf who raised Romulus and Remus on her milk resulted from a misunderstanding of the term “*lupa*,” which might have referred to the prostitution practiced by Larentia, the wife of the shepherd Faustulus, who had rescued the twins after their exposure (1.7.4). He presented Numa Pompilius' regular meetings with a female divinity who inspired him as a hoax (1.21.3); he marveled at the detail that a divine voice was heard at Silva Arsia on the night of the battle, announcing to the Romans that, despite their losses, they had defeated the Etruscans (2.8.2); he doubted the veracity of the exploits of Horatius Cocles, who alone defended the Tiber bridge against the entire army of Porsenna (2.10.11); and, above all, he attacked the idea that the gods would unite with mortals, which led him to crudely characterize the pregnancy of Rhea Silvia as rape, a crime that she wished to hide by attributing the paternity of her newborn twins to the god Mars (1.4.2). Nevertheless, Livy's denunciation of the role of legend in the narrative was remarkably limited, and he certainly could not have had any idea that the overall construction of large parts of the traditional tale matches legendary schemes, nor that, for example, the succession of kings in the canonical list does not require the actual existence of seven kings who succeeded in turn to the Roman throne.

However, as we know, this is one application of the type of analysis that consists of recognizing manifestations of the thought patterns that the Romans shared with other Indo-European-speaking peoples, particularly those patterns found in certain fundamental structures of the traditional history of Rome. This method of analysis was endorsed by the French scholar Georges Dumézil, and although some continue to reject it wholesale, it may well be one path that allows us to understand the formation of traditions concerning the ancient periods of Roman history.¹ For those who do not reject *a priori* the validity of this comparatist approach, and who accept that the Roman historiographical tradition conveys elements that could be clarified by comparing them with similar identifiable elements taken from other Indo-European peoples, the “Dumezilian” method is especially applicable to the

work of the Paduan historian, particularly in Book 1, which deals with the reigns of the seven kings, or at the beginning of Book 2, which deals with the troubled origins of the Republic. This is why, as Dumézil wrote (1968, 268–269), “once we recognize the significance of the Jupiter–Mars–Quirinus triad, we find that our interpretation of the first thirty-four chapters of Livy is loaded with new questions,” and the *Ab Urbe Condita* can be subjected to an analysis that highlights the Indo-European inheritance that might be contained therein.

The Reigns of the Early Kings: An Historical Projection of an Indo-European Scheme?

In the preceding quotation, Dumézil refers to the most well-known aspect of comparatism as it applies to Roman history: that the threefold scheme of functions that seems to have been an essential element of Indo-European mythology, the most striking example of which in Rome was the three gods of the ancient pre-Capitoline triad (Jupiter, Mars, and Quirinus²), may also be applied to the legendary reigns of the first four sovereigns of the *Urbs*. In fact, the peoples of this linguistic family seem to have shared a tripartite vision of the world, founded on a hierarchical classification, structured according to notions of sovereignty, the first function; of military and physical force, the second function; and on a collection of related but more diverse concepts, such as fertility, wealth, beauty, and humanity as a whole, which collectively formed the third function. The world of the gods would have been conceived according to this threefold scheme: the Roman Jupiter was thus a sovereign god, Mars was the patron god of military activities, and Quirinus, according to the terms explained in the following text, was assigned to the vast third function. However, this is only one of numerous possible applications of what Dumézil called “*L'idéologie tripartite des Indo-Européens*,” the only introductory work that he wrote on this subject.³ We find this mental scheme of classification in the threefold organization of the priesthood, such as the three major flamina of Rome; in rituals, such as the sacrifices offered in the Umbrian city of Gubbio to Jupiter, Mars, and Vofionus, the so-called Grabovian gods, the local counterparts of the three gods of the pre-Capitoline Roman triad; and indeed sometimes in the structure of society itself (in India and Iran but not in Rome⁴). However, more importantly for Livy, the scheme appears in innumerable myths, literary epics, tales, and legends, and seems to be at the heart of historical depictions, the collective past being conceived according to this intellectual framework. In particular, it is traditional to attribute to Indo-European peoples, at the beginning of their history, a series of sovereigns whose succession, arranged according to the three functional fields, proved that these peoples were the model of a complete society, and therefore reflected the ideal of what a group could be, conceived according to the rules of the tripartite ideology. We see this ideology projected into a people's origin stories in many other areas of the Indo-European world:

Dumézil recognized it in Scandinavia, where the gods Odin, Thor, Njördr, and Freyr, transformed into princes of the Skjöldunar dynasty, are incorporated into the primitive history of Denmark, as reported by Saxo Grammaticus.⁵ Others have also found it in traditions from Iran, Greece, Armenia, and primitive Russia.⁶ In the Roman tradition, the sequence formed by the four kings of the pre-Etruscan period seems to satisfy this model, and we can read the reigns of Romulus and his first three successors, as related by Livy and the other historians, as an application of the trifunctional ideology.

We can return to this analysis as formulated by T. J. Cornell: “According to Dumézil, Romulus and Numa represent two contrasting aspects of sovereignty, and thus in combination exemplify the first function (as do Varuna [in place of Indra, written in error] and Mitra in Indian mythology); Tullus Hostilius naturally embodies the second (warrior) function, while Ancus Marcius can, with rather less ease, be made for the requirements of the third, economic, function.”⁷ It still seems worthwhile to recognize in this a trifunctional articulation, especially if we look beyond the Livian tale. Romulus is the founder, who established the social and political foundation of the Roman society, while Numa was limited to completing the religious foundation, with the organization of cults and priesthoods. Furthermore, Romulus is violent, his reign being marked by a series of wars, and he acted in an authoritarian manner verging on tyranny, while Numa is gentler and affable and led his compatriots to peace, with no conflicts taking place during his reign—which could hardly have corresponded to historical reality! In this, we can see the implementation of the opposing forces in Roman history that underlie the existence, in Indo-European depictions, of two complementary divinities corresponding to the first function: one representing the authoritarian, even violent aspects, and the other representing the regulated and judicial aspects, as with Varuna and Mitra in India, or Odin and Tyr for the ancient Scandinavians.⁸ Analyzing Tullus Hostilius in terms of the second function poses no problems: his reign is nothing but a succession of wars, and Dumézil made a detailed comparison of many of the central episodes of his reign with known warrior myths from Ireland or India. The combat of the three Horatii and the three Curiatii is echoed in the victory of the hero of the Ulaid, Cuchulainn, the third of three brothers, over the three sons of Nechtan; or in the combat of the Indian warrior god Indra, aided by Trita (whose name means “the third”), against a three-headed monster. As for the conflicts of the king of Rome with his Alban counterpart Mettius Fufetius, they correspond to another myth about the god Indra, concerning his battle against a different adversary, Namuci.⁹ It is certainly much less evident that Ancus Marcius corresponds to the third function, so much so that T. J. Cornell could write that “Ancus makes a poor representative of the third function.” This justly underlines the inadequacy of Dumézil's arguments that Ancus embodies the economic aspects of the third function.¹⁰ However, they prove to be correct as long as the third function is not reduced to its simple components (despite the

fact that Dumézil himself was convinced by this reductionist view). Livy's tale is paramount: if we adhere to the presentation of the facts as described by the Paduan historian, then Ancus, reacting against the attitude of his warrior predecessor, wanted to lead the Romans back to peace, and began to do so by implementing religious measures (1.32.1–2), which relates to the first function. However, he still faced the hostility of Rome's enemies, who took advantage of this peace and attacked him, requiring him to wage war (1.32.3–33.5), thus bringing us into the domain of the second function. It is only after having conquered these enemies that the king could dedicate himself to his economic plan, to increase the size of the city both demographically and spatially, to build a bridge, and to establish the port of Ostia (1.33.5–9), the only part of the tale that matches the aspects of the third function as evoked by Dumézil. In other words, the fourth sovereign of the *Urbs* passes through successive periods that each relates to one of the three functional levels, and he demonstrates his competence in each level. However, this should not be surprising: the Roman citizen is, as Dumézil writes (1968, 434–435), at once “pious, brave, hard-working,” and we must not forget that, in Rome, the canonical god fulfilling the third function is not a god of abundance or wealth, but rather Quirinus (pronounced *co-wiri-nos*), whose name, formed from the idea of bringing men together and related to the names of the Quirites and the curiae, shows that he was the god of the citizens as a whole—thus highlighting what the population considered most important within the widespread duties of the third function. It is therefore normal that Ancus, who is not conceived as a divine figure expressing the most classical aspects of the third function, instead embodies the excellence of the *civis Romanus* in the form of Quirinus, god of the citizens, and is a fully realized figure across all three fields of the tripartite ideology.¹¹ Thus, on the condition that we take into account this peculiar inflection of the third function in Rome, where a god of the citizens was a canonical representative of the Jupiter–Mars–Quirinus triad, this analysis of the reigns of the first four kings of Rome still seems to be valid.¹²

Other Applications of the Comparatist Method

We have lingered on this example of comparative analysis because it is the most well-known, while at the same time it remains far from being unanimously accepted. However, it is only one of numerous instances where this method can be applied to an analysis of the *Ab Urbe Condita*. Yet, contrary to what is far too often assumed when we refer to Indo-European comparatism, this analysis is hardly limited to the tripartite ideology alone. Comparison allows us to discover inherited schemes in Roman history beyond those that originate with the three functions. We have mentioned the battle of the Horatii and the Curatii and the relations between Tullus Hostilius and the Alban Mettius Fufetius. If these episodes represent the trace of an ancient

warrior mythology, then they do not require the intervention of a trifunctional articulation.¹³ Dumézil has also compared the two heroes, one blind in one eye and the other one-armed, who intervene to save Rome from the attack of Lars Porsenna, who has come in an attempt to restore Tarquin the Proud to the throne of the *Urbs*, with the duality formed by the two sovereign Scandinavian gods, Odin and Tyr, one of whom lost an eye, the other his right arm.¹⁴ We may also cite his proposal that the overflow of the Alban Lake during the siege of Veii, cleverly mastered by the Romans, can be compared with the Irish legend of the explosive well of Nechtan. It can also be compared to the Avestan tale of the aborted attempt of the Turanian Frarasyan, enemy of Iran, to seize the sacred crown of the *xvaranah*, the possession of which guaranteed the legitimacy of the Iranian sovereign; this was a sort of qualifying test, by which the divinity of the waters themselves conferred sovereignty upon whomever showed himself qualified to be its legitimate possessor, by forcing him to initially reject it.¹⁵ This intuition has allowed us to find occurrences of the motif everywhere throughout the Indo-European world.¹⁶ However, the comparison does not apply simply to individual episodes of the traditional tale: there are sometimes much larger structural elements that have a counterpart elsewhere. Hence, expanding upon Dumézil's suggestions, we believe we have shown that when the Romans recorded two great crises in their history—the overthrow of the Tarquins, and the fall of the city to the Gauls—they applied to these events a genre of storytelling that had originally been used to explain the battle of the gods against demons, in which the former won a difficult victory over the latter only after setbacks where they had almost been defeated.¹⁷

As for applications of the tripartite scheme, the tale of the first kings of Rome is only one of numerous occurrences of this useful frame of reference that we encounter in the traditional origins of the city's history. Another expanded application of the trifunctional sequence found throughout the Indo-European world is the theme of the “three sins of the warrior”: an individual, at least initially linked to war and thus particularly susceptible to committing faults, is guilty of three faults in succession, each of which illustrates one level of the tripartite ideology; he disappears afterward, emptied, in a way, of his substance. Dumézil had found this storytelling model in the myth of Indra, as told in the *Markandeya Purana*, and in such diverse legends as Heracles in Greece, the Germanic hero Starcatherus, Sisupala in India, the Ossetian Soslan, and Gwynn in Wales; one of Dumézil's students also noticed that it underlies the great Indian epic, the *Ramayana*.¹⁸ It is certainly not absent in the Roman tradition. Dumézil found it in the tale of the reign of Tarquin the Proud, which is founded on three faults: the false accusation leading to the elimination of his political adversary Turnus Herdonius (relating to the first function), the capture of Gabii by a deceitful ruse (the second function), and the rape of Lucretia (the third function), which resulted in the overthrow of the dynasty and the establishment of the Republic. We too have searched for

this theme in the tale of the eviction of the decemvirs, and even in the deeds of Romulus.¹⁹ The Romans, a warrior people, also seem to have been fond of another type of trifunctional sequence: attributing to their sovereigns a series of three triumphs, each characterized as corresponding to one of the three functions. The lack of precise information about Servius Tullius' three triumphs over the Etruscans prevents us from knowing whether they were arranged according to the three functions, as is also the case for Romulus, Tullus Hostilius, and Tarquin the Elder.²⁰ However, this tripartite articulation is also implemented in many other ways. For example, the account of a battle against the Etruscans, in 480 BC, can be broken down into three distinct moments: a soldier ignites the enthusiasm of his comrades by having them swear an oath (first function), one of the leaders distinguishes himself by taking control of a situation that has been militarily compromised (second function), and another captures the enemy camp and the rich booty contained therein (third function). What might seem to be a straightforward account of a battle can thus be understood as a structured scheme, highlighting the action of three heroes across each of the trifunctional domains.²¹ Another frequently occurring tripartite scheme is found in the parallel histories, where, in three apparently independent episodes, the same theme is built upon each of the three functional levels. L. Gerschel discovered the scheme in the histories, where Rome, although facing formidable enemy opposition, benefitted from a favorable sign sent by the gods, such as a human head (a head found in the foundations of the Capitol), a horse (the quadriga of Jupiter Capitolinus), or a cow (the sacrifice of the fabled Sabine cow); this constitutes a trifunctional sequence. We have also noted it in three cases where the Tarquinian kings were opposed to the divine will: their exauguration of the ancient cults of the Capitol, their desire to create new equestrian centuries against the advice of the augur Attus Navius, and their refusal to buy the Sibylline books offered to them by an old woman.²²

Livy and the Indo-European Heritage

It is unnecessary to list further examples where the comparatist method could be applied to the Roman tradition. There is no need to present a global picture of this method here: it is important to know simply what such an Indo-European heritage could have represented for Livy. Yet, we must recognize that, among the examples of trifunctional sequences that we have cited, some appear so deformed in Livy that we can uncover them only by referencing other authors, such as Dionysius of Halicarnassus or Plutarch. We have mentioned the frequent motif of the three triumphs arranged according to function, but this motif does not really appear in Livy. Firstly, he considers, with reason, the institution of the triumph to have been introduced to Rome by the Etruscan kings,²³ and therefore mentions it only after the victory of the first Tarquin over the Sabines (1.38.3); such ceremonies are excluded from the

reigns of Romulus or Tullus. Instead of three triumphs, he certainly could have spun his tale by listing three victorious wars. However, on this point, the author of the *Ab Urbe Condita* is so far from using a trifunctional articulation, whether as a framework for triumphs or simply for victories, that his narrative does not even mention the subsequent three wars. Dionysius of Halicarnassus reports in detail on the first triumph of Romulus over King Acron of Caenina (2.34.2–4), the second over Cameria (2.54.2), and the third over Veii (2.55.5); this sequence is also found in Plutarch (*Life of Romulus*, 16.3–7, 24.4–5, 25.6), although the latter mentions no triumph after the war against Caenina. Livy, on the other hand, omits the war against Cameria. For Tullus, while Dionysius relates three campaigns against the Albans (3.22.3), the Fidenates (3.31.6), and the Sabines (3.32.6), all of which resulted in triumphs, Livy omits the war against Fidenae; more precisely, he combined it with the war against the Sabines (1.30.4–10), attributing to that war certain elements that the Greek historian assigns to the war against the Fidenates (such as the call for mercenaries). Meanwhile, the reign of Tarquin the Elder, which in Dionysius leads to conflicts, and subsequently triumphs, against the Latins (3.54.3), the Etruscans (3.59.3), and the Sabines (3.66.1), in Livy results only in wars against the Latins (1.35.7) and the Sabines (1.36–37). Livy doubtlessly thought it strange to attribute to this king a campaign against his former compatriots. The same is true in the parallel histories. In the instances where the Tarquinian kings are opposed to the divine will, we find in Livy the exauguration of the ancient cults of the Capitol and the story of Attus Navius (1.55.3–4 and 36.2–8); however, the purchase of the Sibylline books is absent. For the series detected by Gerschel, the episode of the Capitoline quadriga is missing; as for the discovery of the head, there is no mention that the Etruscans tried to interpret this miracle positively (1.55.5–6); only the story of the Sabine cow is related completely (1.45.5–7).

Even when the narrative has preserved every element of a threefold structure, this does not imply that it was preserved consciously. We have mentioned the articulation found in the reign of Tarquin the Proud, where three faults are organized according to the three functions. However, there is no link in the text between the framing of Turnus Herdonius (1.50–51), the taking of Gabii by deceit (1.53.4–54), and the rape of Lucretia (1.58). It is only the level of detail and the length of the tale that emphasize these faults among all the others for which the tyrant is criticized, and which do not form part of the functional articulation (such as the political crimes and faults described in 1.49). Likewise, we may consider the tale of the battle against the Etruscans in 480 BC to be founded upon a tripartite structure. The narrative is limited to a simple description of the events and does not highlight any aspects that would allow us to find in them a trifunctional articulation. Livy does not even mention the rewards given to the three heroes of the encounter that Dionysius reports on at the end of his tale and which highlights the existence of such a structure.

It seems impossible, therefore, that Livy had any knowledge whatsoever that the tradition he was echoing had transmitted along with it a certain way of thinking, which consisted of distinguishing elements that related to sovereignty, to war, and to the “third function.” The omissions and deformations that the traditional tale underwent show that, for Livy, it was no longer a living and productive process of classification. And, although he sometimes seems to rediscover the underlying articulation of the tale, he no longer recognizes the trifunctional ideology as a conceptual framework that he could have used to describe it explicitly. We recognize it in the reign of Ancus Marcius, which, as we have seen, unfolded across the three functional levels in succession. First, his reign relates to the regulated and peaceful aspects of the first function, as illustrated by Numa: Livy notes that Ancus initially imitates Numa and rejects the bellicose policy of Tullus, who represented the second function in the series (1.32.2: “When he began his rule, he was mindful of his grandfather's glory [King Numa] and considered that the last reign, excellent in all else, had failed to prosper in one respect, owing to neglect or misconduct of religious observances”). Then, when Ancus' enemies forced him to take up arms, the reference changes: he now evokes the second function, represented by Tullus (1.32.4: “he believed that the times were better suited to the rule of a Tullus than a Numa”). Finally, once peace has been reestablished and Ancus can commence several large construction projects, no model is invoked: this is normal, since this part of the reign relates to the third function, which has not yet had the chance to appear in the tale, precisely because of its trifunctional structure. He can therefore not be compared to any of his predecessors. The same is true when passing from Numa to Tullus, and thereby from the peaceful aspects of the first function to the warlike second function. Livy mentions the rupture, but accounts for it by referring to the preceding rulers (1.22.2: “This monarch was not only unlike the last, but was actually more warlike than Romulus had been”).

We could not attribute to the author of the *Ab Urbe Condita* even the slightest knowledge of the mental categories that were found in the Indo-European ideology. Although we find traces of them rather often in Livy, this is because they were transmitted within the tradition he was reporting, and because the stories that had been created to tell Rome's ancient history were formed out of mental categories and narrative models that were themselves founded upon this long-past heritage. It is difficult to believe that the ancient functional categories would still have been valid as a universal frame of thought for the Romans of the Augustan age, even for Propertius, whose depiction of the three ethnic components of primitive Rome—the Romans of Romulus, the Etruscans of Lucumon, and the Sabines of Titus Tatius—in Elegy 4.1.9–32 was the foundation upon which Dumézil supported his application of the trifunctional hypothesis in Rome.²⁴ It is just as difficult to believe that the tradition that we can reconstruct from the ultimately remarkably similar tales of Livy, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and other historians is the result of a

single act of creation dating from the fourth century BC, and possibly the work of scholars consciously implementing Indo-European models in a manner that would have been completely artificial and disconnected from the historical reality of the Roman past. This is what Dumézil had thought, and what he continued to believe even in his final works.²⁵ However, in fact, for us, Livy is proof that there was a kind of historical memory that dated from well before his time. At first, this memory had to make use of the conceptual tools that it held in common with other Indo-European peoples in order to provide an understanding and an interpretation of its history. In this way, Livy is a valuable witness of Rome's Indo-European heritage, which we can bring to light through comparison—at least, if we accept the premise of such research. However, we can do this, in a sense, in spite of the author, who no longer necessarily understands the underlying elements of the ancient material he has transmitted to us, for which the *Ab Urbe Condita* can be mined for comparatist study.

Notes

- 1 For a rejection of Dumézil's views, see especially Momigliano 1994 and the critiques of various scholars (in particular, C. Grottanelli and C. Ampolo) as part of a seminar hosted by Momigliano at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa in 1983 (Momigliano 1983). For a nuanced analysis of the application of the Dumézilian method to the events of Roman history, see Cornell 1995, 77–80 (Rome's Indo-European Heritage). However, in my opinion, the most exact presentation of the scope of Dumézil's proposals, taking account of the extensions of the hypotheses proposed by other specialists, is that of the Belgian scholar J. Poucet (Poucet 1985, 171–179; Poucet 2000, 371–449).
- 2 The place of the Roman triad in Dumézil's analysis is illustrated by the fact that he named one of his series of books after it, wherein he explored the application of the trifunctional scheme among different Indo-European peoples (Dumézil 1941, 1944, 1945, 1948a).
- 3 Dumézil 1958.
- 4 On this point, it is useless to raise the objection, as Momigliano did (Momigliano 1963, 116; Momigliano 1966, 545–598; and in particular 583), that, for Dumézil, “in a prehistoric past, Roman society was governed by a rigorous separation of priest, warriors and producers.” In his early works, Dumézil defended the idea that primitive Roman society had essentially been divided into three functional classes, but later he abandoned this idea, instead considering the three functions nothing more than an ideological representation that did not manifest itself in social reality. Thus, in Dumézil 1968, 434–435, he insisted on the “uniformity of

the Romans” and on the fact that they were not distinguished according to any specialization of functions.

- 5 Cited in Dumézil 1968, 264–268.
- 6 On the first Iranian kings, see Wikander 1949–1950, 317–321 (and Dumézil 1968, 263); on the kings of Orchomene in Greece, see Vian 1960, Ahyan 1982 (the idea of a trifunctional structure in the primitive history of Armenia has been raised in Petrosyan 2002, table on p. 120); on the rulers of Kiev, see Fischer 1970.
- 7 See Cornell 1995, 78. Our British colleague accepts that “Numa and Tullus can be convincingly interpreted as contrasting functional stereotypes,” but makes no judgment on the Romulus/Numa articulation and rejects the Dumézilian analysis of Ancus Marcius (“The evidence adduced by Dumézil to link Ancus with wealth and production is marginal and the argument is patently unconvincing.”).
- 8 These ideas were first proposed in Dumézil 1940 and Dumézil 1948b. For a more detailed analysis of this aspect of the tripartite ideology, see Dumézil 1977, 153–182 for the Roman data.
- 9 See Dumézil 1942, 34–60 (for Cuchulainn) and 89–140 (for Horatius), and Dumézil 1969, 19–33; Dumézil 1985a, 25–43; Dumézil 1969, 33–42; Dumézil 1985a, 43–55.
- 10 For example, Dumézil 1973, 211: “It is under the reign of Ancus Marcius, complex like all expressions of the third function, that Rome, among other things, was introduced to wealth and long-distance commerce.” The difficulty of this formulation shows that the author is obliged to give undue weight to certain episodes of the tale (such as “the arrival of the most wealthy Tarquin” or the foundation of the port of Ostia: Dumézil 1968, 280–281) in order to give to the whole reign an economic focus that it did not really have.
- 11 We have studied these aspects of the representation of Ancus Marcius and of the underlying figure of Quirinus in Briquel 1996, 2002, 2003.
- 12 Certain proponents of the Indo-European comparative method have expanded the analysis to cover the three kings of the Etruscan period (Tarquin the Elder, Servius Tullius, and Tarquin the Proud), by reinforcing the trifunctional framework with other considerations (Sterckx 1992 accounts for new social categories by adding domiciled foreigners, enemy foreigners, and slaves to the other three basic components of society; Allen 1987, 1993, 1996 distinguishes a fourth function, which could be either positive or negative).
- 13 On this point, there is a clear difference compared to the Indian myths

- about Indra, in which the battles against the three-headed monster and against Namuci form a trifunctional sequence along with the rape of Ahalya, according to the theme of the three sins of the warrior that we will discuss in the text that follows. See Dumézil 1969, 63–77; Dumézil 1985a, 79–97.
- 14 See Dumézil 1940, 115–116; Dumézil 1948, 168–169. Dumézil returned to this question in Dumézil 1968, 424–428, Dumézil 1973, 268–276, and Dumézil 1977, 198–200.
 - 15 Dumézil 1973, 18–89.
 - 16 After the initial reactions of Puhvel 1973 and Scott Littleton 1973, we may cite, among many others, Sterckx 1994 (Greek and Celtic data), Haudry 1994 and Allard 1999 (Scythian and Germanic data), and Meulder 2000 (Roman data). I have myself studied the Iranian (Briquel 1981; Briquel and Desnier 1983), Greek (Briquel 1985, 1988), and Latin data (Briquel 1998a). However, above all, I must cite Desnier 1995, 1997 (also Desnier 1998), dealing with numerous Iranian, Greek, Celtic, and Germanic data.
 - 17 The scheme of a great battle between gods and demons was proposed by Dumézil based on the Indian epic of the *Mahabharata* and the Scandinavian myth of the “Twilight of the Gods” (Dumézil 1968, 29–257). This was extended to the Trojan cycle of the Greek tradition by Vielle 1996. For its application to the story of the Roman revolution in 509 BC, see Dumézil 1973, 263–291, Briquel 2007; and to the taking of Rome by the Gauls, see Dumézil 1973, 216–238, Briquel 2008.
 - 18 For Heracles and Starcatherus, see Dumézil 1969, 89–96; Dumézil 1985a, 77–88 and Dumézil 1971, 109–132 and 25–58, respectively, and also Dumézil 1985a, 97–105; for Sisupala, see Dumézil 1971, 59–95; for Soslan and Gwynn, see Dumézil 1985a, 115–126; for the Indian god Rama, see Dubuisson 1979, 1986.
 - 19 For Tarquin the Proud, see Dumézil 1985a, 105–114; for the story of the decemvirs in the traditional story of Tarquin the Proud, surely adopted from the “ten Tarquins,” as Livy calls them (3.93.3), see Briquel 2004; for Romulus, see Briquel 1980. This theme, “the three faults of the warrior,” is in reality difficult to distinguish from what Dumézil considered (from the case of the Iranian king Yima and his Indian counterpart Yayati) to be the single fault of the king (Dumézil 1971, 243–300). This distinction is often easy to challenge; for example, in Rome, neither Romulus, nor Tarquin the Old, nor the decemvirs, who all commit three faults, could be considered warriors. Dumézil himself was forced to recognize an occurrence of a king committing three faults, in the Hellenic legend of King Laomedon of Troy (Dumézil 1985b, 31–37).

- 20 See Briquel 1980, 1997, 1998a. However, as we will see, this structure is no longer clearly evident in Livy's story.
- 21 Briquel 2000.
- 22 See Gerschel 1952, Briquel 1998b.
- 23 On the history of the triumph in Rome, see Versnel 1970, Bonfante 1970.
- 24 See, most recently, Dumézil 1968, 304–336.
- 25 See, for example, Dumézil 1968, 269: “During the course of the fourth century and the beginning of the third, while Rome was striving to become the highest power in Italy, the city decided to give itself an official past. Or rather, we should say, Roman intellectuals. Popular belief, anonymous and without design, which sometimes remembers the noise of great events for several generations, did not have much to contribute to this undertaking. It was specialists who, recognizing a need, endeavoured to fill it.” For a justified criticism of these views, and for the fact that a traditional history must have existed well before this time and could have thus transmitted memories of actual history, see Cornell 1995, 77–80.

Cross-References

See CHAPTER 20: LIVY'S NARRATIVE OF THE REGAL PERIOD: STRUCTURE AND IDEOLOGY; CHAPTER 21: LITERARY ARCHETYPES FOR THE REGAL PERIOD; Chapter 22: THE REPRESENTATION OF THE REGAL PERIOD IN LIVY

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Chapter 13

Livy and the Annalistic Tradition

Jürgen von Ungern-Sternberg

The Problem of the *Quellenkritik*

In the preface of his work, Livy discusses the difficulty of his task very clearly, being about to write a history of Rome covering more than 700 years, which had been the subject of many historians before him. Indeed, Roman historiography started in the late third century BC with the work of Q. Fabius Pictor and L. Cincus Alimentus, who were followed in the second century, among others, by M. Porcius Cato, L. Cassius Hemina, L. Calpurnius Piso, Cn. Gellius, and in the first century by L. Coelius Antipater, Q. Claudius Quadrigarius, C. Licinius Macer, Valerius Antias, and Q. Aelius Tubero. Unfortunately, all of their historical works are lost. What is known about them from later quotations was first collected in the masterly work of Peter (1914), which has now been brought up to date by Chassignet (1996–2004) and Beck-Walter (2001–2004). For most of these historians, there are good specialist studies and commentaries, for example: Fabius Pictor (Timpe 2007b), Cato (Chassignet 1986; Timpe 2007a), Cassius Hemina (Santini 1995), Piso (Forsythe 1994), Coelius Antipater (Herrmann 1979), Claudius Quadrigarius (Zimmerer 1937; Forsythe 2007; Ambrosetti 2009), Licinius Macer (Walt 1997), and Valerius Antias (Wiseman 1979, 104–139; Rich 2005).

An important question is how Livy proceeded to compose his own history. First of all, like all other historians in antiquity who did not write about their present time, he did not do research in archives, but relied almost completely on the works of his predecessors. He wanted to excel in both style and composition, but not necessarily in giving a fundamentally new picture of the Roman past. Therefore, the most suitable way was to choose one author for each subject and follow that author, comparing other authors only occasionally. An example of this method can be found in his description of the Roman wars in the East in the fourth and fifth decade by comparing it with the many surviving fragments of the history of Polybius, which Livy used as his principal source (Nissen 1863). Occasionally, he added material from other Roman annalists. Therefore, one has to be careful in cases where we do not have the text of Polybius (Tränkle 1977).

For the other parts of Livy's work, we unfortunately do not have such good evidence from other sources. He rarely supplies us with the names of the annalists he uses, and when he does so it is mainly for a correction of his actual main source, or as an addition. In this respect, he worked like his

colleagues in ancient (and sometimes even modern) times: they do not mention the author whom they were mainly following, except in very few cases.

This does not mean that Livy did not know about the responsibilities of a competent historian. Assembling his methodological or critical remarks—as Wiehemeyer (1938) or Oakley (1997–2005, 13–15) or Forsythe (1999, 22–39) did—one could easily put together a handbook of historical methods using his principles. He, for instance, knew about the higher reliability of older contemporary authors compared to younger ones (3.23.7; 22.7.2–4). He made clear remarks on many forgeries that resulted from the competition of noble families in claiming more consulships and triumphs (8.40.4–5; cf. 7.9.3–5; Ridley 1983)—in this case, he may have been influenced by Cicero's complaints (Brut. 62); he especially criticized the many false statements and distortions of the truth made by Valerius Antias (26.49.1–6; 33.10.8; 37.48; 39.43). However, Livy followed his insights only occasionally, otherwise he could have never finished the enormous task of writing 142 books in not more than 50 years, which amounts to almost three books a year. He preferred the fullest account of each event that he could find, and in most cases he accepted the story of the chosen source as true and thus made no changes, even if he afterward detected capital errors in it. Famous examples for this are the chronology of the siege of Saguntum (21.15.3–6) and the trial of the Scipions (38.55.8–57; Luce 1977, 92–104); a striking one is also 1.46.4, where he noted a chronological problem within the Tarquinian dynasty suggested by Calpurnius Piso, but he did not think it worthwhile to evoke a new discussion by questioning the majority of his sources (Forsythe 1994, 227–234). One has to admit that Livy generally had a feeling for probability, as he shows in 6.12.2–6 (Forsythe 1999, 52–64), but the problem is that the annalists knew how to invent probable stories (von Ungern-Sternberg 2005, 88).

The discussion regarding the uncertainty of the early history of Rome, meaning, in practice, the improbabilities recorded in the first decade of Livy's work, was the beginning of modern historical research from Pierre Bayle to Louis de Beaufort and Barthold Georg Niebuhr. Thus, the nineteenth century became the peak period of the *Quellenkritik* with many (mostly German) dissertations with titles in the style of “*quibus fontibus Livius...usus sit.*” The authors strived to assign every section of Livy's narrative to one of his predecessors by name. However, as Livy mentions them very seldom, and as there are only a few fragments to compare, they mostly developed long chains of hypotheses with only a subjective certitude. Looking back, Sir Ronald Syme (1945, 172) was able to write about three of the outstanding scholars in this field of research: “After Soltau (1894) and Kahrstedt (1913), Klotz (1940/41) applied himself to the investigation of Livy's sources, and operated upon the historian with the traditional knife, or axe, unrelenting.”

Still, this rigorous judgment, though understandable in many cases, was not

altogether fair. Proceeding from the results of Nissen, these and other scholars were able to show that Livy in the first decade mainly used the late annalists, namely Valerius Antias, Licinius Macer, Aelius Tubero (who used Antias and Macer, who in turn followed Gellius), and, from Book 6 on, Claudius Quadrigarius, whose annals started only with the Gallic capture of Rome. In the third decade, he continued to use Antias and Quadrigarius, but in addition relied heavily on the monograph of Coelius Antipater about the Second Punic War. Because Coelius on his part had used the same two main sources, namely Fabius Pictor and the Greek historian Silenus—as Polybius did, too—there are many similarities between Livy's account of the first years of the Second Punic War in Books 21 and 22 and the account of Polybius, though Livy only borrowed information from Polybius in a few cases (21.38.2; 28.46.16; cf. Pol. 3.33.17–18.56.4; Jumeau 1964). Only from Book 24 on does Polybius become the main authority for matters in Sicily, Africa, and Greece, and sometimes in Italy (Tarentum). In the last surviving books, that is, Book 31–45, Livy once again followed Polybius, describing events in Greece and the East, and Antias and Quadrigarius for the annalistic parts (events in Rome and the West), though he sometimes added annalistic material to the Polybian narrative and *vice versa*.

This traditional view, also upheld by De Sanctis (1907–1965), Walsh (1961), and Ogilvie (1965), remains valid. However, these scholars have gone too far in trying to minimize the use Livy made of earlier annalists or, in some cases, of original material. In the first decade, he repeatedly quotes Fabius Pictor and Piso, and there is no reason to doubt that he really consulted them (Luce 1977, 161–162; Oakley 1997, 18; Northwood 2000). Nevertheless, they cannot have been his main sources for the first two centuries of the Roman republic. Based on oral tradition, the early Roman historians dealt only briefly with the time between the beginnings of the *urbs Roma* (*ktisis*: ending with the decemvirate) and the third century BC (Wiseman 1989; Timpe 2007b; von Ungern-Sternberg 1988; but cf. the modifications in Timpe 2011). Livy sometimes even took a look at antiquarian literature. In 7.3.5–8, he refers to L. Cincius for his digression on the dictatorship *clavi figendi causa*, and he may have consulted M. Terentius Varro for his digression on the origins of the *ludi scaenici* at Rome (7.2.4–13). For his account in the fourth and fifth decade, Livy had, of course, read the famous *Origines* of Cato and some of his speeches as well (Tränkle 1971).

However, he did not walk around in Rome, or elsewhere, to discover inscriptions or other new documents. The fact that he refrained from taking a look at the linen corselet that Augustus claimed to have detected in the temple of Jupiter Feretrius (4.20.7) is quite understandable: what would have happened if he did not find it? (Badian 1993, 13–16) Yet, it is a pity that he did not try to scrutinize the *libri lintei*, whose authenticity was quite uncertain (the appearance of newly discovered books that gave a suggestion or a

message more credibility was a topos in antiquity; cf. the *libri Numa Pompilii*: 40.29.3–14), and which, according to Licinius Macer, were hidden in the temple of Juno Moneta (4.20.8). Also, he could have then tried to solve the riddle (4.23.1) revolving around the fact that Macer and Tubero claimed to have found different consuls for the year 434 in the same *libri lintei* (Walt 1997, 75–85, who pleads for their genuineness). Livy himself also did not use the *Annales maximi* in any case. Thus, we can leave aside the highly debated question of whether any of the Roman annalists relied on them. Rawson (1991) and Rüpke (1995) have produced remarkable arguments against this assumption; so did Richardson (2011), who gives a good account of the debate, also quoting defenders of the opposite opinion, such as, for instance, Cornell (1995, 12–16).

Generally, the occasional attempts to provide evidence for archival studies of annalists such as Quadrigarius and Antias, especially the use of records of the senate, have not been very successful (Klotz 1940/41; Bredehorn 1968; Rich 2005), although he is well aware of the many inventions and distortions of Antias; he dates him back to c. 80–60 BC, though it is still worthwhile to reconsider a Caesarian date (see von Ungern-Sternberg 2005, 88–90; 96–97). They do not give enough consideration to the common habit of all ancient historians to rely on the works of their predecessors for past events, and to “improve” them through a new representation and modernization, often combined with seemingly plausible inventions (Luce 1977, 143–144, 180; Walter 2004; von Ungern-Sternberg 1970; Timpe 2007c). In addition, there are clear cases of falsified documents (Meyer 1972) that cannot be genuine. The annalists did like to write in an official style, but that does not prove they really used official documents (Gelzer 1964). Cicero's precautionary measures during the Catilinarian conspiracy (*Sull.* 40–43; cf. *Leg. agr.* 2.37; *Leg.* 3.46) hint at the difficulties of using the archive of the senate and at the possibilities of falsifying evidence. Even if he and Atticus occasionally sent a *libertus* to take a look at a collection of senatusconsults (*Att.* 13.33.3; Walter 2004, 357–373; but Cicero's assertion in *De Leg. agr.* 2.88, namely that he had used *senatusconsulta* on Capua in 211 BC is demonstrably false—see von Ungern-Sternberg 1975, 90–93), the question of why annalists should have done the same remains. The poor quality of many parts of the annalistic material for the years between the Second Punic War and the end of the Third Macedonian War, that is, in the fourth and fifth decade of Livy's work, with all of its errors and distortions of the truth, is not a very suitable basis for an argumentation for archival studies of the annalists. Their accounts of the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War, for example, have repeatedly been refuted in the light of the information given by Polybius (Petzold 1940; Briscoe 1973–2008, 36–47). On the other hand, if there had been good information in these Livian decades, this information could have been transmitted by the contemporary historians, who were all senators, especially Cato.

We should not forget, however, that only a part of the first third of Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita* has survived. Thus, the picture of Livy as a romantic admirer of the distant Roman past prevails; however, this is quite a one-sided picture. Our information about the rest of his work (especially from the Epitome) is too inadequate to appropriately judge his achievements as a historian for the last century of the Roman republic, or even for his own time. For this epoch, he not only had to read his historical predecessors such as Sallustius or Asinius Pollio, he also had to do his own research using contemporary testimonies from eyewitnesses and the records of the senate and the assemblies of the people; furthermore, he certainly had to read the speeches of the great orators of the time—above all, the speeches and other works of Cicero. In one case, we can find evidence for this in the Epitome of Book 70, where, for the acquittal of M. Aquilius in c. 98 BC, thanks to a clever device of M. Antonius, Cicero is said to be the only source (*Cicero eius rei solus auctor*; cf. Cic. *De Or.*; 2.194–196).

We do not know a lot about the works of Livy's predecessors. Therefore, the attribution of some parts of his work to one or another annalist—always with the exception of Polybius—is, even if correct, only of limited use. It is more important to appreciate his methodological principles. For this purpose, a comparison with the work of Dionysius of Halikarnassus is illuminating. The Greek historian wrote his *Roman Antiquities* in 20 books, from the beginnings of Rome until the First Punic War in Rome, at the same time as Livy, but independent of him, and he relied mainly on the same late annalists, especially Valerius Antias, Macer, and Tubero, who was his patron. Dionysius needed four books for the regal period, whereas Livy finished his first book with the election of the first republican consuls. In his preface (6), Livy rejects the poetic *fabulae* about the prehistory of Rome, and, starting his second pentad with the recovery of Rome after the Gallic sack (6.1.1–2; following Claudius Quadrigarius, cf. Plut. *Numa* 1.2; Forsythe 2007, 392), he retrospectively underlined the uncertainty of the Roman history in the regal period, and even in the first century of the Roman republic. In his opinion, the events that took place back then were too long ago and thus almost “invisible,” since there had only been few documents that, moreover, had to a large extent been burnt during the Gallic catastrophe. However, those are not his only skeptical statements on that matter; as for Herodotus (7.152), his principle was to tell what he had been told (Walsh 1961, 47–48; Forsythe 1999, 40–51). Having narrated a fabulous story about the capture of Veii, he closed with the words: “But in questions of such remote antiquity I should count it sufficient if what bears the stamp of probability be taken as true” (5.21.9; cf. 8.18.1–3). Equally, he wrote at the end of one version about the mythic origins of the *lacus Curtius* (7.6.1–6), remembering another one that he had told before (1.12.9–10; 13.5): “I would try to investigate it, if there were a way to find out the truth; but now one must adhere to the tradition because the distance of time refuses any certainty” (Oakley 1998, 96–102).

Livy himself did not “embellish” his work with invented episodes or exaggerations. He wanted to tell the old stories in a better style and arrangement, which could sometimes lead to errors and doublets. Quite often, however, his account is much shorter than the parallel account of Dionysius, because he left aside many stories, which seemed rather improbable to him, without any discussion. This has been shown for the reigns of Romulus and Numa (Poucet 2000, 53), but the same holds true for the subsequent time. Thus, he skipped the theophany of the Dioscuri during the battle against the Latins at the Lake Regillus in 496 BC (Dion. Hal. 6.13; cf. Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.6), and only mentioned, without giving any reasons, that the dictator A. Postumius had vowed a temple for Castor (2.20.12). Other good examples can be found in the accounts on the early republic. Dionysius (7.1–2) narrated that, during the first *secessio plebis*, the land had not been cultivated and, consequently, there had been a great scarcity of corn in the year afterward. Therefore, the senate sent ambassadors to various regions and also to Sicily. At this point, Dionysius was surprised to find in his annalistic sources—Licinius Macer, following Gellius and many others—that the ambassadors were sent to Dionysius of Syracuse, whose tyranny began only at the end of the fifth century, that is, almost 90 years later. He rightly assumed that, in the original story, only an anonymous “tyrant” was mentioned, and replaced, after a long digression on chronological questions, Dionysius with Gelon, a correction that is not reliable, of course. It is highly significant that Livy (2.34.1–7), having read the same sources and surely having recognized the chronological problem, simply passed over it without any discussion, merely reporting a legation to Sicily. We thus have to be thankful for the circumstantial account of Dionysius giving us precious insights into the annalistic methods of writing, but at the same time we have to admire the delicacy of Livy. Altogether, it can be shown that every story of grain scarcity in the early republic originated from oral tradition (von Ungern-Sternberg 2006b), and not from the Pontifical tables (Oakley 1997, 58–59; 733).

Livy's Art of Storytelling

Any assessment of Livy's literary achievements has to start with his working methods. For this purpose, we can follow the masterly presentation of Luce (1977, 185–229). He rightly underlines that Livy must have read the Roman history to a great extent, and therefore must have known its details very well, before he started to write his own work. Then Luce distinguished three stages of Livy's procedure.

In the first stage, he divided the books into larger units: Books 1–15 (Early Rome), 16–30 (the Punic Wars), and 31–45 (Conquest of the East), which could be structured according to pentads or decades (such as the 10 books for the Second Punic War). Afterward, he considered the content of each book in search of the most important subjects and suitable episodes (campaigns,

speeches, etc.), and placed them at the beginning, the middle, or the end. He was not constantly careful in arranging the material; he sometimes composed sections, which were of minor interest to him, rather hastily and not well structured. A special case is the traditional material of the annals—such as elections, the allotment of provinces, prodigies, triumphs, the death of priests, and embassies—which he preferred not to structure because of its ostensible antiquity.

In the second stage, Livy read his main sources again for a certain unit, such as one consular year, and selected the most suitable author for each episode, usually the one who provided the fullest and most detailed account. He could then add further information from other sources, for instance, following Polybius for Greek matters, but adding some remarks of his Roman sources, or following his Roman sources for Italian matters, adding some details told by Polybius. Usually, however, Livy preferred to stick to his main source, because it was often difficult to combine or reconcile different versions.

Actually composing the history in the third stage, Livy started reading his main source again, but adapted it in various manners. This can clearly be seen when comparing his text with the Polybian text that he followed. He varied between a close adaptation, a recasting and the abridgement of the text, always “for the sake of a well-paced, well-proportioned story line” (Luce 1977, 207; cf. Tränkle 1972). As he did not translate sentence by sentence, but wrote a whole passage from memory, he often varied the order of things or committed some minor errors. Principally, he may have had the same attitude toward his Roman sources, but especially in the first decade it is likely that he has changed the author of his main source more often.

For the research on Livy's narrative technique, Witte (1910) was epoch-making. Comparing Livy with Polybius, he showed again and again that the main aim of the Roman historian was to produce a series of vignettes, in which the historical events were presented in a concentrated form. Livy (30.30–31) cut out, for example, the conversation between Hannibal and Cornelius Scipio before the decisive battle of Zama from the continuous narration of Polybius (15.6.2–9.2), in order to form a single scene (Witte 1910, 301–304). Another example is the war council of Seleucid Antiochos III before the war against Rome in 193 BC (35.17.3–19), which he made more impressive by adding an excursus on Hannibal, who did not take part in the council, but had explained to Antiochos the reason for his eternal enmity against Rome on a different occasion. That way, Livy was able to combine three speeches for the war, with Hannibal's speech as the climax (Witte 1910, 377–378).

However, these vignettes were not always invented by Livy himself (Timpe 2007c, 215–217). In one case—the duel between Titus Manlius Torquatus and the Gaul in 361 BC (7.9.6–10.14)—we can very well observe how he borrowed from his source Claudius Quadrigarius (fr. 10b Peter). Both authors wrote

about this single combat dramatically, but in different ways. The simple, archaic style of Claudius contrasts the classic color of Livy. Also, he gave the famous story of his predecessor more depth in making “Manlius and the Gaul stand respectively for the virtues of their own race: in their duel the typical characteristics of each nation come face to face, and Rome easily triumphs” (Oakley 1998, 113–123).

Livy certainly also found the same division of the whole into single stories elsewhere. In some cases, this structure was shaped by the existence of various traditions about the same event. Thus, the causes for the defection of Capua from Rome in 216 BC as an important turning point of the Hannibalic War were given in two colorful, but totally different stories, each of them having its own protagonist in the Campanian elite, which must have come from the Campanian milieu itself (23.2–10). The same holds true for some scenes concerned with the battles before Capua, especially for the typical single combats (von Ungern-Sternberg 1975, 24–54).

However, not only short scenes, but also big episodes were already created in the annalistic tradition. An outstanding example is the romantic novel of the origins and the suppression of the Bacchanalia in 186 BC (39.8–19), which surely had a historical kernel (cf. the inscription on bronze with the *SC de Bacchanalibus*, found in Tiriolo in Calabria: *ILLRP* 511; Cic. *Leg.* 2.37), but was highly dramatized by an annalist who cannot be identified anymore (Briscoe 2008, 230–290).

Another example is the famous “Trials of the Scipios” told by Livy (38.50.4–60.10) in 187 BC. In this case, it is clear that Livy borrowed the story from Valerius Antias, whom he quotes at the beginning (38.50.5), until he discovered totally different versions—of Polybius (probably indirect: 55.10–13) and maybe of Claudius Quadrigarius (56–57)—and tried to cope with its many chronological and factual difficulties. Despite all the absurdities that Antias invented—as a matter of fact, a good illustration for his ability to invent negotiations both in the senate and on the forum—Livy preferred to return to Antias after his digression, and follow him to end the account of the trials of the Scipios as if there had never been any problem. It was a good story after all, and it had to be told (Briscoe 2008, 170–207).

Likewise, a comparison of Dionysius with Livy shows that both authors narrated the events of the first and the second decemvirate (451–450 BC) in the same manner. Especially in the fictive second decemvirate, the same scenes follow each other and, more remarkable still, the same invented speakers follow each other exactly, too (Dion. Hal. 11.4–21 ≈ Liv. 3.39–41). Therefore, the conclusion that both authors must have had a common source, which had already delineated the fascinating picture of the good and the bad decemvirate, is inevitable.

These few examples make clear that Livy did not have to model his history

from a *tabula rasa*, even with regard to stylistic matters. However, undoubtedly, he did better than his predecessors, especially in arranging his material. Comparing the narrations of Livy and Dionysius, Burck (1934) established the basis for his epoch-making work on Livy's narrative art. He has shown how the Roman historian chose outstanding turning points for the beginning and end of the first two pentads and the first decade. Livy devoted Book 1 to the royal period, started with the beginning of the Roman republic in Book 2, and ended the first pentad with the capture of Veii and the Gallic sack in 390 BC, which, after the destruction of Rome, was followed by a *quasi*-refoundation of the *urbs*. And that is not all: analyzing Books 1–5, Burck shed light on the careful distribution of the material in each book. Thus, for instance, in the first half of Book 3, Livy narrated the events that resulted in the establishment of the decemvirate, placing this law-giving body exactly in the middle of the book and of the whole first pentad, and ended the book with its overthrow. He even gave more prominence to this center of the pentad by introducing the decemvirate as a new constitution of Rome and by dating it by years *Ab Urbe Condita* (3.33.1). None of this can be found in Dionysius' account (10.57). All in all, he and the common sources of both historians did not structure their works as carefully as Livy did in the first decade, at least in the following books, that is, Books 21–45. In the lost Books 46–142, it is more difficult to identify how and where they were divided into bigger units (Luce 1977, 9–24). The masterly handling of the vast amount of material might be one of the main reasons for the high status that Livy's history immediately achieved in his day.

Livy was highly praised in Rome. Quintilian—in his *Institutio oratoria* (10.101)—compared him with Herodotus for stylistic reasons, such as Sallustius with Thucydides, without mentioning any of the republican annalists. Tacitus also spoke appreciatively of the Livian style in his own name (*Agr.* 10, 3), and through the *persona* of the historian Cremutius Cordus: “*Titus Livius eloquentiae ac fidei praeclarus in primis*” (*ann.* 4.34.3). Martialis even thought that the enormous number of books was too big for his library (14.190). Therefore, there is the *communis opinio* that Livy's history had immediately “swept the field” (Luce 1977, 181). This is true, in so far as nobody after him ventured to present a complete and new *Ab Urbe Condita* in the Latin language. Nevertheless, the works of his predecessors were not entirely superseded by him, at least not in the following two centuries (Oakley 1997, 19–20). Not only Valerius Maximus for his *exempla* and Silius Italicus in his *Punica*, but also the Greeks made use of them in Imperial times, similar to Appianus and Cassius Dio, who wrote histories of Rome, and Plutarch in some of his biographies of great Romans. Valerius Antias, in particular, must have written a book, which was indeed thought worth reading for a while (Nissen 1863, 45; Rich 2005, 145–146). Aulus Gellius also mentioned him several times, though he preferred and admired his rival Claudius Quadrigarius. We owe him nearly half of the 96 preserved fragments of

Quadrigarius. In some cases, Gellius quoted him *verbatim* at length (fr. 12.41.57 Peter), for instance, describing the duel between Manlius Torquatus and the Gaul (fr. 10b Peter). He was pleased with the style, which he described as clear, simple, and charming in an old-fashioned and unstudied way. Gellius, of course, must have known Livy's description of the same duel, but he did not think that it could supersede the older one.

Cross-References

See CHAPTER 14: THE COMPLICATIONS OF
QUELLENFORSCHUNG: THE CASE OF LIVY AND FABIUS PICTOR

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Chapter 14

The Complications of Quellenforschung: The Case of Livy and Fabius Pictor

James H. Richardson

Quellenforschung and Livy

At various places in his work, Livy discusses his sources, to record variant traditions, omissions, confusion, and problems of one kind or another.¹ From these numerous passages, it is possible not only to see something of the way Livy researched his topic (he appears, by and large, to have drawn upon what his predecessors had written) but also, on occasion, to discern something of the nature of his source material. For example, in several places, Livy notes that the figures he has found in the writings of Valerius Antias are quite obviously exaggerated, while elsewhere he says that Licinius Macer sought to bestow praise on his family, and is consequently a less reliable authority.²

One result of all this is that it is not unreasonable to suspect, even if it is impossible to prove, that figures elsewhere in Livy's work that seem implausibly large may conceivably have come from Antias' history, and that stories in which the Licinii appear in a very positive light may owe something to Macer's. Attempts to detect debts of this kind are all exercises in what is known as *Quellenforschung*, the study of an author's sources and the ways in which that author used them. This particular type of *Quellenforschung* is, however, obviously much more difficult than that which confines itself only to discussion of those passages where the source in question is explicitly identified. When Livy says that he found a certain version of events in Licinius Macer (as he does, e.g., at 4.23.1), the version he then relates presumably must come from Macer. However, at 5.12.8–12 and 5.18.5, when Livy says that P. Licinius Calvus was the first plebeian to be elected consular tribune, a claim that appears to be false, and one that certainly contradicts Livy's own narrative, it can only ever be a hypothesis that Livy has drawn on Macer's work. This is the case, even though it is known—because Livy says so—that Macer praised his family, and even though several other Licinii were allegedly (and suspiciously) also the first plebeians to hold various other offices.³ This latter approach naturally requires a willingness to entertain conjecture, and it is partly for this reason that it has become unfashionable in some quarters.⁴ However, some scholars have also denied that there is anything to be gained by such an approach.⁵ The possibility that an inflated figure may come from Antias, even (indeed, especially) when Livy does not

say that it does, may seem trivial, but the implications for Livy's aims, methods, and the ways he handled his sources are potentially very significant.⁶

Matters are, of course, made so extremely difficult by the simple fact that Livy's sources (sections of Polybius' histories aside) do not survive, with the inevitable result that little is known about them. It is one thing to suggest that an exaggerated number in Livy's history may have come from Antias, since Livy says Antias exaggerated and yet still drew upon his work, but it is another thing entirely to trace the expression of some political view, for instance, back to Antias when the very attribution of such views to him may already be a conjecture, one that may depend on the possibility that some other detail, found elsewhere in Livy's work, ultimately comes from Antias too.⁷

One way in which scholarship has tried to mitigate these difficulties is by focusing on families. Rome's nobility was fiercely competitive, and each family sought honors and prestige for itself, in the present, but also—because it affected the present—in the past. Livy and Cicero both observed that funeral speeches could contain false claims to political office and military success, and Livy knew that such claims were also to be found in the inscriptions (*tituli*) that accompanied the wax masks of deceased statesmen (*imagines*).⁸ Whether or not Rome's historians were able to invent military or political victories for their ancestors in the same way remains a contentious issue. On the one hand, there are the supposed requirements of the genre (which can all too easily be contaminated by modern views about what historians should and should not do),⁹ and, on the other, there is, or so it is claimed, a lack of evidence to support the idea. That argument is, however, one from silence, since the writings in question (the histories of men such as Antias and Macer) are lost. Or, at least, the argument as it is often made is one from silence.¹⁰ However, Livy is certainly explicit about Macer, and it is obviously impossible to challenge Livy's assessment on the basis of the few scant remains of Macer's work. It is also dangerous to suppose that Macer may have been unique in praising his ancestors, because Livy happens not to have said something comparable about Antias, for instance.

At 25.39.12–14, Livy relates that the historian Claudius Quadrigarius recorded 37,000 Carthaginian casualties during operations in Spain, but Antias only a total of 17,000. Rather than question the figure, Livy notes only that Quadrigarius translated the history of C. Acilius into Latin. It is unclear if Livy's purpose in doing this was to exonerate Quadrigarius or in some way verify the figure. Whatever his intention, Livy does not accuse Quadrigarius of exaggerating, even though he might reasonably have done so. Similarly, at 38.23.8, Livy records the number of Gallic casualties following one or more battles; Antias said that not more than 10,000 Gauls were killed, while Quadrigarius alleged that 40,000 had been. Antias shamelessly exaggerated,

according to Livy, and yet Quadrigarius evidently managed to surpass him on at least some occasions, and do so, moreover, without provoking any kind of censure from Livy. Indeed, Livy even offers a possible explanation for Quadrigarius' second figure: the prisoners would have brought the total up to 40,000. The fact, therefore, that Livy does not openly accuse other historians of glorifying their ancestors in the way that he accuses Macer is probably neither here nor there. Furthermore, the fact that Macer praised his ancestors in a way that, in Livy's view, made him less reliable also somewhat undermines the argument that the genre of historical writing simply did not permit such things.

Although Livy does not accuse Antias of glorifying his family, many modern scholars have done so. The Valerii are often depicted, in Livy and elsewhere, as the people's champions, and this presentation has been traced back to Antias.¹¹ Since the Valerii often oppose the patrician Claudii, who consistently appear as arrogant nobles and enemies of the plebs, this negative presentation of the Claudii has also been attributed to Antias.¹² However, as the Claudii are on occasion also the rivals of the Fabii, some scholars have instead held the historian Fabius Pictor responsible for the hostile tradition.¹³ As with Antias, Fabius Pictor has also frequently been accused of glorifying his ancestors (again, even though Livy does not). P. G. Walsh, for example, has declared that "Valerius Antias and Fabius Pictor both seized any opportunities to glorify their families."¹⁴ Such assessments are inevitably based on the evidence of writers such as Livy, and on the view that they have carried over various glorified (and hostile, in the case of the Claudii) accounts from their sources. That is, they are products of *Quellenforschung*.

The Influence of Family Models

Fabius Pictor was the first Roman to write a history of Rome. This meant he was in a unique position, although the extent to which this actually allowed him to write whatever he wanted is another matter. Attempts to argue, for instance,¹⁵ that he willfully distorted Rome's early history have not been well received. Nonetheless, it is often supposed that Pictor wrote up the exploits of his ancestors, and episodes involving the Fabii are readily attributed to him.¹⁶ Furthermore, since he wrote in Greek, presumably therefore expected to have a Greek audience of some kind, and is thought by some to have written to present Rome's case to the wider, Greek-speaking world,¹⁷ and various other features of the Roman historical tradition have also been attributed to him. Most notable of these are those episodes in Rome's history that have clearly been borrowed from, or styled on, Greek traditions.

These theories are perfectly possible, but caution is still needed, not least because Pictor's work no longer exists. It is also important to ensure that anachronistic assumptions are not being made about the ways in which

Roman historians thought and worked. It can, after all, be easy to assume that ideas which seem self-evident and obvious, if not even irrefutable, and which are consequently just taken for granted, were equally obvious, or even existed in antiquity, but it is absolutely essential that such assumptions are avoided. Significantly, one area where important differences in thinking can be found is in Roman attitudes toward human behavior.

Romans, and Roman nobles in particular, were expected to live up to the achievements of their ancestors, and it is clear that, to do so, they had ideally to emulate their ancestors' achievements, generally behave like their ancestors, and, where possible, do the sorts of things they had done.¹⁸ In fact, the expectation that people would emulate their ancestors was so great, and so thoroughly embedded in the Roman mindset, that similar behavior could actually be taken as confirmation of legitimacy.¹⁹ A son would behave like his father, if he was his father's legitimate son, and naturally his father would have behaved like his own father before him, and *his* father like his father, and so on.²⁰

A good illustration of this sort of thinking, and of the extremes of continuity in behavior that could supposedly arise as a result of it, is found with the Junii Bruti. L. Junius Brutus was famous for expelling the Tarquins, bringing an end to the rule of kings at Rome, and establishing the free Republic.

According to tradition, those events took place at the end of the sixth century bc. In the mid-first century, that is, nearly 500 years later, M. Junius Brutus was involved in the murder of Julius Caesar; he brought an end to the rule of the king in order to restore the freedom of the Republic. He lived up to expectations, did what any true Junius Brutus would have done in such circumstances, and, in so behaving, confirmed that he was indeed descended from L. Brutus. His opponents, however, denied this. L. Brutus had executed his own sons for conspiring with the Tarquins, and, in any case, he had been a patrician, while everyone knew that M. Brutus was a plebeian. Marcus could not possibly be descended from Lucius.²¹ Despite the passage of time, not to mention all those weighty arguments concerning the freedom of the state, the legitimacy of M. Brutus' actions clearly still hinged to some degree at least on his descent from L. Brutus. If it did not, there would have been nothing to gain by questioning his lineage.

These ideas and expectations about human behavior are extremely important. On the one hand, the pressure to emulate ancestral achievements undoubtedly must have affected the behavior of individual Romans in the present; on the other, it inevitably must have influenced the ways in which individual Romans were believed to have behaved in the past. This is undoubtedly the explanation for the fact that so many Romans are presented in a fairly standardized manner,²² and that individual members of the same family are often depicted in broadly similar ways. If several Valerii, for example, were presented as defenders of the plebs, it would have been natural to attribute

such behavior to other Valerii, and early Valerii, those about whom no information was actually known, would have been especially exposed to the effects of such thinking. The more often the Valerii were presented in this way, the more persuasive the whole presentation would have become (and so it is that the Valerian law of appeal, for instance, could be supposed to have been passed by three different Valerii, a problem that scholarship has long sought to resolve). To modern views, this sort of thinking is obviously fallacious, and the result of it, at best, amounts to distortion, and at worst, outright fabrication. However, it would be wrong to impose modern standards on the Romans. To their mind, such an approach may well have constituted a plausible, and even honest, means of reconstructing the events of the past.

The result is that the way an individual Roman is depicted in any particular account will seldom be directly traceable back to any one source, if the depiction is a standard one. However, at the same time, since Livy says Macer sought to glorify his family, and clearly did so in a way that Livy could detect, the possibility that the way in which an individual is depicted can be traced back to any one source nonetheless remains. Thus, while it is difficult simply to attribute the standardized presentation of the Valerii to Antias, unexpected, out-of-character, or otherwise suspicious appearances of Valerii can more readily be attributed to him.²³ One further consequence of this thinking is that the influence any one source may have had is potentially far greater than often thought. An excellent illustration of this is found with the Fabii.

Fabius Pictor wrote his history c. 200 BC. Exactly what he wrote about the Fabii and their achievements is impossible to know with any certainty.²⁴ As Pictor's work is lost, any attempt to discern what he may have said about his family inevitably constitutes an exercise in the conjectural kind of *Quellenforschung*, as it involves trying to detect the hand of Pictor in stories not explicitly attributed to him. It is, however, reasonable to assume that he took the opportunity to write up the exploits of Q. Fabius Verrucosus the “delayer” (*cunctator*), the man who broke Hannibal with his tactics of delay, and he appears to have written up his own contribution to the war effort. It was Pictor who led the important expedition to Delphi, to consult the Delphic oracle, following Rome's catastrophic defeat at Cannae. Livy appears to be quite well informed about the expedition, and it is not implausible to suspect that Pictor was the ultimate source of his information.²⁵

When it comes to Fabius Verrucosus, however, there is another work that clearly was influential, and in a way that can still, on occasion, be detected. In the early second century BC, the poet Ennius composed an epic poem, the *Annales*, on the history of Rome. One line from his poem in particular became extremely famous. It, and the line that follows, read:²⁶

unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem.

noenum rumores ponebat ante salutem.

(One man restored our state by delaying.

He did not put public opinion before safety.)

The one man (*unus homo*) who saved Rome by delaying (*cunctando*) was Fabius Verrucosus, and this famous verse, combined no doubt with the prestige of Verrucosus himself, evidently came to influence the way other Fabii were perceived. In a world where individuals were not just expected to emulate their ancestors, but could even be assumed to have done so, this should not be surprising. If, on account of his fame, Verrucosus was treated as an exemplary Fabius, and if Ennius' line came to encapsulate neatly and memorably just what it was that he had done, it should not be unexpected if other Fabii were said to have done the same thing, that is, to have saved the day by delaying.²⁷

The most widely recognized instance of a Fabius other than Verrucosus delaying is found in Livy's account of the battle of Sentinum, a crucial battle fought by the Romans in 295 BC. The consuls of that year were Q. Fabius Rullianus and P. Decius Mus. When the battle begins, Livy has Fabius hold back rather than attack, to wear his opponents down (10.28.2–5), and Livy goes on to say that Fabius sought to prolong the battle by delaying (*cunctando*, 10.29.8). That one word alone makes the connection with Verrucosus unequivocal, but the whole presentation of Rullianus' tactics clearly owes everything to Verrucosus.²⁸

Since this battle took place only a generation or so before Pictor's time, it is not impossible to argue that there may still be some factual basis to Livy's account, and that the depiction of Rullianus as a delayer may only be superficial, some sort of literary embellishment of an otherwise broadly reliable narrative. That argument cannot, however, be used for the events of the early fifth century. For such early times, there can have been no evidence of individual behavior, and possibly even no evidence at all, and it is consequently for such times that Roman methods for reconstructing the past can be more conspicuous.

The Fabii appear for the first time in 485 BC, in which year Q. Fabius Vibulanus was consul; and for 7 years (485–479) Quintus and his two brothers, Kaeso and Marcus, allegedly each held the consulship in turn. For much of this time, the Fabii are generally presented as unpopular with the people and as the champions of the patricians.²⁹ This unpopularity was largely the result of their opposition to measures to distribute land (such measures, Livy says in 2.42.6, the senators viewed as inducements to rashness, *temeritatis invitamenta*). In a sense, the Fabii were disregarding popular opinion and following an initially (cf. Livy 2.42.8) unpopular policy. While the several accounts of this opposition contain details evocative of the Gracchan era, when land reform was a contentious issue, Fabius Verrucosus had also opposed measures (those of C. Flaminius) to distribute land,³⁰ so that

may well be a consideration. The opposition of the Fabii Vibulani to land reform may owe something to Verrucosus' own such opposition. It is, in any case, abundantly clear that Verrucosus' career influenced the presentation of these early Fabii.

As a result of their unpopularity with the plebs, the Fabii were said to have encountered problems with insubordination while on campaign. In 481 BC, Kaeso Fabius enjoyed some initial success in battle, thanks to the cavalry, but the infantry refused to follow up on this, and instead returned to camp. Livy's assessment of Kaeso's campaign is significant (2.43.6): “*unus ille vir, ipse consul, rem publicam sustinuit, quam exercitus odio consulis, quantum in se fuit, prodebat*” (“That one man, the consul himself, preserved the state, which the army, in its hatred of the consul, so far as it was able, would have betrayed.”). The debt to Ennius here is difficult to miss, but equally difficult to explain, at least in the context of Kaeso's campaign. Kaeso is, however, a Fabius, and in Livy's account, the sole commander of the great Fabian expedition to Cremera (see the following text), so it was perhaps natural for Livy to conceive of Kaeso as one man alone saving the state.

In the following year, Marcus Fabius was consul. Wary on account of his brother's experiences, Marcus and his colleague, Cn. Manlius, set out on campaign with considerable caution. And, because of their concerns, they remained inside their camp together with their soldiers, with the result that the enemy began to taunt them. By delaying in this way, and forcing their men to suffer the enemy's insults, the consuls ensured that the soldiers' desire for revenge outweighed their desire for mutiny. Although Livy does not here adapt Ennius' verse, his vocabulary nonetheless remains evocative of both it and Verrucosus' strategy (he uses the ablative gerund *remorando* instead of the famous *cunctando*).³¹ The presentation of Verrucosus affected Frontinus' handling of this story in a much more immediate manner, however; he has the consuls imitate a policy of delay (*simulaverunt cunctationem*).³² Although both consuls are involved in this, Livy and Dionysius give Marcus a speech which makes it clear that he was primarily responsible for the delay.³³ Both, therefore, essentially have Marcus Fabius behave like Verrucosus,³⁴ and Frontinus, or his source, does the same. If Frontinus' account happens to have come from Livy's, then presumably Frontinus has simply followed Livy's lead and turned Marcus not just into a delayer, but precisely into a *cunctator*.

The opposite of prudent caution, that is, delay of the kind practiced by Fabius Verrucosus, is rashness (*temeritas*), and this too is pertinent to the presentation of the Fabii. Verrucosus' delay tactics were unpopular with those who were keen to fight Hannibal, and chief among his opponents was his *magister equitum*, Minucius Rufus. However, when Minucius later engaged Hannibal in battle, he encountered difficulties, was nearly defeated, and had to be rescued by Verrucosus. Minucius' *temeritas* (Livy 22.27.8; 22.28.2; 22.29.1) revealed the wisdom of Fabius' delay. Not surprisingly, Minucius

was not the only commander said to have been rescued by his Fabian colleague.³⁵

In 484 BC, Dionysius has Kaeso Fabius dispatch soldiers to rescue his colleague, who had become trapped by the Volsci. Kaeso did not go himself, on account of unfavorable auspices (but Verrucosus had also famously held back on account of unfavorable auspices).³⁶ A few years later, in 479 BC, Kaeso again saved his colleague. T. Verginius, the other consul of that year, engaged the Veientes rashly (*temeritate*, Livy 2.48.5), got himself into difficulties, and needed to be rescued. On the one hand, it is difficult to see why, in 2.43.6, Livy adapts Ennius' line in his account of Kaeso's ultimately unsuccessful campaign of 481 BC, but on the other hand, it is easy: Kaeso is a model Fabius, and so must have behaved accordingly.

It was also in 479 BC that Kaeso set out with his entire family to wage war with the Veientes. In Dionysius' account, his brother Marcus also held command, but Livy's Kaeso is *unus uir*. The expedition was a disaster, and the family was wiped out, with the exception of a small child, who was too young to fight and was consequently left at home. It was thanks to this child that the *gens Fabia* survived. The sources naturally conceive of him as *unus*, albeit youthful (*impubes*, Livy 2.50.11; 3.1.1). The story itself precludes the use of words such as *uir* or *homo*, since a grown man would have joined the expedition. As numerous sources note, it was also thanks to this one child that that other *unus*, Fabius Verrucosus, was able to defeat Hannibal with his delay.³⁷ The sole survivor restored the *res*, in this case, his *gens*, and by doing so allowed Verrucosus to do the same.

It is worth emphasizing that this necessarily brief discussion has largely been restricted to exploring the possible influence of just one line of Ennius' *Annales* on the depiction of the Fabii, and consequently has been limited to one very simplistic idea of Fabian behavior. The influence of more complex models of behavior will probably be more difficult to detect, but equally, such a simplistic model is likely more difficult to use. Just how often can the state be saved by a Fabius who delays? Even from this limited discussion, it is still possible to see how Roman ideas about human behavior allowed for Ennius' verse not just to be adapted to suit other Fabii, but even to become a means by which their behavior could be reconstructed.

What Fabius Pictor wrote about Verrucosus is unknown, but it is reasonable to assume that what he said was not without influence on later Roman historians. The problem is that influence need not have been limited only to the way in which Verrucosus himself was depicted in subsequent work, but, given Roman attitudes toward human behavior, that influence could have affected the way in which any number of Fabii were depicted.

Given the brevity of Livy's account of much of Rome's early history, and the loss of his predecessors' works, the full extent of the influence that

Verrucosus' career may have actually had on the depiction of the Fabii is difficult to see. It is not really until the career of Fabius Rullianus that an individual Fabius receives extensive handling in the evidence, and the illustrious nature of Rullianus' career doubtless invited elaboration. It was Rullianus who won the battle of Sentinum by delaying, and there are several other episodes in his career that unmistakably recall Verrucosus. There is insufficient room to discuss these episodes in detail,³⁸ but a few notable parallels can be mentioned: both were elected consul five times, and both were chosen to be the *princeps senatus*; both were said to have campaigned when they were old men as legates alongside, but under the authority of, their own sons; both were said to have been called "Maximus" on account of their achievements; and both were said to have had their funerals paid for at public expense. The several consulships and the leadership of the Senate may be genuine parallels, perhaps, but the rest is probably the result of the Roman belief that members of the same family behave in the same way and often do the same things.

The Influence of Greek Models

Another area where the influence of Fabius Pictor has often been discerned, even when ancient authors do not name him as their source, is in those various stories from Rome's history that are obviously borrowed from Greek traditions. Moreover, as several of these involve the Fabii, they are even more readily attributed to him. It will be useful to note two such stories, the first favorable to the Fabii, the second, significantly, not.

When Kaeso led his family against the city of Veii, he set out with an army of some 300 Fabii. The family established a fort near the river Cremera, and from there conducted operations against the Veientes until they were finally ambushed and killed. It has long been observed that the story of the 300 Fabii bears a striking resemblance, even in matters of detail, to the story of Leonidas and the 300 Spartans who were killed at Thermopylae. Fabius Pictor has been held responsible for devising this parallel.³⁹

The 300 Fabii were said to have been defeated on July 18, a day subsequently known as the *dies Cremerensis*. July 18 was also the *dies Alliensis*, the anniversary of the battle of Allia, in which a Roman army led by three Fabii (again, three brothers) was humiliatingly defeated by an army of Gauls. After their victory, the Gauls marched on Rome, took the city, and sacked it. Before they arrived, the Roman people somewhat inexplicably fled, not just from Rome, but from the safety and protection that a walled city offers. Some did, however, remain behind on the Capitol, which they fortified. Consequently, the Gauls captured an almost deserted city, although they were forced to lay siege to the Capitol. There is again an obvious parallel here with events in the Greek world, in this case the capture of Athens by the Persians. The Persians,

when they took Athens, likewise captured an empty city, for the Athenians too had departed, that is, apart from those who had remained behind and fortified themselves on the Acropolis. Once again, Fabius Pictor has been held responsible for devising the parallel.⁴⁰

There are good reasons to be wary of attributing the creation of many of these sorts of parallels to Fabius Pictor. First, there is the probable shortness of his work, along with its focus on the foundation of Rome and on contemporary history, with the period in between—that is, the period in which events such as the sack of Rome took place—being covered only summarily, according to Dionysius.⁴¹ Then, there is the fact that these sorts of parallels are actually quite widespread, and are found in a range of different works.⁴² The idea that subsequent historians simply regurgitated stories that had been borrowed from Greek history (and even developed the parallels in them further),⁴³ perhaps only because they had found them in Pictor, seems unlikely. But, if, in contrast, it is supposed that such parallels were simply considered credible, and the devising of them were a valid means of reconstructing the past (just as it was valid to suppose that a Fabius might delay), then their prevalence becomes much easier to understand. The standard of what was appropriate had presumably been set by those Greek historians who told the stories that later came to serve as the models (just as the deeds of Verrucosus could provide examples of appropriate and plausible behavior for the Fabii), and so the borrowing of episodes from their works may have simply been seen as a plausible means of reconstructing the events of the past.

Alongside this, however, another motive can also be detected. A parallel with the battle of Thermopylae was also drawn by the Elder Cato. In his *Origines*,⁴⁴ Cato told the story of a military tribune who led 400 soldiers to their deaths in order to provide a diversion, so that the rest of the Roman army could escape from the enemy. In Cato's view, the military tribune's deed was the same as Leonidas' (*idem fecerat*). The difference between the events was to be found in their subsequent handling: Leonidas was celebrated by all of Greece, while the military tribune received little honor. The point of the comparison was to draw a contrast, but there is clearly also an element of competition.⁴⁵ Rome's achievements are no less great than those of the Greeks; indeed, they are greater, since the tribune led 400 men, but Leonidas only 300 (and even then, the tribune's deed was not celebrated). Not only did Greek historiography provide a supply of plausible material, it also provided a standard of achievement, a yardstick against which Roman accomplishments might be measured. By adapting episodes from Greek histories, Roman historians could not only fill gaps in their own past, and do so with material demonstrably appropriate to historiography (which was after all a Greek invention), but they could also equip themselves with a past every bit as prestigious as Athens' or Sparta's.⁴⁶

Finally, it is worth noting that Plutarch observed that Cato's writings were

embellished with Greek sentiments and historical episodes.⁴⁷ What makes Plutarch's observation significant is the fact that it is part of an argument about Cato's knowledge of Greek literature, which he allegedly only ever read late in life. Plutarch notes Cato's debt because of Cato's reputed attitude toward Greek literature, and not, it seems, because the debt itself was anything noteworthy. The practice of borrowing stories from Greek history was presumably common, and this inevitably means that it is very difficult to attempt to trace any given parallel back to any one writer.

Although much maligned, unfashionable, and always difficult, *Quellenforschung* nonetheless remains useful. The way Livy drew upon and otherwise engaged with his literary predecessors is an important line of enquiry. No one today sees Livy as a mindless copier, and the mechanical and excessive approaches of earlier generations are now also a thing of the past. However, in any discussion of Livy and his sources, what still needs to be taken into account more than is sometimes the case are the different ways in which he, and the Romans in general, thought about the past, about human behavior, and about what constitutes a viable method to reconstruct, and a plausible reconstruction of, the events of the past. This has no small bearing too on what constitutes a lie, for an historian, or at least so it was said, should never depart from the truth; but what counts as a departure from the truth depends in part on what counts as an honest means of reconstructing it in the first place.

Notes

- 1 See, for example, Forsythe 1965; Oakley 2009.
- 2 On Antias, for example, Livy 26.49.3, 33.10.8, 36.19.12, 36.38.6–7 (see Oakley 1997, 89–90); on Macer, 7.9.5.
- 3 See Richardson 2014 (22, 25, 27, 34–35) with references to earlier work.
- 4 See also Oakley 2009, 440.
- 5 For example, Cornell 2005, 64.
- 6 In 27.49.5–6, Livy favors an inflated figure (compare Polyb. 11.3.3), Antias' or otherwise, but for obvious reasons; note, for example, 7.36.13, 9.27.14, 9.31.16, 9.37.11, 9.43.17, 10.42.5, where Livy reports extremely large figures.
- 7 See also Oakley 2009, 452.
- 8 Cic. *Brut.* 62; Livy 8.40.3–5, and also 4.16.3–4, 4.34.6–7, 22.31.11 on *tituli*.
- 9 The matter is contentious. For different views, compare, for example, Wiseman 1993 and Lendon 2009.

- 10 See Richardson 2014, 17–19.
- 11 For example, Walsh 1961, 88–89; Wiseman 1979, 113–117.
- 12 Wiseman 1979, 113–135.
- 13 For example, Alföldi 1965, 154, 159–164.
- 14 Walsh 1961, 152; the same pairing of Pictor and Antias appears in Salmon 1967, 6; Wiseman 1979, 24; Bispham 2006, 31.
- 15 As Alföldi 1965, 123–175.
- 16 See note 14; and, for example, Santoro L'Hoir 1990, 231; Oakley 1997, 29–30; Dillery 2009, 85–86.
- 17 For example, Walsh 1961, 118; Alföldi 1965, 169–175; Badian 1966, 6; Bispham 2006, 30; discussion in Dillery 2009, 78–90.
- 18 For example, Cic. *de Or.* 2.225–226, *Off.* 1.78, *Rab. Post.* 1.2, *Phil.* 2.26–27; Val. Max. 5.8.3.
- 19 For example, Plaut. *Truc.* 504–507; Plin. *Epist.* 5.17.6; Suet. *Calig.* 25.4.
- 20 On all this, see variously Treggiari 2003; Walter 2003 and 2004; Lentano 2007, 113–223 and 2009, 131–187; Richardson 2012, 17–113.
- 21 Richardson 2011 and 2012, 21–23, with earlier bibliography.
- 22 See also, Richardson 2012, 47–52. Obviously, allowances must be made for the usual preoccupations (i.e., with war and politics) of Rome's historians.
- 23 See also, Wiseman 1998, 75–89; Richardson 2014.
- 24 One fragment (18 Peter = Livy 8.30.8–9) concerns Fabius Rullianus, but it is not clear how Rullianus was presented; compare Badian 1966, 3 (“the proud tale”) and Momigliano 1990, 103 (“not entirely favourable”).
- 25 Livy 22.57.5, 23.11.1–6.
- 26 Enn. *Ann.* 363–364 Skutsch.
- 27 Elements of the presentation could, however, also be adapted to suit other individuals and circumstances; see Elliott 2009 and Santoro L'Hoir 1990, especially 230–232.
- 28 Decius Mus also behaved as a Decius Mus should, see Richardson 2012, 24–26.
- 29 There is some inconsistency in the sources, see Richardson 2012, 65–77.

- 30 Cic. *Sen.* 11.
- 31 Livy 2.45.7, see also 2.45.12, 2.46.2.
- 32 Frontin. *Str.* 1.11.1.
- 33 Livy 2.45.12–13; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 9.9.
- 34 Manlius may have behaved in character too; Feeney 2010, 211.
- 35 Nor was he the only Minucius to need rescuing; see Livy 3.26.3–29.3.
- 36 Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 8.86.7; see also Livy 27.16.15–16 and Plut. *Fab.* 19.6 for Verrucosus.
- 37 Ov. *Fast.* 2.239–242; Fest. 174L; Eutr. 1.16.3; *De vir. ill.* 14.6; Serv. *Aen.* 6.845.
- 38 See Richardson 2012, 84–105.
- 39 Pais 1906, 178; Dillery 2009, 88–90. See also Scapini 2011, who associates with Pictor many of the calques of stories told by Herodotus, but who also argues for the possibility of their earlier invention, by Timaeus in particular.
- 40 Sordi 1984.
- 41 Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.6.2; Richardson 2012, 160.
- 42 See also, Scapini 2011.
- 43 For example, Krebs 2006, 97 and note 23.
- 44 Fr. 83 Peter = Gell. *NA* 3.7.1–19.
- 45 Krebs 2006.
- 46 Already Pais 1906, 182–184; see Richardson 2012, 152 with further bibliography.
- 47 Plut. *Cato Mai.* 2.4; Krebs 2006, 96, note 13 on the translation of ἱστορία.

Cross-References

See CHAPTER 13: LIVY AND THE ANNALISTIC TRADITION

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Further Reading

The ideas put forward here are developed at greater length and in more depth in Richardson 2012. On Roman views about human behavior, see the various works cited in note 20. The parallels that can be found between Greek and Roman history are discussed at length in Scapini 2011. *Quellenforschung* may be unpopular, but the study of "intertextuality" (which is similarly concerned with the way an author engages with and otherwise uses earlier texts) remains fashionable; see Polleichtner 2010. For a different response to the approaches of ancient historians, see Lendon 2009.

Chapter 15

Livy and the Greek Historians from Herodotus to Dionysius: Some Soundings and Reflections

Craig B. Champion

The Greeks invented history-writing as a literary art form. In ancient Greek, the original meaning of the noun “*historia*” was simply “an inquiry” the verb “*graphō*” meant to “scratch, scrape, graze”; and then to “delineate, draw, paint”; and finally, by extension, to “write.” *Historiography* therefore, simply means something like “to write up the results of an inquiry,” and such a loose definition well encompasses the wide range of subjects falling under the rubric of ancient Greek historiography, for example, biography, mythology, local legend, geography, antiquarianism, rhetorical display, ethnography, and genealogy (Champion 2004, 3252–3253).

As far as Roman historiography goes, the crucial facts are that it began only after Rome had existed as a city-state for more than half a millennium, and—most important—that it was adopted from the Greeks (Dillery 2009). It is true, however, that the first Roman historians could draw on the native traditions and legends of the *gentes*, or great aristocratic families, such as the Claudians, Cornelians, Fabians, and Aemilians, and that the priests at Rome preserved the barest of outlines for history in their annual records of important events—political, military, meteorological, epidemiological, and religious—later compiled as the so-called *Annales Maximi*, which provided the historian with rudimentary material for historical narrative. These lists encouraged historians to construct their works according to consular years, resulting in an alternative name for the genre, *annales* (Frier 1999 [1999]; see also Badian 1966; Rawson 1991, 1–15; 245–271; see also Feeney 2007 for a stimulating study on Roman conceptions of time). However, more telling is the tradition that Q. Fabius Pictor, Rome's first historian, followed a Greek source, Dionysius of Peoparethos, for his account of Rome's foundation (Plutarch, *Romulus*, 3.1; 8.7).

Although we should not discount the native elements in Roman historiography, it was no coincidence that it appeared as a narrative art form at the same time as political, military, and cultural contacts with the Greek world quickened at the end of the third century BC. It was around the year 200 BC when Fabius Pictor, who had served in the titanic military struggle against Hannibal, wrote his history, *in Greek* (as did other early annalists, such as Cincius Alimentus, Postumius Albinus, and C. Acilius). Pictor seems to have

been particularly well-versed in things Hellenic—he was chosen as an ambassador to consult the Delphic oracle in the aftermath of the debacle at Cannae (Liv. 22.57.5–6)—but he was not an anomaly. Romans, elites and non-elites alike, had for long been exposed to Hellenism, and history-writing was but one of their many appropriations of Greek cultural productions. By the early second century BC, Greek masterpieces of sculptural art were on public display at Rome, adaptations of Greek plays were being performed there, the city had temples and sanctuaries dedicated to Greek deities, such as Aesculapius and Magna Mater, many Roman senators had a ready command of the Greek language, and some even had a taste for Greek poetry and the abstruse intellectual gymnastics of Greek philosophy.

Such cultural borrowings from the Greeks, however, were not without their complexities. Roman aristocrats had for long held an ambivalent attitude toward Greek culture, most clearly seen in the tradition of the elder Cato's cultural pronouncements (Gruen 1992, 52–83), as Roman elites were simultaneously seduced by the charms of Hellenism and yet concerned that its wholesale adoption might compromise a distinctively Roman cultural identity (Champion 2004, 57–62). These culture wars were very much alive in the mid-second century BC, but they had lost much of their force when Livy was writing his history during the climax of the Roman Revolution and the emergence of the Augustan principate (on the date of Livy's composition, see Burton 2000). By then, surely, we can speak of a Greco-Roman civilization under the aegis of Rome, but traces of the old approach-avoidance conflict—and a sense that Romans could not hope to match the amazing cultural achievements of the Greeks—persist in later Roman literary texts. The most famous example here, I believe, must be Anchises' prognostications for Rome's future in the sixth book of Vergil's *Aeneid* (lines 847–853):

Others, I do not doubt, will beat out the breathing bronze with softer mold, coax the features of life out from marble, plead causes with greater eloquence, and with a pointer trace heaven's movements and predict the stars' risings; your task, Roman, is to rule the world (this is to be your art), to crown peace with justice, to spare the vanquished and crush the proud.

In this passage, Vergil recounts several of the artistic and intellectual achievements of the Greeks, emphasizing that the Romans' destiny was much weightier than those admittedly stupendous Hellenic contributions to refined life and edifying culture. The Roman pragmatic mission was to rule all peoples in peace and with justice. Significantly, however, although Vergil's masterpiece on the epic feats of the Trojan hero and ancestor of the Romans, Aeneas, was closely modeled on the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (Otis 1995 [1995]), the poet does not here give the palm for poetry to Homer, claiming by his silence—or at least leaving open for debate—that the genius of the *Aeneid* may surpass that of its venerable Greek forebear.

Livy's attitudes toward his Greek predecessors and contemporaries in the field of historiography are perhaps more difficult to contemplate, but it is reasonable to believe that, as with Vergil, he did not suffer from anything such as an inferiority complex regarding them. Indeed, the Patavian historian was a celebrity in his own time, and the fact that the 142 books of his *Ab Urbe Condita* became his life's work—he apparently produced three or four books per year for a period of over 40 years—suggests that he had no mean appreciation of his own abilities. As an index of Livy's fame, the younger Pliny (*Ep.* 2.3.8) reports that a man once came to Rome from Gades in Spain simply to see the great man, and having seen him, turned around and went home. And the praise of his successors equaled, and perhaps rivaled, the reputation he enjoyed during his lifetime. Quintilian (*Inst.* 10.1.31–32, with Hays 1986), for example, writes of the nutritive benefits of Livy's prose, in particular its “milky texture” (*lactea ubertas*), for the aspiring young orator (but it should be noted that Quintilian in the end thought Sallust was the greater historian: *Inst.* 2.5.19); and, for Tacitus (*Ann.* 4.34), Livy's fame for eloquence and trustworthiness was second to none.

It is then perhaps not surprising that, regarding the Greek historians, Livy directly names neither Herodotus nor Xenophon of the major extant authors, and he does not mention any of the important Greek historians whose works only exist for us in a fragmentary condition, men such as Ephorus, Theopompus, Philinus, and Timaeus. The question regarding Thucydides is more complex, simply because the elder Seneca reports that Livy criticized Sallust for quoting and mistranslating Thucydides (*Controv.* 9.1.14, with Syme 1964, 289), but this falls far short of proof that Livy named Thucydides somewhere in the lost portions of his historical colossus (he is known to have written works other than the *Ab Urbe Condita*).

This chapter explores some of Livy's uses of his Greek historiographical predecessors, both in the form of direct acknowledgements and in much more frequent, indisputable but unspoken, intertextual play; it also compares Livy with the contemporaneous Greek historian and rhetorical expert, Dionysius of Halicarnassus. It goes without saying that, in what follows, I am offering selective soundings rather than comprehensive coverage of a vast topic. The three sections comprising the chapter consider (1) Livy's debts to the two pillars of ancient Greek historiography, Herodotus and Thucydides, (2) his use of the third member of the triumvirate of the great extant Greek historians, Polybius of Megalopolis, and (3) some contrasts between his approach and that of his contemporary, Dionysius. I believe that the following aperçus of Livy's working relationship with his Greek sources support the idea that, in the art of historiography, Livy was his own master.

Muted Influences of Herodotus and Thucydides

In his *Institutio oratoria*, Quintilian did not hesitate to assert that the Roman historians were every bit the equals of the Greeks, and he explicitly compares Livy and Herodotus (*Inst.* 10.1.101, also pairing Sallust with Thucydides). As with Herodotus, Quintilian goes on to say, Livy has a wonderful charm and a most brilliant candor, while his reported speeches are simply beyond description. Comparison of the prefaces of Herodotus' and Livy's histories reveals significant contrasts and similarities. A commonplace in ancient historiography was to open with reflections on the benefits to be derived from reading history, sometimes accompanied by a self-introduction by the historian. Herodotus does introduce himself at the very beginning of his history, and indeed he is the most intrusive of the ancient historians, constantly interrupting his narrative in the first person in order to state his own position on a particular matter, to editorialize, or to reveal something of his methods of inquiry (Marincola 2001, 19–60). Livy provides no such self-introduction, and while he sometimes interrupts the narrative with first-person addresses to the reader, he does so far less than Herodotus. Neither Herodotus nor Livy, unlike Thucydides or Polybius, who were men with wide-ranging experience in politics and warfare, offers much in the way of credentials for writing history. (Herodotus does inform us about the pains he took to visit sites in his history—most famously Egypt—and he often tells us that his account is the result of personal autopsy or personal interrogations.) Both writers begin their works with comments on the nature and purpose of history. For Herodotus, his history of the Persian Wars will help to ensure that human events will not be obliterated by time, and that the great and wonderful deeds of men, both Greek and barbarian, will be celebrated, and the causes of their wars known. Of course, Herodotus wrote one of the first histories, whereas Livy was keenly aware that he stood at the end of a long line of predecessors; and he feared that his introductory exhortations to the reader would seem hackneyed. After this and other such apologies and qualifications, Livy states that the study of history is beneficial and profitable because it conspicuously sets forth lessons (*exempla*) of past human experience, models both to emulate and to avoid (*Praef.* 10–11). Herodotus is more measured and indirect about history as the *magistra vitae* (Chaplin 2000, 7–10), but it must be noted that Livy saw the writing of history at least in part as something of an escape from the times in which he happened to live (*Praef.* 5).

Sheer entertainment value, captivating prose, and enchanting story-telling are the literary features that link Herodotus and Livy together, as the passage cited earlier from Quintilian makes clear. As for Herodotus, so for Livy, history-writing had a decidedly didactic purpose. Sometimes, for example, women provide dramatically salutary lessons, as in the case of the wife of Candaules' vengeance in Herodotus (1.8.1–12.2), or the heroic suicide of Livy's Lucretia (1.57.6–58.12). At a most basic level, Herodotus' history is about the triumph of the Greek way of life over the barbarian, about the victory of Greek freedom over Persian despotism. To stop there, of course,

would be to do a great injustice to Herodotus' complex historical work, which constantly subverts norms and upsets expectations (Hartog 1988), so that Greeks come off rather badly all too frequently, and one interpretation of the work would posit that the Athenians have become “barbarian” by the time the reader reaches the end of Book 9. Herodotus' speeches make such an interpretation plausible, as they frequently problematize the main lines of his narrative (see Pelling 2006, especially 113). Nonetheless, a reading of the *Histories* as a work set up on the axes of liberty and despotism is unassailable. This theme was, *mutatis mutandis*, also a highly charged one in Livy's time. And since Herodotus had, by Livy's day, become known as the “father of history” (as well as the “father of lies”), we should not be surprised to find Herodotean echoes on these themes in Livy (see also Momigliano 1966). The educated ancient reader could hardly have missed the tribute that Livy pays to the Greek historian in describing the tyrannical behavior of Tarquinius Superbus, as juxtaposing with Herodotus' portrayal of the Milesian tyrant Thrasybulus makes abundantly clear:

At the beginning Periander was gentler than his father had been. But afterwards, when he had dealt, by messengers, with Thrasybulus, tyrant of Miletus, he became yet bloodier....For he sent a herald to Thrasybulus inquiring about the safest political establishment for administering the city the best. Thrasybulus led Periander's messenger, outside the city, and with him entered a sown field; then he walked through the grain fields, questioning, and again questioning, the herald about his coming from Corinth. And ever and again as he saw one of the stalks growing above the rest he would strike it down, and what he struck down he threw away, until by this means he had destroyed all the fairest and strongest of the grain....Periander understood the act of Thrasybulus and grasped in his mind that what he was telling him was that he should murder the most eminent of the citizens (Herodotus, 5.92.6).

[H]e sent a confidential messenger to Rome, to ask his father what step he should next take, his power in Gabii being...by this time absolute. Tarquin...was not sure of the messenger's good faith: in any case, he said not a word in reply to his question, but with a thoughtful air went out into the garden. The man followed him, and Tarquin, strolling up and down in silence, began knocking off poppy-heads with a stick. The messenger...returned to Gabii supposing his mission to have failed.... Sextus realized that though his father had not spoken, he had, by his action, indirectly expressed his meaning clearly enough: so he proceeded at once to act upon his murderous intentions (Livy, 1.54.6; for another unmistakable Herodotean echo in Livy, compare the betrayal of Gabii by the tyrant Tarquinius's son, Sextus, at Liv. 1.53, with the treachery against Babylon of Darius's creature Zopyrus, at Hdt. 3.156).

On the themes of tyranny and the forms of treachery that typically accompany

it, therefore, Livy without question employs Herodotus; indeed, Herodotean resonances are so pronounced that the reader may be allowed the indulgence of thinking that Livy sometimes wrote with Herodotus' text by his side. Of course, the cultural contexts and political circumstances for the two authors at the time of composition varied widely. In Herodotus' case, one may speculate that his illustrations of tyrannical abuses are veiled references to the excesses of imperial Athens. More certainly, Livy was writing at the time of an emerging totalitarian state structure in the form of the Augustan principate, and his historical narrative was in some way or other in dialog with it. Some topical allusions to recent political developments are almost a certainty; only the most diehard skeptic and contrarian, for example, would argue that, when Livy states that the deified Romulus may have been torn asunder by conspiring senators, we are not meant to think about Caesar's assassination and subsequent deification (1.16.1–8). However, Livy's relationship with Augustus and any "hidden transcripts" that his text may contain are vast and complicated issues, certainly beyond the scope of this chapter (see Syme 1959; Luce 1990; see also Levene 1993, 241–248). We may at least note his seeming independence from the Augustan regime: there are only three direct references to Augustus in the entire extant text (1.19.3; 4.20.7; 28.12.12), and then we have his apparently unmuted expressions of republican sentiments (see, e.g., Sen., *Q Nat.* 5.18.4; Tac., *Ann.* 4.34.3). The important point here, though, is that, while we have Herodotean colorings in the *Ab Urbe Condita*, they are not present for their own sake, but rather shaded to fit Livy's overall narrative objectives.

As we have seen, Livy is said to have criticized Sallust for his use of Thucydides (but it is not clear that this criticism appeared anywhere in his historical work), and we may consider the ways in which Livy believed an historian could and should employ the Athenian historian from the evidence of his narrative. Thucydides, of course, was the great historian of warfare and battles, of pretexts and realities, and, above all, of the workings of raw power in intra-polis and international affairs. It is here that we see Livy's most pronounced Thucydidean allusions. Livy's Book 21 begins the most climactic battle narratives of the entire work: the life-and-death struggle of the Republic against its most formidable adversary, Hannibal. He opens the book with decided Thucydidean echoes. Similar to Thucydides, he asserts the importance of his subject matter; he observes that the opposing sides were at the acme of their powers; and he even alludes to Thucydides' excursus into ancient history, the so-called *Pentekontaitia*, and to its concluding findings, with the following words (21.1.2):

*nam neque validiores opibus ullae inter se civitates gentesque
contulerant arma, neque his ipsis tantum unquam virium aut roboris fuit*
(for neither have any states or peoples clashed at arms with greater
resources, nor was there ever such great power and might for any of

them).

In reporting the Hannibalic War, Livy makes great use of Thucydides' narrative of the Sicilian expedition of 415 BC. As with Thucydides' history of the Athenian venture into Sicily (Thuc. 6–7), Livy's record of the Hannibalic War is almost an independent history within a larger narrative. The evocation of Thucydides is apparent, for example, when Livy has M. Claudius Marcellus ponder past events of Syracuse's history during his siege of the city; and here, the Athenian attack features prominently in Marcellus' thoughts (25.24.11–12). In both Thucydides' account of the Sicilian expedition and Livy's narration of the invasion of Africa, a rising young general passionately urges an offensive strike; an elderly statesman cautions against it; both parties argue their cases before popular assemblies, which opt for the proposed expeditions; omens give pause, but the armadas nonetheless sail off on their respective adventures. The clearest evidence for Livy's echoing of Thucydides occurs in the paired speeches delivered by Fabius and Scipio in the Senate in 205 BC, modeled on the speeches of Nicias and Alcibiades before the Athenian *ekklesia* in 415 BC (Liv. 28.40.3–44.18; Thuc. 6.9.1–18.7, with Rodgers 1986). In 28.41.17, Livy even has Fabius point to the lesson of the Athenian debacle under the leadership of an energetic and noble young man (*impigro et nobili iuvene*), that is, Alcibiades (see also 28.43.20, for Scipio's rejoinder). As in the case of his use of Herodotus, so in the case of his Thucydidean colorings, Livy silently tips his hat to his Greek predecessor without naming him, and fashions the tribute to his own narrative purposes.

Livy and Polybius on the Middle Roman Republic

Beginning with Book 21, Livy relied on the Greek historian, Polybius of Megalopolis, as an important source. He had great respect for Polybius, the only Greek predecessor he mentions by name, repeatedly (30.45.5; 33.10.10; 34.51.6; 36.19.11; 39.52.1; 45.44.19). However, the two historians could hardly have been more different on the purpose of history-writing and the prerequisites for the historian. Polybius has often been seen as a Machiavellian historian, for whom only success mattered, although Eckstein (1995) has now demonstrated that this long-held view is erroneous, and that ethics and morality were of profound importance for him. However, it is true that Polybius was a sober, no-nonsense sort of man, who had extensive experience in statesmanship, diplomacy, travel, and warfare, and this is reflected in his pronouncements on history-writing. As he famously states, the most important requirement for the historian is truthfulness based on wide-ranging, first-hand experiences (Pol. 1.14.6–9; and further references assembled by Champion 2004, 22, n. 30). For Polybius, matters of style should not be a paramount concern for the historian, and he proudly disavows undue, excessive attention to and care about fine prose (see the criticism of the historian Zeno of Rhodes at Polyb. 16.14.1–20.9). Consequently, over the

centuries, his dry, uninspiring prose has found many detractors, the most stridently condemnatory of whom was the Augustan critic Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who stated that no one could endure reading Polybius' history to the end (*On Composition*, 4, with Sacks 1981, 77–78). Livy may have admired Polybius, but it is likely that Polybius would have found little to commend Livy's work, renowned for its marvelous prose style and rhetorical embellishments.

In the modern period and until relatively recent times, most historians would have rejected the adulatory ancient Roman assessment of Livy, as reflected in the comments of Quintilian and the younger Pliny cited earlier, and they would have sharply disagreed with Dionysius' castigating verdict on Polybius. This is no surprise, since by the mid-nineteenth century the discipline of history modeled itself on the sciences and strove for academic credibility as a positivist social science, allowing Polybius' stock to rise while Livy's star fell. The general tendency was to see Livy as a lightweight thinker, whose careful attention to the purely literary aspects and rhetorical adornments of his composition were inimical to the historian's proper craft. In short, the standard view had Livy as a “scissors-and-paste” historian capable of egregious errors in historical analysis: failure to reconcile divergent accounts in his sources, chronological confusion, geographical blunders, and military absurdities (see also Miles 1995, 8–74). We certainly can find such mistakes in Livy's history. A famous example occurs in his account of the Roman victory over the Macedonian king Philip V at Cynoscephalae in 197 BC. For this battle narrative, we also have the text of Polybius, whom Livy was closely following in his composition of Book 33 (Nissen 1863, 140–153). In Polybius, Philip ordered the first rows of the Macedonian phalanx to lower their pikes, or *sarissas*, as they were about to engage with the Roman legionaries (Pol. 18.24.9). The verb Polybius uses for lowering the pikes is “*kataballein*,” which generally could mean to throw or place down, but in this military context it meant to lower one's weapon. Livy (33.8.13–14) was puzzled by Polybius' Greek, and he writes that the Macedonian soldiers were commanded to place aside their weapons (*hastis positis*), since the pikes' great length was obstructing their progress!

This misunderstanding of the Macedonian tactics at the battle of Cynoscephalae is perhaps the most famous of Livy's military blunders, but it is by no means unique. In Book 38 (7.10), for example, Livy relays the events of the Roman siege against the Aetolians in the town of Ambracia in 189 BC. Foiled in their initial attempts, the Romans constructed underground tunnels in order to get into the city, but the Aetolians learned of these operations and dug a trench from inside the city, setting the stage for a subterranean confrontation. Livy's source here is Polybius (21.28.11), who wrote that the antagonists first fought against one another with pikes, but that this combat was indecisive, because both groups thrust out shields and wattle-curtains in

front of themselves, forming an impenetrable wall. Livy, by contrast, states that, at this point in the fighting, both sides held out curtains and doors against the pikes. It is clear that Livy misread his Polybius, translating the Greek word “*thureous*” (“shields”) as “doors,” because he confused the word with another, “*thuras*,” which does indeed mean “doors” (see Walsh 1958, especially 84–85). The question as to how and why the Romans should have had doors as part of their siege gear apparently did not trouble Livy, and he proceeds with his narrative of the siege at Ambracia without further comment.

Livy was more reliant on his Roman predecessors than Greek writers for his reconstructions of earlier Roman history (especially the so-called “Conflict of the Orders”), episodes of which we shall consider in the following section. However, here Livy's Roman sources were not the most trustworthy of historical guides (see Badian 1966), and in any event they were heavily influenced by Greek sources. Greek historiographical tradition simplified complex political and social developments, for the most part reducing the centuries-old, shifting layers of socio-economic and political tension to a narrative of a battle between rich and poor, haves and have-nots, and patricians and plebeians (see Cornell 1995, 242–292; Forsythe 2005, 147–267; Raaflaub 2006). As Smith (2006, 326) has noted, “There was no need to complicate matters, even if the sources knew enough to do so, by introducing issues such as the identity of the *conscripti*, the problems of plebeian consuls in the early Republic, the continuing importance of the curiate assembly, and so forth. The historical tradition became focused on defending the role which the patricians and plebeians had played, and that was necessary because the argument was over the nature of Roman history and the Roman state.”

Greek historiographical currents therefore ran deep, even for the earliest Roman historical writing. Nonetheless, Livy's independence from Polybius and other Greek writers is plain to see, even in the basic structuring of his work: he conforms to the Roman system of ordering his chronology according to annual consulates (with the exception of Books 1–10, and perhaps 71–142, as well; see also Levene 2010, 34–63, noting Livy's willingness to allow for chronological imprecision for narrative purposes, with a focus on “textual” or “narrative” time), whereas Polybius adopted the Greek system, devised by his predecessor and rival as historian of the western Mediterranean, Timaeus of Tauromenium, of employing Olympiad dates (see also Pédech 1964, 449–461). Through his Roman annalistic sources, Livy provides invaluable information for modern students of the Roman Republic, opening up dimensions of Roman political culture that are entirely absent from Polybius. For example, Livy allows us to see the sort of political infighting that was standard operating procedure among the ruling senatorial aristocracy, paraded before the *populus Romanus* in informal political assemblies called “*contiones*” (on which, see Morstein Marx 2004), while in his Book 6 on the Roman constitution Polybius presents a misleading and distorting picture of

governmental balance and harmony at Rome among the political and social orders. Moreover, Livy shows us how crucial questions of religion were to Roman republican statecraft (see also Levene 1993), whereas Polybius tends to discount religious matters among the Roman elite, suggesting that religion at Rome was, for the most part, a disingenuous tool of the ruling class for the suppression and control of the commons (see, especially, Pol. 6.56.6–12). Livy is also our most important source for another crucially important feature of Roman political life: the request of a general returning from military campaign and the senatorial decision regarding the right to celebrate a triumph, a great procession that would wind its way through the streets of the city and culminate with a grand prayer and sacrifice in front of the temple of Jupiter Best and Greatest on the Capitoline Hill. This is also something about which Polybius has very little to tell us (see Pelikan Pittenger 2008; see also Beard 2007). Occasionally, Livy's account even proves preferable to that of Polybius concerning particular historical events, as for example in their respective accounts of the opening salvo of the horrific battle at Cannae (on which, see Daly 2002; see also Levene 2010, 285–286). Polybius states that the advanced cavalry units on both sides dispensed with the normal wheeling maneuvers, but rather clashed, dismounted, and fought hand-to-hand, adding that this was consequently a “truly barbaric battle” (3.115.3–4, “*machēn alēthinēn barbarikēn*”). Livy (22.47.2–3) more reasonably says that the nature of the terrain confined the horsemen to close quarters, and that this was what caused them to dismount and fight on foot.

For his account of the history of the so-called Middle Roman Republic, and especially for its wars and foreign diplomatic relations, Polybius was Livy's most important source (see Nissen 1863; Tränkle 1977). Livy names Polybius repeatedly as an authority, but he approached his Polybian material with an independent mind, sometimes interpreting what he found in Polybius with embarrassing errors (as in his report of the battle at Cynoscephalae), but at other times with more favorable results (as in his version of the opening round of the battle at Cannae). However, his virtues *as an historian* outweigh these shortcomings. His sensitivity to the nuances and textures of the political culture of the republican senatorial aristocracy is without peer among any of the Greek historians of Rome, Polybius included, and this is only in part due to, and we must think in some cases in spite of, his access to earlier Roman historiography.

Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus on the Monarchy and Early Republic

We can conclude our survey with a consideration of Livy's work in light of the historical writings of his contemporary, Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Dionysius' monumental *Roman Antiquities* covers much of the same ground as Livy's first decade (see Gabba 1991; see also Forsythe 2005, 66–68).

Consequently, we have the luxury of being able to compare both historians' use of their sources and their treatments of some of the same stories. Let us look at their respective accounts of the putative heroics of Gaius Mucius Scaevola in the Republic's infancy. According to the tradition—the first reference to the legend is contained in a fragment of the second-century BC annalist L. Cassius Hemina (fragment 16, Peter)—in the third year of the Republic, the Etruscan *condottiero* Lars Porsenna besieged Rome in an attempt to restore to power there the exiled king, Tarquinius Superbus. The story goes that, when Porsenna was on the verge of starving the city into submission, a disguised Mucius infiltrated the enemy camp with plans to assassinate him. He mistook a well-appareled secretary for Porsenna and slew him. Apprehended and brought before the Etruscan leader, Mucius defiantly declared himself a Roman citizen and enemy. Porsenna was stupefied by the Roman's temerity, and gave him leave to speak at length. Mucius voluntarily offered information that could not have been extracted from him by torture; namely, that there were 300 Roman youths as adamantly bent on Porsenna's destruction as he was. A stunned Porsenna freed Mucius (either immediately or after a peace had been concluded), gave up the siege, and made peace with the Romans.

Such are the outlines of the story. In Livy's rendition, Mucius' request for permission to undertake his stealthy mission before the Senate is curtailed (2.12.4–5), while in Dionysius' version, a prolix Mucius—who is fluent in Etruscan and later repeats much of what he says to the senators in that language in an interview with Porsenna—expatiates about the circumstances and likely consequences of his proposed exploit, thereby slowing the narrative's pace and diminishing its dramatic impact (*Rom. Ant.* 5.27.1–4; see also 5.29.1–4). In this section, Dionysius is either relaying the fuller account of his annalistic sources, which Livy has truncated, or he has freely expanded Mucius' speech. In either case, his account is much less arresting than Livy's. Livy focuses on the interchange between Mucius and Porsenna following the unintentional assassination of the secretary, with Mucius thrusting his right hand into an altar flame in order to demonstrate his steadfastness and the futility of subjecting him to torture. The shaken Porsenna then freed Mucius, who, on his own terms, informed the Etruscan leader about the 300 brave souls, who like him were determined upon his assassination, which information of course led Porsenna to seek the peace treaty (2.12.13–13.5).

The attempted assassination of Porsenna by stealth and disguise was probably of an early-third-century origin, derived from Greek legend. Dionysius (*Rom. Ant.* 5.25.4) gives Mucius the cognomen “Cordus,” which recalls the legendary king of Athens, Kodros, about whom a similar story was told. Moreover, the defiant self-mutilation of Mucius, which Livy reports but Dionysius passes over, may owe something to Herodotus' story (6.114) of the valiant death, at the battle of Marathon of Cynegirus, of the brother of the

famous Athenian playwright Aeschylus. While Dionysius admits that Mucius deceived Porsenna by fabricating the story about the 300 confederates chomping at the bit to make an attempt on his life (*Rom. Ant.* 5.29.3), Livy goes further, providing the dramatic detail about Mucius plunging his right hand into the flame on the altar. This touch would have underscored his deceit for the Roman reader, since this was a traditional punishment for breaking an oath or pledge (Ogilvie 1965, 262). This seems to have been an element of traditional Roman heroic stories (see also the historically dubious tale of the Roman legate Pompeius and King Genthius at Valerius Maximus, *Memorable Deeds and Sayings*, 3.3.2), so that Livy is here using a Roman tradition not merely to embellish a Greek story, but rather as the centerpiece of his narrative account of the attempted assassination of Porsenna. However, he apparently dramatized this narrative detail for an ambiguous characterization. In using it, Livy underscores Mucius' deception (by evoking a punishment meted out to those who break oaths and pledges), and one is tempted to read this as perhaps ironic commentary on the Augustan regime in which he was writing, with its strong emphasis on moral purity and *fides*, or trustworthiness, although it is easy to go too far in such speculations (on such questions, see the cautious approach of Levene 1993, 241–248; see also Luce 1990; and on Augustus' propaganda and cultural program, see Zanker 1988 *passim*).

Both Livy and Dionysius relay a tale about an earlier heroic feat in the time of the monarchy, the combat of the Horatii and the Curiatii (on which, see Solodow 1979; see also Feldherr 1998, 123–131), and a comparison of their accounts reveals a great deal about Livy's moral outlook and working methods. The story raises essential questions that preoccupied the Greek tragic playwrights: allegiances owed to family and allegiances owed to state, and the ways in which they can stand in irreconcilable conflict (the *locus classicus* is, of course, Sophocles' *Antigone*). According to this tradition, the Romans under their king Tullus Hostilius were at war with nearby Alba Longa. With an eye to the looming Etruscan menace—thereby employing the commonplace tactic of fear of a common enemy, *metus hostilis* (on which, see Bellen 1985)—and in order to preserve their respective armies against that threat, both sides agree, by a solemn oath recited in archaic language, to settle their disputes by having a Homeric-style combat ranging three Albans against three Roman heroes. These are the Curiatii on the Alban side, and the Horatii on the Roman (though some traditions reversed the ethnic affiliations). These men, however, were cousins, since an Alban named Sicinius had married off his twin daughters to a Roman named Horatius and an Alban named Curiatius (we have this information from Dionysius; Livy omits the genealogical details). And so, this would be a case of allegiance to the state overriding the ties of blood relations, and the combat would be a fratricidal one (see also Liv. 1.23.1, *civili simillimum bello*). In the end, a single Horatius survived, whose sister had been betrothed to one of the dead Curiatii. When this sister, Horatia, displayed her grief and dismay at the slaughter of her fiancée, her triumphant

brother slew her in a fit of rage near the Porta Capena. Horatius, seized and brought before the king for judgment, was ultimately acquitted by a decision of the People.

What is most striking in comparing the accounts of Livy and Dionysius on the Horatii and Curiatii is Livy's compression (see Oakley 2010, especially 126–137). Dionysius draws out his story by explicating his methodology (*Rom. Ant.* 3.18.1), and he gives a detailed description of the preliminaries to the hand-to-hand combat, especially the diplomatic interchanges leading up to it (*Rom. Ant.* 3.7.1–17.6). He also peppers his narrative with one of his favorite themes, the Greek origins of Roman (and Alban) institutions (*Rom. Ant.* 3.10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 11.2, 11.4, 11.10, with Schultze 1986, 128–133). Livy, on the other hand, accelerates his narrative to hasten the actual showdown of the paired triplets, curtailing the discussions that led to it (1.23.10–24.2). Before turning to the mortal struggle, he does, however, expatiate on the formal ritual practices of the fetial priests for declaring a war that will be just in the eyes of the gods (1.24.4–9). Both writers develop the spectacle of the combat—what it was like for those witnessing it—a literary device reaching back from Thucydides' description (7.71.2–4) of the Athenians watching the disastrous battle in the Syracusan harbor in 413 BC to Homer's duel between Menelaos and Paris (*Il.* 3.340–72). However, Dionysius seems to belabor this literary tactic for lending vividness to his narrative, what in terms of Greek rhetorical theory was called “*enargeia*” (*Rom. Ant.* 3.18.1, 3, 19.1–3, 19.4, 5, and 6 [*theatai*, or “spectators”], and 20.3), whereas Livy artfully interweaves the witnessing of the “unpleasing spectacle” (1.25.2, “*minime gratum spectaculum*”) and the action itself (1.25.4, 5, 6, 9, 13; and for monuments of the spectacle for latter-day viewers, see 1.25.14, with Jaeger 1997, 15–29). To serve his larger narrative purposes, Livy sacrifices verisimilitude in having his spectators omnisciently view a unitary unfolding of the combat, not the piecemeal and conflicting—and more realistic—perspectives of Dionysius' onlookers (*Rom. Ant.* 3.19.2–3).

Livy's account of the Horatii and Curiatii is therefore consummately tailored to his wider narrative design, and it shows an authorial independence and eclectic use of sources not present in Dionysius' work (see also Solodow 1979, 261–268). Let us conclude by considering some of the larger themes that Livy's rendition invites us to ponder. His story of the Horatii and Curiatii harkens back to Rome's hoary beginnings, with his pseudo-archaic language in the ritual establishment of the “just war,” or *bellum iustum*, but in this case the Romans' moral high-ground is undercut by the Alban dictator Mettius Fufetius' observation that both sides were fighting because of greed for domination (1.23.7, *cupido imperii*). Moreover, the combat of the triplets could not have helped but evoke, for Livy's reader, who would have lived through the nightmare of the great warlords and their civil wars, the moral ambiguities of the growth of Roman power and the concomitant violence that

ushered it into being (one only need think of the destruction left in the wake of the gargantuan clash of arms between Caesar, the father-in-law, and Pompey, the son-in-law). This troubling issue is underscored by the slaying of Horatia, as the relatively easy resolution of the crime of a brother's murder of a sister (1.26.5–14) leaves the reader with a disturbed sense of the ways in which domestic atrocities can be glossed over for reasons of state, anticipating Tacitus' representation of the views of jaundiced spectators upon the occasion of Augustus' funeral in 14 CE (*Ann.* 1.10.1–7). In other words, the astute reader realizes that Livy has problematized this heroic legend, revealing some of the “fault lines implicit in the construction of a Roman national identity” (Feldherr 1998, 125). Mucius Scaevola and the Horatii, as well as other figures from Livy's account of early Rome not discussed here, such as T. Manlius Torquatus (7.10.1–14; see also 26.2), M. Valerius Corvus (7.26.1–10), and P. Decius Mus (8.9.1–14), are willing to sacrifice themselves to the greater good and national interests, just as Vergil's hero Aeneas. However, there are ample opportunities for the reader of Livy (and of Vergil), who is so inclined, to see hints of the brutalities and iniquities that may have underlain the *pax Romana*, dressed up in ancient garb.

Conclusions

Livy's debt to the Greek historians, like that of all the Roman historians, was profound. However, perhaps more than any other Roman historian, he mastered his Greek sources in a historiographical sense, never allowing the weight of their authority to divert him from his own literary art. He could deftly allude to Herodotus, as in his account of Tarquinius Superbus' silent message to his son Sextus at Gabii (1.54.6), which recalls the unspoken message of Thrasybulus to Periander's messenger in Herodotus (5.92.6); and he could distantly evoke Thucydides, as in the scene of the spectators of the combat between the Horatii and Curiatii (1.25.4, 5, 6, 9, 13), which may remind the reader of the famous description of the battle in the harbor at Syracuse through the eyes of those who witnessed it (Thuc. 7.71.2–4). In this latter case, Livy eschewed the disparate and incoherent perspectives of Thucydides' spectators in preference for a uniform audience perception, better suited to his narrative goal. In his account of the Middle Roman Republic, Livy relied heavily on the history of Polybius, whose great authority he readily acknowledged, but even here he was not afraid to go his own way, not always with the happiest of consequences. And yet, he offers rich material for reconstructing the actual workings of political life in Rome, which are absent from Polybius' history. His independent and eclectic approach to his Greek sources can be traced by comparing his accounts with those of his contemporary Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Had he carefully read Dionysius' *Roman Antiquities*, which is doubtful, he probably would have found the prose heavy-handed and even verbose; and if he had some acquaintance with

Dionysius' work, he would not in any event have deigned to mention it. However, perhaps this is what we should expect of a celebrated Roman historian in the age of Augustus regarding his Greek contemporaries in the field of historiography. Finally, Livy's narrative of early Rome demands to be read in the political context in which it was composed, stimulating reflection on the Augustan principate in a way that no Greek source can match.

Cross-References

See CHAPTER 4: ROME, MAGNA GRAECIA, AND SICILY IN LIVY FROM 326 TO 200 BC; CHAPTER 21: LITERARY ARCHETYPES FOR THE REGAL PERIOD

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Further Reading

Walsh (1961) and Luce (1977) are of fundamental importance for understanding Livy's historiographical conceptions and working methods. Chaplin (2000) is essential reading for Livy's moral outlook and didactic goals. The essays in Dorey (1971) complement topics touched upon in this chapter. Feldherr (1998) explores the theme of visual imagery and spectacle in Livy's narrative; see also Jaeger (1977) on monuments, and Pelikan Pittenger (2008) on triumphs. For ancient Greek and Roman historiographical conceptions generally, see Wiseman (1979); Moxon, Smart, and Woodman (1986); Woodman (1988); Luce (1989); Marincola (1997); Marincola (2007); Kraus, Marincola, and Pelling (2010); and Champion (2013). For the Greek historians, see Hornblower (1996); Luce (1997); Marincola (2001). The fragmentary Greek historians discussed in this chapter are available with English translations and commentaries in the online *Brill's New Jacoby* project.

Chapter 16

Allusions and Intertextuality in Livy's Third Decade

David S. Levene

Introduction

Allusion and intertextuality have long been central topics in the study of Latin literature. Most Roman writers with even the slightest literary pretensions regularly refer directly to specific episodes in earlier literary works, or employ phrases and expressions that evoke those earlier works' language. It is widely accepted that analysis of such references and evocations offers one significant way of coming to an understanding of the text, since this is a primary means by which a writer, whether or not consciously, places himself within the literary tradition and invites the reader to make various sorts of comparisons between his own work and those of his predecessors. There have been different theories about how precisely those evocations are best interpreted, in particular concerning how far it is possible or desirable to distinguish deliberate allusions from unintentional confluences of language. Even the latter may well still be significant for interpretation, since writers and readers alike frame their work and understand it within a spectrum of previous language usage that they have unconsciously absorbed rather than necessarily being actively aware of, though the form such interpretation takes will need to be different depending on the presumed degree of self-consciousness in the alluding writer. However, these scholarly disputes, even if sometimes heated, mask a broad and far more important agreement about the centrality of intertextual relationships for understanding Latin literature.

Scholarship on Livy, especially his later books, until recently stood somewhat apart from this general trend. A handful of places in the Third Decade have regularly been read in the light of earlier literature: for example, the opening character sketch of Hannibal (21.4.3–9) is widely recognized as an overt imitation of the sketches of Catiline and Jugurtha at the opening of Sallust's monographs (*Cat.* 5.1–4; *BJ.* 6.1 and see also 7.4–5; e.g., Walsh 1973, 127; Clauss 1997; Levene 2010, 99–104), and the debate between Fabius and Scipio on invading Africa (28.40–44) has been held to allude to Thucydides' famous debate over the Sicilian Expedition (6.8–26), something to which Livy makes direct reference (28.41.17: see Rodgers 1986; Polleichtner 2010; *contra* Levene 2010, 111–118). However, such places are surprisingly few, certainly if one considers factors such as the length of the Third Decade and the density of allusion that scholars have discovered in other Latin literary

texts, including other historians such as Sallust or Tacitus.

Finding Allusions

Part of the problem may be that many of Livy's allusions are to texts that are lost, or at least less familiar parts of the canon (Levene 2010, 108–122). It is also the case that scholars have often been swifter to identify allusions in Livy to other historians than they have been to poetic or non-historical prose texts; hence, even when the author alluded to is famous, the allusions are overlooked simply because we are less primed to observe them. For example, there are a number of key moments in the Third Decade where Livy evokes the *Iliad*, such as 30.43.12, where the burning of the Carthaginian ships after their final defeat is “as mournful to the Carthaginians as if Carthage itself were burning” (“*conspectum repente incendium tam lugubre fuisse Poenis quam si ipsa Carthago arderet*”): an allusion to *Iliad* 22.410–11, where the Trojans respond to the death of Hector as if it were the burning of Troy (Levene 2010, 99). The significance is not only in the immediate comparison, but in the wider ramifications. The scene in Homer refers implicitly to the ultimate destruction of Troy, which will take place outside the confines of the *Iliad* itself. So too, Livy hints at the ultimate destruction of Carthage in the Third Punic War: this will not, of course, take place outside the confines of Livy's text (it will eventually appear in Book 51), but it is outside the confines of the Third Decade, which Livy repeatedly marks as a distinct unit of his work. The allusion also implies a causal connection: just as Hector's death is tantamount to the destruction of Troy (see also *Il.* 6.403), so too the defeat of Hannibal removes Carthage's only hope of success and survival, for all that it will take a further 50 years or more for the actual destruction to arrive. Here, the Homeric allusion is central if we are to understand the historical significance of the defeat of Carthage at Zama; it moreover is the culmination of a series of intermittent allusions to the Trojan War in the Third Decade, which together add up to a consistent reading of the Carthaginians as the defeated Trojans and the Romans as the soon-to-be-victorious Greeks (e.g., 21.10.10–11, 21.41.15, 30.34.1: see, e.g., Cipriani 1984, 75–78; Levene 2010, 98–99, 107–111).

Hence, Homer is an important intermittent presence in Livy's Third Decade; it is likely that Ennius' *Annales* was an even more important one, given that his work actually included an extensive narrative of the Second Punic War, and given that he was by far the most widely read Latin poet in the late Republic, though the loss of the overwhelming bulk of the *Annales* means that allusions to it are only rarely detectable. Livy quotes Ennius directly in his obituary of Fabius Maximus (30.26.9), admittedly Ennius' most famous line: “*unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem*” (*Ann.* 363 Sk.: “one man by delaying restored the state for us”). The same line played an even more substantial role in Book 22, where Livy constantly evokes it not merely by the use of *cunctari* and its

cognates in reference to Fabius (22.12.12, 22.14.5, 22.14.10, 22.15.1, 22.23.1, 22.24.10, 22.27.4), but also by the repeated use of ablative gerunds (e.g., *premendo*, *sedendo*, *peragrando*) in the context of the dispute over policy between the cautious Fabius and the aggressive Minucius: these allude to the Ennian line while constantly redefining both Fabius' and Minucius' approaches in positive and negative ways (Elliott 2009).

Moreover, the Ennian allusion is used to point out the complexity of the dispute, a complexity that is apparent despite the obvious slant of the narrative in favor of Fabius and the corresponding denigration of Minucius. The Fabius–Minucius sequence is interrupted by an account of the Scipio brothers' successful campaign in Spain (22.19–22)—a campaign in which success (at least according to Livy) is achieved by precisely the aggressive tactics that Minucius advocates and Fabius rejects. This does not mean that Fabius is wrong in the particular situation he is faced with, but it does indicate how much more limited its application is than Fabius himself wants to believe (Levene 2010, 79–81, 197). It is especially relevant that the Scipios' actions are twice characterized as “*haud cunctanter*” (22.20.1, 22.22.4): in isolation, this phrase might appear unremarkable, but in the context of repeated evocation of Ennius' description of Fabius in the previous narrative, an Ennian allusion is hard to avoid here, but to the opposite end—to indicate that the quality for which Ennius famously praised Fabius should not be extended too far.

Allusions and Source-Analysis

Nevertheless, even with all of this allowed, the relative paucity of identifiable allusions in Livy might seem surprising. However, surprise would be misplaced, because while it is true that Livy's Third Decade is relatively sparse in allusions of the sort that one generally looks for in other Latin literary texts, this is largely because the theory of “allusion” as it has been applied to classical texts has been developed in the context of poetic texts and governed by their presuppositions, and has overlooked key features of historians such as Livy (O'Gorman 2009, 231–234).

That Livy's text has an extremely close relationship to certain earlier texts is not only intuitively obvious, but is directly stated by Livy himself. These texts are from the historians whom Livy used as sources, because Livy, according to all the available evidence, hardly ever drew on original research or documentary material for the surviving books of his history (though he may have done so in the lost portions that covered events within his own memory). Instead, he depended entirely on earlier narrative historians, whose accounts he sometimes compared, critiqued, or changed, but which he often took over intact. He frequently mentions his predecessors by name, though usually only in places where they offer a different version from that of his main narrative or

where he suggests that they may be unreliable. However, it is manifest that, even in the main narratives, much has been taken in large part from those same predecessors, since some of the earlier historians survive independently and allow us to make the comparison.

One famous example is Coelius Antipater, who wrote a seven-book monograph on the Second Punic War in the late second century BC. Cicero paraphrases two episodes from Coelius—the dream of Hannibal before his invasion of Italy (*Div.* 1.49), and the omens received by Flaminius before Trasimene (*Div.* 1.77)—which bear a close resemblance to the same episodes as described by Livy (21.22.6–9, 22.3.11–13), to the point that they even sometimes use the same wording. It is true that, with both of these, and especially the second, Livy appears to have made significant changes to Coelius: he omits parts of Hannibal's dream that appeared to suggest greater divine support for his invasion than Livy is prepared to allow, and with Flaminius he omits one of Coelius' three omens altogether, while reworking the narrative so as to place them all on the immediate eve of battle, as was not the case in Coelius (Levene 1993, 40–41, 45–46). Nevertheless, the two accounts are so close in their overall trajectory—and even in many of the details—that there is no serious doubt that Coelius was Livy's source for both. However, Livy himself does not refer to Coelius in this context, although he does cite him frequently in other parts of the Third Decade.

Still more important is Polybius. He is cited by name only once in the Third Decade, in the very last lines (30.45.5), but there are substantial stretches of Livy's narrative that are closely related to the surviving portions of Polybius' account of the war. There has been much scholarly controversy as to whether Livy used Polybius directly, or whether the similarities are the consequence of either Livy employing a source who had himself used Polybius, or else of Livy's source and Polybius depending on a common source. The major study of this issue in the last generation, by Hermann Tränkle (1977, 193–241), concluded that Livy made no direct use of Polybius until the very end of the Third Decade. I have recently challenged this, offering systematic arguments to show that Polybius was a direct source from the very beginning of the decade (Levene 2010, 126–163).

The key argument is one that has direct bearing on the relationship between sources and allusions discussed in the last section: there are places where Livy appears not merely to draw on Polybius, but to be critiquing and responding to him. The most notable is the speech of Hannibal prior to the crossing of the Alps (21.30), where Hannibal's troops are daunted by the hazards of the mountains, and Hannibal seeks to reassure them that the crossing is both feasible and rational. Polybius does not have a comparable speech, but at exactly the same point in his narrative he has a lengthy digression (3.47.6–48.12), in which he defends Hannibal's rationality in attempting the crossing against the strictures of earlier historians, who had made the crossing out to be

so challenging that Hannibal could accomplish it only with divine aid. Livy's Hannibal, in other words, reproduces in his own words Polybius' defense of Hannibal. Yet, the aftermath is no less important, for when the Carthaginians actually reach the Alps, Livy describes the mountains in lurid terms that recall their original fears, and which therefore show the complacency and misguidedness inherent in Hannibal's (and thus Polybius') defense of his own actions. The Alps really were as bad as fearful rumors made them out to be, and the rationalism of Hannibal (and hence Polybius) was ill-equipped to handle them (Levene 2010, 148–155).

What this shows is not only that Livy made direct use of Polybius—it is hard to make sense of the way the arguments of Polybius' digression are transformed and responded to except on that hypothesis—but also that he viewed Polybius not only as a source, but as a textual predecessor whom Livy's readers are expected to treat much as they treat the allusions to Homer or Ennius. “Source criticism” in historians (and other prose texts) has traditionally been viewed in classical scholarship as an entirely different activity from the identification of allusions. There appears to have been the tacit assumption that “allusions” are (or could be, given a suitably informed reader) invitations to compare the two texts and interpret the reworkings as part of an active engagement of the new author with his original, but that “sources” are hidden beneath the surface, and that while we (modern scholars) may be able to detect them, there is no suggestion that the author expected readers to do so, let alone to make the comparison.

However, such a differentiation is highly implausible, for a number of reasons. One is that, as I have just noted, there are places where Livy appears actively to be inviting the reader to compare his own version of history with one of his sources. A second reason is that the sources are, in many cases, no more obscure than the texts to which Livy appears to “allude” in the more conventional sense, and if the reader is expected to recognize, compare, and interpret them in the latter case, it would surely be expected that they do so in the former also. A third reason is that, as I mentioned earlier, Livy frequently invites such a comparison with his predecessors explicitly, when he refers to and criticizes their versions of history that differ from his own primary narrative. It does not seem likely that Livy expects some wall to prevent the reader from extending that invitation to cover those sections of his text that are dependent on those same predecessors, but where Livy does not happen to cite them by name.

Allusion and History

Hence, the study of sources forms one place where it is possible to see a broader intertextual awareness in Livy than one would expect merely from listing “allusions” in the conventional way. However, there is a further point

as well, which relates to the unique textual status of historiography among ancient genres.

Historiography by its very nature involves a commitment by the historian to give a true account of events that actually occurred. Admittedly, when it comes to ancient historiography, that commitment plays out in ways that can be unexpected in modern terms, since it was clearly felt to be compatible with some degree of what we would nowadays think of as outright invention (though how far that license is taken in practice, and how it can be justified within the historians' claim to veridicity, remains controversial among scholars). However, a broad claim to veridicity in some form is repeatedly made by ancient historians, and it appears to have been accepted by ancient readers.

This central feature of historiography instantly gives an additional set of axes along which allusions can occur. Independently of the historian's text, the people about whom he is writing may have—and often did—constructed their actions in imitation of earlier historical personalities and earlier events. They may have sought to do so with reference to certain widely known features of that person but without regard to any particular text in which they were described, or else they may deliberately have copied actions as described in one particular account. In addition, historical events may well turn out in such a way that they closely resemble other events, whether or not the similarity is constructed as such or even observed by the participants. These features of real-life events may be reproduced in the historian even if the historian does not himself recognize the similarity or the deliberate reference. Conversely, where the historian does recognize them, he may write the events in such a way as to emphasize the allusion (e.g., by using a pointed linguistic reference to an historian of the earlier events), or alternatively he may seek to undercut it by emphasizing the disjunction between the event and its purported earlier model. Either way, since the event took place independently of any text, the historian's allusion may be to the event itself without specific reference to a text in which it was described, or it may be to a particular text.

Admittedly, with Livy, it is often hard to tell which of these may be operating. In particular, since we not only have lost many of the earlier historians on whom Livy may have drawn, but we have little or no access to most of the events of the period except through Livy and one or two other historians, the distinction between a real-life confluence of events and a confluence that is a creation of the historian is, in many cases, difficult to draw. Likewise, it is often hard to distinguish allusions to historical events and allusions to texts in which those events are described, not only because we do not have a sufficient body of evidence, but because the historian himself may construct his allusion in a way that leaves the matter open (Damon 2010). However, we can at least consider certain plausible cases that cover some points within this range.

One such case is the relationship between Scipio Africanus and Alexander the

Great (Levene 2010, 119–122). When introducing Scipio on the eve of his taking up the command in Spain, Livy refers directly to Alexander, comparing the popular story that Scipio was the son of a serpent to the comparable legend told of Alexander (26.19.6–8). Livy indicates that this comparison is not his own, but was made by Scipio's contemporaries, and also that Scipio himself fostered it, albeit by refusing to deny it rather than actively making the claim of divine parentage. It is at least plausible that Scipio, as with many later Roman political figures, did indeed deliberately structure his image and actions around Alexander (Weippert 1972, 37–55), in which case Livy is accentuating the comparison while also slanting it to an end that Scipio himself cannot have intended, since the main point in Livy is to criticize Scipio for deceitful self-promotion. In doing so, Livy is not (as far as we can tell) alluding to any specific historian's writings on of Alexander in which the story of his birth was told: he treats it merely as a popular story. The allusion in this case is to an (alleged) historical event, rather than to a text in which the event was told, and it apparently mirrors a real-life comparison that was promoted by Scipio himself.

There are also places where Livy appears to compare Scipio to Alexander where we have no particular indication that the comparison is anything other than a construct of Livy's narrative. At the siege of New Carthage, Scipio has his troops wade across the receding waters in order to attack the city (26.45.7–9). Livy's account is based on Polybius (10.14.7–11), but he has added a number of details: that the recession of the water was caused by the north wind, and also that the wind “had exposed the shallows so that the water was in some places up to the navel.” Both of these draw on features associated with Alexander's crossing of the sea at Pamphylia, as described in different historians: in one version (Arr., *Anab.* 1.26.1–2), the waters recede because of the north wind, while the account at Strabo 14.3.9 uses very similar language to Livy about the sea exposing the pathway so that the water reaches the soldiers' navels. Here, Livy, presumably at least in part because of the clear parallel between Scipio and Alexander that he has set out earlier, has used direct allusions to different Alexander historians (the sources of Arrian and Strabo, respectively) to reinforce the comparison.

On the other hand, there are numerous other parallels between Scipio and Alexander in Livy's narrative whose status is harder to determine. An example is the magnanimity with which Scipio treated his Spanish female captives after his victory at New Carthage, restoring them unharmed to their families (26.49.11–50.14). This bears an obvious similarity to Alexander's famously magnanimous treatment of the family of Darius, and various Latin writers compared the two episodes (Front., *Strat.* 2.11.5–6; Gellius 7.8; Ammianus 24.4.27). This too may well ultimately derive from Scipio's self-promotion as an Alexander-like figure; there is, however, no direct indication in Livy that he saw it as such, for all that other Romans manifestly did so, nor is there any

allusion that has been discovered to any of the writers on Alexander. Assuming that the episode did indeed happen more or less as Livy describes it, this is a case where the similarity may be inherent in the historical events rather than in the design of the historian: Livy's presumed source, Polybius, survives independently (10.18.7–19.7), and the key elements of Livy's account are present there also, albeit with some variation of detail (see also Chaplin 2010, 60–64), and likewise with no explicit indication of any link to Alexander.

The implications are interesting and revealing. It would be odd to say that Livy “alludes to” Alexander here, given that he neither mentions him directly nor (as far as we can tell) slants his story or his language in any way that would recall specific writers on Alexander. However, it would also be odd to say that a comparison between Scipio and Alexander is absent from Livy's text here, given that he has already alerted the reader to other points of contact between them, and given that we know that other Romans read the two episodes in parallel. Livy would have to be very obtuse not to notice the possibility that his readers would make such a comparison, even if he himself made no particular effort to narrate the story of Scipio in such a way as to bring it out.

In these terms, we can say that an allusion to Alexander is present, but it is present as a consequence of Livy's commitment to the historical truth of the events he narrates, rather than because of any personal slant that he brings to them. It comes not because he changed the story, but because he did not change it. However, in that case, the allusion may exist, but it cannot be treated as a simple product of the mind of a single author. The unique textual situation of historiography, involving as it does an ontological commitment to a reality that exists outside the text, means that any adequate account of “allusion” must take into account not only the relationship between texts, but also the relationship between the texts and the events that they represent.

Historical Allusion and Historical Authorship

With this point in mind, we can now return to the question of the relationship between Livy and his sources. I suggested in the preceding text that Livy's handling of his sources should be analyzed in a manner closely analogous to the type of analysis that one would use when assessing allusions in other authors: in other words, cases where the author enriches his text by importing the resonances of an earlier text, and inviting comparisons between them. However, while that is certainly the case, the fact that both Livy and his source are presumed to be representing reality offers other dimensions that significantly alter the terms in which the reader should view Livy's text.

When scholars and readers analyze Livy's handling of his sources, and above all his handling of Polybius, the one source who survives in extensive

quantities, the particular interest has inevitably been in the places where Livy can be shown to have made changes to the original. This is generally, and rightly, seen as representing significant personal input by Livy: he has taken an original text and made a direct decision to rewrite it in a particular way.

Let us take, as one famous example, Scipio's attack on Syphax and the Carthaginians at the opening of Book 30 (30.3–6). His source was Polybius 14.1–5, which Livy's narrative tracks very closely; however, he has made some important changes of detail to it. In both Polybius and Livy, Scipio deliberately spins out a set of negotiations that he has no intention of concluding, but does so simply in order to prepare his attack. However, in Polybius, he begins the attack proper by preparing a feint against Utica while the negotiations are still proceeding (14.2.1–4), whereas in Livy he properly waits until the negotiations have formally broken down before preparing for military action (30.4.10–11). Moreover, in Polybius, Scipio breaks off negotiations giving only the false pretext that he could not persuade the other Romans to go along with him (14.2.10–12), but Livy adds that Scipio took the opportunity to close negotiations when the Carthaginians, believing that the Romans were determined on peace, suddenly made a series of unreasonable demands that they had not previously insisted on (30.4.8–10). Both of these are obviously designed to cast Scipio's character in a better light in a situation in which, on Polybius' account, he allowed strategy to trump honest dealing entirely (Levene 2010, 233–234).

The fact that the motives for Livy's changes to Polybius here are relatively transparent should not, however, mean that the analysis of his narrative ends here. First, we need to remember that, for the reasons set out in the preceding text, Livy is not making these changes covertly: he is expecting at least some of his readership to have a good knowledge of Polybius' text, and accordingly to recognize that Livy has made some crucial alterations to the original.

Second, the fact that both Polybius and Livy are describing (or purporting to describe) something that actually happened means that Livy, in making these changes, is also making a statement about his view of reality: he is suggesting that Scipio genuinely did act (relatively) honorably in his dealings with Syphax and the Carthaginians, and, accordingly, that Polybius was wrong to have suggested otherwise. This does not necessarily mean that Livy had (or thought he had) direct evidence to contradict Polybius' account: he could well have made the changes simply on the assumption that it “must have been” the way he says, given his prior assumptions about Scipio's character and the way in which the Second Punic War was fought (Woodman 1988, 93; though see also Pelling 1990, 35–52; Feichtinger 1992; and Levene 2010, 385–388, for some important qualifications). However, either way, this, as with every other change that Livy makes to Polybius, is a visible challenge to his predecessor's repeated claims to accuracy. Every change that Livy makes to Polybius is effectively a critique of his history, and a claim to have a more truthful

representation of reality than he did.

However, if changes to Polybius are a claim of superiority, suggesting that his account of the Second Punic War was flawed, then what of the places—such as the great bulk of the account of the attack on Syphax and the Carthaginians discussed earlier—where Livy does *not* change Polybius, but reproduces his account faithfully? We can, as before, treat this as an effective “allusion” to Polybius, which is expected to be recognized as such by some of his readers; and one might think that, in these terms, it makes little difference whether or not the allusion involves Livy making significant changes to Polybius. Either way Polybius is a presence in Livy's text, and either way he is there as a consequence of Livy's choice to incorporate him. Even if Livy chose not to change Polybius on a particular point, this is still a choice that Livy has made: he could have changed him, but decided not to. Hence, even details that are preserved intact from Polybius' original may be analyzed as if, in effect, they represented an original composition by Livy that incorporates elements of Polybius.

Yet, such a procedure depends on a counterfactual assumption: that Livy could indeed have chosen to change Polybius at these points. This, however, is questionable, given the claim to truth that Livy is making. For if changes to Polybius imply a view of reality (that Livy is presenting an account of history that is more accurate than Polybius'), then so too a failure to change Polybius' account implies that Livy is satisfied—and is prepared for the informed reader to know that he is satisfied—that Polybius was correct in the first place, and that his narrative, at least in those respects, required no change. In that case, a failure to change Polybius is not a “choice” at all in the usual sense, but rather is governed primarily by Livy's commitment to narrate history, and his judgment that Polybius' account is an accurate representation of history. His narrative is, in the first instance, generated by that prior ontological commitment, and having made that commitment, his only real choice is thus to maintain it in full rather than (e.g.) abridging it. That is not an entirely negligible choice, as can be seen from the fact that Livy sometimes chooses to skate fairly rapidly over certain things that his sources treated in more detail: for example, Polybius gives an extensive background to Philip V's decision to ally himself with Hannibal against Rome and hence begin the First Macedonian War (5.101–5); Livy summarizes Philip's reasoning in just a few lines (23.33.2–4). However, those are more the exception than the rule: in the overwhelming majority of places in the Third Decade where Polybius has a full account of an event relevant to Livy, and where Livy is employing him as a source, his overall narrative is at least as long as Polybius' was, even if many individual details may be suppressed or reworked. It appears that once the decision to draw on Polybius at all has been taken, Livy tends to reproduce the bulk of what he has to say fairly closely. And this may be presumed to reflect a judgment that Polybius' account to a large degree represented the

truth in the first place: hence Livy's reproduction of Polybius' narrative is formed not by a "choice" to reproduce it, but rather by his genre-based commitment to offer a true story.

Hence, while Livy's use of Polybius as a source may—and should—in many ways be analyzed as an "allusion" to Polybius closely analogous to the allusions familiar in other texts, in this key aspect it is radically different. Usually, speaking of an "allusion" implies an interpretable decision by the alluding author. For example, Virgil, describing the death of Turnus at the hands of Aeneas in the last lines of the *Aeneid*, manifestly alludes to (among other things) the death of Hector in the *Iliad*. This can be seen as Virgil's choice, not only because the scene of the death of Turnus is his own invention (that Aeneas killed Turnus was part of pre-Virgilian legend, but we know of no previous author who narrated it in Virgil's way), but also because, even if Virgil's scene turned out to be less original than we currently believe it to be, the specific linguistic and narrative devices by which he recalls Homer are entirely his. Accordingly, every detail of that allusion is open to interpretation as an authorial choice: the implicit comparisons between Hector and Turnus (and Achilles and Aeneas), the points where Virgil's allusions allow a close analogy between the two, and the points where in alluding he also suggests significant differences between them. All of these contribute to our understanding of how Virgil is seeking to present Aeneas and Turnus in this episode.

However, Livy's allusions to Polybius cannot be analyzed along those lines in cases where he incorporates Polybius' narrative unchanged, because here his narrative choices do not consist of independent authorial decisions. Take, for example, when Livy describes Scipio, when engaging in spurious negotiations as discussed earlier, sending spies to the enemy camp along with his envoys (30.4.1–3):

Along with the envoys whom he was sending to Syphax, he sent as their attendants senior centurions of demonstrated courage and prudence dressed as slaves, who, while the envoys were in conference, wandered through the camps, each spying out different things, all the approaches and exits, the situation and the shape both of the whole camps and of their parts, where the Carthaginians were living and where the Numidians, and how far Hasdrubal's camp was from the king's, and they at the same time got to know the manner of the outposts and the watches, whether they would be more vulnerable to an ambush by night or day.

This draws closely on Polybius 14.1.13:

At these times Scipio always used to despatch with his envoys both some of his political and some of the military men, dressed as filthy lowly people in slave costume, in order to spy out and inspect in safety the approaches and exits to each of the encampments.

Livy has not simply taken over Polybius uncritically here. He has, for example, expanded (presumably on grounds of general probability) the range of things that the spies are looking for, and he also changes (perhaps on similar grounds) Polybius' pragmatic description of the two sets of spies (political and military) to instead suggest that they were selected for their personal virtue. Either of these changes may be recognized by the reader, and may be interpreted as Livy's critical (if minor) reworking of Polybius' vision of the past, as described earlier. However, on the main substance of what Scipio is said to have done, he follows Polybius entirely and openly. This is an allusion to Polybius in the terms set out in the preceding text; but we cannot, as we do in the otherwise comparable case of Virgil, say that the resulting picture of Scipio is Livy's own. Scipio's decision to send spies to the encampment and his decision to dress the spies as slaves are even more important as a key to understanding the narrative and the portrait of Scipio within it, yet they are not Livy's creation, but Polybius', and Livy expects readers to recognize them as such. And the fact that he has left them unchanged suggests not that he is reading Scipio in a particular way, but that he is transmitting Polybius' narrative as a true account of reality.

Hence, to attempt to construct an overall interpretation of "Livy's Scipio" out of the allusions to and changes to Polybius is impossible. The changes do show Livy's own input into the portrait of Scipio, yet they are only a small part of the portrait of Scipio in Livy's narrative, most of which derives from Polybius (and other authors), and is included because Livy thought it to be true: its details are outside Livy's control. "Livy's Scipio" does not exist as a creation of Livy, and cannot be meaningfully interpreted as such. Instead, it is derived from a combination of a number of things: aspects of Scipio that are Livy's own invention or reconstruction, aspects of Scipio that are based on earlier sources but which rewrite them with a new slant, and aspects of Scipio that are similarly based on earlier sources but which are incorporated unchanged from those sources. Only the first two of these can plausibly be seen as Livy's own; the third, which is by far the dominant portion of his narrative, is the creation of his sources (or, more precisely, a combination of his sources and the earlier sources from which they themselves may have derived their material).

It is admittedly reasonable that, especially in light of the argument that Livy expects at least some of his readers to recognize the sources of his narrative and to interpret his narrative as "allusions" to those sources, we should give especial interpretative weight to changes that he makes to them, which he intends those readers to mark. Nevertheless, the Scipio of Livy's narrative is not Livy's. Livy's account of Scipio, as with every other aspect of Livy's narrative, is a composite made up of details that were composed at different periods by different authors; and the proper way to analyze it is one that will take into account its composite nature, and will interpret the narrative as an

artifact of a long period of Roman (and Greek) cultural production rather than of a single author, time, or place. Allusions by Livy to his sources, as with many of Livy's other allusions, differ fundamentally from allusions in other genres by the fact that they are related to an external reality that Livy is seeking to reproduce more or less faithfully. Understanding their nature has the most profound implications for what it means to write and read history in the ancient world.

Cross-References

See CHAPTER 30: LIVY, POLYBIUS, AND THE GREEK EAST (BOOKS 31–45)

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Chapter 17

The Composition of the *Ab Urbe Condita*: The Case of the First Pentad

Ann Vasaly

In the preface to the *Ab Urbe Condita* (AUC), which functions as a kind of “reader’s guide” to the work, Livy claims a profound value for his work. Addressing the reader directly, he asserts that, by studying the past, both “you and your republic” will learn vital lessons concerning what practices to imitate and what to avoid (*Praef.* 9–10). Moreover, Livy suggests that these lessons will be neither recondite nor difficult to fathom, since readers will be able to see paradigmatic illustrations of every sort “placed on a shining monument” (*Praef.* 10: “*in inlustri posita monumento*”). Earlier in the preface, Livy uses the term “*monumenta*” to mean historical writing (*Praef.* 6), a usage common in the late republic. Here, unaccompanied by the qualifying phrases normally employed with such metaphorical expressions, Livy imagines historical writing (*monumenta*) as a physical monument (*monumentum*), and the “apprehension” of historical writing (*cognitio rerum [gestarum]*) as comparable to “looking upon” (*intueri*) a monument on which illustrations of exemplary events “are placed.” Unlike Vergil, who, in the contemporaneous prologue to the third book of the *Georgics* (13–39), describes a future epic honoring Octavian as a marble temple adorned with images, Livy does not specify the form of the monument that he has in mind, but the metaphor encourages the reader to consider questions about his great work analogous to those one might ask about a physical monument: How has the author arranged his illustrations for the observing audience? What makes them perspicuous? What divisions and subdivisions are discernable? And how is the meaning of the work created, communicated, and/or reinforced through its structure? This chapter will discuss possible answers to these questions as they relate to the first pentad; at the end, I will briefly explore the degree to which the conclusions reached about the first pentad might apply to Livy’s other extant books.

The Separability of the Pentad

While the preface to Book 1 helps to guide our understanding of what is to come, the preface to Book 6 looks back to reveal several key aspects of the account we have just read. Here, Livy declares that what follows will be different from what came before, which the author says he has “laid out in five books” (6.1.1). It will be different, first, because its content will be more historically reliable. Events in the earlier books, because of their “extreme

antiquity,” appear “scarcely visible”—such as objects seen from a great distance. In the far-off times covered by the first five books, few events were committed to writing, the “single trustworthy memorial of the past,” and even such written records (*monumenta*) as existed, were for the most part destroyed in the fire associated with the Gallic sack of the city (6.1.2).

The clear division that Livy seems to draw here between the first five books, with their historically unverifiable contents, and the more trustworthy material that follows proves to be an artificial construct, however, since the events recorded in Books 6 through 10 are very like those that precede them.

Although there are fewer reports of supernatural occurrences, these books include a good number of instances in which Livy finds it impossible to choose among the competing versions he found in his sources (Forsythe 1999). Concerning Livy's attitude to the unreliability of the tradition, T. J. Luce (1971, 301) has written: “Quite clearly he considered that this applied with equal force to events after the actual founding: in fact, down to the sack, and in gradually diminishing measure thereafter.” No bright line, then, exists between events before and after the Gallic sack in this respect, and the reason for Livy's claim at the beginning of Book 6 that his reader was now entering a period that would be far “clearer” and “more certain” (6.1.3) appears to be his desire to emphasize the structural isolation of the first pentad.

At the end of the preface to Book 6, Livy mentions another way in which the earlier books may be partitioned from those that follow: Livy chronicles a city that had been destroyed but now “through a second beginning, was reborn from the roots—so to speak—more abundantly and more fruitfully” (6.1.3: “*ab secunda origine velut ab stirpibus laetius feraciusque renatae urbis*”). Here, Livy uses a botanical metaphor that echoes the preface to Book 2 and characterizes the previous books as a cycle from birth to destruction and rebirth, thus envisioning the first pentad as a thematically coherent whole. Indeed, a number of links between the beginning and end of the pentad strongly reinforce this sense, none more so than the portrayal of Camillus, the heroic conqueror of Veii and liberator of Rome from the Gauls, as “*Romulus ac parens patriae conditorque alter urbis*” (5.49.7: “Romulus and father of his country and a second founder of the city”).

The Structure of Books 1, 3, and 5

This explicit acknowledgment by Livy of an intimate connection between the structure and content of the first pentad tends to be accepted by modern commentators as artistically admirable but unsurprising. In fact, it opens the door to a whole range of interpretive questions about the relationship of form and meaning that would not previously have been asked about a historiographical work. Awareness of the thematic coherence of the pentad as a whole inevitably encourages the reader to inquire what relationship exists

between form and subject *within* the books into which Livy divides his account of Rome “*ab condita urbe...ad captam urbem eandem*” (6.1.1). If we begin at the level of the book, the coherent structure of the first volume is readily apparent, as it deals with the self-contained period of the Roman monarchy and is set apart from what follows by a new preface at the beginning of Book 2, inaugurating Livy's account of the Roman republic. The overriding structuring principle here is the reign of each king, and, although Livy does not allot an equal length to each, he divides various innovations among the kings in order to build up a picture of the productive growth of the state over time (Luce 1977, 234–249). He has also mitigated (see Ogilvie 1965, 184–186), or even eliminated, in the case of Ancus Marcius (cf. Dion. Hal. 3.35.3–4), certain negative elements in the tradition in order to illustrate the idea of the *educatio* of the Roman people as taking place under the direction of a series of just kings who could be considered successive *conditores* of the state (2.1.2), while casting Tarquinius Superbus at the end of the book as the fated tyrant whose appearance galvanizes the Romans to overthrow the monarchical system itself at precisely the moment at which they become capable of handling the civic responsibilities of *libertas* (2.1.4–6).

The internal structure of Book 5, although different from that of Book 1, has also been carefully and deliberately constructed, as was recognized by E. Burck (1964, 109–136; with Luce 1971). The book as a whole falls into two, roughly equal, parts: (a) the events leading to, including, and immediately following the sack of Veii by the Romans (1–32); and (b) the events leading to, including, and immediately following the sack of Rome by the Gauls (33–55). The speech of Appius Claudius Crassus at the beginning and that of Camillus at the end bracket the volume, while the connecting point between parts (a) and (b) is found within the story of Camillus, who—as conqueror of Veii and eventual liberator of Rome from the Gauls—has the leading role in both narratives. The account of his exile in 391 BC due to controversy about the booty from Veii is the final scene in the Veian sequence; and, by removing the one man who, according to Livy, might have saved the city from the invading Gauls (5.32.8–33.1), the same event opens the second part of the book, which will culminate in the sack and occupation of Rome, its eventual liberation by Camillus, and Camillus' oratorical affirmation of the sacredness of the site of the city. After summarizing this sequence, T. J. Luce (1971) goes on to show that the second part of this narrative is itself subdivided into two parts: the first tracing the series of disastrous events, including the defeat at the Allia, that leads to the Gallic occupation of all of Rome except the Capitoline Hill, and the second depicting Rome's moral recovery and military victory over the Gauls.

While Book 1 is organized by a sequential movement from Romulus to Tarquinius Superbus and Book 5 is divided into two roughly equal parts,

Book 3 revolves around the decemvirate of 451–449 BC, which occupies the center of this, the middle book of the pentad (and which also stands at the chronological center of the 120 years of republican history covered by Books 2 through 5). Drawing on the botanical metaphor introduced in the preface to Book 2, Livy presents the creation of the decemvirate as a fundamental change in the Roman constitution comparable to the institution of the monarchy and the republic, despite its short duration (3.33.1–2). The historian might have told the story of the decemvirate as the culmination of the successful struggle by the lower classes for codification of the laws, but his narrative is instead the story of “*res publica amissa et restituta*”: the loss and recovery of freedom by the state. Despite the fact that it is the result of years of agitation by the plebeians, the great achievements of the first decemviral board become simply a prelude to the account of the degeneration of the institution into a tyranny in its second year when—according to Livy’s narrative—the enslavement of Rome is brought about by the decision of the plebeians to hand over unchecked power to Appius and his fellow decemvirs (3.37.1).

As E. Burck pointed out in 1934 (1964, 8), awareness of the structure of Book 3 is crucial for understanding the architecture of the pentad as a whole. At 90 OCT pages, it is by far the longest of the pentad, the other books extending over 72 (Book 1), 77.5 (Book 2), 76 (Book 4), and 70.5 (Book 5) pages. Books 2 and 4 both cover 42 years, respectively, while Book 3 spans half this number (22 years) and Book 5 covers just 14 years (see Stadter 2009, 112–114, for further statistics). As has been recognized, the author’s desire to isolate Book 1 (the monarchy) and to cover certain events in Books 3 (the decemvirate) and 5 (the sack of Veii and Rome) in detail apparently caused him to pack a large number of consular years into the intervening space available. Both form and content, then, lead to the conclusion that Livy has made Books 1, 3, and 5 the highpoints of the pentad. Each revolves around the theme of *libertas*, which, in turn, is intimately connected to the idea of the city’s foundation and refoundation over time (see, e.g., Kraus 1994a; Miles 1995, 75–109): Book 1 depicts the long maturation of the Roman people under the monarchy that prepares them for the death of the monarchy and the creation of a government “of laws rather than of men” (2.1.1); Book 3 shows the reversion to a tyranny similar to that of Tarquinius Superbus under the decemvirs, necessitating a second revolution against autocratic power and a “new birth of freedom”; and Book 5 traces the loss of freedom to an external enemy, the destruction of the city “from the roots” (6.1.3), and its recovery and rebirth. The more elaborate treatment of Books 1, 3, and 5 does not mean that we find no evidence of careful organization in the intervening books; rather than deal with these books in detail, however, in the following pages, I will discuss briefly three of the more prominent structuring techniques that are found not only in them but throughout the pentad.

The Annalistic Framework and Narrative Episodes

Two principles of organization are fundamental to Livy's style: *repetitio* and *variatio*. Repetition of various elements, many of them peculiar to historiography, creates structure and predictability, while variation keeps repetitive patterns from exhausting the attention of the reader and allows instances of deviation to take on special significance. The framework on which Livy constructs his history of the post-regal state is the consular year, as he announces at the beginning of Book 2 (1.1: "*annuos magistratus*"). Within each consular year, certain factual material recurs, often reported by Livy in unornamented prose, such as names of magistrates, their particular responsibilities, military campaigns, prodigies, temple dedications, deaths. A good deal of scholarly controversy revolves around identifying the sources of this material, but what concerns us here is what and how it is included in the pentad. While in later books the inclusion of such "archival" material and its placement is sufficiently regular so as to encourage discussion of variation, this is not the case in the early books (Rich 2009). Here, only the announcement of the new consuls at the beginning of each year occurs with great regularity. Similarly, in the later books, an often repeated yearly sequence of internal–external–internal events can be distinguished, but, in the first pentad, Livy's chief subjects—military campaigns and domestic upheavals (6.1.1: "*foris bella domi seditiones*")—might be treated at any point after the announcement of the new consular year. As J. Rich (2009) has demonstrated, the most predictable aspect of the year-accounts in Livy's early books is their extreme variability in content, disposition of material, and length.

Against this annalistic background, Livy plots the vividly imagined stories that bring the history to life, and these two structuring principles often work in tension. Some annual accounts consist only in the consuls' names (e.g., 2.15.1; 2.19.1; 2.21.1). Other years neatly accommodate a single, connected episode, such as the story of the rise and fall of Spurius Cassius (2.41). A few of the more extensive multi-year narratives, however, partially or completely supersede the annalistic structure. The decemvirate (3.33–58), for instance, coincides with the suspension of consular elections, and the decemvirs' determination to retain power creates a new and potentially open-ended structure. The story of Marcius Coriolanus, which dominates the center of Book 2 (33.4–40.12) and extends over the years 493–487 BC, threatens to overwhelm the annalistic frame as well. In the first stage of the narrative, Livy states that Coriolanus' renown in the war against the Volsci was so great that, if not for a commemorative marker, the consul Postumus Cominius' role in the war would have been completely forgotten (2.33.9). In the narrative that follows, Livy focuses steadily on Coriolanus. The consuls become mere names recorded at the beginning of each year, and, in the center of the episode (490 and 489: 2.38–39), even that information is omitted.

Such episodes (the so-called *Einzel Erzählungen*), then, through the variety of their presentation—short/long, episodic/connected in a coherent narrative arc—create within a book or group of books structures that sometimes are subordinated to, sometimes replace that of, year-by-year accounts. Their placement, relative visibility, and relationship to one another on Livy's *monumentum* guide the reader's understanding of the text by signaling which narratives and actors are most important, and by pointing to other narratives and actors with which they are most revealingly compared. We might see an analogy to this technique in Vergil's ekphrasis in Book 8 of the shield of Aeneas, with its central and surrounding images of Roman history (see also, remarks of Kraus 1997, 58, for Livy's text as a physical monument requiring a “map”).

Stereotypical *Personae*

Many of the actors in Livy's extended narratives in the first pentad appear to readers not as individuals but as repetitive types: the brave centurion, the rabble-rousing tribune, the arrogant patrician, the innocent maiden, the heroic general, etc. Such types, in turn, are often identified with various *gentes*, and Livy's deployment of these “gentile stereotypes” suggests that he has used them, as with other repetitive elements, as structuring tools. The Appii Claudii and the Quinctii of Books 2 through 4 provide the best examples of this strategy.

The traditional opposition in action and character between an Appius Claudius and a Quinctius is introduced in Book 2. The rise and fall of Livy's second Appius Claudius, whose arrogance, stubbornness, and hostility toward the plebeians are said to duplicate those of his father, forms the last extended narrative of the book (56.5–61.9). At various points in this narrative, Appius' failure as domestic and military leader is contrasted with the success of Capitolinus in both spheres. In the key central episode of the story, mutual hostility between Appius and his men during a military campaign is contrasted with the close cooperation between Capitolinus and his soldiers. The latter return victorious and grateful to the senate for giving them a “father” rather than the “master” who had commanded the other army (2.60.3: “*sibi parentem alteri exercitui dominum datum*”).

This contrast in Book 2 between a divisive and cruel Appius and an admirable and “moderate” Quinctius (2.60.1: *natura...lenior*) becomes a major structuring element in Book 3, but here several Quinctii narratives surround, rather than are integrated within, the central story of Appius Claudius, decemvir in 451–449 BC (Vasaly 1987 and 2002; on the probable identity of Ap. Claudius II and Appius the decemvir, see, e.g., Ogilvie 1965, 376–377, 383, 386; Wiseman 1979, 77–79; Broughton 1986, 45–47). In these episodes, the character and actions of Quinctius Capitolinus and Quinctius Cincinnatus

mirror one other (see also 3.3; 3.19–21; 3.26–29; 3.66–70; and 4.8–10, 13–16). Each plays the role of heroic savior of the state in the middle of military threat from without and panic and discord within. Motivated by concern for the polity as a whole rather than self-aggrandizement or factional interests, both are portrayed as successful generals who are also able to create internal consensus through a severe but honest form of rhetorical appeal. The most famous Quinctian episode depicts Cincinnatus being called from his small farm to take up the dictatorship. After leading Roman troops to victory, he immediately resigns power. These events, in turn, precede a key moment in the story of the decemvirate, the decision to send a delegation to study the laws of Greek states (3.31.7–8), since it is after the return of this commission that the first decemvirate is inaugurated and the tale of Appius Claudius' rise and fall begins.

Livy did not choose to end the third book of the *AUC*, as might be predicted, with the fall of the tyrannical Appius or with the military and legislative victories of Valerius and Horatius, patrician champions of the plebeians; rather, the historian extends the already-lengthy book to include the fourth consulship of Quinctius Capitolinus in 446 BC. Taking office in the midst of domestic strife and external military threat, Capitolinus delivers a powerful oration to the assembled citizens (discussed further in the following text). The speech is enthusiastically praised by the senate and brings about a renewal of civic harmony. It is, then, Quinctian domestic and military leadership, moral integrity, and success in fostering discipline and civic harmony in the midst of panic and crisis that both introduces and constitutes almost the last images in a book that centers around the ambition, violence, lust, and civil discord associated with Appius Claudius the decemvir.

Although there is compelling evidence that Livy did not originate the stereotypes of the Appii Claudii as proud and abusive opponents of the plebeians (see, e.g., Wiseman 1997, 57–103; Oakley 2005, 357–361, 665–669; Richardson 2012, 26–30), or of the Quinctii as successful generals who were also able to quell domestic upheaval on several occasions (see, e.g., Piganiol 1973; Gagé 1974; Forsythe 1994, 237–238; 2005, 206–207), two aspects of his treatment appear innovative. First, he has cast both Capitolinus and Cincinnatus as interchangeable *personae* who instantiate the character and aims of the “anti-Appius”: an exemplary patrician leader whose exercise of a rigorous but just *auctoritas* creates *concordia* rather than disunity. Second, by placing the Quinctian narratives in Book 3 in such a way as to dominate the narrative space around the central story of the tyrannical decemvirate of Appius Claudius, Livy reinforces, through a kind of ring structure, the didactic goal that he had announced in the preface—the clear and perspicuous demonstration of what is to be imitated and what is to be avoided.

Speech as a Structuring Element

The form of Livy's speeches in the *AUC* has long been a focus of scholarly study, and although many have understood that long speeches in direct discourse occupy key places in the text, only more recently have scholars begun to study speech acts of all sorts as one of Livy's most important strategies for creating structure, and thus meaning, in the pentad (see, e.g., Walsh 1961, 229–231; Treptow 1964, 31–33, 36–37; Ogilvie 1965, 78–79, 428–449, 516–517, 742; Forsythe 1999, 78–86; Oakley 1997, 114 and *ad loc.*; Smith 2010). This subject includes the short utterances, many handed down over the generations in history or drama, that add a memorable and vivid element to the climax or end of a narrative, particularly in the first two books, such as Romulus' boast over the dead Remus (1.7.2: “Thus [die] whoever else might leap over my walls!”), or Mucius Scaevola's exclamation to Lars Porsenna before he thrusts his right hand into the fire (2.12.13: “Observe this, to understand how cheaply those who look to great glory regard the body!”). These proverbial sayings punctuate the text much as the Sister's Beam, the statue of Cloelia, the tombs of the Horatii, or other monuments dot the Roman urban and suburban landscape, bringing to the reader the pleasure of recognition and association. Much less frequent than short utterances are the speeches of medium length, often beginning in *oratio obliqua* and ending in *oratio recta*, such as that of Appius Claudius Inregillensis in Book 2 (29.9–12), or those of Q. Fabius (9.7–13) and Quinctius Cincinnatus (19.4–12) in the first part of Book 3 (for statistics, see Forsythe 1999, 78–79).

Although there is much to say about both these categories of speech, Livy's use of longer orations is especially revealing since—unlike in the history of Dionysius of Halicarnassus—extended speeches in direct discourse are rare in the *AUC*, each serving as a key marker of structure and meaning. The first of only four in the pentad is delivered by T. Quinctius Capitolinus and placed at the end of Book 3. It vividly characterizes the traits of the Quinctian *persona*, while balancing the form and echoing the themes of the shorter speech assigned to Quinctius Cincinnatus earlier in the book (19.4–12). As was true of the earlier speech, Capitolinus' appeal here is based on his uncompromising assessment of the ills of the state and his arguments of the need for unity and action in the face of military danger from without. This oration is, surprisingly, approved by all and produces enthusiastic support for a military campaign against the enemy. As mentioned in the preceding text, it thus creates a final, hopeful vision of civic unity and principled patrician leadership at the end of a book largely devoted to the fracturing of the state under the corrupt Appius Claudius the decemvir.

The speech of the tribune Canuleius at the beginning of Book 4 supporting intermarriage between patricians and plebeians and admission of plebeians to the consulship is structurally a companion piece to that of Quinctius Capitolinus at the end of the preceding book, providing an example of

plebeian leadership and rhetoric complementary to that of the patrician Capitolinus. Despite the fact that it embodies a very different vision of Roman society than had Capitolinus' speech, Livy signals his approval of its contents and his disapproval of the preceding speech by Canuleius' opponents. He makes the latter, assigned simply to the "consuls," shorter than that of Canuleius and renders it in indirect speech (4.2), although the latter is not necessarily a sign of disapproval by the author (Forsythe 1999, 79). Clearly, the contents of this speech in opposition become increasingly objectionable as it progresses, at one point comparing intermarriage with the plebeians to mating promiscuously with beasts (4.2.6). In contrast, Canuleius' speech to the people in *oratio recta* is meant to elicit the approval of the reader, both through his development of the idea that the plebeians must be treated by the patricians as fellow human beings by allowing intermarriage and, second, through his powerful use of the rhetoric of *novitas* in arguing that a great state must open the path to power to all those of outstanding *virtus* (see Ogilvie 1965, 535 *ad* 3.17; Miles 1995, 150–151 on Livy's use here of *topoi* associated with the *novus homo*).

This sympathetic portrayal of a tribune's demands for an expansion of plebeian rights represents a striking change in tone from the end of Book 3, in which much of Capitolinus' speech had been devoted to deploring demagogic tribunician appeals to the masses, and it is probable that Livy changed sources between the end of Book 3 and the beginning of Book 4 (see, e.g., Ogilvie 1965, 528; Forsythe 2005, 227). The effect of this decision was to radically recast for the reader the ideal role of plebeians within the state at the beginning of Book 4. Instead of embodying simply the freedom from abuse, which Horatius and Valerius advise as the proper goal for the plebeian secessionists of the preceding book (3.53.7–9), the speech introduces with approval the unprecedented idea of a plebeian right to *dignitas* (4.6.11), as well as to an active role in the governance of the state for the most deserving of their class. The (partial) acceptance of both these demands by the patricians leads, in turn, to a temporary reestablishment of concord and points the way to the final resolution of the Conflict of the Orders in the second pentad with plebeian admission to the consulship.

Book 5 begins and ends with speeches of almost equal length, the first by Appius Claudius Crassus, and the second by Marcus Furius Camillus. Appius Claudius Crassus is described as long-practiced in struggles with the plebeians (5.2.13), and the reader therefore expects him to exhibit a stereotypically Claudian temperament, resulting in exacerbation of class antagonisms. Yet, his appeal to the people to reject the arguments of the tribunes, who oppose the senate's demand that the siege of Veii be extended throughout the winter months, meets with a surprising degree of popular approval and, together with the news that the enemy had burned the Roman siege works at Veii, produces unanimity of feeling and an outpouring of patriotic support for the war (5.7).

Livy's unexpected use of a Claudian speech to usher in, at the beginning of Book 5, one of the rare scenes of consensus in the pentad seems to signal to the reader that the Romans have now achieved—if only temporarily—the civic cooperation and harmony that will be required to accomplish their great victory over Veii, the subject of the first half of the book. Camillus' equally lengthy speech, probably the most studied of all Livy's speeches, forms an appropriate end, not only to this book, but also to the pentad as a whole. His arguments for the sanctity of the site of Rome and his testament to the civic-religious rites that formed the core of Roman political life exemplify the pious attitude that had led to Roman victories in general and, specifically, to the revival of Roman fortunes after the Gallic occupation, culminating in the retaking of the city; at the same time, they tie the end of Book 5 to the account of the founding and the assertions of Rome's divinely fated destiny in Book 1.

Pentadic Structure of the Remaining Extant Books

The effort Livy makes to isolate the first five books from what follows should caution us against assuming that the same architecture characterizes succeeding books of the history. Although Book 6 begins with a new preface, it is not immediately obvious that the end of Book 10, recounting the Third Samnite War through the year 293 BC, represents a major division between a second and third pentad, since the war continues into the (no longer extant) Book 11. (Those seeing no break after Book 10 include, for example, Syme 1959, 30; Briscoe 1971, 1; Wille 1973, 54–56; *contra*, for example, Walsh 1961, 5–8, and Stadter 2009, 99–100.) J. P. Lipovsky (1981), in his valuable study of the second pentad, finds there many of the same structural strategies as those identified in the first five books: the use of the last book (10) as a culmination of themes developed throughout the pentad; thematic coherence and distinctive structures within individual books; and the use of the central book (8) to define a crucial moment in the overall development, both in the military and domestic spheres, traced by the pentad. S. P. Oakley (1997, 112–114; cf. Kraus 1994b, 24–27), author of a magisterial commentary on the pentad, is less certain, although he compares Livy's complex organization of Book 6 to Book 1, in addition to noting that significant events begin and end Book 9 and that the final military campaigns of Book 10 appear to create an (artificially?) “grand finale.” The continuing scholarly disagreement on the structure of the second pentad is, in any case, surely evidence that its architecture is a good deal less obvious than that of the first.

The length of this chapter precludes anything but a cursory consideration of the degree to which Books 11–45 (of which 21–45 are extant) exhibit structural strategies similar to those of the first pentad. Most scholars agree that Books 6–45 were planned by Livy in some combination of groups of 5, 10, or 15 books. (See Stadter 2009, 91–92, 116–117, for the chief hypotheses on the structure of these, as well as the other books, of the *AUC*.) The most

basic issue is whether Livy arranged these books in pentads. In the preface to Book 31, Livy separates the preceding books into two groups of 15: the first (1–15) covering the period “from the foundation of the city” to the consul “who first began hostilities against the Carthaginians”; the second (16–30), from that point to the end of Second Punic War. Books 16–20 must therefore constitute a pentad dedicated to the First Punic War, since the extant Books 21–30 cover the Second Punic War. This decade, covering the Second Punic War (Books 21–30), appears to fall into two groups of five books. Although no new preface begins Book 26, the focus on Capua at the beginning of this book is a turning point, dividing the 10 books into one pentad dedicated to Hannibal's successes (21–25) and one tracing Rome's recovery and eventual victory (26–30). This division is further supported by Burck's observation (1971, 23–24) that Livy departs from Polybius' chronology in attributing certain Carthaginian successes and Roman reversals to 212 BC (in Book 25), and Roman successes and Carthaginian reversals to 211 BC (in Book 26).

Book 31 begins, as mentioned, with a new preface that looks back on the previous books, and then turns to the war with Macedon (31.1.6: “*pacem punicam bellum Macedonicum excepit*”) and King Philip V. The death of the latter occurs at the end of Book 40, suggesting a certain coherence to these 10 books. Although the first five books focus on the war with Philip, while the second group of five turns to the war against Antiochus, a pentadic structure is not certain. Neither the beginning of Book 41 nor any of 46 is preserved, so the presence or absence of a preface at these points cannot help to establish whether Books 41–45 constitute a coherent whole. The fact that they span the reign of Philip's successor Perseus seems to point to their coherence within an overall 15-book structure (31–45) dealing with Roman expansion to the east. Moreover, since Livy himself (31.1.4) divides Books 1–30 into two groups of 15, the next 15 books (31–45) might also comprise a unit (argued by Luce 1977, 6–9, who recognizes division by pentads within these 15-book groups).

In the pentads just mentioned, Livy employs many complex structuring principles governing episodes within books, whole books, and groups of books. He does not, however, repeat the overall structure of the first pentad, since none of these later groups includes (as far as we know): a new proem beginning the book following the fifth, in which the author refers to the coherence of the preceding five books; a first, third, and fifth book containing key events in the development of an overall theme; a third book with a central episode—delineated by various structural strategies—forming the center of the pentad as a whole and constituting the most important event before the climactic fifth book (*pace* Lipovsky 1981 on the second pentad); or second and fourth books that show obvious signs of their structural function linking the first, third, and fifth books.

As far as we can tell, no one before Livy had ever created a work quite like the first pentad. Some sort of precedent might be argued to exist in

Herodotean ring composition, but nothing like the symmetrical construction of the books of the first pentad is to be found in Herodotus. Nor does Hellenistic Greek or earlier Latin historiography, as far as we know, provide a model for anything other than the thematic or chronological unity of individual books and the very general grouping of several books by subject (Vasaly 2002, 280, n. 13). If all six books of the *De re publica* survived, perhaps it would demonstrate that some of the structural strategies used by Livy were anticipated in Cicero's work of political theory. The closest parallels to Livian structure, however, are to be found not in prose but in poetry. Although little of Ennius' epic remains, the *Annales* seems to have included proems at the beginning of a number of books and a more elaborate "proem in the middle" at the beginning of Book 7 (Conte 2007; cf. Farrell 2008). In the works of poetry published not long before and at about the same time as Livy was writing his pentad—that is, in the years shortly before and after the battle at Actium—we find a preoccupation with creating poetry books distinguished by variation among individual poems and careful attention to the structural symmetry of the whole. Many include programmatic pieces at the beginning and summarizing pieces at the end, as well as special emphasis on the center. The works to which I am referring include Vergil's *Eclogues*, Horaces' *Satires* 1 and 2, Tibullus' book of 10 elegies, and the 22 poems of Propertius 1, especially the central group of 6–9 and 10–14, all of which—except the earlier *Eclogues* and *Satires* 1—were probably published between 30 and 27 BC. As far as multi-volume works are concerned, in the earlier *De rerum natura* of Lucretius and in Vergil's contemporaneous *Georgics*, we find the clear division of books by subject, introduction to the work as a whole, strongly marked beginnings and endings for individual books, and balance between the two halves that creates special emphasis on the middle of the work (see discussion and bibliography in Vasaly 2002; with Farrell 2007 and 2008 on Lucretius).

The most striking parallels between the poet and historian, however, come after the publication of the first pentad, with Vergil's *Aeneid*. Just as Livy places the most crucial events in the development of his major themes in Books 1, 3, and 5, and connects these, in turn, by books that create a context against which to view these events, so also, in the *Aeneid*, Vergil alternates between books that are more important to advancing the line of the narrative (the even-numbered books) and those that create a bridge to these key events (the odd-numbered books). And, as Livy used the center of a group of volumes as a crucial moment in the progress of the pentad as a whole, so one of the most striking aspects of Vergilian construction of the *Aeneid* is the focus on the end of Book 6, in which the early and later history of Rome, including the place of Augustus within that history, is foretold to Aeneas in the Underworld. While I am not claiming that Vergil needed to rely on Livy for these strategies, I would nevertheless see these correspondences as further evidence that both writers were responding to earlier poetic innovations

(including Vergil's own) in the architecture both of single books and multiple-volume works.

It is quite possible, then, that Livy was inspired by experiments in poetic book structure to use the means of creating form peculiar to his own genre (including those discussed in this chapter) to produce the unusual architecture of the earliest books, especially since the untrustworthy nature of the historical tradition allowed him to use a “free hand” (Luce 1971, 301) in constructing his historical *monumentum*. The application of poetic strategies of construction to the first pentad would hardly be surprising, given that Livy declares explicitly the poetic subject matter of the early stories (*Praef.* 6), that he begins the *AUC* with 4 feet of dactylic hexameter, that he ends the preface with an echo of an epic supplication to the gods for the success of his great venture (although accomplished through *praeteritio*), and that he goes on to imbue the early books with poetic diction and syntax.

Cross-References

See CHAPTER 11: LIVY'S HISTORICAL PHILOSOPHY; CHAPTER 18: READING LIVY'S BOOK 5

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Chapter 18

Reading Livy's Book 51

Stephen P. Oakley

Introduction

Book 5, as fine a book as Livy ever wrote, is his tale of two cities, Veii and Rome, and of the rise, fall, and rise again of one remarkable man. Veii will start as Rome's great rival, be defeated by her and be abandoned, and then will nearly rise again when some Romans wish to abandon their own city for her. Rome will start as Veii's equal, will defeat her, will herself be laid low by the Gauls, and will be rebuilt at the end of the book. Marcus Furius Camillus, who receives far more attention than any other individual in Books 2–10, defeats Veii, is sent into exile by hostile tribunes of the plebs,² wins even greater glory when he defeats the Gauls, and ushers in the climax of the book with his speech in Chapters 51–54.³

Structure

Livy organized Books 1–5 so that Book 5 not only ends with the climactic Gallic sack but begins at the beginning of the last and most important Veientine War. Chapters 1–23 deal with the events of 403–396 BC, of which the siege of Veii, finally stormed by Camillus in 396 BC (Chapters 19–23), is by far the most important. By a welcome coincidence, Camillus, introduced unobtrusively for the first time at 1.2, first holds important magisterial office in the year in which the war began.⁴ The political disagreements of patricians and plebeians provide the background to the book's military narrative. The capture of Veii provides the first climax of the book. Chapters 24–33.1 link the narratives that deal with the capture of the two cities and deal with the events of 395–391 BC, which are dominated by further bickering between patricians and plebeians; Camillus is involved in this because of his insistence, unwelcome to the plebeians, that Rome pays her dues to the gods. Chapters 24.5–25.3 introduce for the first time the desire of some plebeian leaders to move Rome to the site of Veii. Of the various campaigns narrated, the most important is that against the city of Falerii, which is defeated in 394 BC (26.1–15). At 32.7–9, the plebeians' hostility to Camillus leads to his being prosecuted and sent into exile. Chapters 33.1–6 describe the beginnings of the attack on Clusium by the Gauls. This leads promptly to Chapters 33.2–35.3, which are a digression on the origin and history of the Cisalpine Gauls. Since digressions are a well-known historiographical device for marking out the most important section of a book or work, this one may be seen to prepare for

Chapters 35.4–55, which contain the events of just 390 BC—that is, the Roman provocation of the Gauls, the Gallic victory over the Romans at the Allia, the Gallic capture of all the city except the Capitoline Hill, the recall of Camillus from exile, his victory over the Gauls, and his powerful speech against the renewed idea of moving Rome to the site of Veii. Alternatively, the placing of the digression just after reference to the Gauls imposes a delay that may be thought to heighten the tension for readers familiar with the tale. The recovery of Rome from the Gauls makes a second climax to the book, capped by the speech of Camillus, with whose greatest triumph the book ends.

Besides, Veii, Rome, and Camillus, three other themes have prominence: the meaning of being Roman (which Livy examines more searchingly in this book than any other); the place of religion (which is more prominent in this book than any other) in public life; and the best way for those in public life to behave and for a state to be governed.

The Opening Two Episodes

The book starts with a programmatic statement: “*pace alibi parata Romani Veique in armis erant tanta ira odioque ut uictis finem adesse appareret*” (although peace had been achieved everywhere else, Rome and Veii had armed themselves with such anger and loathing that it was obvious that the end was nigh for whichever was defeated). At once, the dominant theme of the first portion of the book is introduced and the destruction of one of the two cities is foreshadowed. Livy remarks (1.2–3) that both nations changed the style of their leadership: the Romans increased the number of the consular tribunes from six to an unprecedented eight, while the people of Veii abandoned elective magistracies in favor of a king. One might have expected Livy to show an unambiguous Roman contempt for kingship, and indeed, at §§3–7, he does tell of the “*superbia*” (arrogance) of this king. Yet, matters are not so simple: we learn also that the Veientes had grown tired of the discord caused by electoral competition; and another theme of the book will be the difficulties that Rome experienced either when the patricians and the plebeians squabbled or when her consular tribunes disagreed. The first chapter also introduces the prominent theme of religion (we are told that the Etruscans were (§6) “a people before all others obsessed with religious rituals [*religionibus*], especially because it excelled in performing them”) and two lesser themes: the abandonment of Veii by the other cities of Etruria, and the nature of the Roman fortifications at Veii, with one line facing the city and hemming it in, the other facing outward lest any help should come from Etruria.

At 2.1, we are told that, in 403 BC, the Romans built winter quarters for their troops for the first time. The tribunes of the plebs object to the troops' being employed all the year round and challenge the authority of the patricians and

the senate. Internal discord, a constant theme of Books 2–4, thus reappears at the beginning of the fifth. Livy's account of the conflict is centered on two speeches: the first, in indirect speech, comprises the objections of the tribunes to the patrician policy (2.2–12); the second, in direct speech, is the rebuttal of the previous speech by Appius Claudius Crassus (3.2–6.17). The speech of Appius is notably long and balances the magnificent speech given to Camillus at the end of the book (51.1–54.7). In general, Livy was disposed favorably neither to radical politicians as a class nor to early tribunes of the plebs in particular, and here an authorial comment warns the reader that the motives of these tribunes were selfish (2.2: “*iam diu nullam nouandi res causam inuenientibus*” [for a long time now finding no pretext for stirring up trouble]; and the juxtaposition (§§2–3) of the verbs “*prosiliunt*” [leap forward] and “*sollicitant*” [unsettle] emphasizes their undignified haste [note in particular the exaggerated movement implied by “*prosiliunt*”]). As one would expect, the tribunes impute false motives to the patricians, such as introducing service in the winter to keep the plebs away from politics and especially tribunician assemblies (§5). Their plight is viewed as exile (§4), an ironic foreshadowing of what will befall Camillus, as worse than that endured by the Veientes (§§6–7), and as a form of slavery (§8);⁵ the consular tribunes are accused of exercising *regnum* (“autocratic rule”) (§8)—which they do not but from which Rome's opponents really do suffer. Livy cleverly effects a link with the novelty of having eight consular tribunes in that the year: since all eight had been patricians and not one a plebeian, the tribunes of the plebs say that the plebs had got what they deserved for not voting for their leaders. Alert readers will both see that the argument is fundamentally selfish and notice an irony: the patricians *had* sometimes started a war to stop civil unrest; therefore, they are hardly in a position to complain if, on other occasions, their motives are impugned.⁶

The hostility of the Claudii to the plebs was a leitmotiv of Livy's first decade, and Livy alludes to this with the phrase that he uses to introduce Ap. Claudius Crassus (2.13): “a man already from his youth steeped in battles with the plebeians.” Livy recalls how this Appius had earlier (4.48.5–16) developed a skillful tactic for the dissolution of tribunician power but now describes him as not only clever but mature and experienced. The long speech characterizes this experience. Appius criticizes the tribunes of the plebs for favoring discord (3.2–10); points out that, by serving in the winter, the soldiers are merely earning their pay (4.1–8); he argues that the war should be waged in accordance with the dignity of the Roman people, that the huge labor involved in the creation of the siege-works facing two ways (as we have seen, a theme of this part of the book) should not be wasted, and that campaigning in the winter was a military necessity (4.9–5.12); and, finally, describes the need for maintenance of discipline in the army (6.1–17). Several passing themes are important. One is “*concordia*” ([civil] harmony), found at 3.5 and 3.10. This ideal, much praised in Livy's history, is given prominence at the beginning of

the book, being mentioned also at 7.10, 9.14, 12.12, and 18.3—that is, five out of 72 occurrences of the term in Livy are concentrated in these 18 chapters.⁷ However, there is irony in Appius' use of the idea at 3.10: “*quae si perpetua concordia sit, quis non spondere ausit maximum hoc imperium inter finitimos breui futurum esse?*” (And if this harmony were to be everlasting, who would not be so bold as to guarantee that among our neighbors this rule of ours would not soon become very great?). Appius was a hardline patrician, precisely the kind of man who in days gone by had been responsible for disrupting *concordia*; therefore, the sentiment and indeed the whole speech is in part devalued.⁸ However, the text also echoes the experiences of its first readers: they must often have believed during the civil wars that the state would collapse if *concordia* were not achieved; Livy's authorial voice says as much at the end of the digression on Alexander (9.19.17): the Romans will beat all their enemies, “if only the love of the peace in which we live and concern for civil harmony [*ciuilis...concordia*] should prove ever-lasting [*perpetuus*].”

Perseverance (“*perseuerantia*”) is another important theme. Appius says (4.10): “By God! Sheer disgrace ought to compel perseverance if nothing else does,” and he reiterates the theme at 4.12, 5.7, and 6.8. This last reference comes in the first passage in the book that draws attention to the important question of what it means to be Roman (6.7–8):

Or do you think that the judgment of the world which will follow from this affair is of only passing importance, namely whether our neighbors will think that the Roman people is such (“*populum Romanum eum esse putent*”) that if a city has sustained its first very brief attack it should fear nothing thereafter, or rather will our repute induce the fear that our army cannot be removed from a city that it has besieged by either an exhausting and long assault or the violence of winter, that it knows no outcome of war other than victory, and that it does not wage wars in a rush but rather with perseverance.

Appius speaks primarily of the siege of Veii, but there is also a general reference to Rome's neighbors; from this war, they will learn what kind of a nation Rome is. The authorial voice never endorses Appius' view, and Appius was wrong to predict (6.9) that Veii would succumb to “hunger and thirst” (accordingly, it is easier for anyone sympathetic to the plebeian cause to disregard his speech as a typical patrician utterance); but his words still resonate beyond their local context: perseverance in war was part of Romans' national myth, celebrated in particular by their successes against Pyrrhus and Hannibal.⁹ Perseverance was needed as the war at Veii dragged inconclusively on, but eventually it brought its reward.

Appius alludes to the threat to Rome if the other Etruscan states helped Veii (5.5, 8–10, 6.12), and to the double lines of Roman fortification (5.5). Both themes have been mentioned already, both will occur later; by including them

in this speech, Livy binds different parts of the book together.

When Appius criticizes the tribunes for selfishness (3.2–10), he picks up one of Livy's own authorial comments, and his speech is more persuasive because he looks beyond petty local political quarreling to the broad theme of national interest; but it would be a mistake blindly to assume that the reactionary Appius always expresses Livy's own views. Although at 3.8 he cleverly turns the servile imagery of 2.8 and 2.11 back on the tribunes, his final comment (6.17) “*quoniam ea demum Romae libertas est, non senatum, non magistratus, non leges, non mores maiorum, non instituta patrum, non disciplinam uereri militiae*” (since such in short is liberty at Rome, not to show respect for the senate, the magistrates, the laws, the customs of our ancestors, the ordinances of our fathers, nor the discipline needed in war) shows him in his true colors as an extreme reactionary.

The individual episode, which Livy shaped carefully, was an important compositional unit in his narrative.¹⁰ His account of the events of 403 BC may be viewed as one long episode that reaches its climax in Chapter 7.¹¹ Appius was already the equal of tribunes in debate, when a dramatic “*peripeteia*” (reversal) is introduced in a *cum*-clause¹² that serves also to recapitulate several key themes (7.1): a disaster at Veii makes Appius' arguments seem superior, forces a greater stress on *concordia*, and a greater desire for perseverance at Veii.¹³ The stress that Livy then places on the emotions generated at Rome by this reverse is entirely characteristic of his historical technique:¹⁴ “*maestitia*” (sorrow) descends on all and “*cura*” (worry) and “*metus*” (fear) on the senate, lest the tribunes of the plebs should become unbearable (thus we meet again the theme of the selfishness of the tribunes). However, then Livy introduces a dramatic *peripeteia*, again with an inverted *cum*-clause. “*Repente*” (suddenly) (§5), in a periodic sentence leading to a climax, the members of the equestrian order pledge their service. The first clause of the next period describes briefly how they were thanked in the senate, but then (§6) “*subito ad curiam cursus fit plebis*” (suddenly the plebs rush to the senate house), the brevity of the clause enhancing the excitement of the scene, with the last word packing the biggest surprise. In response to the plebeians' support in the war, the senators pour out of the senate house in thanks, a visual image that surpasses what had gone before. The emphatic “*tum uero*” (then indeed, §8) underlines the climactic action, as does the slow build up to it through “*non enim...neque aut...aut*” (for not...nor...or) to “*sed*” (but). Livy focuses on the significant gestures, the shouting (“*uoce*”) and gesticulation (“*manibus*”); “*laetitia*” (joy) (§9) picks up and reverses the earlier *maestitia*. The theme of concord is given great prominence (§10): “*beatam urbem Romanam et inuictam et aeternam illa concordia*” (with such unity the Roman state was blessed and invincible and everlasting). The senators are then recalled, a typically visual detail, pass decrees, and Livy then rounds off the episode in a way that, characteristically, is both swift and

looks forward to his own day (§13): “*tum primum equis suis merere equites coeperunt*” (then for the first time the equestrians undertook military service with their own horses).¹⁵

The events of 402 BC are contained in two chapters (8–9) and pick up many of the themes seen in the account of 403 BC. Livy narrates just two events: the Volscian capture of Anxur and a serious reverse at Veii. These diverse defeats might not have seemed ideally suited for blending into one episode, but Livy links them by the theme of the incompetence of the commanders. “*His tribunis*” (with these [consular] tribunes, 8.2) sets the tone, and we learn (8.2–3) how the garrison at Anxur was stormed because the neglect of the commanders had let to most of the soldiers being either on leave or engaging in commerce in the nearby countryside. Livy then turns to Veii and immediately removes the element of surprise by writing:

nor was the war conducted any better at Veii...the Roman leaders possessed more hatred toward each other than courage against the enemy, and the scale of the war was increased by the sudden arrival of the Capenates and Faliscans.

This re-establishes two themes. The previous episode had been concerned with concord (or the lack of it) between the orders; now we see the dangers from discord between the commanders, and now the threat from the rest of Etruria, mentioned before, becomes a reality. “*Repentino*” (sudden, in §5) marks the intensifying of the situation at Veii, and the Capenates and Faliscans are introduced with a splendid periodic sentence that embraces both their motives and their arrival at Veii; *necopinato* (§6) makes clear that this was sudden and unexpected. At last, Rome's double trenches are tested. One military tribune fails to help another, and in the rout much of the army flees to Rome. The sentence structure has Livy's customary refinement; note in particular the stark and incisive “*diu in medio caesi milites*” (for a long time the troops were cut down in the middle), but, as so often, one of his prime concerns is to make moralizing comments; see §11: “*huius arrogantiam pertinacia alterius aequabat*” (the obstinacy of one was matching the arrogance of the other), “*uinci ab hoste quam uincere per ciuem maluit*” (he preferred to be conquered by an enemy rather than to conquer by a friend), and §13: “*pauci rei publicae, plerique huic atque illi ut quosque studium priuatim aut gratia occupauerat adsunt*” (few stand with the state, the majority with either the one or the other in accordance with how either partisanship or influence had taken a grip on each), this last being a comment on the senatorial supporters of the two unfortunate tribunes.

In Chapter 9, the scene shifts to Rome: dissatisfied with these consular tribunes, the Senate requests the whole college to resign, but the delinquent Sergius and Verginius refuse. Thereupon, the tribunes of the plebes threatens to coerce them, but then Gaius Servilius Ahala, another of the consular tribunes, intervenes, witheringly dismisses the threats of the tribunes of the

plebs, threatening to appoint a dictator unless Sergius and Verginius ceases their opposition. The opposition duly ceases. Two points may be made about this end to the episode: first Livy once again develops the theme of the essential selfishness of the tribunes of the plebs (9.4: “While this was happening the tribunes of the plebs, although they had unwillingly restricted themselves to silence while there was political agreement and success in the war, suddenly and aggressively...”). Second, the wise and dignified behavior of Ahala stands as a model of statesmanlike conduct and contrasts with the antics of both the tribunes of the plebs, and especially Sergius and Verginius.¹⁶

Like a Roman

What makes a Roman? To the question of Roman identity, raised explicitly by Appius Claudius at 6.7–8, four later episodes return. The first three contain the adjective *similis* (“like”), inviting us to ponder what it is to be “like” a Roman. The first is the account of the victory that Camillus won over Falerii in 394 BC. When a deserting Faliscan schoolteacher hands over the children of the Faliscan aristocracy, thereby allowing the Romans, had they wished to do so, to drive a very hard bargain with the Faliscans, Camillus, who in Livy often appoints himself a spokesman for Roman morality, dismisses the suggestion out of hand and offers some generalizing remarks about Roman behavior. He tells the schoolteacher (27.5) that he has not come to either a people or a commander “like yourself” (*similem...tui*); and his concluding remark is (§8): “You, so far as you were able, conquered those [who oppose Rome] with a new crime as at Veii, I shall conquer with Roman arts (*Romanis artibus*), bravery, siege-works, and weapons.”

Next, when Rome sends a gift to Delphi to thank Apollo for his assistance in the war against Veii, pirates from Liparae intercept the embassy. Livy's narrative voice tells us (28.3–4) that “by chance in that year a certain Timasitheus held the chief magistracy [in Liparae], a man who behaved more like the Romans than his own people [*“Romanis uir similior quam suis”*]” and that, when Timasitheus instructed his people to show reverence for the gods, they obliged—unsurprisingly, “since a crowd generally behaves like [*“similis”*] the man who controls it.” In this instance, Roman morality is clearly entwined with behavior in religious matters. It will be again in the fourth instance of theme, but this will invert the scenario: Romans will behave like barbarians and the people will follow their leaders in rejecting proper morality.

This comes in the account of the climactic tale of both book and pentad, the defeat at the Allia at the hands of the Gauls, the subsequent Gallic sack of Rome, and Camillus' bringing about the Roman recovery. In a brilliant exposition of Livy's artistry, T. J. Luce has demonstrated that he recast

material inherited from his sources around a turning point, or *peripeteia*, that comes quite early in the narrative at 39.8: “Yet during that night and the following day the state was not at all like [“*similis*”] that which had fled so fearfully at the Allia.”¹⁷ Before this point, Roman behavior is out of character and, at times, almost comical in its ineptness:

1. Because of Marcus Caedicius' lowly birth, the Romans ignore the divine warning about the Gauls given to him on the *Via Nova* (32.6–7).
2. They send Camillus into exile (32.7–9).
3. The Fabii (“extremely impetuous ambassadors who were more like [“*similes*”] Gauls than Romans”) break international law by fighting against the Gauls when they were part of an embassy to the Gauls (36.6–7).
4. The senate fail to surrender the Fabii, who were members of their own order, to the Gauls but leave the people to pass judgment (36.9–10).
5. The people not only fail to surrender the Fabii but elect them consular tribunes (36.10–11).
6. The Romans fail to appoint a dictator to counter the Gallic threat (37.1–2).
7. The consular tribunes fail to hold a special levy (37.3).
8. They fail to fortify a camp (38.1).
9. They fail to take the auspices (38.1).
10. They fail to set out properly their line of battle, Livy commenting that prudence [“*ratio*”] as well as good fortune [“*fortuna*”] was on the Gauls' side (38.3–4).
11. The Roman army is so frightened that it does not fight, Livy commenting “in the other [i.e., Roman] line of battle nothing was like [“*simile*”: yet another use of the adjective in the context of moral characterization] the Romans, neither among the leaders nor the troops” (38.5).
12. The Romans flee, mostly to Veii (38.6–8).
13. They send no message to Rome (38.9).
14. At Rome, no watch is on duty and the gates of the city are not even shut (39.2).

After the turning point, Roman behavior is flawless in all these respects and reaps its just reward at Camillus' victory:

15. The Romans in their stronghold on the Capitoline Hill defend themselves and their gods (39.9–13).

16. The priest and vestals look after the sacred objects (39.11).
17. The elderly give themselves up to death at the hand of the Gauls rather than consume food that cannot be spared (39.12–13; 41.1–10).
18. Unlike their refusal to hand over the Fabii (see item 4 in this list), the senior senators among the elderly now take the lead (39.13).
19. The lowly Lucius Albinus reveals true piety when he places the Vestal Virgins and their sacred objects in his cart rather than his family (40.9–10). This efficacious action by a humble man symbolically reverses the ignoring of Caedicius (see item 1 this list).
20. When the Gauls attack the Capitoline, the Romans fight “in no way either rashly or in panic (43.2: “*nihil temere nec trepide*”), thereby reversing the rashness (37.3: “*temeritate*”) of the envoys in starting the war.
21. Fortune, on the side of the Gauls at 38.4, now (43.6; 44.3) brings Camillus, in exile at Ardea, into the conflict.
22. Previously the Romans had waged war without discipline (see items 8 and 10 in this list), whereas now the Gauls do so (44.6).
23. The troops who had fled from the Allia to Veii now finally show some courage in defeating Etruscans who were attacking them (45.4–8).
24. Gaius Fabius Dorsuo finds a way through the enemy lines to carry out a family ritual on the Quirinal (46.2–3); this act of piety reverses the earlier immoral behavior of Fabii (see also, item 3 in this list).
25. The recall of Camillus (46.6–11) reverses his exile (see item 2 in this list).
26. Having previously failed to appoint a dictator when one was needed (see item 6 in this list), the Romans now find a way of appointing Camillus dictator in accordance with proper constitutional propriety (46.6–11).
27. The piety of those on the Capitol in still feeding the case sacred to Juno, even though there was a shortage of food, pays a handsome dividend when the geese alert Manlius Capitolinus to the danger coming from Gauls' scaling the hill (47.1–11).
28. Shortage of food compels the Romans to ransom the city, but the Gauls cheat in the weighing out of the gold (48.9); this reverses the breach of international law by the Fabii.

Unsurprisingly, success attends this reversal, and Camillus' two victories over the Gauls (49.2–6) compensate for defeat at the Allia. In this episode, the narrative has moved beyond pointing in isolation to such characteristics as perseverance, respect for the envoys, and proper conduct in war to an all-

embracing consideration of Roman behavior: the disaster is caused by multiple failings at Rome in matters of international law, piety, good constitutional practice, and military discipline. Yet, that questions of national characteristic are still fundamental to the narrative is shown by the comparison with the Gauls at 36.1 and the implicit comparisons throughout the episode; we are encouraged to ask whether the Romans will continue to behave like Gauls and the Gauls like Romans, or, as in fact happens after the *peripeteia*, whether national characteristics will reassert themselves.

The final appearance of the theme of national identity comes in the great closing speech of Camillus, but there it is entwined even more closely than in the Timasitheus episode with the theme of religion, which needs to be considered first.

Religion¹⁸

“After 1.4–6, religion is not prominent in the two opening scenes analyzed in the preceding text, but the rest of the book teems with it: we read of prodigies, including the unnatural superabundance of water in the Alban Lake (15.1–2), the sending of an embassy to Delphi to ascertain how to react to this particular prodigy (15.3), the capture of the Etruscan seer who said that Rome could capture Veii only if the lake was drained (15.4–12; 16.8–17.5), the seizing of the entrails of a victim sacrificed by the king of Veii by Romans hiding in a tunnel who had heard that whoever cut out these entrails would have victory (20.8–9), the sending of a thank-offering to Veii and the help received from Timasitheus (25.10; 28.2–5), the ignoring of the prophesy given to Marcus Caedicius about the Gauls (32.6–8), and much else besides. Even before Camillus' final rousing speech, the narrative of the book invites the interpretation that affairs go well for a state when it respects religious ritual, less well when it does not.

Camillus' Speech

As in the previous episode of the Gallic Sack and recovery, so here Livy has refashioned inherited material to give prominence to Camillus at the close of the book. Plutarch (*Cam.* 31.3–32.1) tells us that, when the tribunes agitate once more about a move to Veii, the senators remind them of the shrines of their fathers, the holy places instituted by Romulus and Numa, the sign of the human head found on the Capitol that was an omen that Rome would be “head” of Italy, and the fire of Vesta; that when this failed there was a debate in the senate in which Camillus and others spoke at length; and then that the famous omen provided by the centurion's cry of “Rest here!” proved decisive in persuading all to rebuild Rome. In Livy, the arguments of the tribunes are barely recounted, the arguments of the senators are replaced by Camillus' speech in which the same points may be found (see especially 52.6–7, 54.6–

7), and the following debate in the senate is mentioned barely in passing (55.1) before he too reports the omen (55.2). Therefore, all weight is thrown on Camillus' speech against those who wish not to rebuild Rome but to move to Veii, for the religious content of which Livy makes space as the climax of the book and pentad.¹⁹

If any reader had reached Chapter 51 without pondering on the importance of religious observance for the interpretation of the book, Camillus there provides a reminder:

For look in turn at either the successive good or bad things of these years: you will find that everything turned out well for those who cultivated the gods, badly for those who did not. (6) First of all the Veientine War—waged through so many years and with such effort—did not reach its conclusion before water was drained from the Alban Lake at the behest of the gods. (7) What then about this recent disaster for our city? Did it take place before a voice sent from heaven about the arrival of the Gauls had been spurned, before international law had been violated by our ambassadors, before with the same lack of care for the gods we ignored this violation when it ought to have been punished? (8) Accordingly conquered, captured, and redeemed, we paid so much punishment to both gods and men that we may serve as a lesson. (9) Our failures then reminded us of our cults [*“religionum”*]: we fled to the Capitol, to the seat of Jupiter Optimus Maximus; because of the fall of our own affairs we hid some of our sacred objects in the ground, others carried away into neighboring cities we removed from the eyes of our enemies; and, although abandoned by men and gods we did not break off the worship of our gods. (10) Therefore they gave back to us our fatherland, victory, and our old lost glory in war; and they set panic, flight, and slaughter against enemies who blind with avarice had broken their treaty and faith over a pound of gold.

Although Camillus' perspective is both broader (he looks back over the whole events of Book 5, appropriately in a speech that provides the conclusion of book) and narrower (he concentrates on religion, appropriately again in a speech for which religion provides the main theme), he picks out many of the points noted earlier in our analysis of Livy's account of the events of 390 BC, and his words offer a further invitation to view the structure of Chapters 32.6–49.7 around the turning point of 39.8.²⁰

Among Camillus' arguments that Rome can succeed only if she shows a proper reverence for her religious institutions and practices, a sense of place obtrudes almost everywhere. The symbiotic link between the two themes is made especially clear at 52.2:

We have a city founded on the auspices and augury; no place in it is not replete with rituals [*“religionum”*] and the gods. The places for our

habitual sacrifices are as much ordained as the dates. Citizens of Rome, do you plan to desert all these public and private gods?

Camillus points out to his audience that Fabius Dorsuo wanted to carry out his rituals on the Quirinal itself (52.3); that the banquet of Jupiter (“*epulum Iouis*”) had to take place on the Capitol (52.6); that the Flamen Dialis was not allowed to remain outside the city for one night (52.13); that to abandon the city because it has been devastated by the Gauls would have the effect of making it seem that the Gauls could more easily destroy Rome than the Romans could repair it (53.5). He expresses his own distaste for politics at Rome (51.1), but confesses that in exile he yearned for its physical site (54.3), a site whose natural attractiveness was such that the gods chose it “not without reason” (54.4). In short, in this final appearance of the theme of what it means to be a Roman, we learn that, for Camillus at least, “Romanness” was not possible if Romans did not inhabit the city of Rome itself.

Political Behavior and Government

As elsewhere in Books 2–10, the strife between the patricians and the plebeians looms large in Book 5, which offers a good example of Livy's portrayal of political conflict. Patricians regularly criticize the tribunes of the plebs (3.2–6.17; 9.5; 51.1), and even more often these tribunes are shown to be selfish and partisan trouble-makers, either by the direct comment of the narrative voice (2.2–12; 9.4; 10.6–9; 12.3, 8) or by their making statements that do not correspond to what the narrative has just stated (11.4–7). One may suspect that Livy himself thought that the poor should allow the propertied classes to govern, but his writing never shows blind admiration for everything done by the patricians, whose motives are shown to be suspect at 14.1–4, 26.1, 32.7, and 36.9–10. The Veientes had chosen to be ruled by a king because they had grown weary of political competition (1.3). Part of the explanation for Rome's political conflict was the desire of the tribunes of the plebs to be elected consuls or consular tribunes (2.9–12; 12.8–10; 13.1–3; 14.1–2), but the consular tribunes' falling out with each other could be another cause of discord, graphically illustrated in Chapters 8–9 (analyzed in the preceding text). Livy's narrative regularly invites us to admire selfless behavior and *concordia*: hence the artistry lavished on the events described in Chapter 7, and the singling out of the moderate plebeian Publius Licinius Calvus for commendation (at 12.10–13.2 and 18.1–6; see also 20.4–9).²¹ Although Servilius Ahala at 9.5–8 shows his colleagues how to behave, in general in Book 5 the consular tribunes bring Rome little success; other episodes emblematic of their performance is the defeat in 396 BC described at 18.7–12 and the spectacular reverse at the Allia. The contrast with what is achieved by Camillus as dictator at Veii and then again after the Gallic sack is striking; little or nothing that Livy writes in this book prevents his readers from deciding that, in a time of crisis, it was preferable to be governed by one

man than a college of magistrates.

And what of Camillus, Livy's first *fatalis dux* ("leader destined by fate") (19.2)? That the tone of the narrative is highly laudatory, both in the authorial voice (e.g., 33.1, 45.8) and in the reported thoughts of others (e.g., 26.1, 46.6, 49.7, 49.9) hardly needs illustration. To any reader of the first pentad, it will be obvious that Camillus' victories at Veii, Falerii, and Rome give him a rank higher than all Rome's previous generals. In Book 5, his voice articulates, at Falerii and after the Gallic sack, a vision of what it means to be Roman that is supported by events as the narrator has presented them. His successes and leadership contrast with the failures of the consular tribunate, his concern for the body politic (21.14–15; 32.8–9; 51.2) with the selfishness of some others. However, no Roman who is allowed any extended amount of space in Livy's narrative is shown as flawless: even Camillus is criticized mildly for the lavishness of his triumph over Veii (23.6; cf. 28.1), and his handling of the division of booty after Veii had fallen is a cause of trouble for both patricians and himself (20.1–10; 22.1–2; 23.8–11; 25.4–12; 32.8–9).²²

When the future Augustus was born in 63 BC, the tradition about the events in Book 5 probably already included most of the tales that Livy was to narrate, and to read about Camillus must have encouraged reflection on such contemporary leaders as Crassus, Pompey, Cicero, and Caesar. In the 20s BC, Augustus was dominant, and it would have been hard both for Livy in writing and for any of his first readers not to compare and contrast Camillus with him; but unless it be in Camillus' interest in religious revival, the narrative never offers an explicit invitation, and the differences in circumstance are quite as great as the similarities. To read Livy's Camillus with an eye too firmly on Augustus is to risk trivializing political reflections that have a wider applicability among states ancient and modern.

Notes

- 1 By a mixture of paraphrase and analysis, this chapter attempts to convey some sense of Book 5's literary qualities. It contains discussion both of broader themes and of the detailed artistry to be found in some episodes, especially the excellently written opening chapters, which have been relatively neglected because of the deserved fame of Livy's account of the capture of Veii and of the Gallic sack of Rome and its aftermath.
- 2 "Tribunes of the plebs" were plebeian leaders, "consular tribunes" the chief executive magistrates of the state for most years in this book. The latter normally numbered six (the eight that, at 5.1.2, Livy regards as a striking innovation is probably a mistake on his or his sources' part).
- 3 The whole book illustrates Cicero's observation (*Ad familiares*; 5.12.4–6) that reversals of fortune make arresting historical narrative.

- 4 Livy ignores the material relating to Camillus' earlier life that Plutarch recounts at *Cam.* 1.1–2.5.
- 5 In §8, the hyperbaton of 19 words between “*hoc*” and “*seruitutis*” (“this much of slavery”) places a massive emphasis on “*seruitutis*.”
- 6 First at 2.28.5; more passages are cited at Oakley (1997–2005, 1.612).
- 7 The term occurs six times in Book 4: Livy often stresses the dangers that discord posed to the state during the Struggle of the Orders.
- 8 Appius appears in more typical colors at 20.5–6.
- 9 For example, Livy's authorial voice is therefore able to boast in the Alexander digression (19.9): “what line of battle could have broken the Roman army, which neither Caudium nor Cannae broke” (see further, Oakley 1997–2005, ad loc.).
- 10 See, e.g., Witte (1910), Ogilvie (1965, 18–19), Oakley (1997–2005, 1.125).
- 11 For a briefer treatment, see Burck (1964, 109–111).
- 12 See Oakley (1997–2005: 1.594).
- 13 The long periodic sentence in which Livy describes how the siege-works were fired is characteristic of his verbal art: note the long opening *cum*-clause, succeeded by a *dum*-clause. Then, after this build up, the pace quickens with an ablative absolute “*patefacta repente porta*” and the main verbs “*coniecit*” and “*hausit*.”
- 14 See Oakley (1997–2005: 1.121–2).
- 15 See Luce (1971, 279–80, 281) (for swift endings), Oakley (1997–2005: 1.127–8).
- 16 Those interested in Livy's style will note the splendid periodic sentence (§§7–8) with which the episode comes to an end.
- 17 However, Luce (whose interpretation is adumbrated by Stübler (1941, 51–73) wrongly argues that the narrative is articulated around two *peripeteiai*, the other being at 49.1: whereas this second *peripeteia* has only local importance, being akin to that found in many of Livy's smaller scenes (e.g., in this part of the narrative at 47.4, where the geese awake to stop the Gauls climbing the Capitol), that at 39.8 is pivotal for this whole episode.
- 18 The excellent treatments of this central theme by Stübler (1941, 44–93) and Levene (1993, 175–203) explains my brevity here.
- 19 Since there was a much weaker motive for introducing the details that

Plutarch reports than giving prominence to Camillus, Plutarch probably represents more faithfully what stood in the Roman annalistic tradition, whereas Livy has innovated. Nevertheless, it is surprising that Plutarch did not follow Livy, whom in his *Camillus* (6.3) he cites as a source and whose focus on Camillus was well suited to his biographical needs. For discussion, see Klotz (1941, 301–2); also Mineo (2003bb, 165).

20 For religious interpretation of a defeat by an important character in Livy's history, compare the remarks of Fabius Maximus at 22.9.7.

21 *Concordia* is mentioned at 12.12 and 18.3.

22 Note, too, Camillus' slowness to embrace necessary change at 6.34–42.

Cross-References

See CHAPTER 17: THE COMPOSITION OF THE *AB URBE CONDITA*: THE CASE OF THE FIRST PENTAD

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Part IV

Book 1. The Regal Period

Chapter 19

Livy's Narrative of the Regal Period and Historical and Archaeological Facts

Timothy Cornell

Like many historians before his time, and not a few since, Livy was not interested in what would nowadays count as historical research. It was not his aim to discover new facts, or to examine the credentials of the facts recorded by his predecessors, who provided most, if not all, of his knowledge of Rome's past. Livy had no clear awareness of the distinction between primary and secondary sources, and in his reading of the latter it did not occur to him to give attention to the former. The attitude of his predecessors (and sources) was probably little different, although we know that at least one earlier historian, the late republican writer C. Licinius Macer, had made use of a documentary source, a list of magistrates preserved on linen rolls (*libri lintei*), which he himself had discovered in the temple of Juno Moneta (Livy 4.7.11; 20.8). Whether this example is an isolated exception, or reflects a more general commitment to investigative research on the part of Macer, cannot be known; and even less is known about how Macer's contemporaries and predecessors approached the matter of historical inquiry. The possibility that at least some of them carried out original research is not to be ruled out. Livy's reports of routine senatorial business were undoubtedly taken at second hand from earlier historians, but the necessary implication must be that at least one of his predecessors, probably Valerius Antias, compiled the necessary information directly from original records (Rich 2005, 2011). And it stands to reason that the first Roman historians, who had no predecessors (although they undoubtedly made use of earlier Greek historical accounts of Rome), must have been pioneers who constructed their narratives from whatever raw materials were available, including oral tradition and archival documents (on which see Cornell 1995, 10–16).

However, whatever the approach adopted by earlier historians, the fact remains that Livy himself relied exclusively on the works of his predecessors, and never considered any other kind of evidence. What we have in Livy is therefore the accumulated findings of a historical tradition going back around two centuries to the work of the first Roman historian, Fabius Pictor, who wrote probably at the end of the third century BC. Livy himself was well aware of the limitations that this fact imposed on the reliability of what was recorded (e.g., 8.40.5).

Livy's practice was to work with received information taken from his sources and to construct his own narrative from it, the aim being to bring the events to

life in a way that would allow his readers to experience them as spectators and to share the emotions of the participants. Readers were also invited to consider the deeper meaning of the events and to judge the complex moral issues that they raised. As a general statement of Livy's purpose, this much is generally accepted (see, e.g., Solodow 1979; Feldherr 1998). However, Livy did not see it as his task to attempt to establish the veracity of what he was reporting.

That is not to say that he took everything on trust. On the contrary: it is quite clear from numerous indications that he was aware of the legendary character of much, if not all, of what passed for Roman history in the early centuries of the city's existence—which form the subject of his first book. This emerges not only from explicit statements that accompany reports of miraculous events or stories of divine intervention, which he characterizes as *fabulae* (*praef.* 6, etc.); it is also evident from the frequency with which he distances himself from the stories he recounts simply by reporting them as such, using words such as “*ferunt*” (they say), “*dicitur*” (it is said), “*fama est*” (the story goes), and so on (references and discussion in Forsythe 1999; cf. Oakley 2011, 441–446).

It follows that any inquiry into the credibility of the early Roman history narrated in Livy's first book should not be directed at Livy personally, at his investigative skills or his historical judgment, still less his honesty (which is not really in question); rather, what we should be attempting to establish is the reliability of the received information taken from the earlier historians he used as sources. These earlier historians cannot be identified, for the most part, except in general terms: that is to say, we know that he had read Fabius Pictor and Calpurnius Piso Frugi among the earlier Roman historians (1.44.2; 55.7–9), and possibly Licinius Macer, Valerius Antias, and Aelius Tubero among the more recent ones (all cited at 4.23.1–3, but nowhere in Book 1). However, apart from one or two exceptional cases, it is not possible to attribute any given passage of Livy to a particular named source, and attempts to do so more widely are futile. This is because, in the first place, we have no reason to think that Livy's method was simply to cut and paste from one source at a time; in fact, he was perfectly capable of blending two or more sources to produce his own distinctive version, and there is every reason to suppose that that is exactly what he did—hence, it is misguided, in principle, to try to identify Livy's source at any particular point. In the second place, the exercise is pointless because very little is known about earlier Roman historians, whose methods, skills, honesty, and reliability are even less able to be tested than in the case of Livy (thus, e.g., Briscoe 1973, 1–12; Luce 1977, 139–229; Oakley 2009).

If we assume that the Roman historians of the last two centuries BC inherited most of their material from their predecessors and passed it on to their successors, including Livy, we are entitled to use the term “tradition” for what

we find in the surviving texts of Livy and other historians. What we need to do is to examine the credentials of this tradition as a whole, rather than to analyze the sources and methods of Livy in particular. This is not to say, however, that Livy added nothing of his own in the way of historical interpretation and insight. In fact, his account of early Roman history is marked by two distinct but closely linked ideas of the city's development.

First, the scale of his narrative, which extended from the foundation of the city (*Ab Urbe Condita*) to his own age, increases exponentially with the passage of time. Book 1 covers a period of several centuries, from the beginning to the expulsion of the kings. On Livy's own figures, the monarchy lasted for 244 years (1.60.3), taking the story back to the middle of the eighth century BC; but he actually begins with the fall of Troy and the flight of Aeneas, which happened many centuries earlier still. The centuries from Aeneas to the foundation are covered in a mere six chapters (1.1–6), and the reigns of the seven kings fill the rest of the book. The scale then increases considerably, so that Books 2–5 are allocated an average of 30 years each, the next five just under 25 years, the next 10 books get 7.5 years each, and so on down to the first century BC, by which time Livy was covering a single year (or a little more) in each book. By consciously adopting this artful scheme, which he himself likens to the phenomenon of visual perspective (whereby more distant objects appear smaller to the eye), Livy also betrays some awareness that both the quality and the quantity of reliable evidence diminishes the further back into the past one goes (the clearest statement to this effect occurs at 6.1.1–2).

This may seem to us a rather obvious point, but it is worth saying that other Roman historians do not appear to have shared Livy's view of this matter, or to have replicated his method of narrating on an ever-expanding scale. Although most of them seem to have devoted a predominant amount of space to events of their own time and the recent past, they did not consistently taper their narratives as they went back to earlier times. On the contrary, most of Livy's predecessors, as far as we can see, adopted the pattern found in the work of his Greek contemporary, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, whose 20 books on early Roman history to the Punic Wars are distributed as follows: one on the period before the foundation, three on the kings, six on the Republic to the Twelve Tables (509–450 BC Varr., i.e., an average of 10 years per book), three from the Valerio-Horatian Laws to the Gallic sack (449–390 BC Varr., 20 years per book), five from the retreat of the Gauls to the outbreak of the Pyrrhic War (389–281 BC Varr., 22 years per book), and finally two from Pyrrhus' invasion to the start of the First Punic War (280–264 BC, 8 years per book). That is to say, Dionysius devotes far more space to the kings and the early republic than Livy, and the scale of his narrative actually diminishes as the history of the republic progresses, before expanding again in the final two books.¹ It is also clear that Dionysius did not share Livy's uncertainty about the historical value

of the story he was telling, and that, although he may have consulted a wider range of sources and done more research, his understanding of the nature of the material and his grasp of the historical process were considerably less sophisticated (on Dionysius, see Gabba 1991).

Secondly, Livy's account of the monarchic period in Book 1 is incremental in the sense that it presents the foundation of the city as a gradual process. Each of the kings, says Livy (2.1.2), was the founder of part of the city, and each contributed to the development of its political and institutional structure. The idea that the Roman constitution developed gradually over several generations was not a new one: it had already been articulated by Cato and Polybius in the second century and embraced by Cicero in the *De re publica* (Pol. 6.10.12–14; Cic. *Rep.* 2.2–3, citing Cato). However, Livy takes the idea much further, and presents a picture of Rome as a community starting from nothing: a mere handful of shepherds brought together by Romulus on an uninhabited site (1.4.6), supplemented by surplus population from Alba Longa (1.6.3), and by the fugitive slaves and vagabonds who flocked to the asylum established “between the two groves” (“*inter duos lucos*”) on the Capitol (1.8.5). Livy's original Romans are a rabble of shepherds and vagrants who can only obtain wives by force (the “rape of the Sabines,” described in 1.9). The citizen body that emerged was primitive, unsophisticated, and politically immature; in Livy's view (2.1.3–6), they needed the guiding hand of a paternalistic monarch, and were not ready to take on the responsibility of political liberty for two and a half centuries.

Livy's view of this matter contrasts sharply with that of other sources such as Cicero and Dionysius. For Cicero, the earliest Romans were the existing inhabitants of the site of the future city who were already numerous enough to form a powerful state (*Rep.* 2.4–5); the rape of the Sabine women was merely a device to provoke war with the Sabines so that they could be conquered and incorporated (*Rep.* 2.12–13). Cicero also took the view that the original inhabitants were advanced and cultured, and that Romulus created a city that was every bit as civilized as contemporary Greek states and had a mixed constitution similar to that of Lycurgus (Cornell 2001, 51–3). For his part, Dionysius of Halicarnassus saw the Romans as a civilized people of Greek descent, and Romulus as the founder of a fully formed Greek *polis* (see esp. 2.7–29, with Wiseman 2009, 81–98).

The contrast is real enough and deserves emphasis because it shows that Livy, for all that he cannot match Dionysius' erudition or command of antiquarian detail, nevertheless has a much better grasp of the nature of historical development; in short, he is a much better historian. Cicero's case is slightly different, because he was not writing history, but rather setting part of his analysis of the structure of the *res publica* in a historical framework (Cornell 2001). Whether by accident or not, Livy's account in this sense comes much closer to the historical reality as revealed by archaeological facts. These reveal

a pattern of continuous growth and development of the settlement down to the archaic period. Try as they might, archaeologists have been unable to point to any decisive break in the continuity of settlement down to the archaic period in the archaeological record as such. There is no doubt that the archaeological evidence, taken on its own, comes closest to the model of “*Stadtwerdung*” (city development) rather than of “*Stadtgründung*” (city foundation; on this contrast, see Müller-Karpe 1962), and consequently resembles Livy's picture of incremental growth rather than that of a fully armed city leaping from the head of Jupiter, as in the foundation narratives of Cicero and Dionysius.

However, in one key respect, the archaeological record conflicts radically with the accounts of all the surviving historians, Livy included. This is in the fact that the settlement or settlements occupying the site of Rome start at a very early date, and show continuity of habitation going back at least to the Final Bronze Age—that is, to around 1000 BC, and in some places considerably earlier still—whereas the literary narratives date the foundation of the city in the middle of the eighth century. This is a real contradiction, because all the crucial elements of the foundation story—the exposure of the twins and their rescue by a wolf, their early life among rustic shepherds, the colony from Alba Longa, the augural contest and the dispute about the location of the new city, the asylum, and the rape of the Sabine women—combine to make it absolutely clear that, in the traditional story, Rome was founded *ex nihilo* on a virgin site; there was no existing settlement and no existing population.² It follows that when archaeologists seek to distinguish between the urban and pre-urban (or “proto-urban”) phases of the settlement, and to identify a moment of change in its long archaeological history as a moment of “foundation,” they are going head-on against the literary tradition. Indeed, the natural conclusion to be drawn from the available data is that, in this respect, the archaeological evidence has comprehensively disproved the traditional story.

One may say that this hardly matters, given that the foundation story we read in the ancient sources is obviously legendary, as Livy himself acknowledged, and can hardly be taken to represent a historical event in any normal sense. Nevertheless, many scholars remain wedded to the idea of a moment of foundation (*Stadtgründung*) and, out of respect for tradition, to a date for it in the middle of the eighth century BC. In particular, the archaeologist Andrea Carandini, who has been leading excavations in the historic center of the ancient city since the 1980s, has devoted considerable effort, and numerous publications, to showing that the city was indeed founded in the middle of the eighth century, and that many details of the traditional story, including the person of Romulus, are founded on historical facts (e.g., Carandini 1997, 2006, 2011). This is not the place for a detailed discussion of Carandini's theories, or indeed of the archaeological evidence in general. What follows is brief discussion of some of the problems that confront anyone attempting to

combine archaeological evidence with the literary tradition.

What Carandini and his team have tried to find is evidence of an eighth-century foundation in a place where continuous settlement can be traced back to before 1000 BC. This prompts two questions: first, what does “the foundation of the city” mean in this context? Or, to put it more simply, what did the founder or founders (whether or not they included someone named Romulus) actually do to transform the existing settlement into a city? Secondly, how would this change manifest itself in the archaeological record? In answer to the first question, we could define the foundation as a conscious act to unite the resident community or communities, to subject them to a single political authority, and to form a state with permanent institutions (for a brief statement to this effect, see Carandini and Cappelli 2000, 10–11). The second question can perhaps be approached obliquely by saying that, in the later archaic period (the sixth and early fifth centuries BC), there is clear archaeological evidence of a functioning city-state, in the form of organized space with public cults, sacred and other public buildings, streets, and communal meeting places (in particular, the Forum and Comitium). That the ruler was a king can be inferred from inscriptions, and from later republican institutions such as the *rex sacrorum*, the *interrex*, and the public building known as the *regia*, which can best be explained as relics of an earlier monarchy. This can be accepted as a certain event though none of the traditional seven kings has so far been reliably documented as a historical person.

Some of these features of a monarchical city-state can be traced back as far as the seventh century: they include the earliest *regia*, the first paving of the Forum, and the development of architectural buildings of orthogonal design with stone walls and tiled roofs. Earlier buildings had taken the form of thatched huts. It may be admitted, however, that this monumental urbanization is, strictly speaking, only a *terminus ante quem* for the self-conscious unification and organization of the community, and that this purely political act may have happened somewhat earlier. That at least is the view of Carandini, who has identified a number of features in the archaeological record that point to major changes in the organization of the community in the eighth century. Most famously, in 1988, he announced the discovery of a series of walls and ditches of mid-eighth century date on the northeastern slopes of the Palatine (Carandini 1990; earlier notices appeared in press in 1988). The finds are said to represent a symbolic boundary rather than a defensive fortification; an open space on the inside, itself marked by a wooden palisade, recalls the tradition of the *pomerium*, the ritual circuit that Romulus is said to have marked out with a plough, at least according to some of our sources (but not Livy, be it noted). In Carandini's view, this sacred boundary was the product of a deliberate act of foundation.

Other finds have added to the picture. Hut foundations in the area of the later

House of the Vestals have been identified as part of a developing palace complex and associated with Romulus' successors, Numa Pompilius and Ancus Marcius, and as indicating the beginnings of the cult of Vesta (Carandini 2004; 2006, 240–247; 2011, 64–88; 2012, 12–15; Filippi 2004, 101–121; 2005b, 199–203; Arvanitis 2004, 145–153). An early paving of the Comitium, dated to the end of the eighth century, provides possible evidence of a space marked out for public meetings (Carafa 1998, 75–82, 87; 2000, 69; Filippi 2005a; Gusberti 2005a; Carandini 2006, 249–255; 2011, 89–93; 2012, 16–17); and a votive deposit on the Capitol, unearthed in excavations from 1925 to 1927, has been re-examined and dated to the second half of the eighth century (first briefly announced by Colini 1927–1928; detailed description in Gjerstad 1964, 190–201; Sommella Mura 1976, 145–146; Albertoni 2000; cautious discussion in Filippi 2000; linked with Jupiter Feretrius by Gusberti 2005b; Carafa 2000, 69; Carandini 2000, 327–328; 2006, 255–258; 2011, 93–100; 2012, 17); it is a clear sign of religious activity two centuries before the construction of the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus, and has been taken as evidence of an early poliadic cult and linked to the temple of Jupiter Feretrius traditionally attributed to Romulus (Livy 1.10.5–7).

The problem with these and similar claims is that they are based not on the archaeological finds themselves, but on secondary interpretations of the finds. Some level of interpretation is of course essential if one is to make any historical sense out of archaeology, and to go beyond the bare description of stones, bricks, postholes, ceramic fragments, metal artifacts, bones, and other organic material. Interpretation is required even to characterize such items as huts, houses, tombs, weapons, drinking vessels, and suchlike, let alone as temples, palaces, votive deposits, Greek pots, or Etruscan bronzes. The danger arises when interpretation is carried too far, and the archaeological finds are made to carry more weight than they can bear. In the case of the eighth-century material referred to in the preceding text, a moment's reflection is enough to show that the archaeological finds are insufficient in themselves to support the conclusions drawn from them. Connecting finds with named cults and monuments because of their location (Vesta, the Comitium, Jupiter Feretrius, etc.), and with particular kings because of their date (Romulus, Numa Pompilius, Ancus Marcius), is methodologically unsound, as we shall see. As for the foundation of the city, that is a very bold claim to make on the basis of a wall of very uncertain character that may or may not be part of a circuit around the Palatine—quite apart from the fact that, in some sources, Romulus' city extended beyond the Palatine to include the Forum and the Capitol (Dion. Hal. 2.1.4–2.1; Strabo 5.3.7, 234C; Plut. *Rom.* 11.1–2). That is equally true of the archaeological discoveries near the Temple of Vesta, in the Comitium, and on the Capitol; and it is not at all clear how Carandini and his team explain these finds in relation to the wall. That the whole ensemble signifies the beginning of a city-state is theoretically possible, but this claim must be set against the fact that tombs of the Orientalizing period have also

been found in different parts of the site, suggesting that it continued to consist of groups of huts with associated burials. Given the strict prohibition in the archaic period (codified in the Twelve Tables) on burials within the area of the city, this evidence might rather be taken to show that, in the period down to the mid-seventh century, the city of Rome had yet to come into being (Ampolo 2013, esp. 253–273).

Particular difficulties arise when the interpretation of archaeological finds depends on their chronological coincidence with the traditional dates of the regal period. This is because the regnal chronology presupposed in the literary sources was artificially constructed by Roman historians and antiquarians and is manifestly unhistorical. The eighth-century date for the foundation was first propounded, as far as we know, by two of the first Roman historians, Fabius Pictor and Cincius Alimentus. However, their contemporaries, the poets Naevius and Ennius, preferred to date it centuries earlier; in their accounts, Romulus was the grandson of Aeneas, and the foundation, according to Ennius, had occurred around 1100 BC (Serv. Dan. *Aen.* 1.273; Ennius *Ann.* 154–155, with Skutsch 1985, 314–316; according to Dion. Hal. 1.73.1–3, this was also the view of some Roman historians). In this, they were following Greek writers, including Eratosthenes, who had fixed the date of the Trojan War at 1184 BC. The first to challenge the early date for the foundation of Rome was Timaeus, the Sicilian historian, who in the early third century proposed the date of 814 BC, the same year as the foundation of Carthage (Dion. Hal. 1.74.1; in general, see Feeney 2007, 52–57). We know that Timaeus accepted Eratosthenes' date for the Trojan War, so he must have been aware that several centuries separated Aeneas from the founder of Rome, whoever Timaeus thought that might have been. What reasons Timaeus had for his new dating we do not know, but the Roman historians who lowered the date of the foundation still further to the middle of the eighth century felt obliged to explain the interval between Aeneas and Romulus, and did so by fabricating a dynasty of kings of Alba (Livy 1.3.6–11)—a patent fiction, as everyone recognizes.

It bears repeating that we have absolutely no idea why Roman historians fixed upon a date in the eighth century for the foundation, or whether they had any sound historical basis for it. There must be a suspicion that it is based on a calculation of the length of the regal period as around 245 years, allowing the seven kings an average reign of 35 years each ($7 \times 35 = 245$). If so, we can assert with confidence that the traditional chronology is wrong, because there is no historical parallel for a monarchical regime in which seven successive rulers lasted for two and a half centuries.³

One particular aspect of the traditional king list is demonstrably impossible, namely the reigns of the last three kings: Tarquinius Priscus, 616–578 BC, Servius Tullius, 578–535 BC, and Tarquinius Superbus, 535–509 BC.⁴ As Dionysius of Halicarnassus pointed out in an extended discussion (4.6–7),

these dates result in complete absurdity. Tarquinius Priscus, who arrived in Rome as a mature man early in the reign of Ancus Marcius (i.e., in the 630s BC), cannot have been the father of Tarquinius Superbus, who became king in 535 BC, was expelled in 509 BC, and died in 495 BC. Dionysius points out that, on the traditional chronology, Superbus would have been over 100 years old when he fought on horseback at the battle of Lake Regillus (496 BC), and he has great fun pointing out that his mother, Tanaquil, would have been over 115 years old when she attended the funeral of her eldest son Arruns (Dion. Hal. 4.30.2–7). These observations remain entirely valid, and Dionysius' case is unanswerable.

Although Dionysius notes that, according to some historians, Arruns and his brothers were the sons not of Tanaquil but of a second wife whom Tarquinius Priscus married in old age, and according to another they were not his sons, but his grandsons,⁵ these variants do not resolve all the difficulties; and it is quite clear in any case that they were not based on evidence but were secondary rationalizations that have no historical value. It needs to be said that there is no difference in principle between inserting an extra generation between the two Tarquins and inventing fictitious kings of Alba to fill the gap between Aeneas and Romulus. It follows that the traditional chronology of the Tarquin dynasty, and therefore of all earlier regnal dates going back to Romulus, is completely unhistorical. We may further conclude that it is misguided in principle to match archaeological finds with supposedly contemporaneous events in the traditional account of the regal period—that is, to connect eighth-century material with Romulus or Numa, or to seek archaeological confirmation of (for example) Tullus Hostilius' destruction of Alba Longa in the fact that the Iron Age settlements in the Alban Hills had disappeared by the first half of the seventh century.

Livy's account of the kings purports to trace the development of Roman political and religious institutions, the growth of its territory through conquest, and the extension of its influence through successful war and diplomacy. The reigns of the seven kings form a colorful *histoire événementielle* that is difficult if not impossible to test against the archaeological evidence. There are several reasons for this. First, the traditional dates are demonstrably wrong, as we have seen, and there is a fair chance that the whole dynastic history of the seven kings is wrong as well. None of the kings can be shown to be historical, as noted in the preceding text, and at least some of them may be mythical (something that is virtually certain in the case of Romulus); and there may have been others who ruled at Rome who were subsequently forgotten or, for some other reason, failed to make the canonical list. If the developed account of the seven kings is pseudo-historical rather than historical, it is obviously nonsensical to seek to verify aspects of it by means of archaeological evidence.

Secondly, archaeology can sometimes be shown to be consistent with events

reported in the tradition, but rarely if ever amounts to conclusive proof. A good example is the conquest of the lower Tiber valley by Ancus Marcius (traditionally 640–616 BC), and the foundation of Ostia at the river mouth (Livy 1.33.9). No trace has been found so far of an archaic settlement at Ostia (but the absence of evidence does not disprove the story). On the other hand, ancient settlements have been unearthed along the route, at Laurentina, Castel di Decima, and Monte Cugno (Acilia), which have been variously identified with Politorium, Tellene, and Ficana, towns that were destroyed by Ancus Marcius during his march to the sea (Livy 1.33.1–3). When these sites were first explored in the 1970s, there was great excitement because their cemeteries seemed to come to an end in the later seventh century, which appeared to confirm the story of their destruction; but subsequent studies showed that the lack of funerary evidence did not indicate the end of the settlements, and that habitation actually continued at these sites into the sixth century and beyond (details in Cornell 1979–1980, 83). However, it has been argued that the Roman conquest would not have left any clear traces in the archaeological record if these places were simply annexed and allowed to continue as subject communities (Carnoy 2004, 238–241). Even if their populations were deported to Rome (as Livy says), they might have been replaced by Roman colonists. In other words, the evidence remains consistent with the story of Ancus Marcius' conquest, whether or not the settlements came to an end!

Thirdly, it should be noted that most of what is attributed to the kings cannot, in the nature of things, be tested archaeologically. Numa is said to have instituted the calendar and most of Rome's religious cults; Tarquinius Priscus reformed the senate and the cavalry; and Servius Tullius reorganized the tribes and instituted the census. It goes without saying that archaeology cannot be expected to throw light on these alleged activities, or on any other political events. We may conclude that, when it comes to the possibility of verifying specific items of an *histoire événementielle*, or the deeds of particular kings, the results, in general, are disappointingly negative. The problem is methodological, and lies in the fact that the wrong questions are being asked: scholars would be better advised to concentrate on questions that archaeology can be expected to answer.

At this point, it will be convenient to give a brief summary of what the archaeological evidence tells us about Rome in the archaic period (say, from c. 650 to c. 450 BC). It is now beyond doubt that Rome at that time was a growing center of population and was enjoying increasing wealth and prosperity. In the sixth century, it became a nucleated urban settlement with advanced architecture, monumental public buildings, temples, streets, and public open spaces; its artistic culture was relatively sophisticated and bears witness to extensive trade and contacts with centers of production in Etruria, Campania, Magna Graecia, and beyond. This general picture of Rome's

material culture in the sixth century is clearly reflected in Livy's account of the city's flourishing condition during the later monarchy (see, e.g., 1.45.1), and its position of power as the dominant city in central Italy.⁶

At this general level, it is legitimate to say that Livy's narrative, which is matched by those of other sources, coincides with the picture drawn by the archaeological evidence. How exactly this came about (i.e., what evidence led the Roman historians to adopt this essentially correct view of Rome's general situation under the last kings), we do not know, but there are good reasons to think that it was not an accident. That evidence from the archaic age survived into the late Republic and was accessible to historians and antiquarians is beyond doubt. This evidence consisted of monuments, buildings, institutions, and customs that were preserved as relics of the distant past; most important of all were written documents, which we know survived to the late Republic and beyond. The earliest evidence of literacy at Rome dates from the seventh century BC, and public documents that could be used by historians were preserved from before 500 BC (Cornell 1991). At least a dozen archaic documents that have a good chance of being authentic are cited in literary sources, and some are indeed still extant (see Langslow 2013).

One of these texts constitutes what is by far the most important piece of evidence bearing on the archaic history of Rome, namely the first treaty between Rome and Carthage, which was discovered and transcribed by Polybius in the second century BC (his Greek summary of the text is at 3.22). We can be reasonably confident that this document is authentic and that it was correctly dated by Polybius to the first year of the Republic (on the treaty, see Scardigli 1991, 47–87; Cornell 1995, 210–214; Langslow 2013; Colonna 2010). The treaty confirms that, at the end of the monarchy, Rome was the ruling power in Latium, and controlled the coast from the mouth of the Tiber as far as Terracina, 100 kilometers to the South. In doing so, it implicitly confirms that the Romans had extended their control of the Tiber valley to the sea during the monarchic period (whatever we may think of the story of Ancus Marcius, or of the archaeological evidence from sites such as Ficana). We may also reasonably surmise that the same applies to the region of the Alban Hills—but without making any claim for Tullus Hostilius or the traditional date—namely, that this area too had fallen into Roman hands under the monarchy.

Once it is conceded that such aspects of the traditional account may be historically authentic, or at least that they can no longer be dismissed out of hand as fictitious, we can, with all due caution, bring similar historical arguments into play. Since Mommsen, it has been claimed, on perfectly reasonable grounds, that the earliest Roman calendar of festivals, traditionally ascribed to Numa, dates from the monarchic period (Mommsen 1863, 361 ff.). Other arguments can be offered along the same lines. For example, there are good reasons to believe that the system of local tribes, traditionally instituted

by Servius Tullius, was in existence before 495 BC, and probably goes back to the time of the kings (Cornell 1995, 173–175). Many years ago, Plinio Fraccaro produced strong arguments to show that another supposedly Servian institution, the centuriate army, must predate the dual consulship, and is therefore probably of pre-republican origin (Fraccaro 1957, 287–306, articles originally published in 1931 and 1934; Cornell 1995, 181–183).

Let us be clear. The argument that the traditional account found in Livy et al. has some basis in historical fact is rather more complex than showing that this or that part of the traditional narrative is directly confirmed by archaeological evidence. Rather, the archaeological evidence confirms the general prosperity and sophistication of Rome in the sixth century, and indirectly provides a convincing backdrop for the state of affairs revealed in the Carthage treaty, a document fortuitously preserved independently of the Roman tradition. Other arguments based on data extracted from the tradition but developed independently of it (such as Fraccaro's reconstruction of the original Roman legion) point in the same direction.

Finally, we may be much more positive about those parts of the traditional narrative that can be directly tested against the archaeological evidence, and in particular passages that describe the construction of specific monuments and buildings. Where these can be identified on the ground, the results of archaeological soundings have always tended to bear out the traditional accounts. For instance, Livy's statement (5.19.6) that Servius Tullius dedicated a temple to Mater Matuta in the Forum Boarium is borne out by the discovery of a sixth-century temple at the site of Sant'Omobono (Sommella Mura 1977, 1981, 1990; Cifani 2008, 165–173). Other early temples that have been confirmed archaeologically include the temple of Castor in the Forum, traditionally dedicated in 484 BC (Livy 2.42.5; archaeological confirmation: Nielsen and Zahle 1985; Nielsen 1988; Nielsen and Poulsen 1992; Cifani 2008, 119–123). However, the most striking case remains that of the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the Capitol. The story of the construction and dedication of this great building takes up much of Livy's attention in his account of the reign of the last king and the first year of the Republic (1.55; 2.8.6–8); and the surviving remains of its foundations and substructure beneath the Capitoline Museum in the Palazzo Caffarelli confirm both the sixth-century date and the immense size of the original building (Sommella Mura 2000; Sommella Mura et al. 2001; Cifani 2008, 80–109). This is extremely well known, but it is important not to lose sight of what an extraordinary fact this is. A major event reported in the historical tradition is, in this instance, directly confirmed by archaeology. Not only that, but its immense scale—it is the largest known sixth-century temple in the whole of the Mediterranean area—must bear out the traditional picture of Rome's power and importance at the end on the monarchy, and is in every aspect compatible with all the rest of the evidence.⁷

Notes

- 1 Earlier historians did the same, as far as we can tell (Cornell 1991, esp. 21–25). At least as far as the foundation and regal period are concerned (which is what matters in the present context), republican historians were far more expansive, both relatively and absolutely, than Livy; Cato and Piso each devoted one book out of a total of seven to the kings. Cn. Gellius devoted at least three books, and Valerius Antias at least two. For full details, see Cornell et al. 2013.
- 2 As was noted earlier, Cicero could be taken to imply the contrary, but he gives no details, and in this respect his account departs radically from the rest of the tradition and makes little historical sense (thus, Cornell 2001). The other accounts, and especially Livy, are unequivocal in this matter.
- 3 “No historical parallel” means what it says: there is no example of such a thing in the entire recorded history of the world. This point was already recognized by Lorenzo Valla in the fifteenth century and subsequently by Sir Isaac Newton (Newton 1728).
- 4 These are Varronian dates—that is, dates numbered according to the scheme developed in the late Republic by Varro and others, which placed the foundation in 753 BC, the start of the Republic in 509 BC and the Gallic sack in 390 BC. Livy does not follow this Varronian chronology, but he gives the same number of years as Varro to each of the three reigns (1.40.1; 48.8; 60.3).
- 5 Dionysius attributes this solution to Piso (Dion. Hal. 4.7.5 = Piso *FRHist* 9 F18), but notes that it was not accepted by later historians. Livy (1.46.4) was aware of it but chose to reject it in favor of the traditional version. Edlund (1976) may be right that, in approving Piso’s revision, Dionysius was engaging in a veiled criticism of Livy.
- 6 The evidence is conveniently summarized in the exhibition catalog *La Grande Roma dei Tarquinii* (Cristofani 1990), updated in the recent volume with the same title (Della Fina 2010). In view of what has been said earlier, the description of the period 616–509 BC as “the Age of the Tarquins” is unhelpful and misleading.
- 7 Another potential point of contact between the traditional account of the late regal period and the archaeological evidence is the question of the so-called Servian Wall. Livy attributes the construction of defensive fortifications to both Tarquinius Priscus and Servius Tullius (1.36.1; 38.6; 44.3), but there is much dispute about whether these reports can be verified archaeologically. The so-called Servian Wall, which extends in a circuit of some 11 kilometers around the republican city, and of which large portions

still stand, is actually a fourth-century construction, built after the Gallic sack (cf. Livy 6.32.1). However, there is a possibility that it follows the course of an earlier circuit, traces of which have been dated to the regal period. For a fully documented statement of the case, see Cifani 2008, 45–71; but many difficulties remain. For the contrary view, see Bernard 2012, and for the opinion of the present writer, see Cornell 1995, 198–202. The issues are too complex to go into in detail here.

Cross-References

See CHAPTER 11: LIVY'S HISTORICAL PHILOSOPHY; CHAPTER 20: LIVY'S NARRATIVE OF THE REGAL PERIOD: STRUCTURE AND IDEOLOGY; CHAPTER 21: LITERARY ARCHETYPES FOR THE REGAL PERIOD; CHAPTER 22: THE REPRESENTATION OF THE REGAL PERIOD IN LIVY

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Cornell, T. J. 1995. *The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 BC)*. London: Routledge. A general survey of the period, taking account of archaeological research as well as written sources.

Forsythe, G. 2005. *A Critical History of Early Rome: From Prehistory to the First Punic War*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. Covers the same period, but claims to be more critical of the ancient sources.

The clearest statement in any language of the skeptical case against the ancient tradition is given in two books by the Belgian scholar Jacques Poucet:

Poucet, J. 1985. *Les origines de Rome: tradition et histoire*. Brussels: Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis.

Poucet, J. 2000. *Les Rois de Rome: Tradition et histoire*. Brussels: Académie royale de Belgique.

Momigliano, A. 1963. “An Interim Report on the Origins of Rome.” *Journal of Roman Studies* **53**: 95–121. A classic article written when postwar archaeology was just beginning to have an impact on the subject. Its discussion of how to combine archaeology with other kinds of evidence is still required reading.

Cristofani, M. ed. 1990. *La Grande Roma dei Tarquini: Catalogo della mostra*. Rome: “L’Erma” di Bretschneider. A magnificently illustrated catalog of a major public exhibition. In Italian, but the illustrations alone provide the best available impression of the archaeological evidence for the city of Rome in the archaic period.

Carandini, A. 2011. *Rome: Day One*. Princeton, NJ, Oxford: Princeton University Press. This is the only one of Carandini's many books to have been translated into English (not very well, admittedly); but it gives an idea of the author's unorthodox and controversial approach to the question.

Grandazzi, A. 1997. *The Foundation of Rome: Myth and History*. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. Accepts Carandini's findings.

Chapter 20

Livy's Narrative of the Regal Period: Structure and Ideology

Paul-Marius Martin

Book 1 stretches over a period of almost two and a half centuries¹—that is, one-third of the length of time treated by Livy's work, compared with 141 books for five centuries. Such a difference is obviously explained by the paucity of the “documentation” that Livy had at his disposal on regal Rome and on the “prehistory” of Rome (Sehlmeyer 1998). The narrative, about 20 years later, of the regal period by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Books 1–4) shows that he uses the same annalistic material (Gabba 1991; Martin 1993), outside the “heterodox” traditions exhumed by antiquarians. Before him, we have retained only one relatively complete account of this period: that of Cicero (Cic. *Rep.* 2.4–52), who complains that “for those distant periods, there is scarcely anything but the names of the kings who remained in the spotlight” (Cic. *Rep.* 2.33). The stability of general data, in the three authors, is remarkable. And the jetsam of historiography prior to Livy confirms that the main lines of the traditional narrative concerning the regal period were fixed and that the spirit that had given birth to it was unchanged (Classen 1965; Guia 1967; Martin 1994, 187–256).

A Patchwork

For the latter, narrators were therefore held in a rigid framework (seven kings, succeeding one another in unchanging order, each having a reign lasting about one generation), with a prerequisite framework for each of them, so that the history of regal Rome is reduced essentially to a succession of biography portraits (Bernard 2000, 31f.; 176f.; 189f.; 198f.). To the “classified” motifs could be added “free” motifs (Poucet 1985, 238f.): variations within the first, or the addition of new motifs, with an epic or dramatic character. Livy does not decline them, not only for “Rome before Rome” (Hercules and Cacus), but also in the many passages where the sudden fullness of the style betrays an epic or dramatic inspiration. With the result that Livy's writing, in Book 1, resembles a *patchwork*. To be convinced of this, one needs only to examine the placement, in the first chapters, of the three linguistic components of the Livian account: “historical” narrative, dramatic developments, antiquarian's notices²:

Rome before Rome

(Hercules and Cacus) (7.3–15)

Antenor and Aeneas in Italy (1–2)

Alba (3)

Birth and childhood of the twins (4–5)

Romulus

Foundation of Rome (6–7.3)

Institutions (8)

Rape of the Sabines (9)

First attack (10.1–4)

Opima spoils (10.5–7)

Second and third attacks (11.1–5)

Tarpeia (11.6–8)

Fourth attack (12)

Jupiter Stator (12, 3–7)

Intervention of the Sabines (13.1–4)

Roman–Sabine synoecism (13.4–8)

End of the Romulus's reign (14–15)

Romulus's apotheosis (16)

Out of 16 chapters, “historical” narrative itself occupies a little more than nine, that is, scarcely 60% of the text, compared with six dedicated to dramatic accounts and the equivalent of one chapter taken up with antiquarian's notices—a proportion, for the latter, moreover unequalled in the rest of the work. The importance of the story which is dramatic (Pauw 1991), even tragic (Thomas 1991), should not surprise from an author who began a preface with four feet of hexameter³ and finished it with regret for not being able, like poets, to invoke the Muses (*Praef.* 13; Moles 1993, 143f.).

The sequel to Book 1 continues to blend “objective” narrative and cold archaeological, legal, and ritual notes (Liv. 1.18.6–10; 24; 26.5–8 and 12–13; 32.5–14; 36.5; 38.2; 42.4–44.2; 45.4; 48.7), and sheer purple passages, which are so dramatic as to become almost pathetic: an Alban saga (22–26; 28–29); stories of Lucumon Tarquinius and Servius Tullius, until their accession to the throne (34–35.6; 39–41); counterbalancing this, we have the suspenseful double ending of Servius Tullius and of royalty (46–48.7; 57–60.2); without forgetting the trap against Turnus Herdonius (50–52) and the trick of Gabies (53.4–54)—all together 24 chapters out of 44, that is, more than one out of

two.

Contributing to this dramatic style of writing are the speeches and dialogs, lively and nervous, or pathetic (7.5; 9.5; 22.6–7; 23.4–5; 48.1–2; 50.8–9; 53.6–11; 58.7–10). The eloquent Livy, extolled by Quintilian (Liv. 1.18.6–10; 24; 26.5–8 and 12–13; 32.5–14; 36.5; 38.2; 42.4–44.2; 45.4; 48.7), scarcely appears in Book 1: one finds there few speeches *per se* and, when there are any, they are brief. Livy seems to shy away from the rhetorical exercise of oratory composition, as if the primitive era did not lend itself to that: thus, perhaps remembering Cicero (Cic. *Brut.* 53), he prefers to highlight the “natural” character of Brutus's eloquence (59.11). One can scarcely find embryos of antilogy (23.5–9), of altercation (48.1–2), of *suasoria* (9.3–4; 26.10–11; 35.3–5; 41.3; 47.3). Let us put aside the invocations to divinity (10.6; 12.4–6; 18.9) and the ritual formulae (24.7–8; 32.6–13; 38.2–3).

These speeches, concentrated on the romanesque or dramatic sequences, are more and more numerous as the book proceeds: Alban gesture (23.7–10; 26.9–11; 28.4–9); the coming to power of Lucumon Tarquinius (34.6; 34.9; 35.3–5), of Servius Tullius (39.3; 40.2–3; 41; 3–5), and of Tarquinius Superbus (46.7–8; 47.2–6 and 10–12); the disagreement between Turnus Herdonius and Tarquinius Superbus (50.3–6; 51.3–6; 52.1–3); and Brutus's appeal to the people (58.8–11). The coincidence of the places where these speeches are found with the purple passages found *supra* is total. Compared with Livy's other remaining books (except Book 2), Book 1 is, from this point of view, totally atypical: speeches are frequent, but brief (one or two paragraphs); the longest speeches do not exceed five paragraphs, and the part of the direct speech there is clearly larger than in the rest of his work: 50% in 1.1, compared with an average of 20% (direct) and 80% (indirect) elsewhere (Utard 2004, 16). And you get the impression, while reading, of a story narrated by several voices, in the manner of those radio transmissions of the past, where the narrator interrupted his story to let different voices intervene *off*.

A “Timeless” Story

This impression of the “timeless” story is accentuated by the absence of chronological markers (Martin 1998): the only explicit date is that of the *exactio regum* (60.3), to indicate a year that, besides, in an exceptional way, is shared between the end of Book 1 and the beginning of Book 2. For the rest, we have length of reigns, but no indication of date. Livy had advised that his work would start with the beginnings of Rome and would even mention the “prehistory of Rome” (*Praef.* 1–4; 6). However, to the question “What depth of time would that represent?” Livy does not respond, other than with a vague “more than seven hundred years” (*Praef.* 4),⁴ which does not take into account the “prehistoric” period. He could have been more precise: Dionysius

of Halicarnassus dates precisely the stages of this “pre-Rome,” since the date of the fall of Troy was thought to be known (D. H. 1.74.2). Livy contents himself with an imprecise *Troia capta* on the first page, before confining the epyllion of Hercules and Cacus in a *flashback* that spares him from any dating: *multis ante tempestatibus* (5.2)—the equivalent of the “in very ancient times” that opens our stories.

Remaining in this mythical time, outside of chronological reckoning, has the advantage, for Livy, of facilitating the coming and going between past and present. Thus, the reader is invited to stroll across the vestiges of regal Rome that are preserved—or recently restored (cf. *RGDV*, 29)—in contemporary Rome, whether they be major (Lupercal [5.1–2], *Ara Maxima* [7.10], the temple of Jupiter Feretrian [10.6]) or anecdotal (*ficus Ruminalis* [4.5], *sororium tigillum* [26.13], *Sceleratus uicus* [48.7]). He even indicates the recently disappeared royal monuments: the *Curia Hostilia* (30.2) and the statue of Attus Navius (38.6), destroyed in the Comitium fire in 52 BC (Plin. *NH* 34.21), or even the chapel of Diana (48.6), burnt in 56 BC (Cic. *Har. resp.* 32). He thus creates the impression of a superimposition between regal Rome and contemporary Rome (Jaeger 1997, Chapter 4). The permanence of these rituals—the sacrifice to the *Ara Maxima*, *Lupercalia*—has also been maintained since the Rome of the kings. Immutable finally (*hodie quoque*: 17.9) are the fundamental institutions: senate, *interregnum*, equestrian centuries, and the voting system based on the poll tax.

The superimposition of regal Rome and contemporary Rome, besides the fact that it must not displease Augustus (Prop. 4.1; 9; 10; Gros 1976), reinforces the adhesion to the myth of Rome's irresistible and continuing organic growth, up to world dimensions (Liv. F 64 W. M. = 65 Jal (=Apon. *Cant. Cant.* 12); D. H. I, 3, 5; Ruch 1965–1966; Burck 1982; Feichtinger 1992). Because it was necessary for this growth to be justified in the eyes of men and gods, Livy insists twice on the fetial ritual (Penella 1987) proof of the *bellum iustum* (24.3–9; 34.5–14; Albert 1980; Rampazzo 2012, 61–93). Livy introduces this theme right from the birth of the founder of “the greatest world power after the gods” (4.1) and the latter afterward is recurrent in Book 1 (7.10; 16.7; 53.3–5). Already under the kings, the keywords regarding the City are “*augere*” and “*crescere*” (Liv. 1.8.4; 21.6; 33.8; 30.8–9; 44.3; 45.1; 55.7). Only Tarquinius Superbus, in spite of his victories (53.1) and the continuation of the great works (55), is absent from the list of kings all deemed *conditores* of a Rome “increased” by them, to whom Livy renders dazzling homage at the very moment they disappear from the destiny of Rome (2.1.2).

Thus, instead of a precisely dated historical work, we have a story interspersed with recurring phrases such as “after that” (about 50 “*inde*”), “and afterward” (25 “*deinde*”), and “then” (more than 40 “*tum/tunc*”). By their brief character, these mechanisms of speech accentuate the apparently naïve nature of an account that therefore risks appearing less careful to show

the historical sequences of cause and effect than to roll out a succession of high-color scenes, exotic as well as familiar to the reader (Feldherr 1998), but with no logical link between them.

The Direction to which History Points

As a result, one could ask: could it be that this history of the kings is due to chance? A superficial reading could lead one to believe this, when one notes that 10% of the two terms expressing chance in the preserved Livian books—the noun “*fors*” and its ablative adverb “*forte*”—are concentrated in Book 1 only. In reality, that is not the case: no more than the rest of Roman history, the history of royal Rome is, for Livy, deprived of meaning, but the latter is less historical than providential: “*forte quadam*,” but “*diuinitus*” (1.4.4: Champeaux 1967)! He is thus the first historian of Antiquity to give a meaning to history. Must one see there the influence of stoic thought? Two words in any case clearly indicate that, for Livy, history makes sense.

The first is “*fatum*.” It appears in four founding moments: the coming of Hercules onto the future site of the city and the creation of his cult (7.11); the birth of the twins (4.1); the immortality promised to Romulus by the fates (7.15); and the fatality that strikes Servius in spite of his precautions (42.2). If this last-mentioned occurrence refers to the “*fabula*” of the end of his reign, the first offers a major ideological interest: Romulus agrees to honor with a cult the still living Hercules, because, says Livy for the first time, he recognizes in him the union of *uirtus* and the forces of destiny.

The second word is “*fortuna*.” The *imperatores* had used it and abused it for a century to support, with efficient charisma, their appetite for power (Champeaux 1987, 215–290). Livy uses it abundantly, in all its meanings, some of which do not interest us here. Some may be banal, like that of “fate, luck, individual destiny” (31.3), if it did not apply to the conduct of Lucumon Tarquinius, to Servius's origins, and to Brutus' trick (34.11; 39.6; 56.7)—three figures who subjugated the *fortuna*. No less banal, the notion of *fortuna belli* (27.6), except when it is applied to the miraculously lucky coincidence of there being two sets of triplets (23.10), or when it highlights the rarity of the *spolia opima* (10.7). Above all, we find it in an association already made with *fate*: the one, so Roman, of *fortuna* with *uirtus*, which makes Rome irresistible (Dion. Hal. 1.4.2; 5.2–3). Outlined with Romulus, this association is affirmed before the fight between the Horatii and the Curiatii (25.2), and it legitimizes the throne of Servius by the epiphany of his victory (42.3).

Incidentally, it is beyond doubt for Livy that these particular fortunes depend, in reality, on the Fortune of Rome, the only sovereign. As a matter of fact, the opposing triplets champions are fully aware that the patriae fortuna (25.3) or fortuna publica (27.2) depends on them. Besides, in the same sentence where Livy deplores Servius's incapacity to master his mortal destiny, he stresses in

compensation his conviction that “the fortune, of the Roman people wanted to prolong Servius' reign, so that he could lay down the foundations of the city” (46.5). That again is invoked by Tarquinius Superbus to invite the Latins to share with Rome this *fortuna populi Romani* (52.3). Here, the king is perfectly in phase with the politics of Republican Rome, which ended up absorbing the Latins. The reader could not but recognize there the very official *Fortuna Publica populi Romani Quiritium Primigenia*, to whom had been dedicated in 204 BC a temple consecrated 10 years later (Liv. 29.36.4–9; 34.53.5–6; Champeaux 1987, 3–35). Besides the mentions of this devotion and dedication, Livy mentions this deity only five other times in the preserved part of his work (Liv. 2.40.13; 6.30.6; 7.34.6; 28.44.7; 45.3.6), compared with two occurrences for Book 1 alone. Obviously, he considers that the goddess leaned toward Rome of the first centuries with the particular solicitude required in caring for a newborn.

Thus, the events of this period, even if they seem *a priori* deprived of inner logic, all contribute to defining the profile of a Rome that, since her birth, is called upon to lead the world (Liv. 2.40.13; 6.30.6; 7.34.6; 28.44.7; 45.3.6). The essential features of what became Rome at the time when Livy wrote can be seen in the portrait he paints of the Rome of the kings, as one recognizes in a child's portrait the traits of the adult he has become. Assuredly, this portrait is largely reconstructed but, from Livy's point of view, the important thing is not the “historical truth,” it is the idea that one could make of it, thanks to accounts such as the following one (Fox 1996, 29–48; 96–141): “In such ancient facts, if what is likely was taken as true, I would be satisfied with it” (5.21.9). It is clear enough that he was no fool (Miles 1995, 7–84; Forsythe 1999, 40–51). However, if he claims the right, as a Roman—if only of the first generation—to doubt the paternity of Mars (4.2), it is in order to better intimate to other peoples the obligation to believe in it (*Praef.* 7)!

The March to *Libertas*...

However, as Book 1 progresses, one suspects that the narrative works toward an end other than that the sole exaltation of Rome. For a long time, this aim is hardly discernible, as long as Livy hastens toward it, by means of *breui, confestim, in dies, quam primum, celeriter, extemplo, nec diu, haud multo post*—as many terms, especially frequent in the first half of the book, that “fast forward” history. The author seems in a hurry to finish with this obscure and distant period, which he fears will tire the reader (*Praef.* 4). He barely stops for the time to describe a ritual and to narrate a canonical episode, which he revisits with all the resources of his literary art, such as the episode of the Sabines (1.9; 13; Jaeger 1997, 30f.), the combat of the Horatii and Curiatii (1.25–26; Solodow 1979), or the pathetic scene of the Albans hunted from their town (1.29), perhaps in remembrance of similar scenes during the civil wars.

And here suddenly the “film” ceases to “fast forward.” The reader is present “live” at the arrival of Lucumon Tarquinius in Rome, at the maneuvers which enabled him to raise himself to the throne (34–35), at his assassination (40); then he follows the detours of the royal palace, to be a witness to the miraculous childhood of Servius (39), to the sleight of hand of his accession to the throne (41), before trembling at the family plot which causes his loss (46–48); next, Livy shows him the real truth in the tricks of Tarquinius Superbus against Turnus Herdonius, followed day by day (50–52), and in those of his sons against Gabies (53–54); finally, the reader is outraged with the lot of the unfortunate Lucretia (57–59) before thrilling at Brutus's call for liberty (59–60). The last scenes, from Chapter 46, form theatrical sequences—a mixture of *Hamlet* and *Bajazet*—practically continuous, separated only by a few paragraphs that play the role of the cinema *cut*. They concern exclusively the life of Tarquinius Superbus, and the influence of the *fabula* is obvious there (Mastrocinque 1988, 13–35; Wiseman 1998). Moreover, the adjective “*tragicus*” invites itself at the beginning of the theatrical sequences (46.3),⁵ inviting the reader to see there some “tales more specific...to scenic representation, which takes pleasure in the marvelous, than to credibility” (5.21.8). As a result, the continuous tale increases in scale: the 15 chapters that narrate the end of royalty cover at least 30 years, compared with 40 chapters 6 previously for more than two centuries.

Thus, with the coming of liberation from the monarchic yoke, Livy slows down the tempo of his account to describe in detail the march toward liberty. The word “*libertas*” appears then, for the first time, at the beginning of this sequential series (46.3), and words of the same root give emphasis to the account at a pace that is more and more sustained (48.9; 56.8; 60.2 and 3). Book 2 can begin: “*Liberi...populi Romani...*”

...Corollary to the Degradation of the Monarchy

This march to liberty is accompanied by a corollary: the progressive degradation of the monarchic institution. The *odium regni* was one of the foundations of Roman republican ideology (Martin 1994, 3–95). This visceral repulsion for all monarchical power (*taedio regum*: 46, 3) went back, according to tradition, to the tyrannical reign of the last king. Whether or not it has a historical basis, it is certain that this feeling of hatred erupted in the second century BC (Ferrary 1982, 761f.), faced with the example set by the monarchies with which Rome had contentious or amicable relations: the first inspired fear and hatred, the second contempt. All were founded on what seemed in the Roman Republic as an aberration: agnatic heredity. Now, the same tradition that stigmatized the memory of the last king conceded the lasting existence of the monarchical system in the final phase of Roman history. To come out of this impasse, the annalistic tradition thus created, mixing archaic and anachronistic realities, the myth of an elective monarchy

(Martin 1982; 7–70; Miles 1995).

Book 1 depicts a slow but continuous degradation of royalty, from the Etruscan period. Let us pass over the reign of Evander, founded on the *auctoritas* (1.7.8–9), and over the Alban dynasty, if only to note that the twins had approved in *contio*—already—the restoration of Numitor (6.2).⁷ For Romulus, this procedure, according to Livy, was ruled out⁸: the primitive population was, on the Greek model, composed of surplus from Alba (6.3), and the *asylum*—another borrowing from Greece—is after the foundation (8.5–6); indeed, this *turba*, which he describes as composed of the dangerous dregs of the peoples around, could not straightaway constitute a body of citizens (1.8.6; 2.1.4). Therefore, it is religious sanction for the taking of auspices that, alone, gives Romulus his legitimacy (6.4–7.4)—contested, as a matter of fact, by Remus, whose murder is the initial act of the founder—Rome's “original sin,” as it was thought of in the black hours of the civil wars (Jal 1963, 407f.). If there is original sin, Livy does not situate it in the murder itself, the two versions which he reports—that which absolves Romulus and that which makes him the perpetrator (7.2), with a preference for the second—but in an *auitum malum, regni cupido* (6.4). Therefore, at the origin of Roman royalty, as in every monarchy, there is this original flaw: the desire to reign, the thirst for power (the Latin “*regnum*” does not distinguish between the two: Bruno 1966).

Livy, as distinct from a philosophical thought that Cicero echoes (Cic. *Rep.* 2, 41; 47), does not believe that monarchy is the best theoretical regime. In accordance with republican ideology, he thinks that royalty is intrinsically bad, in that it forbids the exercising of supreme civil good, *libertas*, even if that regime was necessary in the first phase of the history of an immature people (2.1). This can explain his complacency to openly report facts borrowed from the “black legend” of Romulus (Ver Eecke 2008, 181–188; 193–240; 425–431): the absence of regret on the death of his “co-king” T. Tatius (14.3); demagoguery and personal guard (15.8); the suspicion that the Fathers, incensed, had assassinated him (16.4).⁹ Livy could have silenced them; that he did not do so shows that he wished to mark the distance with this first exercising of royal power.

However, in Rome, if tradition is to be believed, it was possible to check this “genetic” illness of royalty for a certain time. With Numa, the procedure is put in place for “election” of the king: the triple filter of choice by the people, and ratification by the senate and auspices gives to the king's election the double guarantee of men and gods (17.9–18). After him, Tullus Hostilius and then Ancus Marcius were elected in accordance with the rules (32.1; cf. 22.1).

Tarquinius the Elder may have been, if we read Livy, the first to break with this virtuous tradition. Certainly, he too obtained the triple approval of the people, the senate, and the gods. However, previously, he had received the announcement of his royal destiny by a prodigy (34.8–9), who, objectively,

“overtakes” in advance the regular procedure by reducing it to the confirmation of a divine election. Besides, the manner in which Livy reports this election shows that several new elements were there, either introduced by him, or interpreted in new terms. The first is Tarquinius' eviction of the sons of Ancus by trickery (35.1); this precaution taken by Tarquin helps Livy to show that the temptation to reduce “elective” royalty to the current hateful model—hereditary royalty—was already making its way; if not, why would Ancus have asked his “friend” to ensure a “guardian” regency over his children? (34.12). This hereditary logic armed the latter, who considered Tarquinius' election as “the ultimate indignity” (40.2) and the prospect of seeing Servius arrive on the throne as “a disgrace, while there exist male descendants to King Ancus” (40.3). Two other new elements appear in Livy's account: “*Isque primus et petisse ambitiose regnum et orationem dicitur habuisse ad conciliandos plebis animos compositam*” (35.2). The balancing “*et...et ...*” shows the link between these two new elements: the ambition to become king and the concern to win the people's favors through speech. Gone is the modest virtue of the former kings! Tarquinius wants the throne and gives himself the means to obtain it, thanks to his wealth—before his new fellow citizens: affability, a welcoming table, good deeds; before the king: socializing, friendship, and competence (34.11–12). And, to finish, an electoral campaign speech (35.3–5) that begins with a counter-truth: “*se non rem nouam petere!*” (He wasn't looking for revolution!). Money and crafty elegance—the two evils of Roman political life—thus make their entry with Tarquinius. Finally—the last new thing—the king was elected “*ingenti consensu*” (35.6): for the first time, there is talk of an electoral tally: Livy suggests that, for the preceding kings, the question had not been asked.

This first crack in the royal institution was to be widened with Servius Tullius. He also received in advance the *omen* of a prodigy (39.1–3). And his coming to power is, this time, totally irregular, without *interregnum*, without popular vote, without senatorial approval, without auspices: seated on the throne by a state lie, he installs himself there, by a sort of *usucapio* of royalty, under the protection of an armed guard (41.2–6); however, says Livy, “*primus iniussu populi, uoluntate patrum regnavit*.” Livy thus distances Servius from the image of the tyrant, traditionally upheld by the people against the nobles¹⁰ and not the reverse. This blurred image persisted even when military victory had made him “*haud dubius rex*,” as much in the eyes of the plebs as in those of the senate (42.3). For, in addition to this consensus remaining informal in Livy, the epiphany by arms refers the reader either toward the ideology of Hellenistic royalty, or rather toward the recent recovery of the latter by the *imperatores*; both of them had been exposed to the “*odium regni*.” Certainly, Servius ended up asking the citizens, at an undetermined date, using the traditional formula “*uellent iuberentne se regnare*” (if they wanted and ordered him to reign), and he obtained in reply an unequalled *consensus* (46.1), but this delayed legalization—a new element compared with previous

tradition—does not prevent his reign from having been, for a long time, marred by constitutional irregularity. Livy, besides, felt the need to justify him for it by praising, by way of a funeral oration, “such a soft and moderate government” (“*tam mite ac tam moderatum imperium*”: 48.9), for “with him ends fair and legitimate royalty” (48.8). The fact remains, he adds, that this authority “was that of one single man.” Already, the lassitude of the monarchic institution is reaching the Romans.

Thus, while the monarchy is turning sour, the desire for liberty is growing. Had the sixth king felt it? Tradition credited him with the desire to install the republican transition at the end of his reign (48.8–9). This legend, whose first sure confirmation is found in Accius (Acc. *Brut.* F 4 Dangel = Cic. *Sest.* 123), presented Servius Tullius not only as the last legitimate king of Rome, but also as the last one who *should have* reigned in Rome. Livy, judging by the distant manner in which he reports this tradition, does not believe too much in it. In fact, it upsets his outline of evolution toward liberty: if the Roman people were ripe for freedom from the end of Servius Tullius' reign, why did they tolerate, for another quarter of a century, the tyranny of Tarquinius Superbus? In his mind, on the contrary, this tyrannical “flare up” was necessary for the ultimate maturation of the desire for liberty, by exacerbating it (2.1.3–6). On the other hand, he adheres totally to another historical myth: that of the *commentarii Servi Tulli* (Acc. *Brut.* F 4 Dangel = Cic. *Sest.* 123), which would have permitted, without discontinuity, laying of the foundations for the republican regime (Marastoni 2009, 51–85). The last sentence of Book 1 (60.4) marks the concern for continuity between royalty and the Republic. The last legitimate king would thus have conceived the change in regime.

That makes the reign of Tarquinius Superbus even more illegitimate. Without even speaking of previous domestic crimes (46), or the assassination of his predecessor, he is the only one to have reigned constantly “*neque populi iussu neque auctoribus patribus*” (48.3), and his tyrannical behavior¹¹ earns him the stigma of *iniustus rex* (53.1). With him is produced the *anacyclosis* that, in Greek political philosophy, fatally reduces royalty to tyranny (Pol. 6.4.8; Cic. *Rep.* 1.42f.).

Livian Originality

Does this schema of degradation of royalty go back to Cato, even to Fabius Pictor (Timpe 1972)? We do not think so. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who, while not knowing Livy, treats the same material, proposes a noticeably different schema of degradation of the Etruscan monarchy, with a fully legitimate Tarquinius the Elder and an ambiguous Servius Tullius, but whom he tries to render legitimate (Delcourt 2005, 314–359; Martinez Pinna 2009, 96f.).

Before him, Cicero, by insisting on the “*lex curiata de imperio*,” which, from

that era, would have managed the royal election (Cic. *Rep.* 2.23–25; 31; 33), reports that the election of Tarquin the Elder had been unanimous, without making the slightest reference to his ambition (Cic. *Rep.* 2, 35). For Servius, he recognizes that he began to reign *iniussu populi* before obtaining a *lex curiata de imperio*; on the other hand, as with Dionysius, Servius definitively did without senatorial approval (Cic. *Rep.* 2, 37–38). The incomplete state of the text prevents us from knowing how Cicero related Tarquinius Superbus' rise to power, but it seems that the Romans had tolerated for a time “this unjust and cruel master” because of his military successes, before being incensed by him and shaking “*seruitutis iugum*” (Cic. *Rep.* 2, 45–46). In spite of the semi-illegality of Servius's reign, Cicero thus considered, as with Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the first six kings as perfectly legitimate. A fragment from the *De Republica* (Cic. *Rep.* 2, 43 = Non. 526, 10) confirms it (Bréguet 1980, 31; 141. n. 2). Knowing in fact that Livy, Cicero, and Dionysius are in agreement as to the duration of the regal period,¹² if one does not retain in this fragment the abusive correction of Mai, followed by Ziegler, the text mentions a duration of “constitutional” royalty of “220 years approximately”—which must obviously be understood as referring, not to the fall of royalty, but to the taking of power by Tarquinius Superbus, whose 25-year tyranny (60.3) in fact marks the end of the “Romulean constitution” that had governed previous reigns.¹³ Besides, one finds the trace of this ideological schema in the preface of Livy's Book 2, where he sings the praises of all the kings, except the last (2.1.1–6; Martin 2013).

In the schema of degradation of royalty prior to Livy, the latter, therefore, intervened brutally, with the last king and his depreciative *cognomen* (Thomas 2008). Servius' power, to be half illegal, was nevertheless legitimate through the beneficent exercise of it. The general thread of the annalistic account, therefore, made all the weight of the *odium regni* weigh on the last king, who was painted with stereotypical colors of the Greek tyrant (Dunkle 1971), and the only one, in the original tradition, to have succeeded his father. Livy, without breaking with this schema, nuances it in a subtle manner. His originality is in having drawn a *progressive* degradation of royalty, by tracing the beginning of the process to the first Etruscan king, even to Ancus Marcius. Perhaps it is the irregularity, inscribed in tradition, of Servius' reign which suggested that he interpret, beforehand, other elements of the latter as evidence of degradation and, conversely, proceed to a progressive, but, in the end, total legalization, of Servian royalty. At the same time, he is careful to show how, as the *regnum* subsides, *libertas* rises in a concomitant way. Thus, the reader follows the first simmerings of the dawning dream of liberty, under Servius, until its birth, which closes Book 1 right in the middle of an incredibly charged year 509 BC. A slow degradation of royalty on one hand, a slow maturation of liberty on the other, fit well into his concept of a history of Rome that is at the same time “organicist” and cyclical (Mineo 2006, 19f., 101f., 425f.). For Livy, royalty was “pregnant,” if we can say it, with the *res*

publica (2, 2.1–6; Heldmann 1987; Feldherr 1997).

However, this strongly marked cut in 509 BC constituted a historical–ideological innovation (Timpe 1972). In fact, tradition commonly considered that, if the fall of royalty indeed marked a rupture, the legal framework that enabled the Republic to function was put in place only by the law of the XII Tables, more than a half-century after. Moreover, Livy agrees that “the laws of the XII Tables still nowadays...are the source of all public and private law” (3.34.6). His choice of closing Book 1 with the election of the first consuls of the Republic results thus from an ideological course of action taken, which is not new, but which he revives. This ideology is that of the Roman Republic: *libertas uersus regnum* (Martin 1994, 99–184). In short, either we are in the Republic, and it is liberty; or we are in a kingdom, and it is servitude: “The Roman people were slaves, when they were under the kings” (2.12.2). A rough ideology, but tremendously effective, which the first French Republic inherited en bloc.

Livy the Republican

Whether the text of 1.1 that we are reading is a new edition (Bayet 1940, XVII f.) or a modified version (Luce 1965), published between 27 and 25 BC (1.19.3), of a previous text (around 30 BC), it has not been profoundly reworked. Livy kept its spirit, and it is doubtlessly a very republican Livy who emerges—all the more republican as, never having known the Republic, at least the “happy” Republic, this “first-generation” Roman citizen—who received the *ciuitas* in 49 BC—idealizes it. So, “Pompeian”? Does it still mean something under Augustus (Hayne 1990; Mineo 2006, 109–134)? To have been over-interpreted (Walsh 1961, 12f.), the evidence of Tacitus regarding this epithet that Augustus would have mockingly attached (Liv. F 67 = Tac. *Ann.* 4, 34, 6) must not be under-interpreted either. Neither anti-Augustan, nor Pompeian, Livy is quite simply a Republican. Several indications support this.

He calls Lucius Brutus a “liberator,” with an insistence that has nothing innocent in respect of the praise that Livy made of the anti-Caesar chiefs¹⁴ (Liv. 1.56.8; 60.2; 2.5.6; 7.8; 4.15.3; 7.32.13). This term had strong connotations, since Cicero has used it abundantly, for the first time in this sense, to designate the Caesaricides (Cic. *Phil.* I, 6; 36; II, 31; 88; 114; X, 8; XIV, 12; *Att.* XIV, 12, 2) as eminent men. Even if it was doubted (Jal 1979, 214; 253f.), he is indeed pondering about Caesar: “Was it better for the State that he was born or that he was not born?”¹⁵ On the other hand, since the cult of *Diuius Iulius* was created probably as soon as 42 BC (Dio 47.18.3; Simpson 1998, 427–429), to mark such an obvious distance with regard to the traditions over the deification of the “prototypes” Aeneas and Romulus—whom he never calls Quirinus—(2.6; 15.6; 16) is evidence of a real reticence, comparable to that which he expresses regarding the incertitude relative to the

ascendancy of the *gens Iulia* (3.2: Nesselrath 1990; Salamon 2009). Livy is clearly reticent to the claim to the “divine right” that looms across this cult, as well as to a family domination against which, on the fall of royalty, Roman civil identity had been built (Feldherr 1997; 1998, 189f.).

He who experienced, as a young man, the turmoil of the last civil war doubtless reserved judgment on Caesar's autocracy, on his mythical genealogy, on his deification—in short, on this Caesarean heritage assumed by Octavian from the beginning of his rise to power. Doubtless, he judged, conversely, that Pompey had embodied the last republican legitimacy, in spite of his twisting the latter, exactly as Servius who, notwithstanding the irregularities of his reign, had incarnated the ultimate royal legitimacy. It is thus that one must understand Augustus's apostrophe—who, one may add, was not unhappy to distance himself from Caesar in restoring the figure of Pompey (Ramage 1985; Ledentu 2012; Mineo 2012).

Nevertheless, the first three words of Book 2—“*Liberi iam hinc...*” (2.1.1)—indicate clearly that Livy, under a principdom installed from now on, toward 27–25 BC, indeed thinks that he lives in a free Rome, and that the *res publica* still exists, or has a new beginning, thanks to Augustus (cf. Chapters 7 and 8). As for knowing if he still persisted in thinking that...(Syme 1959; *contra* Miles 1995: Chapter 1).

Notes

- 1 Excluding Chapters 1–3 and 7 on the “prehistory” of Rome.
- 2 The first category in upright script, the second in italics, the third underlined.
- 3 Liv. *Praef.* 1 (*facturusne operae pretium sim*); cf. Quint. *I. O.* 9.4.74.
- 4 The mention of the length of time between the foundations of Lavinium and of Alba (3.4) does not contradict our statement: it was imposed by the chronological interpretation of the legend of the 30 piglets (cf. Virg. *Aen.* 8.42). And Livy confuses the duration of the Alban kings' dynasty and the duration of the city's existence: 400 years for the two (compare 3.6–10 and 29.6).
- 5 It is only found again in 24.24.2, in his technical acceptance.
- 6 Taking away the chapters on “prehistory.”
- 7 *Contra* D. H. 1.85.1.
- 8 *Contra* D. H. 2.3–6.1.
- 9 Some of this data was ancient. It had been revived by the political struggles

in the last century of the Republic.

- 10 Dionysius, on the other hand, seems faithful to the tradition (cf. Cic. *Rep.* 2.37–38); he reverses the propositions by making him elected by the people, not by the senate: D. H. 4.12.
- 11 Contrary to Dionysius (D. H. 4.41.2 and 4; 42.3), Livy never calls him *tyrannus*, but the description he makes of him is indeed that of a tyrant.
- 12 Liv. 1.60.3; Cic. *Rep.* 2.52; D. H. 5.1.1.
- 13 See also Cic. *Rep.* 2.51
- 14 Liv. *Ibid.*
- 15 Liv. F 58 W. M.=F. 20 Jal (=Sen. *NQ* 5.18.4).

Cross-References

See CHAPTER 11: LIVY'S HISTORICAL PHILOSOPHY; CHAPTER 19: LIVY'S NARRATIVE OF THE REGAL PERIOD AND HISTORICAL AND ARCHEOLOGICAL FACTS; CHAPTER 21: LITERARY ARCHETYPES FOR THE REGAL PERIOD; CHAPTER 22: THE REPRESENTATION OF THE REGAL PERIOD IN LIVY

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Chapter 21

Literary Archetypes for the Regal Period

Marianna Scapini

When Livy set about his work, he dealt with the annalistic tradition, which was dotted with a significant number of later falsifications.¹ Out of the many strategies for adulterating history, one case characteristic of Roman historiography are calques of historical or pseudo-historical Greek plotlines, mostly drawn from Herodotus, as well as reduplications of literary topics taken from tragedy and epic. Some literary *topoi* in the Roman tradition inherited by Livy bear the shadow of very ancient pre-Hellenic mythological archetypes, already known by the Near-East cultures of the first millennium BC. As we shall shortly see, Greek tradition was probably a frequent intermediary between legends coming from the East and the writers of Roman history, but by the same token we must not forget that direct links between the Italian peninsula and the Oriental world had existed since very ancient times.

Influences by Eastern plotlines

The Eastern influences on Roman History mostly concern the process of ascension to kingship. We shall start from the account of the birth of Romulus. This story appears to be modeled on a very ancient myth of royal birth, which already belongs to Semitic culture: the legend of Sargon's birth, or of the Biblical account of Moses' childhood spring to mind (Grottanelli 1987, 88). The basic schema implies that the founder of a kingdom is the son of a god and a priestess,² left to the waters and then saved through luck (Coarelli 1992, 313–314; Meurant 2003, 517–542). Furthermore, his birth, destined to upset pre-existent political equilibrium, is generally announced by means of dreams or marvels. As is commonly known, revelation preceding the birth is a common motif in the biographies of the founders.

In the legend of the birth of Romulus, all the elements are there: the priestess mother impregnated by a mysterious personage, whom the contemporaries of Livy (Liv.) believed to be Mars (Liv. 1.4.2); the threat of cruel men who expose the baby to the elements (Liv. 1.4.3); and the miraculous rescue (Liv. 1.4.6–7). This story appears akin to the Herodotean version of the birth of Cyrus, son of Cambyses and of the daughter of King Astyages. The parallelism was noticed by many scholars (among them: Ogilvie 1965, Mazzarino 2000 (2), and Mineo 2006). It is difficult to establish how and when this model was inherited by Roman culture (Scapini 2011, 21–25). It is

possible that it was the Greeks who transmitted the Eastern legend to the Romans, although the latter could equally have acquired it independently.

The story of the birth of Cyrus is handed down by Herodotus (1.108–113). Here, the newborn descendant of the royal household is abandoned in a forest because of King Astyages' fear, following a premonitory dream, that one day the infant might somehow seize the throne from him. Subsequently, thanks to the timely intervention of a couple of servants, the infant is saved. The schema of the event, therefore, is identical to that of the story we read in Livy, Dionysius, and Plutarch.

The parallelism is very close between the *anagnorisis* of Cyrus—as a little boy, he will happen to come before the king who, struck by the boy's dignified behavior and physical traits, will begin to suspect his real identity (Hdt. 1.116.1)—and the recognition of Remus by his grandfather Numitor (Liv. 1.5.6). According to Mineo, this last parallelism was particularly suitable for the Livian social conservatism, since it emphasized the nobility of the blood of Romulus (Mineo 2006, 163).

Among the influences from literary and mythical Oriental archetypes on Livian regal history, I shall mention the links between Tarquinius Priscus' accession to the throne and those of Gordius (Justinus 11.7) and Midas (Arrianus *Anab.* 2.3.2–6). Likewise, a comparison is possible between Priscus' good luck and the seizing of power by Peisistratos, told by Herodotus (1.60) and Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 1.14.4).

These episodes appear to underlie a single and structured mythical and ideological symbolism, relating to the hero's conquest and legitimization of his rule, typical of the religious awareness of the ancient Phrygians and inherited by both the Greeks and the Romans (Borghini 1984, 65; Scapini 2011, 55–56).

Arrian narrates that Gordius was a poor man among the ancient Phrygians, albeit with a small piece of land. One day, while he was plowing, an eagle rested upon the yoke. He hastened to consult the Telmisseean augurs. When he arrived at a certain village nearby, he met a virgin who foretold what would happen to him, and ordered him to return to his field, and there offer sacrifice to Jupiter. He then took her as his wife, and she bore him a son named Midas. The Phrygians were at that time harassed by a cruel sedition. They consulted an oracle, who communicated that a chariot would bring them a king, who would put an end to their sedition. Meanwhile, Midas was arriving with his father and mother on his chariot. Then, interpreting the oracle as relating to him, they made Midas their king.³

The similarities with the legend of Tarquinius Priscus (Liv. 1.34.8–10) are self-evident. Tarquinius and his Etruscan wife Tanaquil went to Rome in search of fortune. They happened to reach the Janiculum where, as Tarquinius sat in the chariot with his wife, an eagle takes off his cap and, flying round the

chariot, neatly replaced it on his head. Tanaquil received this omen with great joy, being a woman well skilled in celestial prodigies, interpreting the event as a premonition of royalty. At that juncture, they entered the city. Being a stranger and becoming particularly wealthy in a short space of time, he became famous, with his fame reaching the palace. Henceforth, Tarquinius becomes the confidant of the old king Ancus, finally succeeding him to the throne, as is told in Chapter 35.

A similar structure seems to be present within the story of Peisistratos' accession to power. Herodotus (1.60) writes that Megacles, harassed by factional strife, sent a message to Pisistratus, offering him his daughter in marriage and the sovereign power besides. Once the offer had been accepted, a plan was devised to bring Pisistratus back. Meanwhile, a very beautiful tall woman named Phya lived in the Paeonian *demos*. Having been fully clad in armor and put in a chariot, she led them into the city. At the same time, as instructed, heralds ran before them, claiming that Peisistratos was entering the city under the protection of goddess Athena. The people, believing that the woman was the goddess herself, welcomed Pisistratus.

The analogies between the Phrygian and the Roman traditions are clear, and we can infer that the former has influenced the latter, through the intermediation of Greek historians.

As for the Herodotean anecdote about Peisistratos, even without the themes of miracle and divination, it still presents the hero destined for power arriving on a chariot, and the woman who accompanies him. In this case, the correspondences with the Roman tradition are more generic. We can therefore infer that they independently depend on the same ancient archetype.

In the same way as Tarquinius Priscus, Servius Tullius gains power with the aid of a woman: Tanaquil, yet again.⁴ In this case, the theme could have been absorbed by the Roman historical corpus through the Greek historiography on the tyrants (Cornell 1995, 130–150), which influenced the Roman tradition under several points of view, as we shall shortly see.

Ogilvie (1965, 162–163) suggests an additional conceivable parallelism between Livy's Servius Tullius and certain plotlines in Greco-Oriental historiography. In his opinion, the fact that Tanaquil leans out from an upper-floor window of the palace to speak to the people and mislead them, saying that Servius is still alive (Liv. 1.41.4), is actually an anachronism inspired by the Hellenistic historiography: perhaps by the story of Ptolemy IV Philopator, whose death was kept hidden for a whole year (Walbank 1936, 20–34).⁵

Themes Shared with the Greek Literature Concerning Tyrants

The episode in which Romulus surrounds himself with bodyguards on

horseback, the *Celeres*, operative in war and also in peace (Liv. 1.15.5), can be ascribed to the rich Greek literature relating to tyrants, *in primis* to those passages of Plato (*Resp.* 567) and Aristotle (*Pol.* 1285 A, 28) that speak on a theoretical level about the necessity of tyrants relying on the protection of armed bodyguards (Ogilvie 1965, 197).

According to Ogilvie (1965, 83), the presence of a body of *Celeres* in Romulean Rome is an obvious historical anachronism. This tradition probably dates back to an anti-tyrannical thread, probably expressed by some Roman annalistic writers who represented a source for Livy. Many hints suggest that the theme of the bodyguards had been inserted in the tradition from the time of Sulla onward, after the equation Romulus = Sulla = autocrat, with an ideological intent (Scapini 2011, 40–42; Ogilvie 1965, 84). The theme of the bodyguards appears in Servius' biography as well (Liv. 1.41.6) and gives this character a tyrannical feature.

The saga of Tarquinius Superbus is the chapter of Roman royal history that appears to be the most influenced by Greek literature concerning tyrants. Indeed, according to most scholars, much of the tradition about the last king of Rome is modeled upon conventional stereotypes (Ogilvie 1965, 205; Martin 1982, 54, 778–779; Poucet 2000, 254–255; and other authors quoted in Scapini 2011, 90–96). The responsibility of such manipulation of history could be ascribed to Republican historians, who participate in the ideology of the *odium regni* from the very beginning of Roman historiography. Through this process, the image of Tarquinius in Livy has become the prototype of the *iniustus rex* (Liv. 1.53.1). As we shall see, the preferred model used by historians in shaping Tarquinius' reign with a dark trait seems to have been the story of the Greek tyrant Peisistratos and his sons.⁶ This parallelism concerns also the synchronism between the end of the tyranny of Hippias and that of Tarquinius (Aulus Gellius 17.21.4). According to Ogilvie (1965, 195), this tradition originated at a very early stage in the writing of Roman history.

The parabola of Tarquinius' power starts and finishes according to the canonical scheme of the biographies of tyrants. As we have already seen in studying the reign of Servius, Tarquinius ascended the throne through violence and against the law.⁷ He then behaved as a perfect tyrant, by eliminating his opponents and creating a group of bodyguards (Liv. 1.49.2), as well as Romulus in his negative portrait. A very strict parallel of this last theme is provided by the tradition about Peisistratos and his sons. Herodotus speaks of a body of macebearers who protected him (1.59.5), while Thucydides says that Hippias was protected by some spearmen (6.56.2 & 57.1). In a similar way, the Greek tyrant of Cuma, Aristodemus, strengthened his power by creating three groups of guards (Dion. Hal. 7.8.3).

The potential contact between Tarquinius' and Aristodemus' traditions seems to be as interesting as the parallelism between the last Roman king and Peisistratides, since according to the tradition inherited by Livy the Roman

and Cumaeen autocrats were not only contemporaries, but friends (Liv. 2.21.5 and 2.34.4).

Even the description of the public works imposed by Tarquinius (Liv. 1.56.1–3) seems to be influenced by the Greek *topica* concerning tyrants. In fact, the idea that tyrants used to promote large architectural projects in order to direct the energies of the people and so prevent revolts was quite widespread, as we learn from Aristotle (*Pol.* 1313 b.18–32).⁸

Tarquinius' refusal to bury Servius, after having violently usurped his throne (1.49.1), seems to have been borrowed from the Greek tradition about tyrants as well. A parallel with the boycotting of hero Adrasto's worship imposed by the tyrant of Sikyon Kleisthenes comes to mind (Hdt. 5.67). Finally, the tyrannical *topos* of the denied funeral recalls the famous Theban episode about Creon who forbade the burial of Poleinikes' corpse (Ogilvie 1965, 197). This similarity suggests that writers of Roman history were interested in Greek tragedy, a phenomenon that we shall see again.

Influences of Greek historiography concerning tyrants can also be recognized in the tradition regarding Tarquinius' conquest of Gabii (Liv. 1.53–54). As already observed by many scholars (Pais 1913, 534; Ogilvie 1965, 205; and others), this episode is clearly modeled upon the story of the Persian conquest of Babylon, thanks to Zopiro's ploy, as it is related by Herodotus (3.151–159). The ploy is particularly based upon a pretended desertion, and is commonplace in Greek historiography regarding tyrants, and especially those of the East. However, we also have an example of this in the tradition concerning the Trojan War, namely the desertion simulated by the Greek Sinon (Verg. *Aen.* 2). The same theme appears in the tradition on Aristodemus (Dion. Hal. 7.10.5–6).

In the *corpus* on the stratagems of war, tyrants play an important role. In Polyaeus' *Stratagems*, personalities such as Kypselos, Pittacus, Gelon, Peisistratos, Teron, and many others stand out. Among them, there is also Solon, whose biography was a source for some themes of the tradition on Servius, as we shall see. It is relevant that, among the stratagems attributed to Peisistratos, Polyaeus mentions an episode in which the tyrant, after inflicting injury on himself, complains about an aggression by his opponent Megacles (*Strat.* 21.3). Even if the anecdote could have a historical base, it is interesting that the biographies of Tarquinius and that of the tyrant of Athens, besides many other affinities, share the theme of the simulated wounds as well.

The *topos* of the ploy is a particular development of the larger theme of the tyrant's wit. This idea also appears in a minor episode belonging to the tradition about the Gabii's campaign.

As we read in Livy and in other authors (Liv. 1.54.5–8; Dion. Hal. 4.56.1–2), having received the emissary who had been sent by his son, who wanted to

learn a strategy to help him strengthen his power in the city of Gabii, Tarquinius leads him into the palace courtyard and begins to break the stems of the tallest poppies in the meadow with a stick. The episode seems to have been picked up from an anecdote told by Herodotus concerning the life of the tyrant Thrasybulus. In fact, he is said to have made a similar gesture of severing the ears of corn in a wheat field in the presence of the herald sent by his friend Periander, who was looking for the secret of on how to keep his tyranny stable. This alluded, metaphorically, to the opportunity of eliminating his outstanding political opponents (Hdt. 5.91–92). The Greek inspiration of this episode was already underlined by Dionysus of Halicarnassus (4.56.3).

As I have anticipated earlier, the manipulation under the tyrannical schema of Tarquinius' saga is more evident in the last part of his parabola, which is enriched with many tyrannical *topoi*. These are basically related to the immoderate sexual behavior shared by the Tarquini in general, as is evident in the story of Lucretia's rape by Tarquinius' son, the event that provokes the fall of Tarquinius.⁹

As in other biographies on tyrants, Tarquinius Superbus' fall was predicted by many omens. Livy speaks, in particular, of a prodigious apparition of a snake in the royal palace (Liv. 1.56.4), a *topos* that frequently occurs in Greek literature.¹⁰

Considering the relations already seen between the saga of Tarquinius' family and that of the Peisistratides, a parallel is possible with the bad omen that appeared in a dream of Hipparchus, brother of the tyrant Hippias and responsible of Hippias' fall (Hdt. 5.56). According to the tradition (Dion. Hal. 7.9.1), the fall of the Cumaean Aristodemus was also predicted by a prodigy. Even the consultation of the oracle of Delphi in order to clarify the omen (Liv. 1.56.5–13) is a pervasive theme in Greek literature. Mostly found in traditions regarding tyrants, we have a noteworthy example of it in the story concerning King Croesus.

Also, the fall of the last Lydian king is anticipated by a prodigy involving snakes (Hdt. 1.78.1–2). Croesus had sent ambassadors to Delphi to ask if he should fight against the Persians, obtaining in turn the famous ambiguous response that later deceived him and thus provoked his fall (Hdt. 1.53). It is clear that the thematic perspective, which the stories of Tarquinius, the Peisistratides, and Croesus belong to, is the same.¹¹ Indeed, it seems probable that Roman historians recognized a connection between Oriental plots and Greek traditions on tyrants, and both were handed down in a tragic style.

The links between Tarquinius' destiny and those of the Peisistratides and Aristodemus of Cuma appear to intensify in the last act of the king's parabola, approaching the fateful couple of years to which the tradition has ascribed the fall of Hippias and that of Tarquinius Superbus: 510/509 BC.

Tarquinius falls after his son Sextus commits sexual violence against the

noble matron Lucretia (Liv. 1.57–60). Similarly, Hipparchus, brother of the Athenian tyrant Hippias, falls in love with a young boy called Harmodius (Thuc. 6.54.2–3).

Aristotle (*Athen. Pol.* 18.1) says that Hipparchus was passionate and playful, a portrait comparable to the Livian image of Sextus, presented as prone to *lusus* and a victim of libido. On the other hand, we can also compare this tradition with the traditional description of Cumaean Aristodemus. As we learn from Plutarch, he used to harass young people besides being prey to the passion for the maiden Xenocrites (*Mul. Virt.* 261 F & 262 A).

Sextus manages to satisfy his lust. His victim commits suicide in order to repair her shame, asking her relatives for vengeance in the presence of Brutus (Liv. 1.58). This latter will consequently promote the overthrow of Tarquinian tyranny (Liv. 1.59–60). Equally, since Hipparchus cannot have his beloved Harmodius, he humiliates Harmodius' sister in public. Harmodius takes revenge by organizing a revolt, in which Hipparchus dies (Thuc. 6.56–57). Similarly, Aristodemus rapes Xenocrites, who, after this offense, leads a rebellion of nobles, which puts an end to the power of the tyrant (Plut. *Mul. Virt.* 262 A & C). Thus comes to end, in three different but strictly parallel stories, the same tragedy of power.

The Enlightened Lawgiver

Nonetheless, the links between Roman history and Greek literature regarding rulers do not always imply a negative trait, since traditions concerning enlightened tyrants and lawgivers did exist in the Greek world (Catenacci 1996, 190–240). We should probably see, in this particular perspective, the account of Servius Tullius' reforms, which seem to be paralleled to those of Solon the lawgiver.

Among Solonian-type reforms attributed to Servius and quoted by Livy, a redistribution of land stands out (Liv. 1.46.1–2). Gabba, along the same path of Ogilvie, notes that political themes of the Gracchan age underlie this motif (Gabba 1961, 98–121; Ogilvie 1965, 187). We know that this problem interested Solon as well, and it appears from some of his fragments (Solon 29b, Gentili-Prato). The anachronistic attribution of Gracchan measures to Servius could actually have been motivated by the desire of giving them a greater authority, thanks to the Solonian example.

One of the most important Solonian initiatives attributed to Servius is the timocratic reform, mentioned by Livy in Chapters 42 and 43. Even this is likely anachronistic (Marastoni 2009, 21–34): the backdating of the timocracy to this king implied an emphasizing of the parallelism with Solon, the creator of the timocracy in Athens.¹²

Besides the reforms, additional themes that Servius shares with Solon are

good luck and intelligence, which after all are preliminary to the reforms. These themes pertain to the profile of “good tyrants” and heroes as well.

Another heroic theme in the Livian account regarding Servius is the miraculous crown of flames around his head that appeared when he was sleeping (Liv. 1.39). As we have previously seen in the tradition about Romulus, a prodigious childhood is typical of biographies on kings and heroes.

Influences from Greek Tragedy

The birth of Romulus is one of the first Livian episodes that may have been influenced by Greek tragedy. The annalists may well have linked it to Oedipus' birth and abandonment. We know, indeed, that the Theban saga enjoyed great success with the Etruscans (Mastrocinque 1988, 235).

The Roman story was already influenced by the Theban saga at least in one case, namely the conflict between Amulius and Numitor, which may depend on the clash between the sons of Oedipus (Ogilvie 1965, 47). In any case, the fight between Eteocles and Polynices was perhaps the most famous episode in antiquity of royal offspring seeking agreement on the paternal inheritance in order to establish their respective roles, and then infringing that agreement.

The theme of the fraternal conflict between Amulius and Numitor also appears in the clash between Romulus and Remus. Ogilvie (1965, 57) connects the episode to the story of Poemander and Leucippus in Plutarch (*Aetia* 299 C & D) and to that of Oeneus and Toxeus in Apollodorus (*Bibl.* 1.64.1–4). In these episodes, there is mention of the consequences faced by whoever disregards and transgresses walls, just as Remus was killed for having shown contempt for the “mere walls” of his brother (Liv. 1.7.2).

Greek tragedy probably provided a model even for the episode of Servius' ascent to the throne, which is dealt with in a highly dramatic manner, just as others in the Tarquinian saga,¹³ and may have been influenced by Greek tragedy and historiography of a tragic stamp (Thomsen 1980, 281; Poucet 2000, 257; Mineo 2006, 194–195). It may be that the model was classical drama, in particular the plots of the Labdacids and the Atreidæ, as Livy's own words seem to suggest.¹⁴ Moreover, the figure of Tullia could well have been modeled, for example, on that of Clytemnestra (Saulnier 1980, 95). The themes of the “parents–children” conflict, of the degenerate prince who succeeds his enlightened predecessor, and of the good son or daughter against the bad one, all motifs that creep into the final chapter of the last three Roman kings, are also commonplace in Greek stories on tyrants. In any case, as I have suggested earlier, Greek stories regarding tyrants share a stylistic air of tragedy, a trait that very probably attracted Roman historians.

Moreover, the scholars observe that the description of the Etruscan Tanaquil

in Livy (1.34.9) could have been influenced by the figure of Medea, the Greek model *par excellence* of a woman with superhuman powers.¹⁵

The Greek Topos of the Treacherous Maiden

In stories related to the reign of the first king of Rome, there is a figure that does not seem to be immune from contamination with Greek themes: Tarpeia, the legendary girl who, according to the legend, gave her name to the Capitoline rock, in proximity to where a cult was dedicated to her.

The Livian account of the episode of Tarpeia (Liv. 1.11.6) follows the most ancient version of the legend that is available to us, present in Fabius Pictor (Fr. 8 Peter) and Cincius Alimentus (Fr. 5 Peter). This tradition portrays Tarpeia as a girl who died under the shields of the Sabines and as a traitor to her city for a petty desire for jewelry. In the same passage, Livy echoes a second version that transforms Tarpeia into a heroine.¹⁶ There is also a transformation of the event into a love story that met with great success in the Augustan epoch (e.g., Propertius 4.4) and that, according to Momigliano, had clear Hellenic origins (Momigliano 1969, 482–483).

Pais has already quoted certain Greek legends that share themes with the legend of Tarpeia, though he focused on the “romantic” variant (Pais 1905; also Beaujeu 1969, 164–165).¹⁷ It is impossible to recognize the precise model of Tarpeia's story, since its plot is exceedingly widespread in Greek literature.

First of all, we can recall the story of Achilles and Peisidike, handed down by Parthenius of Nicaea (*Erotica* 21). Peisidike, daughter of the king of Methymna, fell in love with Achilles, who was besieging the city, and promised to open the gates for him, asking that he marry her as a reward. The hero accepted, but once he had entered Methymna, had the girl stoned to death by his soldiers.

The legend of Scylla has a very similar structure. Scylla, daughter of the king of Megara, Nisus, became infatuated with Minos, who was besieging the city. She made him promise to marry her in exchange for Nisus' magic lock of hair on which the safety of Megara depended. This episode also ends, of course, with the death of the traitor at the hands of the ungrateful lover.¹⁸

Furthermore, I shall mention the version about Scylla's death proposed in Æschylus' *Choephora* (lines 612–622), where the parallel with the story of Tarpeia, alongside the love motif, also contains the Livian theme of the temptation of jewelry. If we accept this last parallel, we have to add the story of Tarpeia to the series of Roman episodes likely influenced by Greek tragedy, which I have analyzed earlier.

Moreover, a further passage by Parthenius (*Erotica* 9; also Plut. *Mul. Virt.* 17) deserves our attention since it concerns an episode that, although different in

structure from the legend of Tarpeia, contains themes that echo both Piso's "heroic" version and Propertius' romantic version, as well as the motif of jewelry and death by suffocation. During a war between Naxos and Miletus, the latter allied with Eretria, Polycrite, sister of the Naxian king, was captured by Diognetus, the leader of the Eretrians, who fell in love with her. She promised him that she would accept his love on condition that he abandoned the Milesians. Polycrite then warned her brother by way of a secret message, allowing Naxos to win. Once she returned home, she died suffocated by the gifts of her grateful fellow citizens.

Finally, we could quote the learned parallel found by Pseudo-Plutarch (*Parallela Minora* p. 309 Stephanus) between the story of Tarpeia, whose ambition leads her to treason and that of a certain Demonike of Ephesus, who betrayed her city, bribed by promises of riches by the besieger Brennus.¹⁹

Other Possible Greek Influences and Final Considerations

It is conceivable that even the episode of the duel between the Horatii and the Curiatii echoes Greek precedents. The theme of the outcome of a war or battle settled by a duel between champions already appears in the *Iliad* with the clash between Paris and Menelaus, which theoretically should have determined once and for all the victors in the age-old conflict (Ogilvie 1965, 109). However, the similarity of single themes is not enough to demonstrate direct relationship between episodes: they were evidently *topoi* that recurred frequently in the Greek milieu, from the classical epoch until Hellenism.

More interesting is the close similarity, identified in Pseudo-Plutarch's *Parallela Minora*, between the Roman account of the Horatii and Curiatii (Liv. 1.24–26) and the war between the Tegeans and the Pheneans, narrated by a certain Demaratus (Plut. *Parallela Minora* p. 309 Stephanus; also Stob. *Flor.* 39.32). Common to both stories is the decision to have a duel between champions instead of battle, and the fact that these should be six champions, three and three; the procedure of the duel;²⁰ the theme of the killing of a sister, who succumbs to the hero's castigation and that of the hero's exoneration.²¹

However, the question is not so simple, since we do not know anything about Demaratus and his chronology: he could be one of the "Schwindelautoren" invented for numerous episodes in the *Parallela Minora* (De Lazzer 2000, 62–63). In this last case, it is possible that it was precisely this anecdote of the Tegeans and the Pheneans to have been modeled on the tradition regarding the Horatii and the Curiatii, and not vice versa.²²

This last example demonstrates how arduous the study of the literary models of Roman history is, and recalls the necessity to study deeply the sources of

the tradition that we can read in Livy, Dionysius, and Plutarch.

No scholar has ever systematically tried to explain the phenomenon of calques by identifying the person or persons responsible for them. In a recent study, I suggested that this process was relatively ancient, and that Livy had already found the calques well rooted in his sources (Scapini 2011). A good candidate for the intrusion of Herodotean themes into the historical corpus could have been Fabius Pictor, but that the tendency of making Roman history similar to that of the Greeks may have already been present in the Hellenistic historians who wrote about archaic Rome and from whom Fabius and the annalists drew.

Many scholars interpreted the Hellenization of Roman history as a means of fattening up and adorning the lean information that the annalists had on the more archaic history of their city (Pais 1913, 591–592; Ogilvie 1965, 195, 205; Mazzarino 2000 (2), 73). However, alongside these aesthetic reasons, there was most likely the ideological aim of making the history of Rome as Greek as possible, worthy of a central place in the Mediterranean world (Frier 1979, 264).

Notes

- 1 For an analysis of this phenomenon, see the recent Mineo 2006.
- 2 According to Catenacci (1996, 131–132) the nobility of hero's mother is a *topos* that can be traced back to the idea of a matrilineal origin of royalty, going back to the Anatolian Ægean world.
- 3 The story of Justin is analogous, with the difference that it is not the son Midas, but Gordius himself who becomes king.
- 4 The hypothesis returns on broader reflection to the woman–goddess who initiates into royalty, a very ancient myth of Mediterranean origin, also dealt with by Dumézil 1943; Verzár 1980, 35–86; Grottanelli 1987, 71–105; Cornell 1995, 130–150; and Mineo 2006, 187 and 194. The same mythical themes—the woman who gives and takes away power, the chariot, the defenestration—appear reversed in that “palace tragedy” that signals the end of Servius' reign: cf. Gagé 1963, 25–62, as well as Borghini 1984, 101–109.
- 5 For the theme of the woman–goddess at the window, see Coarelli 1992, 301–328.
- 6 We have just seen how the story about Peisistratos' seizing of power shares some topics with that of Servius.
- 7 “*Neque populi iussu neque auctoribus patribus regnaret*”: Liv. 1.49.3.

- 8 Among the Greek tradition regarding tyrants, public works were promoted, for example, by Polikrates from Samos (Her. 3.39.4); the Egyptian Cheope (Her. 2.124.1–4); again the Peisistratides (Thuc. 2.15.3–5; Paus. 1.14.1; Aristot. *Pol.* 1313b.24); and the Cuman Aristodemus (Plut. *Mul. virt.* 262, A–B). Even if the emphasis on the inhumane heaviness of the works promoted by the king probably depends on the will of Republican historians to blacken Tarquinius' image, we have to consider that important public works are attested in Rome in the period correspondent to the last decades of monarchy: *inter al.* see Coarelli 1992.
- 9 All these traits have, by nature, a tragic trait: in Scapini 2011, I have attempted to analyze the relation between the monarchic history of Rome and Greek Tragedy (and the younger Roman one) and Hellenistic “tragic history” promoted by Duris of Samos. This relation is suggested by a tragic flavor shared by both, a trait that is anticipated under many points of view by Herodotus in his *Historiae*. In particular, I have suggested that it was exactly the tragedy rooted in the Roman view of history that determined the fortune of Herodotus as a literary model and as a source of plotlines. The following development on the influence of Greek tragedy on the monarchic chapter of the history of Rome shall explore another aspect of this “tragic” tendency that frequently seems to emerge in the tradition about the most ancient period of Rome. The chapter by Attilio Mastrocinque (Chapter 23) concerns a particular interference in the tradition regarding Tarquinius by Greek (and later Roman) tragedies. Regarding the tragic inspiration that deeply characterizes this particular chapter of Roman history, one can recall the fortune of the Shakespearian tragedy dedicated to *The Rape of Lucrece*: Cornell 1995, 217.
- 10 See, for example, Aeschyl. *Ch.* 527, where we learn about a dream of a snake made by Clitemnestra.
- 11 According to Catenacci (1996, 87, 94), Greek and Oriental tyrants' lives share an “oracular rhythm” that imposes a necessary relationship with Delphi.
- 12 The theme of the enlightened lawgiver that emerges from the Livian tradition regarding Servius does not imply an interpretation “*popularis*” of his reign. The democratization of the king was indeed present in a few annalists, but could not be inherited by Livy. Indeed, the latter would rather connect the image of Servius with that of Augustus, and it was precisely with this aim that he refused the tradition that considered Servius a son of a slave (Liv. 1.39.5–6): Mineo 2006, 193–198.
- 13 For example, the fall of Superbus, whose tragic trait we have already analyzed.

- 14 “*Tulit enim et Romana regia sceleris tragici exemplum*” (1.46.3). See Bayet 1947, 79, n. 3. As I mentioned earlier, citing Attilio Mastrocinque, the saga of the Atreidæ probably influenced Tarquinian tradition as well in the story of the ambassadors sent by Tarquinius Superbus to Delphi, through the intermediation of the Accian Brutus.
- 15 Ogilvie 1965, 144. Poucet takes some distance from this hypothesis (2000, 280–281).
- 16 As we learn from Dionysius (2.38.3), this variant could go back to Calpurnius Piso, a rationalizing correction in order to explain the fact that she was the focus of a cult.
- 17 According to Momigliano (1969, 484, n. 67), the links between the legend of Tarpeia and other Italic and Etruscan stories regarding people being killed under shields are weaker: in his opinion, these stories did not have a female protagonist. In the stories involving betrayal of the homeland for love, we can glimpse the same *topos* underlying the legend of Medea, though in this case we should speak about a reference of these stories to a same ancient archetype rather than a direct connection between them: cf. Beaujeu 1969, 164, n. 5.
- 18 During the siege of Taphos by the Theban troops under Amphitryon, an analogous event is supposed to have happened: the daughter of the besieged king, Comætho, in love with the Theban lord, is supposed to have handed over her father's magic lock of hair to him, only to be killed (Apollod. *Biblioth.* 2.4.7).
- 19 In any case, remarks Momigliano (1969, 483), it would be more prudent to hypothesize that the Ephesian story was created *ex novo* based on the story of Tarpeia, and not vice versa: cf. Scapini 2011, 46.
- 20 The survival of a single warrior from one side who at the end gains the upper hand by his lucid strategy of feigning flight.
- 21 Pais (1913, 463–464) mentions further examples of proxy clashes between heroes, as well as Greek stories that tell of victors who, having returned from the battle, killed their mothers and sisters.
- 22 In addition to the Pseudo-Plutarchan parallel between Tarpeia and Demonike of Ephesus, which we have just examined.

Cross-References

See CHAPTER 12: LIVY AND INDO-EUROPEAN COMPARATISM; CHAPTER 13: LIVY AND THE ANNALISTIC TRADITION; CHAPTER 20: LIVY'S NARRATIVE OF THE REGAL PERIOD: STRUCTURE AND

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Further Reading

Briquel, D. 1998. "À propos de Tite-Live. L'apport de la comparaison indo-européenne." *Revue des Études Latines* 76: 41–70. This work and the one that follows represent how productive the research on the archetypes hinted in Roman tradition can be.

Dumézil, G. 1947. *Tarpeia. Essais de philologie comparative indoeuropéenne*. Paris: Gallimard.

Momigliano, A. 1963. “An interim report on the origins of Rome.” *Journal of Roman Archaeology* **53**: 95–121. This provides a general picture of the history and legends regarding the origins of Rome.

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Chapter 22

The Representation of the Regal Period in Livy

Matthew Fox

Livy's first book is a remarkable creation: an elegantly formed and energetic rendition of the earliest era of Rome's history that shapes the period of monarchic rule as a suspense-driven prelude to the history of the free republic. Other chapters in this volume deal with Livy's sources, and his position in relation to existing historical tradition. The theme of this is to provide a guide to how Livy represents the regal period: what impression of the period emerges from his account, and what Livy's concerns were in determining its shape. I also discuss the book's broader literary and rhetorical concerns: the way the writing draws readers in, and creates dramatic effect. There are political and ideological dimensions to these topics, and in the Augustan context, the subject of monarchy is a loaded theme. This discussion assumes that a neat separation of literary from political is impossible, and draws attention to the manner in which they intersect. My approach takes its lead from recent scholarship, which focuses upon the intersection between historiographical and political concerns. The portions of the text selected should be taken as examples; Book 1 itself, although brief, is so rich in material that a complete treatment is impossible. For more detail, readers are referred to the suggestions for reading.

Establishing the History of Rome: Origins and Details

One of the most significant features of Book 1 is that Livy makes a decision to begin with the foundation and end with Tarquinius Superbus. He thus makes an unprecedented connection between literary form and the constitutional character of the period. No previous author, Latin or Greek, saw the regal period as distinct in quite this manner. Beginning Book 2 with the start of the Republic enables Livy both to reflect upon the nature of monarchic rule at Rome and to emphasize the importance of the republican constitution as the system that produced Rome's rise to global domination. However, the price he pays for this powerful effect is the remarkable compression of the regal period: over 250 years of history told in only 60 chapters. Livy is so successful in providing a satisfying rendition that it is easy to forget what a bold decision he has taken. That satisfaction is most clearly felt in the build up of tension in his narrative of the rape of Lucretia and the expulsion of the

Tarquins. The book culminates in a powerful parable, full of dramatic tension, which stresses the cost of tyranny to the individual, and plays on readers' deep-held beliefs about sexuality, morality, and the connection between the individual and the state. The episode demonstrates an effective blending of literary and political that is fostered by compressing the regal period into a prelude. Although it is clear enough what Livy achieves by ending the book as he does, his decisions at its beginning are less easy to describe. However, if we examine them, we gain considerable insight into the main technical feature: the combination of compression in narrating episodes, with the provision of selected details to enhance the idea of historical verisimilitude and reliability. The challenge of treating the regal period so briefly is in ensuring that a credible historical framework is established. On such a basis, readers can grant authority to the moral and political messages.

Livy has explained in his preface his reasons for not including detailed treatment of pre-foundation material: it is more suitable to poets than to historians. He draws attention to the fact that there is a great fund of well-known material associated with Rome's pre-history, but, by repudiating it, he refuses to commit himself on stories that he regards as intractable in history. The attitude conveys his sense of responsibility as a historian, and of himself as scrupulous: the kind of historian whom readers can rely upon to be clear-thinking and fair-minded—to exercise an appropriate degree of skepticism, while still giving an adequate account of the material. The difficulty presented by such an approach, however, is that skepticism must be balanced by the need to create a persuasive sense of Rome's pre-historical character, without the advantages of a long build-up in the narrative. In this, he relies to a great extent upon his ability to use small details to construct a coherent historical world, and upon his readers to fill in gaps from their own prior understanding of Rome's early history. This approach, applied to the history before Rome, continues as he tells of the regal period itself. It becomes less prominent as the book progresses, and Livy finds narrative material, principally that relating to the final three Etruscan kings, which enables him to lay greater emphasis upon dramatizing a good story.

However, this compression of the earliest times does not result in an authoritarian attitude toward problems in the sources. Livy does not shy away from bringing these forward. Examples include problems over the identity of Aeneas' son Julius (1.3.2–3); over which set of brothers, Horatii or Curiatii, came from Rome (1.24.1); or, more famously, the identity of the triumphator Cornelius Cossus in Book 4. The effect is to keep readers involved in the problems of the sources, and to keep the work of the historian visible in readers' minds. Thereby, questions of methodological difficulty, of belief or disbelief, do not disappear from the texture of the work. Rather, they are used to allow Livy to put forward his own versions of stories without insisting too much upon his own authority. That involvement helps increase readers' sense

of a relationship with the historian, upon which he can build in his more dramatic narratives.

In his abbreviated account of the foundation, Livy seems concerned above all to make his version look vivid and fresh. He allows his focus to move rapidly among the different characters: Aemulius and Numitor (wicked great-uncle and benign grandfather), Rhea Silvia, the shepherd Faustulus, and the twins themselves. In spite of the lack of a focus on a single protagonist or location, certain points of emphasis emerge. Livy is concerned about what kind of community the future founders of Rome come from, and how it is that they are in position to organize a *putsch*, thereby acquiring the status of local heroes at Alba Longa who are then in a position to found their new city (1.4–6). He also allows us to see that the problems associated with monarchy in Rome's later history already exist: regal cruelty (*crudelitas regia*) does not stand in the way of the will of the gods in allowing Romulus and Remus to survive exposure (1.4.3), and it is “that ancestral vice, greed for monarchy” (“*avitum malum, regni cupido*”) that motivates the twins to fight each other over the site of Rome. These tiny details establish abiding themes, in addition to adding a sense of believability to a sketchy narrative.

As the twins are maturing, Livy draws attention to the growing strength of their bodies and characters:

Born and reared like this, as soon as they matured, though not neglecting their farmsteads or flocks, they went ranging over the hills, hunting. Thereby gaining strength both of mind and body, they faced not just wild beasts, but attacked brigands laden with loot, and divided what they took with the shepherds. That band of youth was growing daily and with them they shared their toils and amusements.

(Liv. 1.4.8–9)

The detail of the “band” may seem trivial, but Livy lays down a theme here, of the twins as leaders of men, which he draws on again as the story goes forward. Those same brigands (*latrones*) take revenge on the brothers when they are occupied in celebrating the Lupercalia, and although Romulus repels the attack by force, Remus is captured: without explicit comment, we perceive that Romulus was the more dominant, and his victory in the race to found the city less haphazard. Livy reports the accusations of aggrieved brigands (1.5.4): the twins had gathered together a band of men to carry off their booty in a hostile manner (“*collecta iuvenum manu hostilem in modum praedas agera*”). At this point, it is hard to know whether we are supposed to be sympathizing with the future founders of the city, or whether they are in fact a disreputable bunch, harassing their neighbors in a way that bodes ill for Rome's future relationships with them. The accusations have the providential effect of Aemulius handing the captive Remus over to his brother Numitor (since it was on his land that the raids had taken place), so that the two

different groups of young men, one under Romulus' leadership, the other drawn from Numitor's household, can rescue Remus and assassinate the king (1.5.7). Livy goes into even finer detail, however. The men who assisted Romulus were not a recognizable group ("*non cum globo iuvenum*"), since he was not equal to a show of open force. Rather, they were other shepherds who came to the palace at a pre-arranged time. And when the deed is done, and Numitor takes control of the situation, Livy provides a detailed picture of different groups of young men, who, in the swift resolution of the narrative, become an audience to the proclamation of the accession of Numitor, and witness the reuniting of the twins with their grandfather.

This level of detail, within such an abbreviated rendition, enables us to draw conclusions about Livy's priorities. First, the details lend verisimilitude, producing a picture in readers' minds of the kind of society that the founders of Rome inhabited. A similar kind of process can be observed in the battle scenes in which Livy depicts, in the succeeding chapters, the conflicts between Rome and her neighbors: they are very vivid, containing details of the movements of the fighters in particular locations, and usually some kind of military crux that casts short-term doubt on the outcome. These military narratives are part of the stock-in-trade of the historian, and Livy's capacity to invent in this context relies upon the convincing effect of well-chosen details rather than proper source material. Verisimilitude of this type depends to a large extent upon familiarity—in the battle narratives, there is a repertoire of typical activities. In talking about Romulus's companions, it is the behavior of young men in groups that is familiar, and the potential that such groups have to carry out acts of violence, to come into conflict with authority. Without laboring the point, or giving an explicit analysis, Livy produces a suggestive picture of an unruly gang, but spirited and purposeful. They can only be united into a recognizable citizenry when Romulus deals out laws, as soon as he has performed the minimal religious institutions that found the state (1.8.1). With the benefit of hindsight, the retrospect at the start of Book 2 is relevant here (2.1.4). There, Livy indulges in an unusual counterfactual hypothesis: what would have happened if the rabble of shepherds and incomers who made up Rome's population had not had the firm guidance provided by their kings? With remarkable precision and economy, Livy has already depicted the vigorous but wayward character of Rome's first citizens. The development of their political consciousness as Book 1 progresses is sketched in with similar economy, so that the analysis at the start of Book 2 seems to be based on clear evidence.

There are many other instances of similar acts of minimal historical characterization that foster both historical verisimilitude and particular ideas about the development of Rome. Some of them seem to reveal a lack of historical consciousness on Livy's part, a failure to have a proper grasp of how much societies change across time. When telling the story of the death of

King Tatius, for example, he writes that the people of Laurentium protested against maltreatment by Tatius' envoys, and take up their case under the *ius gentium*, the Roman equivalent of international law (1.14.1). It is hard not to think that he is confused about one of the principal duties of the historian: to recognize the proper evolution of institutions across time. How can it be the case that a legal framework, only evidenced for much later periods, can have existed so soon after the foundation of Rome? From the perspective of modern historiography, Livy is doing something wrong. However, another way of looking at this failure is to see it as part of a prevailing feature of Livy's technique. By referring to *ius gentium* here, which the situation does not demand, he produces a sense that this society had structures that were familiar: that Rome was not coming into being in a cultural or social vacuum, and that, therefore, the difficulties facing Rome's first inhabitants, which center on conflicts with their neighbors as Rome begins its inexorable expansion, take place within a world that is recognizable to his readers.

We can see the same techniques at work in the depiction of the death of Romulus (1.16). Livy introduces the idea of deification, and narrates the episode so as to allow for this supernatural possibility, while at the same time making it clear that there had been, from the time of Romulus' death itself, a different report according to which Romulus was assassinated by a group of discontented senators. However, he does not elaborate the episode to suggest a sensitive parallel between the assassination of Romulus and that of Julius Caesar, which, we can assume, loomed rather larger in the minds of Livy and his contemporaries. With a few carefully chosen phrases, he suggests that the assassination version is as old as the event itself, and that this version has persisted, even if barely ever spoken of: "I believe that even at the time there were some who declared in silence that Romulus had been torn apart by the hands of the senators" (1.16.4). He is here drawing upon his established skeptical attitude to variations in the sources to deflect attention from his own views on the matter. At the same time, he cautiously endorses the assassination report by attributing it to those who experienced the event themselves. When he closes the account by telling the story of Proculus Julius, the observer of Romulus' supposed apotheosis, he points out how strangely successful ("*mirum*" is the key word) his intervention was in soothing the discontent of the army and *plebs* (1.16.8). Perhaps this comment should be interpreted as ironic and politically loaded, but Livy's technique makes that hard to judge. Certainly, has he no sooner rounded off this episode than he proceeds to recount how the minds of the senators were tossed by a struggle and desire for regal rule ("*patrum interim animos certamen regni accupido uersabat*": 1.17.1). This particular vice, *cupido regni* (see earlier, p. 288), a staple of moments of constitutional tension for the rest of Rome's history, is thereby integrated into the beginnings of Rome's political character. The possibility of the assassination suddenly looks more believable, but Livy then takes care to draw a distinction: this is not the same kind of *cupido regni*

that characterized the Republic: the dominating individuals necessary for that manifestation of it had not yet evolved—an idea that fits easily with the manner in which he depicted Romulus's rule. Hence, the small details allow readers both to focus upon what is recognizably Roman at the start of the city's political life, but also understand that Livy is concerned about historical difference, and has a mastery of the material to enable these fine distinctions.

The mention of *cupido regni* suggests that Livy wants to provide an origin for some of the central concepts in the Roman political order: conflict between senate and *plebs*, the power of tribunes, and the popular appeal of charismatic leaders. *Cupido imperii* (desire for dominion) appears as Rome is about to go to war with Alba Longa. Here, in another characteristic technique, Livy attributes that political analysis to one of the historical protagonists, the leader of the Alban army, who is reflecting in a speech about what has led to this war (1.23.7). However, in addition to using such motifs to establish the historicity of his account, there is a small repertoire of key ideas that Livy wants the regal period to convey. We find a Sallustian concept of *ambitio* in the regal aspirations of Tarquinius Priscus (1.35.6); and Sallust's other obsession, *avaritia* (avarice) visible in the account of the reign of Tarquinius Superbus. Less clearly identifiable, since not marked by a single keyword, is an interest in growth: the idea of Rome growing from a small community to a world empire is referred to regularly in the opening books, and is established as an ambiguous force in Book 1. In the preface, Livy has made clear his own sense of the trouble caused by Rome's enormous size (*Praef.* 4). That ambiguity is differently expressed when he is narrating the origins: Rome's growth is represented either as a vague presentiment in the minds of individuals (e.g., 1.8.4: a nameless expectation of the city's growth), or it is something with a sinister force in the perception of those beyond Rome: the neighbors invited to the first festival of Consualia at which the Sabine women are seized (1.9.10), and the people of Fidenae, who begin war rather than wait for Rome's expansion (1.14.4.). Growth is referred to again as the book progresses: the sack of Alba leads to a doubling of Rome's population (1.30.1); under the fourth king, Ancus, Livy lists more areas added to the city (1.33), and under Servius Tullius, it is not just additional space (1.44.3), but growth by the addition of *decus*: a word suggestion both ornamentation and prestige (1.45.1).

In that context, it is worth pointing out that Livy does not imagine Rome at the start as a space on an empty map: he points, right at the start, to the relatively flourishing Etruscan civilization (1.2.3; cf. 1.30.4: the wealth of the Sabines is compared to that of the Etruscans); most strikingly, he digresses on the visit of Hercules to Rome in a section laden with etiological material connecting contemporary Rome to its most distant pre-history, and does so with the excuse that Romulus had inherited a set of religious rituals from this Greek predecessor (1.7.4–15; as well as adopting some from the Etruscans:

1.8.3). Such devices add to the sense that, in spite of the brevity of treatment, the Rome that Livy imagines has historical depth, and that the historian is correct in drawing parallels, as well as establishing differences, between the Rome of his own day and that of the city's origins. Historical verisimilitude, established by the careful use of significant motifs, is essential if readers are to be convinced by the connections between past and present, upon which, of course, Livy's entire history depends. The explanation of origins in the past of the institutions of the present can be termed as "etiology." It is itself so vital a part of the traditions concerning the regal period that I will now turn to discuss it in its own right.

Etiology

In the minds of Augustan readers, the main function of the regal period is to enable etiological reflection: to link the origins of a wide range of contemporary objects and institutions to the period in which the city originated. It is not difficult to see why this way of using the past had such appeal. Roman society had a conservative mindset, and its historical traditions had grown out of the tendency of aristocratic families to foster a sense of clan memory, based on celebrating, embroidering, and preserving the deeds of the ancestors. With the growth in Rome's empire, the broadening of the political class, and the spread of Greek education and Latin literacy, an interest in Rome's origins became an industry: a number of Greek historians, fewer Roman counterparts, and especially the prolific antiquarian Marcus Terentius Varro produced together a vast amount of writing in this area. Most of it is lost, but we can sense the popularity of the etiological way of thinking when reading Livy. He uses etiological references with astonishing frequency in Book 1. Within the first few chapters, he points to the origins of the temples of Jupiter Feretrius (1.10.7), the first temple in the city, and Jupiter Stator (1.12.6.); to locations in the city: the Tarpeian Rock (1.11), although the association of names here makes a clear statement of name–origin unnecessary; and the Lacus Curtius (1.13.5). He also points to the names for the whole or parts of the Roman people: to Quirites (13.5); Ramnenses and Titienses, Luceres, names for equestrian centuries (1.13.8); to Celeres (1.15.8), a term no longer used; and finally to the Cluilian trench (1.23.3–4). This last is interesting and shows that Livy is keen to prevent etiology from becoming an inert cliché: he notes that both the trench itself and the name for it have now disappeared.

Etiologies often have the function of ending a particular episode, acting as a way of providing a natural break in the narrative, but also of reinforcing the significance of this portion of the work: to stress a sense of connection between the Rome of now and the Rome of the distant past. This mode of thinking, however, is not restricted to visible institutions. It also extends to ideas about the character of the Romans themselves, on the basis that the

behavior of the earliest inhabitants foreshadows that of their descendants. Hence, in Rome's first military engagement, when a band of men from Caenina (a town around 30 kilometers from Rome) attack in protest at the rape of the Sabine women, Livy remarks: "So does Romulus teach that anger is pointless without power?" (1.10.4). The point of the sentence is not to make a historical claim about Romulus' intentions or ruminations, but to invite reflection on the theme of military force in Rome's history, and, in particular, Rome's character as a formidable military opponent. Likewise, when the Sabine women intervene in a later battle that has spilt down from the Palatine into the forum, their pleas to their menfolk draw attention to the idea prominent in Rome's recent civil war: that of conflict between son-in-law and father-in-law (i.e., Pompey and Caesar), *socer* and *gener* (1.13.2). These are different from the etiologies concerning place names, or particular institutions. However, the general mindset established by the prevalence of those etiologies sets a pattern into which these hints about an etiology-of-characteristics can work effectively. The entire book is so filled with etiologies that it is tempting to see it in some sense as a microcosm of Rome's history: the characterizations of the historical figures he describes and their motives, as well as the physical memorials they left behind them, make this early period into the seedbed of the later development of Rome, both as a city and as a civilization.

One of the most famous episodes of Book 1 can serve as a good example for understanding the way in which etiological references function. In retelling the battle of the Horatii and the Curiatii (1.24–26), Livy makes clear that, while the episode is already well known, there is doubt concerning details. Seemingly as a response to the difficulties of the traditions concerning a popular story, he heaps up etiologies, both to give the story a sense of historical security, and to stress the connection between it and the monuments of it that remain visible in the Rome of his own day. The two sets of triplets are set to fight against each other as representatives of their cities, to avoid full-scale conflict between Rome and Alba Longa, Rome's metropolis. Before the battle, Livy describes in detail a ritual known as the *fetial formula*, a form of words employed in the declaration of war. According to Livy, this is the oldest preserved form of treaty known at Rome. He quotes the words of the formula verbatim, and interrupts his narrative to include this extended item of antiquarian interest, the words of the treaty working to locate the origin of the treaty in a particular episode, as well as to provide an archaic version of the formula, which had become obsolete by Livy's time. Minor etiologies are interwoven in the names of the individuals who took the roles of the officials, all with some connection to families that were known from Rome's recent history. However, more marked etiologies appear as the battle is concluded: Livy claims that the tombs of the fallen can all still be seen at Rome. After he has provided a vivid account of the fighting, it turns out that it is the tombs that have provided him with the evidence for the actual position of the

engagements that led to the death of each of the brothers. He turns the visible monuments (they do still seem to have been visible to him) into information for the construction of his account of the battle.

The battle concluded, the single survivor, Horatius, returns to the city and encounters his sister at the Porta Capena: the named location establishes a clear link with Livy's Rome. Her grief at the death of her Alban lover causes him to run her through. That leads Livy to describe (using the same degree of detail as for the fetial formula) the mechanisms employed for the establishment of the Duumviral court (a court ruled by two magistrates), and the archaic legal charge of *perduellio*, a form of treason. Again, he includes a number of legal formulas; but here there is more drama, as the pronouncement of the formulas lead to the noose being placed on Horatius' neck. In pleading for his son's life, his father makes reference to the Pila Horatia, a location that was named later, but was still visible in Rome, where, after their deaths, the armor of the fallen Curiatii was gathered. Similarly, the father expiates the son's crime by making him walk under the so-called Tigillum Sororium ("sisterly beam"), another surviving relic of the events, and one still maintained at public expense. Livy also reports that the tomb of Horatia can still be seen, at the spot where she fell.

As often, it is etiologies with a strong link to a particular place that round off the story. They point to the survival in Augustan Rome of monuments to events from the distant past, and thus invite Livy's readers into a detailed engagement with questions of similarity and difference, with the relevance and persistence of the past in the present, and with the ideas of monumentality and memory. The episode has one unusual feature, in that Livy uses it as an opportunity to include discussion of two primitive legal institutions, possibly as a way of adding more material to the otherwise rather minimal traditions concerning the reign of the king, Tullus Hostilius. However, in general, the episode is typical for the manner in which topographical references are used to structure the account, and for the etiologies that invite a consideration of the relationship between past and present, and provide a different form of inducement from that provided by vivid narrative for readers to feel a strong connection with this material from Rome's distant past. There is also the implied reflection on the change in Roman morality over time: the harshness of the brother's attitude reflects the values of a bygone age. Other examples are the brutal execution of Mettius Fufetius, in the next episode, torn apart by horses (1.28.10), or the pitiless self-condemnation of Lucretia (1.58.9–10). Livy tells the stories both to show how this early society could bring forth such examples of old-fashioned, but extreme, resolve, and to suggest that, even then, sympathetic bystanders or relations could display a more lenient attitude. A similar dichotomy can be seen in the account of the execution of the sons of the Junius Brutus at the start of Book 2 (2.5.5–10).

Etiology adds a rich layer of significance to the details of individual episodes.

The idea that Book 1 itself, taken as a whole, provides a large-scale etiology of Rome's later development is a difficult one to argue in detail. Certainly, the contrast between the Rome of Romulus and the Rome of Tarquinius Superbus carries with it suggestions of political decline based on a growth in size and sophistication that has a parallel with Livy's synopsis of Rome's development in the preface. There is also the schematic characterization of the first four kings: Romulus and Numa as founders of military institutions and religion, Tullus as fiercer than Romulus, Ancus as blending war and religion, a characterization welcome to the Romans themselves, who had already become nostalgic for the ways of Numa (1.31.7)—here again, Livy aspires to a greater authority by anchoring his analysis to the perceptions of his historical subjects. This scheme lends support to the idea that there is a certain set of original characteristics that form the building blocks of Rome's character. It is clearer to observe a sense of progression, even decline, in the three Etruscan kings that follow Ancus, in particular woven around the scheming of the royal women: first Tanaquil, then Tullia introduce a new element into the account. Livy makes the most of the exoticism inherent in the idea of ambitious women as historical agents, an exoticism as old as the genre itself. He mentions Tanaquil's aristocratic Etruscan ancestry, her skill in interpreting omens, and her persuasive power over her husband. And it is easy to read Tullia's ruthlessness in securing Tarquinius' accession as a negative version of a similar ambition to that which had earlier enabled Tanaquil to succeed in assisting her husband to the throne (1.34.4–10), and in identifying Servius Tullius as his successor (1.39.3). We might reasonably recall Sallust's distinction between good and bad *ambitio*. Tullia's murder of her father is a willful manifestation of a kind of primitive harshness that is the opposite of admirable. It provides the origin of a street name (the *uicus sceleratus*, “Criminal Alley”), and is also an omen of the gods' determination to drive the evils of monarchy from the city (1.48.7). And once more, Livy puts reflections on this event, as on other crimes of the royal family, into the mouth of the founder of the republic himself, as Livy reports, a few chapters later, Brutus' speech to the people following the death of Lucretia (1.59.8–11). If, however, one is to speak of a sense of decline over the book as a whole, it is important to remember that it takes place more visibly on the level of these women than it does for the kings themselves. Tarquinius' predecessor, Servius Tullius, is considered an upright and beneficial monarch, and the move into tyranny is not so much a slide as a sudden leap. However, the trio of Tanaquil, Tullia, and Lucretia do, between them, suggest that Livy has in mind more than just a single tyrannical individual who tarnishes the name of *rex* for all time. As with Brutus' audience, Livy's readers are in little doubt that tyranny goes beyond the behavior of one individual. However, in touching upon the theme of tyranny, we come to the question of the political dimensions of Book 1, which demands separate consideration.

Politics and the Regal Period

Ogilvie characterizes Livy as an author uninterested in politics: “by nationality and upbringing Livy was predisposed to a narrow-minded and somewhat *bourgeois* detachment from the political struggles of his time” (Ogilvie 1965, 2). Such a statement nowadays appears anachronistic, and Miles's book (Miles 1995), published 30 years later, is a convincing account of how ideology, rather than politics, imbues the early books of *Ab Urbe Condita* (AUC). Nevertheless, Ogilvie's view is well-founded in the terms in which he understood politics and literature to intersect, and is a useful invitation for us to consider what political engagement in historiography would look like for Livy, and how it would appear in his account of early Rome. The basic political theme concerns the stability of Augustus' newly established regime, and the role that visions of Roman history had in supporting it. There is no doubt that, as with Julius Caesar, Augustus drew upon history as a resource to validate his political dominance; it remains a matter of hypothesis how far his use of history contributed to the maintenance of that power. In addition to general ideas about the restoration of a traditional moral and religious rectitude (which gained in detail later in his rule), a crucial element was the constitutional one: the idea that rule by one man had precedent at Rome, and that constitutional monarchy represented a traditional and beneficial way of organizing the nation. Over a century later, Tacitus was unequivocal on this topic, beginning his *Annals* with a thumbnail sketch of the history of one-man-rule at Rome that makes an explicit connection between the imperial system and the regal period (Tac., *Ann.* 1.1). It is far from clear that at the time Livy was writing, the equation between Rome's kings and Augustus was as transparent as it was after the empire had become well established. On the basis of scanty evidence, scholars point to the *popularis* sympathies of one of Livy's sources, Gaius Licinius Macer, who seems to have painted a portrait of Romulus as a despot that left its traces both in Livy and in Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Against that evidence must be laid the much-better-preserved account of the regal period in Cicero, *De republica*, which, although engaging with that tradition, takes pains to paint monarchy as a potentially positive form of government, not just in its discussion of Rome's actual history, but also by elaborating (in a now fragmentary part of the work) on the idea of an enlightened *princeps* as a way out of Rome's political *malaise*. There is no doubt that “*regnum*” (monarchic rule) was a key term in political invective in the late republic, and that it was associated with, in particular, the figure of Tarquinius Superbus. There is more doubt about how far the earlier kings were thought of as non-constitutional tyrants. The biggest problem, for today's readers, is finding a stable position on which to arrive at an assessment of the evidence. Livy balances outrage at the tyrant Tarquin, and, to an extent, the tyrannical aspects of kings in general, with nostalgia for the earliest period of Rome's history, and a sense of pride in many of the

institutions that the kings were supposed to have bequeathed to Rome.

An example of how this works in the text is the dual kingship of Romulus and Tatius. As a prototype for the republican consulship, this could be thought to have political overtones, but it is typical of Livy that these are left implicit. The uniting of Romans and Sabines is said to be the cause of great happiness for both populations, and Livy reinforces this impression by making the unification the first etiology of the structure of the Roman voting assemblies (1.13). However, no sooner has he established this picture of a society united under the peaceful double-monarchy, than he moves swiftly to tell of the demise of Tatius, and to point out that Romulus is reported not to have taken the assassination as badly as would have been fitting (1.14.3). To express this, he employs one of the frequent devices that place responsibility for the analysis onto the anonymous historical tradition (*“ferunt...”*: they say that...). The effect is to introduce, almost subliminally, a contrast between this constitution, and the benign dilution of double monarchy that characterizes the republican consulship, and to cast a negative light upon monarchy, even upon the idea of the end of the consulship. Should this be read as veiled criticism of the emerging imperial system? Augustus himself was keen to preserve the consulship, and even Julius Caesar had not interfered with it. However, this is just a brief moment, and it is hard to draw a firm conclusion.

Without entering at any time into an explicit discussion of the nature of monarchic constitutions in general, Livy's account leaves little doubt that he subscribed to the theory, first elaborated by Aristotle, of constitutional pairings: a good monarchy degenerates into a bad tyranny, just as a good democracy deteriorates to mob-rule, or a benign aristocracy to a wicked oligarchy. The theory had been thoroughly applied to Rome by Polybius, and elegantly re-presented by Cicero in his *De republica*, with interesting discussion of the merits of a monarchic government over other forms, using the kings of Rome as evidence. It is not hard to detect small moments in Livy's account of the first four kings, or even the foundation narrative, that demonstrate the tensions in the historical traditions regarding monarchy that made this theory so effective a tool for analyzing Rome.

However, beyond that, it is difficult to be sure that Livy is interested in anything more concrete than political resonances. To conclude, I will return to the decisive role played by the story of the rape of Lucretia at the end of the book, which suggests that Livy does have a consistent view of the manner in which early history can articulate political concerns. The popularity of Lucretia, as an inspiration to poets and painters from the early Renaissance onward, comes from the manner in which the moral dilemmas of an individual intersect with those of a state. Because of the role played by Lucretia's actual body, first as an object of tyrannical desire, then as an incitement to revolution, we can also see that “the body politic” is a concept that can apply both individually and collectively. So broad a definition of

politics coincides with the theme announced in the preface (*Praef.* 9): “*quae uita, qui mores fuerint*” (what [the Roman people's] lives and customs were). It is in the lives and behaviors of individuals, and in social customs, that the history of Rome will be written. The narrative of Book 1 stays true to that program. Bringing to life this collection of individuals involves representing them in terms that his readers will find meaningful, and that includes, at moments, allowing their political significance to become clear. However, Livy's concern to create a distinct sense of the atmosphere of early Rome is also a determining factor, and he exploits a popular interest in etiologies to stress ideas of growth and change. In that context, Book 1 provides a stimulating and suggestive prelude to the rest of his history, but it does not do that on the basis of providing clear-cut messages about the nature of regal power, or by telling his readers how to judge it. As a political position, that can be thought to be a sensible one, coming at a time when Rome's new monarchy was itself still something of an experiment.

Cross-References

See Chapter 19: LIVY'S NARRATIVE OF THE REGAL PERIOD AND HISTORICAL AND ARCHAEOLOGICAL FACTS; Chapter 21: LITERARY ARCHETYPES FOR THE REGAL PERIOD

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Part V

Book 1-5. From Tarquinius Superbus to the Siege of Rome by the Gauls (390 BC)

Chapter 23

Tarquin the Superb and the Proclamation of the Roman Republic

Attilio Mastrocinque

The main account of the origins of the Roman Republic is that of Livy, at the end of his Book 1 and the first chapters of Book 2. Livy's report is our standard account. He gathered information from annalistic works from Fabius Pictor to the latest ones, such as Valerius Antias and Claudius Quadrigarius, and depended on their researches, additions, falsifications, or their selections and refusals. Starting with Mommsen's *Römische Forschungen* (Mommsen 1864–1879), the modern historians have recognized in this account traces of political debates and historical situations of the second and eventually the first centuries BC. Numerous scholars even avoid dealing with this period, because it is rich in uncertainties. In fact, ancient authors present as true history what is, in reality, fictitious history created for the sake of Roman glory or glory of one's family, moral admonitions, political propaganda, replicas of different historical accounts, and other features, which the modern researcher has to recognize.

The transition from monarchy to republic was ideologically fundamental for the Romans, because they had to explain how lawfully the last king was deposed and, above all, how the republican institutions were founded and shaped. The origins of institutions indeed raised political arguments during the entire life of the republican period. It was always crucial to state, for example, what consulate, tribunician power, political assemblies, *imperium*, and *auspicia* were at their very origin.

Livy and Annalists of Gracchan Age

Many scholars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries supposed that Livy mostly used recent annalists, such as Valerius Antias (in whom praises for Valerius Publicola could not be missing), Licinius Macer (a rare case of an annalist from the *populares*), Aelius Tubero, and Claudius Quadrigarius (see Ogilvie 1965, 185–186, 195). However, Livy quotes (1.55.8–9) only Fabius Pictor (end of the third century) and Calpurnius Piso (end of the second century) concerning Tarquinius' building of the Capitol. A large use of Valerius Antias is improbable, because the life of Publicola by Plutarch describes this hero as more influential than in Livy. Moreover, Livy does not speak of the *ludi Saeculares* celebrated by Publicola, which will be discussed later.

The role of Piso among Livy's sources can be underlined thanks to the comparison between Piso's fr. 18 P ("*Quodcumque deliquisset, ignosciturum adfirmabat*") and Livy (1.58.9: "*mentem peccare, non corpus, et unde consilium afuerit culpam abesse*"), in a passage concerning Lucretius, Collatinus, and Brutus' absolution of Lucretia from any charge (Peter 1883, II, 128). Piso was probably the source of both Livy (2.7.5–12) and Cicero (*Rep.* 2.53). Their accounts are very similar and deal with the house of consul Valerius Publicola, who was suspected of creating a new tyranny. Arguments arose because of the position of his new house on top of the Velia Hill, but he was able to persuade the Roman people of his Republican faith and gave up his architectural project. For chronological reasons, Cicero could hardly have used Aelius Tubero and Valerius Antias, and Licinius Macer was too *popularis* for Ciceronian political taste, whereas he used and appreciated Piso (Boscherini 1975).

An influence of this annalist on the Livian account of Collatinus' deposition from his consulship has been often recognized, because such an argumentative episode was crucial after the deposition of the tribune Octavius by Ti. Gracchus (see Tränkle 1965; Bauman 1966). However, it was crucial also after Cinna's deposition by the Senate (Ogilvie 1965, 239; Martin 1982, 8), and again after Lepidus' deposition by Octavian (Bauman 1966, 136). This elusive episode gives a concrete example of how difficult our task is.

An important stage at which Livian annalistic sources had been created was, in any case, the Gracchan period. It was especially then that the story of Tarquinius' fall took features of a tragedy and was enriched with moral and political values borrowed from Greek mythology.

Livy preserves traces of reshaping after the model of Orestes, Aegisthus, and Clytemnestra. Tarquinius' expulsion was seen as a tragedy within a familiar group. Tullia, Servius Tullius' daughter, married to Arruns Tarquinius, persuaded Lucius Tarquinius to kill his own brother Arruns and his wife Tullia—that is, her own sister (Liv. 1.9). She could thereafter get married to Lucius Tarquinius and was also able to persuade him to kill Servius Tullius himself, her father. In this way, Tarquinius sat on the throne. She was so wicked that she made her chariot pass on her father's corpse.

Livy is aware that the tradition presented Tarquinius' expulsion in a dramatic way, and says: "So it came about that the Roman palace afforded an instance of the crime which tragic poets have depicted" ("*tulit enim et Romana regia sceleris tragici exemplum*": 1.46.3). Another feature of Greek tragedies, namely the Furies, is mentioned when Livy describes Tullia driving her chariot on the corpse of her father, Servius Tullius: "Tullia, goaded to madness by the avenging spirits of her sister and her husband, drove right over her father's body" ("*amens, agitantibus furiis sororis ac uiri, Tullia per patris corpus carpentum egisse fertur*": 1.48.7) (see Wright 1910; Michels 1951; Mineo 2006, 200–201).

We know of an author who could have inspired some annalists whom Livy consulted, namely Accius. A relatively large fragment from his tragedy *Brutus* (fr. I–II Ribbeck; I–II Dangel) is preserved, in which a prophetic dream of Tarquinius is described. The king saw a wonderful ram, which butted him violently; the sun suddenly inversed its heavenly course, and this prodigy was interpreted as an omen of forthcoming renewals for the Roman people. Accius was imitating Euripides' *Electra* (699–746), in which the poet mentions Pan taking the lamb with golden fleece to Mycene; the sun, which inverted his course in the sky; and a prediction that was deduced from this prodigy. Here's a comparison of Accius and Euripides:

Accius	Euripides
“...in my dreams a shepherd near me drove a fleecy herd whose beauty was extreme...”	“...one day, Pan, the steward of husbandry, came breathing dulcet music on his jointed pipe, and brought with him, from its tender dam on Argive hills, a beauteous lamb with fleece of gold...”
“While there I lay outstretched and wounded sore, the sky disclosed a wondrous miracle: the blazing star of day reversed its course and glided to the right by new pathway...”	“In the self-same hour it was that Zeus changed the radiant courses of the stars, the light of the sun, and the joyous face of dawn, and drove his car athwart the western sky with fervent heat from heaven's fires...”
“The sun's changed course portends immediate change of people's life. And may that prove benignant to the people; for since the almighty orb revolved from left to right, it was the best of auguries that Rome would be supreme over all the earth.”	“...the sun turned round his glowing throne of gold, to vex the sons of men by this change because of the quarrel amongst them.”

The story of Tarquinius and Brutus was thus shaped after the model of Aegisthus and Orestes (Mastrocinque 1983; 1988, 18–25). The role of Clytemnestra was taken over by Tullia, whereas Valerius Publicola played a role similar to that of Pylades. Both Brutus and Orestes moved from Delphi to liberating their homeland. Perhaps also the apparent stupidity of Electra's husband was a model for Brutus' apparent stupidity. The solemn oath by Brutus, Publicola, and Lucretius to get rid of the tyrant is very similar to that of Orestes, Pilades, and the old tutor of Lucretia. The four Romans were in front of Lucretia, who committed suicide after the rape, whereas the three Greeks were in front of Electra, who held a dagger, promising to commit suicide if they did not succeed. The Roman *fabula praetexta* was thus influential in annalistic accounts, for we find its traces still in Livy.

Accius was a supporter of D. Iunius Brutus Callaicus (Cic., *Arch.* 27; Val.

Max. 8.14.2; Schol. Bob. 179 Stangl.), a politician who participated with consul Opimius in the repression of Caius Gracchus and his party (Ampel. 19.4; 26.2; Oros. 5.12.6). Accius' tragedies had an anti-tyrannical character (Gabba 1969), for M. Iunius Brutus, Caesar's murderer, chose them in order to make the Roman people hate the deceased dictator (Cic., *Att.* 16.2.3; 5.1; *Phil.* 1.36; 2.31). They were probably conceived in order to condemn the Gracchi as tyrants.

Another enemy of the Gracchi was the contemporary annalist Calpurnius Piso. He was a stout opponent of the agrarian law by Caius Gracchus (Cic., *Font.* 39; *Tusc.* 3.48; Schol. Bob., 233 Stangl.), and therefore it is possible that his annals were influenced by Accian tragedies.

Livy's Preferences for Aristocracy

Aristocratic and senatorial points of view concerning Tarquinius' fall and the republican constitution proved very influential, and Livy preserves traces of those opinions, which were probably shared by many anti-Gracchan, pro-Sullan, and post-Sullan moderate writers. It is evident, on the other hand, that the Livian account is relatively impartial between *pro populares* and *pro optimates* opinions, because he maintains that Tarquinius was the oppressor of both *plebs* and *senatus*. The *plebs* was oppressed with the building works of the Cloaca Maxima (1.56.2–3 and 59.9); the most important citizens were put to death, among which was Brutus' father (1.56.7: *primores civitatis*); and the king did not want to replace the deceased senators (1.49.6; cf. 1.53.6).

In any case, however, the new republican constitution is presented by Livy as the result of a movement led by prominent citizens (1.59.6: “*primores civitatis*”), such as Lucius Junius Brutus, Valerius Publicola, Tarquinius Collatinus, and Spurius Lucretius Tricipitinus. Livy praises the old Roman kings who prevented people from being obsessed by tribunician movements and arguments against the Senate (2.1.5: “*tribuniciiis procellis...cum patribus serere certamina*”). Brutus made the Romans swear not to accept the power of another king and replaced the deceased senators with prominent members of equestrian order (Liv. 2.1.10–11). Livy never speaks of patricians as creators of the Republic: this is only a modern assumption.

Livy—or his authors—did not give information that could contradict a historical reconstruction of the early Republic as a fundamentally aristocratic creation. Livy could not admit that the name “Iunius” was plebeian, and therefore he avoids speaking of a tradition according to which Brutus was the leader of Roman *plebs* and the first tribune of the people and aedile (Dion. Hal. 6.89; 7.14.2 Plut., *Coriol.* 7; *Suda*, s.v. δῆμαρχοι).

Livy probably knew of a tradition according to which the tribunes of the people had been elected by the curiate comices (Cic., apud Ascon., *In Corn.* 76 Clark; Dion. Hal. 6.89.1; 9.41.2; Zon. 7.17), because he says that, in 471

BC, the elections were entrusted to the centuriate comices, but does not mention what the previous comices had been (2.56.2; 58.1). Plutarch knows of a *pontifex maximus* Spurius Minucius, who absolved a Vestal Virgin; Livy instead reports this episode but does not mention this plebeian name; Livy (5.40.9) tells the story of Vestal Virgins and the flamen Quirinalis who warranted the safety of the sacred objects during the Gallic attack to Rome, and of the plebeian Lucius Albinus who brought them to Caere on his chariot. Diodorus (15.51.) knew the consular tribune Lucius Albinus, and the *Fasti Praenestini* (*Inscr. It.* XIII. 2, 17) knew his wife, who dedicated a temple. Aristotle (Plut., *Cam.* 22: Lucius) and Augustus (*Inscr. It.* XIII. 2, 11) presents this man as the savior of Rome. Therefore, the inconsistency in the Livian account has been recognized and explained: L. Albinus himself was the flamen Quirinalis, but Livy could not admit it (Palmer 1970, 163). We are probably facing another case of Livian silences concerning plebeian men in leading positions. It is evident that Livy and some of his sources intervened in the tradition by cancelling the traces of plebeians who took civil or religious offices during the early Republic.

In 509 BC in Rome, nobody could take the auspices and gather the comices to elect the consuls. The king had both *imperium* and *auspicia*, and he only could transmit them to another supreme ruler. In 509 BC, there was no *interregnum*, but the *praefectus urbis* presided at the elections according to directions given by Servius Tullius (Liv. 1.60.3). Surprisingly, the election of Numa took place during an *interregnum* (Liv. 1.17), but the election of the first consuls followed this unusual path. It is possible that Livy had at his disposal traditions that were not in keeping with his personal idea of republican rules and republican constitution. We saw that he did not admit the surreptitious tradition according to which tribunes of the people had been elected by curiate comices, and his description of elections in 509 BC appears to have substituted a surreptitious tradition with an inept and improbable procedure. Livy found such information concerning Tullius' political handbook in some authors of Sullan or post-Sullan and Pompeian age. Appianus (BC, 1.59) in fact reports that Sulla, in 88 BC, "proposed that no question should ever again be brought before the people which had not been previously considered by the Senate, an ancient practice which had been abandoned long ago. Also that the voting should not be by tribes, but by centuries, as King Servius Tullius had ordained" (translation by Mendelssohn). Modern scholars have consequently put forward the reasonable hypothesis that the alleged Servian constitution was a product of Sullan ideology (Gabba 1991, 89; Marastoni, 51–85). Livy thus cannot be accredited with creating this fake, but only with accepting it. He did not say that the Republic was dominated by the Roman patriciate. He and his authors were rather convinced that the prominent citizens who led the republican revolution were both patricians and authoritative plebeians. They are styled as *equites* by Livy (2.1) and powerful by Dionysius of Halicarnassos (5.13.2). At

this historical stage, there were neither *ordo equester* nor patriciate (Magdelain 1964; Richard 1978). The plebeian prominent citizens, who also appear in the *Fasti consulares* of the first decades, are styled as *conscripti* by Momigliano (1967), quite in keeping with Livy's narrative.

Intrusion of Greek History into Roman Archaic History

The ancient tradition concerning Tarquinius, Brutus, and Publicola was quite poor, and the annalists made it larger also by adding romanticized and exciting episodes, without any historical basis, but copied after Greek historians, especially Herodotus (see Scapini 2011). Livy tells the story of Sextus Tarquinius, who feigned a persecution by his father Tarquinius in order to win the favor of the Gabinian people. Then he betrayed them and handed over the city to the Roman king (Liv. 1.53–54). This account is evidently derived from the Herodotean (3.154–160) story of Zopyros and the Persian siege of Babylon. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (4.56.3–4) first noticed the imitation after Herodotus (5.92) in the story of Tarquinius who gave his son Sextus the advice of cutting the heads of prominent citizens of Gabi. This suggestion was transmitted only by letting him know—by means of a herald—that he was cutting the highest poppies in a crops field (Liv. 1.54.7–8). Herodotus (5.90–93) told the story of Thrasybulus, the Milesian tyrant, who, in order to offer a suggestion to Periander, the tyrant of Corinth, takes Periander's messenger for a walk in a wheat field and cuts off the highest ears of wheat. The borrowing of historical accounts from Herodotus and other Greek sources was an ancient feature of Roman annalistic. In fact, a fragment of Fabius Pictor (fr. 5 P = 7 Chassignet) preserves an example of such a historical fiction (see Her. 1.108–113; Binder 1964). Herodotus was the favorite author, thanks to his fascinating and emotional narration, which was preferred to the cold factual history of Thucydidean tradition (Gentili and Cerri 1973). Moreover, the ancient annalists picked up Greek accounts that were roughly contemporary to Roman facts.

In particular, the fall of Tarquinius was contemporary to the fall of the tyranny in Athens. Therefore, some ancient annalists (Fabius Pictor spoke of Collatinus: fr. 14 P; 17 Ch.; see Ogilvie 1965, 239; Scapini 2011, 160–161) were pleased to have one of the first consuls, Tarquinius Collatinus, exiled only because of his kinship with the Superbus (Liv. 2.2). They created thus a beautiful parallel with Hipparchos, son of Charmos, ostracized in Athens for his kinship with the Peisistratids (Aristot., *Ath. Pol.* 22.4). In this case, the Roman historical thought was also looking for a lawful transition from a monarchy to a republic, and supposed that the first consuls were both Tarquinius' relatives—Brutus was his nephew (Liv. 1.56.7; Dion. Hal. 4.68.1) and Collatinus his cousin. Members of the Tarquinian family were probably supposed to inherit auspicial capacities, such as the patricians who inherited it

(see Poletti 2011, 37–48). We will speak later of other juridical fictions invented to legitimize the Republic's possession of Tarquinius' properties and rights.

Livy (2.9.1–2; 10.8; 13.3) maintains that Porsenna waged war with Rome by pretending that Tarquinius was to be replaced on the throne. The contrary was probably true: Tarquinius was allied with both Latins and Cumeans, who were Porsenna's foes, and several modern scholars even supposed that Porsenna himself drove Tarquinius from Rome and became an ally of the young republic (see Cornell 1995, 217–218). The tradition, however, created a parallel to Darius, the Persian king, who wanted to take Hippias back to Athens and to restore him as the tyrant of this city (Hdt. 6.3).

What Livy Did Not Say

Several historical accounts are absent from Livy but can be read in other authors; they are few but meaningful. In particular, we notice those concerning the arrival of the *gens Valeria*, Valerius Publicola, and the foundation of *ludi Saeculares*. This account is reported by Valerius Maximus (2.4.5) and Zosimus (2.1–3). Augustus was proud of having warranted the renewal of time, and inaugurated a new era with the *ludi Saeculares* of 17 BC. Vergil, in his fourth *Bucolic*, was already aware, in 40 BC, of the arrival of the new era. A great role of the *gens Valeria* in those games and in republican liberty of Rome was perhaps not an appropriate praise in Augustan Rome.

Livy expresses moderate praise for Brutus, whereas Vergil (*Aen.* 6.817–818) calls the republican hero “*anima superba*.” Indeed, after Caesar's murder by M. Iunius Brutus the Younger, the character of Lucius Iunius Brutus the Elder became controversial.

The purchase of the Sibylline books (Cass. Hem., fr. 37 P.; 40 Ch.; Calp. Piso, fr. 11 P.; 13 Ch.; Dion. Hal. 4.62; Plin., *NH* 13.84; Gell. 1.19; Solin. 2.16–18; Zon. 7.11) is forgotten by Livy, probably in order to avoid every link between the Superbus and this prophetic text (Mineo 2006, 201), which Augustus transferred into Apollo's temple, close to his palace.

Livy passes over every information concerning cults that were introduced at the beginning of the Republic, and namely the *ludi Taurei* (Fest., 478 L; Serv., *Aen.* 2.140) for the gods of the dead, the festival of Carna (Macrob. 1.12.31), a goddess of health, and the reform of *Compitalia* (Macrob. 1.7.34–35) in honor of the *Lares* and the *Mater Larum*, also called Mania. The *ludi Taurei* were prescribed by the *Libri Sibyllini*, and the reform of *Compitalia* was ordered by Apollo himself to Tarquinius, who thought the order was that of cutting human heads, whereas Brutus was able to understand that it sufficed to offer garlic bulbs and poppy heads.

Different accounts concurred in describing a religious crisis under Tarquinius,

which produced plague, sterility, and death. The wrath of the dead seems to have been the main cause, and Apollonian oracles offered a solution. Tarquinius did not understand those divine messages, which Brutus interpreted correctly after having expelled him. The mention of archaic and scarcely known gods suggests that some antiquarians, Varro for instance, preserved those accounts, which late Republican historiography deemed unworthy of reporting.

Livy (1.56.4) describes instead a prodigy, which was a sign of divine wrath. A snake crawled out of a wooden column in Tarquinius' palace, and the tyrant sent an embassy to Delphi to ask for Apollo's advice. Two sons of the king and Brutus went to Delphi and questioned about who should become king after Tarquinius. Apollo answered that it would be the one who would be the first to kiss his mother. Brutus readily discovered the meaning of the oracle, fell down and kissed Mother Earth. This episode was also known to Cicero (*Brutus* 53). Therefore, the tradition removed Apollo's answer, and substituted it with another answer. Livy preserves this cut, and the scar is still visible. Apollo's word was ideologically fundamental for the ancient Roman ideas concerning the Republic. This oracle dealt with religious rituals, as we have seen. It is possible that Cicero, Livy, and other authors who supposed that the Republic had been created by the aristocracy did not want to mingle *Compitalia*, a festival of late Republican lower classes, with the noble birth of the Republic.

However, the scar proves that the stories of *Compitalia* and other popular festivals were quite ancient and pertinent to Roman local traditions, transmitted from a generation to another with the celebration of the festivals themselves.

Livian Chronology

Livy presents an evidently false chronology of Servius Tullius without noticing impossibilities or oddities. The last three Roman kings reigned from 616 to 509 BC: Tarquinius Priscus 37–38 years, Servius Tullius 44 years, and the Superbus 25 years. If one accepts the Livian chronology, Tanaquil, Tarquinius Priscus' wife, lived no less than 115 years, Tarquinius Superbus lived for 110 years, and Egerius engendered Tarquinius Collatinus when he was more than 70 years old. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (4.7) noticed those impossibilities and made (4.6.1) Fabius Pictor responsible for having erroneously supposed Superbus to be Priscus' son, and not his grandson, as Calpurnius Piso (fr. 15 P = 17 Ch.) supposed before him. Dionysius witnesses that Piso was the only historian who gave such a reconstruction, and thus it is evident that Livy preferred not to go astray, far from the broadly appreciated tradition.

The character of Servius Tullius was crucial for the political and historical

thought of the Sullan age (Marastoni 2009), and then his story became increasingly larger and more important than in Pictor's *Annales*. Those *Annales* accredited Servius Tullius with far less than 44 years of reign, and, between Pictor and Piso, some historians expanded the chronology of the last three kings in order to make Roman and Corinthian chronology correspond. Tarquinius Priscus was the son of Demaratus, who was exiled in 657 BC by the Corinthian tyrant Cypselus. The beginning of the Tarquinian dynasty was consequently placed a long generation later, and the Servian reign was enormously expanded in order to reach 509 BC with only three kings (on all these topics, see De Cazanove 1988). The mistake in Livy was that of accepting such a lasting reign of Tullius.

Livy (2.2.1) accredited Brutus with the creation of the *rex sacrorum*, in charge for cultic ceremonies and lacking any political power, and M. Horatius Pulvillus with the dedication of the temple of Iuppiter Capitolinus (2.8.6–8). This signifies that he did not think that the first day of the Roman Republic was September 1, 509 BC, the anniversary of this temple and the beginning of the new deal of Ludi Romani. Livy, in fact, describes (7.3) the ritual of driving a nail on this very day into the wall of the temple, in order to indicate how many years elapsed since its inauguration and to record the course of the Capitoline era. The date of the beginning of the ancient Roman year—and of the first year of the Republic—on September 1 is a modern mistake (Mommsen 1858, 86–89; Versnel 1970, 270–272, and other authors), based on Dionysius of Halicarnassus (5.1.2). This author dates with precision the birth of Roman Republic to the first year of the 68th Olympiad, under the Athenian Archon Isagoras (508–507 BC), four months before the end of the year. The mistake was that of taking this year as the Roman, and not the Athenian year. Four months before the end of the Athenian year—that is the end of June, the beginning of July—corresponds to a date some time in March according to the Roman calendar, and therefore it was supposed that Tarquinius was exiled in February, when the festival of *Regifugium* was usually celebrated (by the *rex sacrorum* under the Republican government), and the beginning of the consular year was placed in March, probably March 15.

According to Livy, the Republican era coincides with the era of the Capitoline temple, and both start in 509 BC, whereas another tradition states that the dedication of the new temple occurred under Horatius Pulvillus, consul for the second time, that is, in 508 or 507 BC (Dion. Hal. 5.35.3; Tac., *Ann.* 3.7.2; cf. Pol. 3.22). The Paduan historian gave thus a greater historical and ideological value to the first year of the new constitution.

Traces of Greek Historical Tradition

A historical fiction would have Tarquinius killed by a republican tyrannicide.

On the contrary, the tradition of Tarquinius' exile was fairly true. Livy (2.21.5–7) knew of Tarquinius' death at the court of Aristodemus, the Cumaeen tyrant, and of the expropriation of a grain supply in a Roman ship as a reparation for having dispossessed Tarquinius of his properties. Aristodemus behaved in this way because he was Tarquinius' heir (Liv. 2.34.4). This account is perfectly fitting with the story of the confiscation of Tarquinian fields and their subsequent consecration to Mars. Those fields became the Campus Martius, and the harvest was tossed into the Tiber (Liv. 2.5.1–3). The story of Roman cereals supply is reported in detail by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (7.2.3 and 7.13.1–2), with the only difference that the expropriation of the Roman ship was pretended by Roman refugees adherent to Tarquinius, and Aristodemus had been chosen as a judge, who condemned the arguments of the sailors. In Dionysius, this episode is the starting point of a long description of Aristodemus' career, his victory against Porsenna and his son Arruns in Latium, when the Cumaeen leader was allied with the Latins, and his final fall. Dionysius of Halicarnassus was using a Greek source, which was possibly Timaeus (Meyer 1937, 750; Cozzoli 1965, 24–26). This source approved the conspiracy that put an end to the tyranny.

The story of the Tarquinian family was also the story of a conspicuous patrimony, inherited from the Corinthian nobleman Demaratus (see Plin., *NH* 35.16 and 152; Zevi 1991). Livy (1.34) knew of the wealth inherited by Lucumo, thereafter called Tarquinius Priscus; of Tarquinius Superbus' estate in Rome; and of arguments that arose owing to the confiscation. This tradition was based on Greek historiography concerning Corinth, the Corinthian colony of Syracuse, and the vicissitudes of the Corinthian-exiled aristocracy. This tradition is mirrored by local artistic developments in Southern Etruria and Latium, which depended on the Corinthian artists who immigrated to Italy (Colonna 1961).

Livy, probably for the sake of brevity, picked up only a short and reliable notice concerning Aristodemus as Tarquinius' heir, and let aside a large amount of speculations concerning the Campus Martius, which was previously the *ager Tarquinius*, and narrates instead the origins of the *insula Tiberina*, grown on the tossed crops. The Roman tradition, for juridical scruples, proposed many stories, according to which the Campus Martius was given to the Roman people by a member of the Tarquinian family, or it was consecrated to gods from the very origin. Plutarch (*Publ.* 8.7–8) knows of a Vestal Tarquinia who gave to the Romans a part of this field; her name was later transformed into Taracia (Plin., *NH* 34.25; Gell. 7.7.1–4; see Poletti 2011, 49–59). Another tradition had that Acca Larentia got married to a very rich man, Tarutius, and, after his death, she gave her properties, and in particular the Tarax or Turax field, to the Romans or to Romulus (Plut., *Rom.* 5; *Quaest. Rom.* 35; Gell. 7.7.6; Macrobian 1.10.12 & 15; *Inscr. It.* XIII. 2, p. 139; Lact., *Inst.* 1.20.4–5; Tert., *Ad nat.* 2.10; Aug., *De civ. D.* 6.7). All those

stories were created after the model of the Tarquinian heritage and were already aimed at denying the rights of Tarquinius' heirs on the Campus Martius.

Livy and Shakespeare's Macbeth

The dramatic and tragic feature of the Livian account concerning Tarquinius' fall did not escape Shakespeare and other contemporary authors who were interested in the debate against tyranny (see Miola 2001). Modern scholars failed to notice that his *Macbeth* was perhaps the greatest modern tragedy that brought onto the scene some Livian patterns of the Tarquinian story. The dramatist was notoriously fascinated by Lucretia's fate and quoted many times the deeds of Brutus the elder in his *Julius Caesar*. In *Macbeth* (2.1) he writes of the tyrant: "With Tarquin's ravishing strides, towards his design moves like a ghost." Many features of the tragedy prove that Shakespeare was remembering the Livian passage.

1a. In Liv. 1.47, Tullia "allowed her husband no rest day or night, for fear lest the past murders should prove fruitless. What she wanted, she said, was not a man who was only her husband in name, or with whom she was to live in uncomplaining servitude; the man she needed was one who deemed himself worthy of a throne, who remembered that he was the son of Priscus Tarquinius, who preferred to wear a crown rather than live in hopes of it. 'If you are the man to whom I thought I was married, then I call you my husband and my king; but if not, I have changed my condition for the worse, since you are not only a coward but a criminal to boot. Why do you not prepare yourself for action?'"

1b. Hence, she urged her husband Tarquinius to kill Servius Tullius. The Livian "*qui habere quam sperare regnum mallet*" is mirrored by Shakespeare "I dare not" wait upon "I would," in a passage, in which Lady Macbeth says (1.7):

Was the hope drunk

Wherein you dress'd yourself? Hath it slept since?

And wakes it now, to look so green and pale

At what it did so freely? From this time

Such I account thy love. Art thou afeard

To be the same in thine own act and valour

As thou art in desire? Wouldst thou have that

Which thou esteem'st the ornament of life,

And live a coward in thine own esteem,

Letting 'I dare not' wait upon 'I would,'

2a. In Liv. 1.56, we read “When Brutus heard of the massacre of the chiefs of the city, among which his own brother, by his uncle's orders, he determined that neither his intelligence nor his fortune should give the king cause for alarm.”

2b. Macduff passed over silence the suspicion that Macbeth actually murdered Duncan and thus escaped to Fife and then to England.

3a. Tarquinius, in Liv. 1.56, saw a prodigy: “a frightful portent appeared; a snake gliding out of a wooden column created confusion and panic in the palace. The king himself was not so much terrified as filled with anxious forebodings. The Etruscan soothsayers were only employed to interpret prodigies which affected the State; but this one concerned him and his house personally, so he decided to send to the world-famed oracle of Delphi.” The god was enquired by Brutus and Tarquinius' sons about the forthcoming king of Rome, and Livy writes: “A voice came from the lowest depths of the cavern [*“ex infimo specu”*]: ‘Whichever of you, young men, shall be the first to kiss his mother, he shall hold supreme power in Rome’.” Only Brutus was able to understand the true meaning of the oracle.

3b. Macbeth in *Macbeth* 3.4 saw a prodigy as well: the ghost of Banquo appeared to him. Subsequently, Macbeth went to the cavern of the three witches (4.1), and their oracle gave him three answers concerning the destiny of his kingship, two of which spoke of apparently impossible events:

Be bloody, bold, and resolute; laugh to scorn

The power of man, for none of woman born

Shall harm Macbeth!

and

Macbeth shall never vanquish'd be until

Great Birnam wood to high Dunsinane hill

Shall come against him.

Macbeth was unable to understand the meaning of this, but Macduff fulfilled the prophecies.

4a. After coming back to Italy, the sons of Tarquinius and Collatinus rode from Ardea to Rome to control the behavior of their wives—Liv. 1.57: “Setting spur to their horses they galloped off to Rome, where they arrived as darkness was beginning to close in.”

4b. Macbeth, on the other hand, knew that Banquo and Fleance wanted to ride on horseback:

MACBETH

Ride you this afternoon?

BANQUO

Ay, my good lord.

Thereafter, Macbeth sent some hired killers to murder them (3.3–4).

5a. Brutus, Lucretius, Collatinus, and Publicola knew from Lucretia of the rape by Sextus Tarquinius and saw her committing suicide. Livy writes (1.59.1): “Whilst they were absorbed in grief, Brutus drew the knife from Lucretia's wound, and holding it, dripping with blood, in front of him, said, ‘By this blood—most pure before the outrage wrought by the king's son—I swear, and you, O gods, I call to witness that I will drive hence Lucius Tarquinius Superbus, together with his cursed wife and his whole brood, with fire and sword and every means in my power, and I will not suffer them or any one else to reign in Rome’.”

The heroes swore the same oath, left and rose the Roman people against the tyrant.

5b. Macduff, exiled in England, knew that his wife and sons had been murdered by Macbeth's emissaries (4.3). His friend Malcolm urged him to take revenge and liberate Scotland:

MALCOLM

Be this the whetstone of your sword: let grief
Convert to anger; blunt not the heart, enrage it.

MACDUFF

O, I could play the woman with mine eyes
And braggart with my tongue! But, gentle heavens,
Cut short all intermission; front to front
Bring thou this fiend of Scotland and myself;
Within my sword's length set him; if he 'scape,
Heaven forgive him too!

Malcolm, his uncle Siward of Northumbria, and Macduff joined their armies and overwhelmed Macbeth.

It is evident that Shakespeare expanded the historical background provided by Holinshed's *Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland* by using Livian patterns and reshaping as a tragedy this Roman story, which had already been

represented as a tragedy by the Romans themselves.

We can hardly find a story that was more intermingled with tragedy than that of Tarquinius.

Cross-References

See CHAPTER 4: ROME, MAGNA GRAECIA, AND SICILY IN LIVY FROM 326 TO 200 BC; CHAPTER 21: LITERARY ARCHETYPES FOR THE REGAL PERIOD

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Chapter 24

The Beginnings of the Republic from 509 to 390_{BC}

Gary Forsythe

Introduction

Since the first Romans to write formal histories did not begin doing so until c. 200_{BC}, early Roman history (i.e., the period preceding 264_{BC}, with the beginning of the First Punic War) is the most problematic period of the modern study of Rome's history. By the time that Livy began writing (c. 30_{BC}), there existed more than 20 full histories of Rome composed by Romans.¹ In fact, the subject of Rome's history had by then become so fully treated by different writers that Livy devoted much of his *Preface* to justifying and apologizing for his contributing another work to this well-established historiographical tradition.

What little remains from Livy's predecessors indicates that the traditions of the regal period (i.e., the period preceding 509_{BC} and covered in Livy's Book 1) were already well defined in the accounts of the earliest historians, but the period from the beginning of the Republic (509_{BC}) down to the Pyrrhic War (280–275_{BC}) did not begin to receive detailed treatment until the last quarter of the second century, at which time the political violence and controversies of the late Republic exercised a profound influence upon how contemporary writers portrayed the events of the early Republic, especially their portrayal of the conflict between patricians and plebeians, the so-called struggle of the orders. For example, Livy's account in 2.41 of the agrarian proposal of Spurius Cassius and his downfall is patterned after the careers of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, whose activities (133–121_{BC}) initiated the political violence of the Late Republic. Before Rome began its territorial expansion during the fourth century, the Roman community may have experienced a shortage of arable land, and this could have periodically caused political tension; but by portraying early events in late-Republican terms, Roman historians have made it difficult for modern scholars to ascertain the truth.

Our two most important literary sources for early Roman history are Livy's First Decade and *The Roman Antiquities* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. The former ends with the year 293_{BC}. Dionysius was an exact contemporary of Livy. He arrived in Rome in 30_{BC} and published his *Roman Antiquities* in 7_{BC}. It was written in Greek for a Greek audience. The work ended with the year 264_{BC} and comprised 20 books. It was much longer than Livy's account, and much of this additional length was achieved by Dionysius' inclusion of

long fictitious speeches. Only the first 11 books of Dionysius have survived, going down to the year 448 BC. Consequently, Books 4–10 of Livy constitute our single most important source of information for Roman affairs during the years 447–293 BC. Livy and Dionysius closed out the so-called annalistic tradition that narrated Roman affairs from earliest times and covered the period of the Republic. For the most part, ancient historians of Rome henceforth focused their attention on the history of the Principate. Generally speaking, Livy and Dionysius give us the same basic outline of events, although there are numerous differences, which reflect their use of different earlier writers on specific matters, as well as their own particular interests and apathies. The two narratives represent each author's literary reworking of a well-established historical tradition, to which their only unique contributions were their own literary artistry and storytelling ability rather than original historical research.

As seen from the following tabulation, the four books treated in this chapter roughly form two pairs in terms of Livy's scale of treatment.

Book
2
3
4
5

Word Count
Years
Words per Year
17,824
42
424
20,202
22
918
16,806
42
400
16,379
14

Book 3 is Livy's longest surviving book and is dominated by the events surrounding the rise and fall of the decemvirs, whereas Book 5 is almost entirely occupied with the two episodes of the war against Veii and the Gallic capture of Rome. Because of Livy's elaborate treatment of these events, these two books encompass far fewer years than do Books 2 and 4. The latter pair cover the same number of years and at about the same average scale.

Despite the overwhelming wealth of detail contained in these books concerning military and domestic affairs, the modern reader must realize that the evidentiary basis for these events is very slim. Livy's historical narrative becomes gradually more factual from the mid-fourth century onward, but it is not an exaggeration to describe the fifth century as largely a dark age to Romans of later times. The amount of authentic historical information that survived from the fifth century into later times must have been quite meager. The data preserved by the chief pontiff (*pontifex maximus*), known as the pontifical chronicle and eventually published in literary form as the *Annales Maximi*, derived from a series of monthly or annual whitened notice boards, whose purpose was to inform the Roman community of the religious and legal calendar. However, since the pontiffs were in charge of expiating prodigies and maintaining the goodwill of the gods (*pax deorum*), they would have recorded major disasters and religious innovations affecting the Roman state. Thus, about the only factual data that we can extract from these four books of Livy are the list of annually elected consuls or consular tribunes, temple dedications, food shortages, epidemics, foundations of colonies, and perhaps some major military victories or defeats.² Apart from the Law of the Twelve Tables, there seem to have been few documents or inscriptions of the fifth century that survived into later times and were available for historical reconstruction. Livy's predecessors of the late Republic (c. 130–30 BC) succeeded in transforming a skeletal outline of bare events of the fifth century into a highly detailed, dramatic, and elaborate narrative; and Livy's account is his own reworking of these late Republican (and largely fictitious) narratives. Unfortunately, given this sorry state of our evidence, modern reconstructions of early Roman history often differ significantly from one another, because scholars disagree on what aspects of Livy's account should be accepted as historical, and what parts should be rejected as unhistorical.

Book 2 (509–468 BC)³

Following prefatory remarks to mark the transition from the monarchy to the Republic, Livy devotes the first 20 chapters (nearly one-third) of this book to describing the establishment of the Republic in opposition to the exiled Tarquin family and Rome's hostile neighbors. Central to this episode are King Porsenna of Clusium, the virtue of Lucretia (narrated at the end of Book 1), the patriotism of Junius Brutus, and the heroic self-sacrifice of Horatius Cocles and Mucius Scaevola. This elaborate tale of the Republic's foundation through Roman heroism is a complex mixture of later literary fabrication, popular folktale, and some historical facts. “The Rape of Lucretia” is probably fictitious and is later Roman historians' adaptation of the famous Greek story of the tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton, the downfall of the Peisistratid tyranny in Athens, and the beginning of the Athenian democracy. Horatius Cocles, the one-eyed or one-legged man, and Mucius Scaevola, the one-handed man, are heroes encountered in the folklore of many cultures,⁴ and they have been given historical identities and placed in this period in order to glorify the beginning of Roman Republican freedom. As we learn from Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who drew upon a well-informed Greek historian of Cumae for the years 524–484 BC (*Rom. Ant.* 7.3–11), Porsenna did in fact attack Rome; and some modern scholars have speculated that it was his war against Rome and its capture (not abortive siege) that was responsible for the expulsion of the Tarquins, the ending of the monarchy, and the emergence of the Republic.⁵

The remainder of Book 2 narrates a complex series of domestic and foreign affairs. As soon as Republican freedom is secure with the death of Tarquinius Superbus in exile at Cumae, in 495 BC (21), Livy embarks upon the theme that will dominate the remainder of his First Decade in describing and explaining intricacies of Roman domestic politics. This is the struggle of the orders, a continuous clash between patricians and plebeians, as the latter attempted to end the political monopoly of the former and to acquire their own political rights and equality through political agitation. This struggle commences in 495 BC with the first consulship of a patrician Claudius; and henceforth, all patrician Claudii in Livy's First Decade are depicted in stereotypical terms as unrelenting opponents to the plebeians and staunch upholders of patrician privileges. Book 2 contains two important episodes in this struggle: the first secession of the plebs and the creation of the office of plebeian tribune (495–493 BC in 21–33), and a major innovation in this office more than 20 years later (473–471 BC in 54–57), involving either the increase in the number of annually elected plebeian tribunes or the creation of a tribal assembly for electing them.

In order for modern readers to appreciate the historical value of Livy's early-

Republican narrative, they must be aware of the highly problematic nature of the struggle of the orders.⁶ Patricians and plebeians were the two groupings or orders (Latin *ordines*) into which Romans were divided during republican times. According to the later ancient tradition, this dichotomy was as old as Rome itself. When Romulus founded the senate, its initial 100 members were called *patres* (fathers), and their patrilineal descendants became the patricians. All other Romans belonged to the plebeian order. Unfortunately, modern research has rendered this neat ancient thesis untenable. Yet, according to the later ancient tradition, which was not developed until long after the events described, the patricians at the beginning of the Republic in 509 BC were supposed to have enjoyed a monopoly of power by comprising the senate, holding all priesthoods, and having the sole right to be elected consuls. Since the plebeians were excluded from these positions, Rome's internal history during the early republic was characterized by a constant political struggle between the two groups. The notion of a struggle of the orders, however, according to which later ancient historians cast nearly all aspects of Rome's early history, bristles with so many contradictions, inconsistencies, and oversimplifications that it has rendered early Roman history extremely difficult for modern scholars to reconstruct, because they find it virtually impossible to sort out fact from fiction. For example, T. J. Cornell (1864–1879) regards the framework of the struggle of the orders as generally reliable, although embellished with numerous fictitious details from later times. G. Forsythe (2005), on the other hand, adopts a more critical approach and sees the struggle of the orders as the later ancient tradition misconstruing many unrelated events into a largely unhistorical, uniform pattern.

Modern scholars of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, influenced by invasionist models current in Indo-European studies, postulated that Rome's patricians and plebeians arose out of racial or ethnic differences in the original population. More recent scholarship has discarded such invasionist approaches, preferring to see the dichotomy as resulting from the process of state formation, as Rome during the archaic period (c. 800–500 BC) progressed from a small, simple village of poor peasant farmers to a thriving city-state with a population of 20,000–30,000, and with marked social and economic differences. One approach has been to accept the later ancient Roman connection between the senate and patricians and to regard the latter as constituting early Rome's most eminent families, whose adult male members comprised the Senate that advised the kings. Another approach has been to see the patricians as an early elite group of families who defined their special status through their hereditary tenure of priesthoods, which conferred upon them a religious mystique that they never entirely lost in later, more secularized times. In addition to these different explanations concerning the origin of the patricians, modern scholars likewise disagree about the date of the patriciate's formation. Some think that it had come into being by the beginning of the Republic in 509 BC, thereby agreeing with the later ancient

tradition concerning the struggle of the orders commencing with the Republic. Others argue that the patriciate did not come into being until the closing decades of the fifth century. In later times, the plebeian order comprised the entire Roman citizen body minus the small number of patricians. It was therefore quite heterogeneous, consisting mostly of peasant farmers and artisans; but it also included all moderately well-off and rich non-patricians, many of whom aspired to the same honors enjoyed by patricians. Thus, the so-called struggle of the orders is likely to have been quite complex, involving different groups pursuing different goals.

The notion of a patrician monopoly of the consulship from 509 to 367 BC is contradicted by the names in the consular list. During the period 509–445 BC, patricians held only 55% of the consulships or decemviral positions of 451 BC. Plebeians account for 15% of these offices, and the remaining 30% were held by members of families whose status cannot be determined. If the patriciate did not come into being until the closing years of the fifth century, its monopoly of the consulship must not have amounted to too much, because by then the office had largely been replaced by the military tribunate with consular power. Thus, the later ancient tradition may have erred by misdating the patrician monopoly of the consulship by about a century and by wrongly assigning it to the very beginning of the Republic. The secession of the plebs may not be historical, but instead, be patterned after an actual secession of 287 BC. In the ancient tradition, the creation of both the consulship and plebeian tribunate coincides with the dedication of two of Rome's most important temples: Capitoline Jupiter and Aventine Ceres; but these datings are far from certain. Dionysius (*Rom. Ant.* 3.69.2 and 5.35.3) dates the former's dedication to 507, *not* 509 BC. Moreover, viewing the consulship and tribunate as offices created to oppose one another may likewise be a later ancient misconception. Instead, the two offices may have been originally designed to complement one another, with the consuls tending to foreign and military affairs and the tribunes looking after domestic and civilian matters.

The two major military episodes in the second half of this book concern Coriolanus (33–40) and the Cremera disaster (42–54). Although his family name (Marcus) was plebeian, Coriolanus was supposed to have been a patrician so opposed to the plebeian cause that he was banished from Rome. He then gave his military talent to the Volscians and led them successfully against Rome until shamed into retreat by his indignant, patriotic mother. The tale probably embodies Volscian military success against Rome and the Latins during the early years of the fifth century, but patriotic Roman historians later inserted Coriolanus into the story in order to attribute Volscian success to a Roman, whose withdrawal from Rome's territory was effected by his mother, who thereby became a shining moral example by placing country before family.⁷

In 1977, there was discovered at Satricum (south of Rome) an inscription

dating to c. 500 BC and recording a dedication to Mamars (Mars) by the companions of Publius Valerius.⁸ This find has prompted modern scholars to regard the deaths of the 306 Fabii at the Cremera while fighting against Veii in terms of early Roman clan warfare (see Bremmer 1982; Smith 2006, 290–295). Although this interpretation has become widely accepted, it is not without problems. There is likely to have been, in later times, an authentic memory of some disaster at the Cremera that occurred under Fabian leadership. When it was dated to 478 BC because of the dominance of the Fabian family in the consular list, the disaster was patterned after the famous destruction of the 300 Spartans at Thermopylae in 480 BC.⁹

Book 3 (467–446 BC)¹⁰

Perhaps the most memorable tale in the first part of this book concerns L. Quinctius Cincinnatus being summoned from the plow on his small farm to be appointed dictator in order to rescue the consul Minucius and his army being besieged in their camp by the Aequians (26–29). This tale of patriotic heroism is unhistorical and was fashioned from two other historical events: the dictator T. Quinctius Cincinnatus in 380 BC defeating Praeneste, who was heading a coalition of nine towns against Rome (Liv. 6.28.3–29.10), and the famous dictator Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator rescuing his master of the horse, M. Minucius Rufus, from Hannibal in 217 BC (Liv. 22.23–30). The historicity of the former event is guaranteed by the preservation into later times of a statue, gold crown, and accompanying dedicatory inscription in the Capitoline temple to commemorate the dictator's victory. The story of L. Quinctius Cincinnatus was so popular and gratifying to Romans that some historians went even further and fabricated another similar tale involving a different Quinctius coming to the rescue, which Livy records at the very beginning of this book (4–5).

The central episode of this book involves the codification of the Twelve Tables and the downfall of the evil board of decemvirs (32–59). As usual, since the Twelve Tables represented a major landmark in Rome's early development, Livy and his sources explained it in terms of the struggle of the orders and the plebeians' demand to have the power of the patrician consuls defined and circumscribed by law rather than having it left up to the consuls' arbitrary caprice. As Rome's earliest law code, the Twelve Tables formed the foundation of all subsequent Roman private law. Its complete text survived into historical times, and school children were still being required to memorize it during Cicero's youth. Although today we do not have a full text of this law code, we can reconstruct 105 provisions from quotations or paraphrases preserved in ancient writers; and these provisions give us a clear, representative sampling of the code. It is almost entirely concerned with matters of private law, not constitutional law, and reflects the social and economic conditions of a simple agrarian community.¹¹ Thus, the notion that the law code defined consular power to limit abuses against plebeians is false and is a later invention. Rather, the law code is better explained in terms of the normal process of state formation, which is much better documented among the ancient Greeks. During the archaic and early classical period, Greek city-states rationalized their affairs by establishing annually elected magistrates, by organizing their adult male population into a hoplite class for waging war, by instituting coinage and methods of taxation, and by devising law codes. We can see the same process occurring in Rome at the time of the Twelve Tables. In 447 BC, two quaestors (treasury or financial officials) began to be elected every year, and, in 443 BC, two censors began to be elected

periodically for conducting a census of the Roman population for taxation and military service.

Modern scholars have generally rejected as unhistorical the second board of evil decemvirs. The idea that the first board of 10 decemvirs drew up exactly 10 tables of law, and that the second board formulated the last two tables, is simplistic. The law code was not so complicated that more than one board could not have accomplished the entire job in a single year. Moreover, the evil anti-plebeian Appius Claudius is an unbelievable stereotype, and the tale of Verginia is nothing more than Roman historians recycling the rape of Lucretia. In fact, the tyrannical board of decemvirs, their downfall, the second secession of the plebs, and the restoration of the Republic with the Valerian Horatian Laws are Roman historians' adaptation, respectively, of the 30 tyrants of Athens, their downfall, armed civil conflict, and the restoration of the Athenian democracy (404–403 BC). Consequently, little, if any, of Livy's narrative should be regarded as historical.

Book 4 (445–404 BC)¹²

The first quarter of this book (1–16) contains three highly problematic matters: the Canuleian Law rescinding the prohibition of intermarriage between patricians and plebeians instituted by the evil board of decemvirs, the creation of the office of military tribunes with consular power, and the sedition of Spurius Maelius. First of all, the prohibition of intermarriage may not be historical (Forsythe 2005, 225–230). It could be a misinterpretation of a provision of the Twelve Tables that simply required all priests to be married by the solemn rite of *confarreatio*; and the misinterpretation was designed to portray the decemvirs as evil, anti-plebeian legislators. Dionysius' account of the year 445 BC and of the tribune Canuleius (11.53–61) is more detailed than Livy's and differs from it significantly in excluding any repeal of the prohibition. It is therefore quite evident that Roman writers did not agree on this matter; and this leaves us wondering exactly what did they know, and where the truth lay.

The creation of the office of consular tribunes in 444 BC and its alternation with the consulship down to 367 BC has attracted considerable modern attention and speculation.¹³ Ancient writers, of course, explained all these matters in terms of the struggle of the orders. When the plebeians insisted upon opening the consulship to their order, the patricians retained their consular monopoly by agreeing to create the consular tribunate, to which both patricians and plebeians could be elected. Following his detailed explanation in these terms, Livy (7.2) ends his account with these words: “There are those who say that because a Veientine war was added to the one with the Aequians and Volscians and to the defection of Ardea, and because two consuls were unable to cope with so many wars simultaneously, three military tribunes were elected without the mention of a law proposed for electing consuls from the plebs, and they had the power and insignia of the consuls.” This variant explanation is far more plausible and was probably the older established tradition until supplanted by the explanation in terms of the struggle of the orders. The latter was most likely the creation of late-Republican historians, such as Licinius Macer, Valerius Antias, and Aelius Tubero, whom Livy seems to have used as his principal (and perhaps his only) sources for this book (see 7.12, 20.8–10, and 23.1–2); and having devised this new explanation for the consular tribunate, they proceeded to revise *in toto* the history of this period in terms of the struggle of the orders. Accordingly, the alternation between consuls and consular tribunes could be described in dramatic and exciting terms with a constant interplay between domestic politics and military affairs. This style of historiography is consistent with what we know about the historians of the late Republic, and it helps to explain how they succeeded in expanding a skeletal framework of basic facts for this period into a lengthy and elaborate narrative, crafted to please and entertain a

readership habituated to the tumultuous politics and electioneering of the late Republic.¹⁴ Livy's account for the period 444–367 BC reproduces this fictitious late-Republican revisionism; and unfortunately, too many modern scholars have given credence to these fabricated embellishments, despite the fact that the events of these years never could have been known to later writers in the wealth of detail as described by Livy.

Once we arrive at this conclusion and strip away all the Livian embellishments concerning the struggle of the orders, much of modern scholarship concerning the consular tribunate becomes irrelevant, and the patterns in the empirical data (i.e., the number of chief magistrates elected each year) can be evaluated. During the 18 years between 444 and 427 BC, there were only 5 years in which three military tribunes with consular power were elected, whereas consuls were chosen for the other 13 years. In 426 BC, the year in which Rome captured and annexed Fidenae, the number of consular tribunes was increased to four for the first time, and during the 21 years between 426 and 406 BC, there were only 7 years of consuls but 14 years in which there were either three or four consular tribunes. Then, in 405 BC, the number of military tribunes was increased to six for the first time; and apart from a few anomalous years in which 8–10 consular tribunes are recorded, the Roman state was headed by six military tribunes for almost every year down to the abolition of the office and the reinstitution of the consulship in 366 BC. This gradual but rather steady increase in the number of consular tribunes during the late fifth and early fourth centuries is best explained in terms of a complex combination of Rome's increasing external-military and internal-administrative needs. This is evident from the fact that the reorganization of the Roman state in 367–366 BC replaced a board of six consular tribunes with five officials with differentiated functions: two consuls for waging Rome's wars, one praetor to oversee lawsuits in the city, and two *curule aediles* to perform other urban administrative duties, such as organizing public spectacles and exercising jurisdiction over markets in Rome. Thus, given the nature of the transition in 367–366 BC, we may plausibly surmise that, during the period 405–367 BC, when six consular tribunes were elected almost every year, two, three, and perhaps even four of these officials were occupied with non-military administrative duties confined to the city, but they could be called upon to serve in the field if the need arose. Finally, it cannot be an accident that the consular tribunate came into being during the same decade in which the censorship and quaestorship were also created. All these innovations testify to a growing state meeting its needs with new offices.

Spurius Maelius together with Spurius Cassius and Marcus Manlius Capitolinus formed the three canonical demagogues of early Roman tradition, men who aspired to become tyrants through revolutionary politics, but who were executed amid infamy. Later writers portrayed them in the demagogic politics of their own day and presented them as models to be avoided; and

their downfalls were also used to explain odd features of Roman topography or nomenclature. It is therefore difficult to sort out fact from fiction. The sedition of Spurius Maelius (440–439 BC) probably has at its center the historical fact of a severe food shortage that led to some form of unrest, but the story eventually attracted various folk elements, as well as later writers' elaborations, which have obscured the truth. In the oldest version of his downfall, recorded by Cincius Alimentus and Calpurnius Piso (Dion. Hal. 12.4.2–6), Maelius' executioner, Servilius Ahala, resembles Mucius Scaevola, a young noble who steps forward in the Senate and volunteers to rid Rome of its would-be tyrant. In the more elaborated accounts of the late Republic, as we have in Livy, Servilius is the master of the horse under the dictator Quinctius, who has been cast into the mold of “Cincinnatus to the rescue.” The tale served to explain the Aequimelium at the foot of the Capitoline, the surname Ahala, and probably the custom of displaying the severed heads of executed criminals at the Lacus Servilius in the Forum.

According to Livy's account for the year 431 BC (26–29), the Aequians and Volscians combined forces for a major campaign against the Latins. Their serious intent was marked by them conducting military recruitment under a *lex sacrata*, whereby the recruits pronounced a dreadful curse upon themselves in the event of defeat (cf. Liv. 10.38). This threatening situation prompted the Romans to appoint Postumius Tubertus as dictator, who succeeded in scoring a major victory over the enemy. The basic historicity of Tubertus' great victory receives support from Ovid's *Fasti* 6.721–724, according to which June 18 was the anniversary of Tubertus' defeat of the Aequians and Volscians. Since this battle is the earliest one for which such an anniversary is recorded and was still noted by Ovid 450 years later, it must have been of considerable significance at the time. In addition, Ovid's information must derive ultimately from pontifical records.

The most important military event in this book was Rome's conquest of Fidenae.¹⁵ This town was situated several miles upstream from Rome on the Tiber and was opposite Veii. Its conquest therefore paved the way for Rome's absorption of Veii in the following generation. Later historians possessed only three basic data concerning this conflict, and all three were physical monuments and reminders of this war: the statues of the four Roman ambassadors slain by King Lars Tolumnius of Veii and set up on the Rostra in the Roman Forum, a gold crown in the Capitoline temple dedicated by the dictator Mam. Aemilius to mark the victorious conclusion of this war, and the “richest spoils” (*spolia opima*) stripped from Lars Tolumnius by Cornelius Cossus and dedicated in the small shrine of Jupiter Feretrius on the Capitoline. According to the Livian narrative (17–20), Lars Tolumnius was responsible for murdering the four Roman ambassadors in 438 BC, and this led to the outbreak of war in the following year, in which Cossus, serving as a mere military tribune under the dictator Mam. Aemilius, killed Tolumnius in

single combat and thereby vindicated Roman honor by exacting swift revenge upon the king. The war, however, did not end until 426 BC, when Mam. Aemilius, serving as dictator again with Cossus as his master of the horse, finally captured and annexed the town (31–34).

In his brief reference to Cossus winning the *spolia opima* Valerius Maximus (3.2.4), who often records stories with no Livian parallel, describes Cossus as a master of the horse, not a mere military tribune. This version apparently assigns the episode to 426 BC rather than 437 BC. This suggests that Tolumnius' death was variously dated to either the first or the last year of the Fidenate War. In fact, Tolumnius' death in the last year of the war makes excellent historical sense: for the king's death would have abruptly ended Veientine support of Fidenae, and this in turn would have caused the immediate collapse of Fidenate resistance to Rome and the town's capture or surrender. In 426 BC, Cossus was initially elected as one of the year's four military tribunes with consular power, but was later chosen by the dictator Aemilius to be his master of the horse. It is therefore likely that later historians, wishing to portray Rome as exacting immediate revenge against Tolumnius, moved Cossus' winning the *spolia opima* from the last to the first year of the war and changed his status from a military tribune with consular power to a mere military tribune.

Finally, Livy's account of Cossus leads him into an interesting discussion involving Augustus (20.5–11), who claimed that Cossus had been consul, not military tribune, when he won the *spolia opima*. Rome's first emperor apparently made this assertion in order to justify him denying M. Licinius Crassus, proconsul of Macedonia, the right to dedicate *spolia opima* taken from the chief of the Bastarnae (see Dio Cass. 51.24.4). Livy's convoluted attempt to sort out the date of Cossus' exploit and his rank reveals Livy's independence of judgment from Augustus, his shortcomings as a historian of early Rome, his respect for established historical traditions, his cautious conservatism, but also his intellectual inability to find solutions to complex historical and historiographical problems.¹⁶

Book 5 (403–390 BC)¹⁷

In this book's two major episodes, the capture of Veii (1–23) and the Gallic capture of Rome (33–55), Camillus is the dominant figure. Indeed, the ancient tradition portrayed him as one of the greatest Romans of the early Republic, but exactly how much of this portrait is accurate and historical cannot be determined.

Rome's annexation of Veientine territory was its first sizable acquisition in its long course of expansion. It has been estimated that Veii's conquest increased the size of Roman territory by about 60%, and it also might have marked Rome's first sizable windfall of chattel slaves. Consequently, ancient writers described the war against Veii in suitably impressive terms. The 10-year war was obviously patterned after the Trojan War of Greek mythology. Later writers, however, are likely to have possessed very few actual facts about this war, and the only three Livian data that seem historical pertain to religion and were probably preserved in pontifical records. One was the first Roman celebration of a *lectisternium* in 399 BC (13.4–8). This was a ceremony in which the images of gods were placed on couches, before which were set tables laden with food, so that the gods could participate with humans in a public banquet. Another likely historical fact was Rome's consultation of the Delphic oracle; and the third one was bringing the cult of Juno from Veii and installing it upon the Aventine in Rome. Although Livy's account of this last event is romantic and marvelous, such cultic importations from conquered states was typical of Roman religious imperialism, embodied in the formal ceremony of *evocatio* (summoning forth), by which a general or priest prayed to the tutelary deity of an enemy state, recently or soon to be conquered, and invited him or her to come to Rome to receive worship. It thereby deprived the enemy state of divine protection and enhanced that of Rome.¹⁸

The conquest and annexation of Veii enabled Rome to extend its influence further upstream along the Tiber. Thus, in the interlude between the two major events of this book, Livy records Rome forming alliances with the towns of Falerii and Capenae (26–27), but of course, the alliance with Falerii is explained in patriotic and moralizing terms with Camillus as the central hero. Livy also records Roman military operations in central Etruria against Volsinii and the Sappinates (31.5 and 32.2–5). The latter are a people otherwise unattested in all of ancient literature, and who may have passed out of existence in later times. Their presence in Livy's narrative probably derives ultimately from an early archival or epigraphic source recording Roman military success. If so, it testifies to the fact that Livy's narrative was becoming slightly more historical.

The Gallic capture and occupation of Rome was a traumatic event that made a lasting and profound impression upon the Romans. For example, July 18, the

Day of the Allia (*Dies Alliensis*), was remembered for centuries and was even marked in official Roman calendars.¹⁹ On the other hand, as in the cases of Horatius Cocles and Mucius Scaevola, whose heroism was invented to mask Porsenna's victory over the Romans, later historians obscured the truth by fabricating patriotic and morally edifying tales to counterbalance this great national humiliation: L. Albinus lending assistance to the Vestals in their flight to Caere, the aged Roman senators solemnly devoting themselves to death and then quietly awaiting the arrival of the Gauls, and Fabius Dorsuo marching through the midst of the astonished enemy in order to perform religious rites at their customary spot in the city. The story of the sleeping dogs, cackling geese, and Marcus Manlius thwarting the Gauls' nocturnal ascent of the Capitoline was intended to give erroneous explanations for various odd customs (see Forsythe 2005, 255–256), as well as for the origin of Manlius' name Capitulinus. Some modern scholars reject the historicity of Capitoline Hill not falling into Gallic hands.²⁰ It is virtually certain that the Romans paid a sizable ransom to persuade the Gauls to leave the city, but Livy instead has Camillus return from exile and appear in the Forum just in time to prevent this ultimate embarrassment.

Finally, it is worth noting that archaeology thus far has failed to uncover any evidence of destruction caused by the Gauls. There is no doubt that they captured and occupied Rome, but rather than causing destruction by widespread burning, they may have been content in simply carrying off easy plunder.

Notes

- 1 On these writers, see Forsythe 1994; Oakley 1997, 21–108; and Chapter 14 in this volume.
- 2 On the pontifical chronicle, see Crake 1940; Frier 1979; Forsythe 1994, 51–73; Oakley 1997, 24ff.; and Forsythe 2005, 69–74.
- 3 On the events contained in Book 2, see Ogilvie 1965 233–389; Heurgon 1973 156–169, 176–180; *CAH* 1989, 172–226, 243–297; Forsythe 1994, 245–301; Cornell 1864–1879, 215–272, 293–309; and Forsythe 2005, 147–200.
- 4 For this topic, see Lincoln 1991, 244–258.
- 5 See Alföldi 1965, 72–84.
- 6 For a representative collection of modern essays treating this difficult historical problem, see Raafaub 2005, along with Cornell 1864–1879, 242–271; Forsythe 2005, 155–170; and Smith 2006, 251–280.
- 7 For a critical analysis of the tale of Coriolanus, see Salmon 1930.

- 8 For modern scholarly discussions of this important find, see the essays in *Lapis Satricanus* 1980.
- 9 For more detailed analysis of the Cremera legend, see Forsythe 2005, 197–200, and 2012, 31–34.
- 10 On the events contained in Book 3, see Ogilvie 1965, 390–525; Heurgon 1973, 169–173; *CAH* 1989, 227–242; Cornell 1864–1879, 272–292; and Forsythe 2005, 201–233.
- 11 The best modern edition of this material in English is Crawford et al. 1996, 555–721. For detailed treatment of its various provisions, see Watson 1975. For a revisionist interpretation of Roman law and jurisdiction at this time, see Forsythe 2005, 211–216.
- 12 On the events contained in Book 4, see Ogilvie 1965, 526–625; Heurgon 1973, 173–175, 180–182; and Forsythe 2005, 234–246.
- 13 For a good survey of modern scholarship on this matter, see Oakley 1997, 367–376, with the works cited by Forsythe 2005, 234, n. 2.
- 14 For more detailed analysis of this subject, see Forsythe 2002.
- 15 For detailed analysis of Livy's account of the Fidenate War, see Forsythe 2005, 241–246.
- 16 For further analysis of this matter with citations of other modern studies, see Forsythe 1999, 63–64.
- 17 On the events contained in Book 5, see Ogilvie 1965 626–762; *CAH* 1989, 294–308; Cornell 1864–1879, 309–322; and Forsythe 2005, 246–256.
- 18 For the verbal formula of the *evocatio* used in 146 BC against Carthage, see Macrobius, *Saturnalia* III.9.7–8.
- 19 For detailed treatment of the Day of the Allia, see Forsythe 2012, 24–31.
- 20 For these doubts, see Skutsch 1953, and Horsfall in Bremmer and Horsfall 1987, 63–75.

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See INTRODUCTION: LIVY

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Further Reading

Any attempt to understand the historical aspects of Livy's narrative of the early Republic must be accompanied by an in-depth inquiry into Rome's political institutions and practices. This brief bibliographical section will therefore focus primarily upon offering guidance in this regard.

For the legislative process, the Roman assemblies, and the magistrates who presided over them, see Kaj Sandburg's monograph, 2001. *Magistrates and Assemblies: A Study of Legislative Practice in Republican Rome*, Acta Instituti Romani Finlandiae, vol. **24**, Rome.

The early consular list and its reliability have attracted much scholarly attention with diverse views as to the accuracy and possible later manipulation. For an excellent survey of modern scholarship, see R. T. Ridley. 1980. “Fastenkritik: A Stock-Taking. 1983.” *Athenaeum* N.S. **58**: 264–298 with idem, “*Falsi Triumphi, Plures Consulatus*,” *Latomus* **42**: 372–382.

One question that has been raised by several modern scholars concerns the origin of the consulship itself, and whether the ancient tradition was

correct in thinking that there was a tidy transition from the power of the kings to that of the consuls. For a convenient survey of earlier modern views on these matters, see E. S. Staveley 1956. "The Constitution of the Roman Republic 1940–1954," *Historia* 5: 74–119. For more recent analyses, see the essays by Christopher Smith (pp. 19–40) and Gianpaolo Urso (pp. 41–60) in *Consuls and Res Publica: Holding High Office in the Roman Republic*, edited by Hans Beck, Antonio Dupla, Martin Jehne, and Francisco Pina Polo, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge), 2011.

For the nature of the original power and competence of the consuls, see F. Drogula. 2007. "Imperium, Potestas, and the Pomerium in the Roman Republic," *Historia* 56: 419–452, and T. Cory Brennan. 2000. *The Praetorship in the Roman Republic*, volume I, Oxford University Press. Oxford: 12–25.

For an additional reconstruction of the beginning of the Republic in terms of the struggle of the orders, see E. S. Staveley. 1983. "The Nature and Aims of the Patriciate," *Historia* 32: 24–57. For Livy's handling of this subject, see R. T. Ridley's essay, 1990, "Patavinitas among the Patricians: Livy and the Conflict of the Orders," in *Staat und Staatlichkeit in der frühen römischen Republik*, edited by Walter Eder, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart: 103–138.

Finally, for treatment of the Fabii in the annalistic tradition regarding the Cremera disaster and the Gallic capture of Rome, see James H. Richardson. 2012. *The Fabii and the Gauls: Studies in Historical Thought and Historiography in Republican Rome*, *Historia Einzelschriften* Band 222, Franz Steiner Verlag (Stuttgart).

Part VI

**Book 6-10. From the Siege of Rome (390 BC) to
Sentinum (295 BC)**

Chapter 25

From 390_{BC} to Sentinum: Diplomatic and Military Livian History

Ghislaine Stouder

It took the Romans less than a century and a half to achieve the conquest of Italy, and Livy provides, in Books 6–10, the fullest account of it, from the Gallic sack of Rome (390_{BC}) to the battle of Sentinum (295_{BC}); still, because of the loss of the Second Decade, it is incomplete, and the Pyrrhic War, in particular, is lost. Nevertheless, his narrative gives the main outlines and some precious details about Roman expansion during these years: the way Rome recovered from the Gallic sack (390–367_{BC}); the first fights with neighboring peoples such as the Volsci, the enemies of old (390–367_{BC}), but also with the Latins and the Hernici, the ancient allies, and at the same time the regular incursions of Gallic troops (367–349_{BC}); wars with the Etruscans (358–351_{BC}); Capua's *editio* and the beginning of the Samnite Wars (343–341_{BC}); Latin League's ending (340–338_{BC}); the long and dramatic Second Samnite War (327–304_{BC}); wars with Etruscans again (310–302_{BC}); submission to Rome of peoples from central Italy (306–298_{BC}); the beginning of the Third Samnite War (298–292_{BC}); not to mention some scarce notices about peaceful relations with Carthage (348_{BC}, 343_{BC}, and 306_{BC}). Books 6–10 are therefore an exceptional testimony to understand the major steps of Rome's growth of power during the fourth century in the Italian peninsula. However, we cannot reduce the Livian account to a mere compensation for the loss of other sources. These books have their own value, since they mirror Livy's conception of Roman imperialism in the particular historical and historiographical context of the mid-republican period.

Moral Vision of Romans. A More Reliable Tradition

In the second introduction to the *Ab Urbe Condita*, at the beginning of Book 6, Livy explains that, after the Gallic disaster that had led to the destruction of the Roman archives till 390_{BC}, the sources are henceforth more reliable. His narrative should be more trustworthy for both internal and external affairs (6.1.3). However, about the earliest wars between the Romans and the neighboring peoples, in particular the Volsci, Livy still has to admit that there can be some doubts about information (6.12.2). Elsewhere, he is even aware of the lack of reliability of some episodes, but prefers to integrate them as they were narrated in his sources, and be faithful to the spirit of Roman tradition, when it is about remote events (7.6.6).

These are indications as to how some military and diplomatic narratives that are hardly authentic should be read. The Latin embassy of 340 BC, leading to the outbreak of the last Latin War, during which the Latin *praetor* Annius accidentally dies after a threatening answer of the consul Manlius (8.6.1–3), or some battle scenes as the victorious fight against Gauls in 367 BC (6.42.4–8) or against Samnites at Luceria in 294 BC (10.35.4–36.15) are patently unreal. However, as Lipovsky (1981, 170) wrote, Livy does not try to deceive his readers. By tacit agreement, he chooses to give an instructive account of Roman history and expansion. This criterion sometimes explains his decision to follow one version rather than the several he read regardless of realism, such as for the military conspiracy of 342 BC and the part taken by Valerius Corvus in putting an end to the internal conflict (7.42.3–6), or elsewhere the soft way Fundi was treated after having been defeated by Roman forces in 330 BC (8.19.13–14).

These events belong to a remote past, which explains the historiographical habit of filling the blanks with more or less realistic episodes. Generally, in Livy's work, the recurrence of identical motifs, particularly in the battle descriptions, is an indication of rewriting—such as the capture of an enemy camp (6.29.8); nightfall or storm stopping a battle (7.33.15); the ravaging of the enemy territory (8.29.11); or a commander's speech before battle (9.13.1). More remarkable is the greater length at which Livy narrates the events of the years 390–293 BC, compared to what he had previously done for more than three centuries of Roman history. The comparison with Dionysius of Halicarnassus' parallel narrative enlightens the special interest that Livy had for mid-republican history: while the first pentad corresponds to 14 books in Dionysius, the following 10 books (6–15) corresponds to the last six books of the *Roman Antiquities*. Livy's growing interest for Roman history is even more remarkable within the second pentad: 33 chapters are dedicated to the years 366–344 BC and the relentless wars with the neighboring peoples, but nine chapters are entirely devoted to the year 343 BC, which corresponds to the beginning of the First Samnite War, that is to say the beginning of the wars that led to Roman hegemony over the Italian peninsula. Livy seems to have felt a greater interest in writing about the expanding Roman power and the Roman virtues that permitted it, even if the material was not much more reliable than it was for the previous years.

This statement must not support an excessive skepticism regarding Livy's narrative. Oakley (1997, 39) noticed a greater reliability not from Book 6, as Livy states, but from Book 9, and he ascribed this evolution to a better preservation of archives and consequently to a more trustworthy tradition. He could base his analysis on the list of magistrates¹ which he compared to the *Fasti consulares*, so far as the consuls were concerned, but also on the still-more-frequent and precise references about foundations of colonies and numbers of settlers, triumphs, *deditiones*, and killed enemies and prisoners; in

Book 10, for the first time, Livy mentions the figures relative to the number of legions and contingent of allies serving in the Roman army (10.18.3–4). He is also more precise about the assignation of a consul to a province, even if, at this time, as Oakley suggested (1997, 67), a general may be allowed to operate in two or three distinct theatres of war during the same campaign. The increasing quality of information can also be seen in the exactness with which Livy reports the decision-making process after a battle. While, until the last third of the fourth century, Livy loosely ascribes to a general the victory and the consequent decisions, those are, from then on, described in more detail. In 329 BC, for instance, Privernum, defeated by the consul Plautius, sent an embassy to Rome on the command of the latter to sue for peace; there were debates in the Roman senate before the assemblies proceeded to the final vote (8.21.10): three steps instead of one are now described for an identical kind of decision. Many similar examples could be added (Linderski 1995).

A Homogenous Tradition

Another way to appraise the value of Livy's testimony is to compare his account to that of the other extant traditions. Unfortunately, only sporadic parallel narratives are available (Oakley 1997, 19–20). Annalistic tradition is lost, except for few fragments. As for the Greek historians, Polybius is not interested in Roman history prior to the First Punic War; Diodorus gives only short notices, sometimes consisting only in the name of eponymous magistrates, especially when he deals with Alexander's deeds (in his 17th and 18th books); from the narratives of Dionysus of Halicarnassus, Appian of Alexandria, and Cassius Dio, only a few fragments remain; and Plutarchus' biography, *Camillus*, covers only the beginning of the period considered. Zonaras, Dio's Byzantine epitomator, loosely sums up Roman history until the Pyrrhic Wars. Therefore, if we compare from a quantitative point of view Livy's contribution to the Greek historians' one, which represents the main alternative source about Roman external politics during our period, 152 diplomatic acts are reported by Livy, while all Greek historians put together only provide 58, that is to say more or less a third of Livian information.

Concerning military and diplomatic history, the parallel Greek and Latin narratives overlap, with some discrepancies, about 30 episodes in Livy, and the extensive comparison of these reveals that Livy probably did not offer a factual account much different from the Greek historians such as Dionysus, Appian, or Dio. The relative uniformity between Livy and Greek versions is all the more striking as, contrary to what has sometimes been said, Plutarchus and Dio did not use Livy as a source, at least not as a primary source for their works. The versions' cohesion must therefore be ascribed to the prior harmonization of annalistic tradition. In spite of few differences, the global framework of Roman conquest of Italy was well established and quite homogenous by the end of the first century BC (Oakley 1997, 15). Furthermore,

all these historians insist on the same great military and diplomatic events between the years 390 and 295 BC: the Gallic sack, the end of the Latin League, and the battle of Caudine Forks and its aftermath during the Second Samnite War. This may mirror above all the coincidence of transmission,² but corroborating traditions, such as Zonaras and other epitomators,³ indicate a similar focusing. The result is not an outline of the major steps that led to Roman dominion over Italy, but rather more a gathering of episodes in which examples of true Roman character are exposed through canonized mid-republican figures in a moral way. Hence, the Livian account is essential not only because it provides one version of Roman expansion into Italy, but also because his version could roughly reflect the factual developments of the other lost accounts and the similar moral point of view on this period of Roman history. Greek and Latin authors were looking for an exemplar history, and Livy made no exception (Chaplin 2000, 197–202, worked specifically on the Caudine Forks defeat to show the multiple reading this remote event allowed in Roman and even foreign memories, 32–49). Insistent moralizing is a dominant characteristic of Livy's work, as it is for quite all ancient historians—Greek and Romans. That is why they used to canonize early and middle republican figures as instances of truly Roman or un-Roman behavior. As Livy himself stated, late fourth century was the age “*qua nulla uirtutum feracior fuit*” (9.16.19: cf. Oakley 1997, 115).

The Annalistic Tradition

The moral vision was part of the annalistic heritage, but the latter is still more evident in the way Livy presents external affairs. To begin with, there is the annalistic framework that is supposed to narrate both domestic politics and foreign affairs in turn. To pass from one to another, Livy is obliged to use stereotyped formulas such as “*eodem anno*” (6.4.4), “*dum haec geruntur*” (9.32.1), “*haec eo anno domi militiaeque gesta*” (8.17.12), and “*dum haec gerebantur*” (9.32.1; 9.38.1; 10.36.16). Besides, diplomatic indications are generally used to introduce or call off a war, giving it some cohesion (Jal 1985, 119), and it seems to be the main role of diplomatic episodes. It has been said that they acted as transitions between the previous year and the next one, in the same time as the consuls' taking up office, the distribution of *prouvinciae*, and the armies leaving Rome (McDonald 1957, 156; Frier 1979, 270–275; Jal 1985, 124; Utard 2004, 24–26).

However, this structure is operating for the last extant decades. As for the second pentad, except for Book 10—that is to say, from the moment the sources rely on archives more trustworthy—there is no such structure (Oakley 1997, 124–126); on the contrary, it is sometimes hard to attribute a diplomatic act to one year or another. The outbreak of the Second Samnite War with its kind of prelude, the war with Neapolis, provides a good example of such difficulties: there are still some doubts about the date of the various diplomatic

episodes, at the end of 327 BC or at the beginning of 326 BC. Indeed, the calendar of Roman external affairs during the two last centuries of the Republic clearly expressed that, certainly for greater effectiveness, diplomatic decision was to be made at the beginning of the year, when consuls and magistrates had taken their office, before leaving for their *prouvinciae*. The diplomatic calendar for the fourth century is more vague: beyond the unreliability of the sources, the procedures were rather loose at this time, and diplomatic affairs were dealt with when the necessity occurred. Hence, the Livian account may correspond to a historical reality, when Rome did not yet have regular diplomatic contacts that structured the year and senatorial activity.

Unlike the following years for which Livy follows more or less the Polybian diplomatic and military analysis, the fact that he relies mainly on the annalistic tradition in Books 6–10 may be cause of the lower quality of his analysis. For instance, regarding wars, their causes, spread over many years, escape Livy's inquiry; so much that he generally emphasizes the pretexts rather than the causes. For all that, conversely, events that occurred during the same year are not always related one to the other. It is particularly true at the end of the Second Samnite War, when Romans have to fight against Etruscans at the same time. Livy's account succeeds in glorifying Roman forces' ability to fight at the same time with several armies, but fails to see a plausible alliance between Etruscans and Samnites. Regarding the exactness of his testimony about military things, Walsh has been very critical (1961, 157–163): he outlines the numerous mistakes about weapons, mechanical devices, battle tactics, siege descriptions, or geographical data (but on this point, see Oakley 1997, 63), and how, in the battle descriptions, Livy was more interested in psychological insight than to technical factors.

This being said, Livy's narrative does not completely lack analysis: speeches provide the opportunity to describe former international relations, to expose the complaints of each part, or to discuss the right decision to take (Oakley 1997, 113–115). Nevertheless, these speeches are placed at strategic points—the beginning of a book, as the speech of the Samnite Gaius Pontius after the Caudine Forks (9.1.3–11), or at the end, as the plea of Capuan envoys (7.30.1–23)—to the extent that Livy seems to pay attention to dramatic effects as much as to their relevance. Besides, it should be said that his use of diplomatic vocabulary is quite loose, no more and no less than other historians. In particular, all that concerns agreements and alliances is the subject of variations along the narrative, as exemplified by the problematic status of Caere. Livy is generally more sensitive to the moral behavior of the partners of Rome, if they are faithful to their engagements, as Romans are respectful of their *fides*. Finally, in the analysis of decision-making processes, he grants the Senate with a much more important role than other sources do: Livy, and his Latin sources, paid more attention to the mechanism of Roman

institutions, while Greek historians may have been more interested in the validation of the decision, and its symbolic value. This example, as the previous ones, show how difficult it is to estimate Livy's testimony without judging, at the same time, his sources, mainly the annalistic tradition.

Roman Imperialism and Its Causes. Building Hegemony

Numerous studies have already tempted to propose a general pattern of Livy's work and tried to distinguish, using the *Periochae*, an organization in five or ten books in his whole work, and more particularly in the extant books. In spite of the discrepancies, researchers usually admit that there was a first break after Book 5—Books 1–5 dealing with archaic Rome—and a second one after Book 15, that is to say after the end of the Pyrrhic War and before the beginning of the First Punic War at Book 16 (Klotz 1926, 819–820; Syme 1959, 30–37; Bayet 1954, 12–15). In that way, the 10 books (6–15) must be read as a whole, dedicated to the Roman domination over Italy, and Books 6–10 only as a half of this more general narrative. Indeed, Book 10 ends with an important but not decisive victory of L. Papirius Cursor over the Samnites, in the middle of the so-called Third Samnite War, while Etruscan cities and, most importantly, Tarentum and Southern Italy are still independent. However, as Stadter (1972, 293–294) and Lipovsky (1981, 169) suggested, this very victory of Cursor is presented as the one that asserted, if not finally, at least convincingly, Roman supremacy over Italy. Consequently, there is a kind of internal break at the end of Book 10, giving some consistency to a unified analysis of Books 6–10, which are actually focused on the beginning of Roman imperialism, the causes and means of conquest.

At first sight, however, the first two books of the pentad seem rather disjointed: numerous engagements are very dramatically related, but the overall understanding of the international situation is quite unclear. Still, Rome is always presented as a strong military power in spite of the Gallic sack a few years before. While recovering from this trauma, Rome has to face frequent raids on her own territory, enduring attacks from everywhere, and yet does achieve great success over Latins, Hernici, Volsci, but also Etruscans and Gauls. The authenticity of those victories is doubtful (Toynbee 1965, 372–377, who prefers the Polybian narrative in which we are told of no war during this period), as may be doubtful too the importance of the Gallic sack (Cornell 1989, 309–310), but Livy's intention was to enhance Rome's endurance as a prelude to its imperialism.

Therefore, too much credit should not be given to the military and diplomatic events as reported by Livy in the first two books, particularly the sixth. It is dedicated to the whole period between the Gallic sack in 390 BC and the resumption of Gallic incursions into Roman territory from 367 BC, and is

dominated by the figure of Camillus. As the first book dealt with the regal period, and was set apart from the other four books of the first pentad, the sixth book is marked off from Books 7–10 of the second pentad (Oakley 1997, 113). Indeed, most of the victories in Book 6 are due to the *dux fatalis*, who had already been victorious over the Veians in 396 BC and over the Gauls in 390 BC: his military fights between 390 and 367 BC may be less important, but he is still presented as the only one able to contain the pressure of the neighboring people and to permit the recovering of Rome after the Gallic disaster. As such, there was an obvious parallel in the Livian narrative with both Romulus and Augustus, but the influence of the contemporary context on the way Livy narrated Camillus' achievements should not be over-valued in this book (Syme 1959, 48).

As for Book 7, which covers the years 366–342 BC, it is clearly divided into two parts: the first half, covering the years 366–344 BC, is characterized by recurrent struggles between Romans and Gauls, and includes an important war too with Etruscans during the years 358–351 BC. The second half, dedicated to the years 343–342 BC, is about the First Samnite War. Between these two parts, at 7.29.1–2, a prefatory passage introduces the Samnite Wars, but also foreshadows the wars to come, which made possible Roman hegemony over the Mediterranean area. After this break, there is more unity in the narrative, as Livy describes wars against one enemy, or at least with one objective.

In the middle of the second pentad, Book 8, covering the years 341–322 BC, is dedicated first to the Latin War (340–338 BC) and its subsequent settlement, and then to the beginning of the Second Samnite War. As we will see, the Latin settlement is of first importance in the analysis of imperialism causes, but it is also situated at the center of the book, and underlines as such the opening of a new kind of conquest, over more remote territories and peoples. The book ends with an important victory over the Samnites in 322 BC. As for Book 9, it begins with the defeat in the Caudine Forks in 321 BC and ends with the victorious outcome of the Second Samnite War in 304 BC, thus representing the continuation of Rome's growth of power. The Alexander digression (9.17.1–19.17) in the middle of the book permitted to isolate the major defeat at Caudine Forks from the victories that followed (Oakley 1997, 113–115). Finally, Book 10 concludes the pentad with a victory over the Samnites' forces in 293 BC, but, once again, Livy narrates in the middle of it the climatic and victorious campaign of Sentinum (10.24.1–31.9). Therefore, each of the last three books ends with a victory but also reports right in the middle of it an important step in Rome's growth of power. This way, Livy highlights Rome's superiority over the Latins, then over Alexander, and finally over all the gathered Italian peoples.

The Causes of Roman Imperialism

Within Books 6–10, Lipovsky (1981) and Oakley (1997, 113) have quite rightly highlighted a detailed structure that strengthens the thematic unity of the pentad. The most prominent fact is the grant of citizenship to the Latins in 338 BC, narrated in the middle of Book 8, and therefore in the middle of the second pentad, marking in other respects the transition from a local phase of Roman conquest to a fight for Italian hegemony. The partition between Books 6–7 and 8–10 and its correlate division between local and Italian phase is reinforced by an increasing development in the narrative, from Book 8 onward, of military affairs at the expense of domestic politics. As shown by Briscoe (1971, 18), 43% of Book 6 and 57% of Book 7 deal with military affairs, while 70% of Book 8, 74% of Book 9, and 72% of Book 10 are dedicated to military activities.

Indeed, Book 8 is focused on two major aspects: (1) the grant of citizenship to the enemies and partners of Rome, developed in the middle of it and (2) the military *disciplina*, which constitutes a central theme of the book, and in particular the adoption of the maniples (Lipovsky 1981, 88–89). Through both of these, Livy insists on two Roman virtues that permitted hegemony: *moderatio* and *modestia* (Lipovsky 1981, 101). The construction of Book 8 and of the second pentad is all the more obvious as Dionysius, for example, dealt with grant of citizenship regarding Tusculum in 381 BC, when the Latin town became Roman. Through the figure of M. Furius Camillus, the historian of Halicarnassus glorified Rome's leniency. Livy chose to introduce the same remarks in the middle of the pentad, and to credit this example of generosity to L. Furius Camillus. Associating the Latin settlement to the further enlargement of Roman wars horizon, Livy must have considered the grant of citizenship as one of the major causes to imperialism.

Other aspects may have played a part in his conception. Levene (1993, 214–239), for instance, attached importance to religious elements. Indeed, all along the Livian account, great victories are often connected with religious actions before, during, or after a battle. Spoils of the vanquished are consecrated to gods, such as Juno (6.4.3) or Lua Mater (8.1.6); temples are vowed to Mars, after a victory over the Gauls (6.5.8), to Juno Moneta, after a battle against Aurunci (7.28.4–5); and ill omens are expiated (7.28.7–8). That way, Romans look far more pious than their enemies, and this explains partly their supremacy and gods' help. Latin impiety during the embassy of 340 BC (8.5.2), and the sacrilegious behavior of the Samnites during the Second Samnite War (8.39.10–15), led systematically to their respective defeats; but when Romans are themselves impious, they are always able to regain divine favor and get back to victory. The defeat at the Caudine Forks, followed by a succession of victories at Luceria and Satricum (9.10–11 and 25) is the best example (Chaplin 2000, 35).

The religious explanation to Roman imperialism is an important one in ancient historiography, particularly in the annalistic tradition. That being said,

Livy is sometimes more concerned with these elements than other historians. For example, the duel of Valerius Corvus with a Gaul contains religious elements that are less developed in Gellius (9.11.6–7) or Valerius Maximus (8.15.5), and which even disappear in Dionysius (15.1), Florus (1.8.20), in the *De Viris illustribus* (29), and Zonaras (7.25). The same could be said about Decius Mus' *deutio* in 340 BC in the Livian narrative (8.6.9–8.9.4), compared to Dio (fg. 32.4–5) and Zonaras (7.26). This *deutio* is all the more important that it is echoed in the middle of Book 10, with the *deutio* of another Decius Mus, during the battle of Sentinum. In both cases, the piety of some Roman emperors led to decisive victories, over the Latins and over the Italian peoples.

Empire by Invitation

I would like to put forward two other important factors in the Livian explanation of Roman imperialism, which are not conflicting with the previous ones. The first one deals with the fetial priests and their rituals, necessary to declare war and to wage a *bellum iustum*. This college is known through the theoretical presentation of many authors, antiquarians, and historians; but, historically, except one fragment of Dionysius about the outcome of the Second Samnite War in 326 BC, Livy is the only source to describe its application along the narrative. It may be due to the fragmentary character of the parallel Greek tradition. At all events, the historical occurrences of the *fetiales*, except their first appearance during the regal period, are all concentrated during the fourth century and the beginning of the third, and Livy provides the most complete overview of their actions: in 362 BC, against Hernici (7.6.7); in 361 BC, against Tibur (7.9.2); in 357 BC, against Falisci (7.16.2); in 343 BC, against Samnites (7.32.1); in 327 BC, against Neapolis (8.22.8); in 304 BC, against Aequi (9.45.6); in 298 BC, against Samnites (10.12.2–3); and in 293 BC, against Falisci (10.45.7–8). The *deditio* of the vanquished generals at the Caudine Forks to the Samnites in 320 BC (9.10.7–11.13) must be added to the list. The interpretation of this documentation is particularly difficult: the vocabulary that Livy uses is often loose, and we cannot always be sure that he is referring to fetials, while mentioning *qui indicerent bellum*. This means that Livy was more careful to describe the declaration of war than the fetials' ritual. Moreover, there does not seem to be historical or even logical explanation to the seemingly hazardous use of fetials; it may be suggested that it depended on the cultural identity of the enemy, but this criterion is not relevant except for the Etruscans, systematically excluded from this procedure. Nevertheless, it should be noticed that the outcomes of Samnite Wars are always preceded by the fetial ritual, as if this great conflict, the one that led to Roman hegemony, was to be absolutely presented as a *bellum iustum*.

The second important factor about Roman imperialism in Livy may be linked

to the way in which Romans henceforth handled their diplomacy. It has been said that the introduction to the Samnite Wars constituted a break in Book 7 and in the Roman history from Livy's point of view. This may not have been sufficiently underlined. The preface to the Samnite Wars is situated in the middle of the first 15 books, which deal with the "Italian history" of Rome, as a prelude to Roman hegemony in the Mediterranean area. In light of this, it is worth noticing that the first Roman act after this preface is Capua's *deditio* to the Romans (7.29.1–31.5). This religious and juridical action has been interpreted in terms of modern geopolitics as a procedure characteristic of "Empire by invitation" (Eckstein 2006). It is obvious that it has to do with the defensive imperialism Livy wants to put forward. At the same time, he points out a diplomatic mechanism that was actually used by Romans: the first two Punic Wars, and most of the wars in the Greek East, were waged because of allies asking for help. The act of 343 BC was the first one and as such could have been presented as an *exemplum*. The point here is not to justify Roman wars, but to remark that Livy was perfectly conscious of the way Roman imperialism developed.

The scarcity of parallel sources, except on a few points, makes it difficult neither to identify a similar pattern in other historians nor to establish some Livian originality in his way of presenting Rome's external affairs during this period. It seems clear that the Pyrrhic War, reported in the now lost third pentad, represented for Greek historians, as for other Latin authors, the turning point between the conquest of Italy and the ultra-marine expansion, beginning with the Punic Wars, and concluded the series of victories that led to Roman hegemony over the peninsula. Given this, the memory of the First Samnite War is almost completely lost in the other sources, and we have no echo of the Capuan *deditio*. Livy may have been, therefore, the only one to understand and to enlighten the importance of this procedure as one of the most clarifying examples of Roman imperialism development.

Romanocentrism. Rome and Italy

In exposing the beginning of Roman imperialism, Livy is mostly interested in the way Rome acted or behaved, but he does not take into consideration the interactions with other states, which however played an important part in the development of Roman hegemony. Actually, his narrative is quite useless to get information about Italian peoples and their organization, and also their possible alliances to face Rome's growth of power. The best evidence is the battle of Sentinum in 295 BC: it is one of the greatest victories of the Romans over a coalition of Italian peoples, but we know little about its setting up. Above all, the Greek city of Tarentum must have played a relevant role in the diplomatic history of Southern Italy—not to say of the whole peninsula—but Livy seems to ignore its influence. The almost complete loss of Italian testimony reduces the Livian account to a one-way interpretation of the

conflicts with Rome during the fourth century.

As he usually does with ethnic portrayal, Livy reduces the foreigner to one or two distinctive features: the Gallic tribes are defined by their *ferocia*, while Samnites are presented as bloodthirsty slaughterers of armies (Lipovsky 1981, 96). The aim is to play with the duality Roman/barbarians, knowing that sometimes a Roman can be assimilated to barbarians, when his behavior happens to be immoral (Bernard 2000, 284–291). No wonder then if the duel is so dramatically put forward in Livy's narrative: we know about three duels, two against Gauls (one with Manlius Torquatus and another with Valerius Corvus) and one against a Latin (with the son of Manlius Torquatus, put to death because of this duel being forbidden by his father). Indeed, the duels constitute the proper military episode to bring Roman and foreign identities face to face and to glorify the Roman one, through victory.

However, if we set apart these quite legendary episodes, Livy sometimes provides a few elements about foreign institutions, especially when Romans have to deal diplomatically with them. We know about a *concilium* of the Samnites with whom the Roman delegates have to hold discussions in 343 BC (Senatore 2006, 37–47), or of the Latins, an assembly which the Latin delegates of 340 BC have to address. The terminology is so vague that we do not learn much from these notices. Similarly, the numerous modern discussions regarding the mention, during the war with Etruscans in 358–351 BC, of the *Fanum Voltumnae* (7.21.9), without longer description, sheds light on Livy's ignorance as much as on his lack of interest for local history. Finally, when we have more precise elements, such as the use of fetials by Samnites, this detail has been thought of as a way to Romanize foreign institutions unknown to Livy (Salmon 1967, 145–146). The loss does not concern the sole knowledge of the Romans' neighbors; it also damages the understanding of how Rome adapted its diplomacy according to the political institutions of the interlocutor.

Mediterranean Background

Despite everything, Livy also provides from time to time useful elements to have a better understanding of the background of Roman development in the Roman peninsula, without actually understanding their importance himself. One good example could be the Gallic incursions into Roman territory along the first half of the fourth century. Polybius and Livy provided two different accounts: the former reported only two Gallic incursions, except the first one of 390 BC. He did not propose an absolute chronology of these events, nor use the Roman system of consular years, but only mentioned the interval of time: 30 years between the first Gallic sack and the second incursion (dated of 360–358 BC, according to an inclusive or exclusive counting), and 12 years between the second and third incursions. For the same period, Livy narrated seven

incursions (367, 366, 361, 360, 358, 350, and 349 BC). From the discrepancies, modern historians have thought the Polybian account to be more reliable, while Livy was influenced by the *topos* about the Gallic terror, and searched to increase the danger. Sordi (1960, 62–72, 154–165) tried to conciliate the two accounts, but she most of all demonstrated convincingly that Livy did provide a more acute narrative, alluding to alliances between Latins and Gauls coming from Southern regions against Romans, while Polybius (or maybe Fabius Pictor, his source) was influenced by the Gallic Wars at the end of the third century, when the threat came from North. There could have been larger alliances between those Gauls, the Latins threatened by Roman hegemony, and the tyrants of Sicily who wanted to prevent Rome's progression on the Tyrrhenian coast. Hence, even if there may certainly be some “doublets” in Livy, his account of the Gallic incursions is more useful to understand the international challenges that Rome was confronted with.

These conclusions partly result from a reconsideration of Roman chronology, compared to Greek elements. Indeed, Roman chronology for the fourth century is an important and still unresolved problem for both ancient and modern historians. Two main chronologies coexisted among the Ancients: the “Varronian” one, which corresponds more or less to the data given by the *Fasti consulares capitolini*, which included 5 years of anarchy before the vote of the Licinio-Sextian Laws (375–371 BC) and 4 “dictator-years” (333, 324; 309; 301 BC); and the one used by Diodorus, also called the short one, because it gets rid of those intermediate years (Cassola 1982). The Varronian chronology is certainly late, and has generally been disregarded, while Diodorus was considered a more reliable chronological source, because it was more ancient. In between Diodorean and Varronian chronologies, annalists and historians may not have been conscious of the difficulties: what mattered was to record an event under the right consular year (Cornell 1989, 347–350). As a matter of fact, Livian chronology did not draw much attention among scholars. It includes the 5 years of anarchy instead of 1 year in Diodorus, but ignores the 4 “dictator-years.” In spite of this, there is a difference of 7 years between Livy and the version of the *Fasti*, because concerning the fifth century Livy also ignored 4 more consular years, but considered that there was 3 years of decemvirate instead of 1 year.

The comparison between the two chronologies should make us reconsider the situation of Rome in the peninsula and in the Western Mediterranean Sea. For instance, the famous Livian excursus on Alexander the Great and Roman military superiority due to the succession of great generals (Book 9) has been thus reinterpreted. Indeed, it is situated in 326 BC (Varr.), that is to say in 323 BC in absolute chronology, when Alexander, back from the East, could have thought about an expedition toward the Western world and particularly against Carthage; in 323 BC, supposedly, Romans would have sent an embassy to him at Babylonia to get his mercy (Humm 2006). The long excursus may

have served to hide an inglorious episode in Roman diplomatic history. Otherwise, some scarce and disconnected notices are of great interest in Livy's work, even if they are beyond understanding *per se* and need to be analyzed together: the simultaneous Gallic and Greek attack in 349 BC (7.25.3–26.15); the *amicitia* with Alexander the Molossian in 336 BC (8.17.9–10); the military conflict with Cleonymus in 303–302 BC (10.2.1–2); and the embassy to Epidaurus in 292 BC (10.47.6–7). The relations with Carthage, for which Livy only provides the mention of treaties, should be seen according to the same point of view. All these elements prove that Rome was far more implicated in the Mediterranean affairs than it has often been said. Even if Livy is dependent on annalistic (and senatorial) tradition, which refused the possibility of Roman interests in naval trade, he provides a few elements that seem to prove the contrary. We may suppose these details did actually appear only because Livy, and maybe his sources, did not understand the real meaning of the episodes they narrated.

Livy can be criticized for his treatment of military and diplomatic history. Nevertheless, he has to be read as a Latin historian, depending on annalistic tradition, dealing with remote events. As such, we should above all be interested in the originality in the way he presents the roots of Roman hegemony in the peninsula, but also appreciate the few elements that he provides to let the modern scholars write the Mediterranean history that he was unable to think, as were most of his contemporaries.

Notes

- 1 The list of legates is the only one to be problematic and may originate from a confusion with the *tribuni militum*' one.
- 2 Or at least, the interest of the readers who transmitted those Greek texts, when the Emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus (945–959) decided to undertake an encyclopedia in 53 chapters, all composed with fragments from Greek historians' works.
- 3 As the so-called *Ambrosianus*, an anonymous summary of Dionysius' work, found in a manuscript at the Milan's library.

Cross-References

See CHAPTER 3: PORTRAITS OF PEOPLES; CHAPTER 24: THE BEGINNINGS OF THE REPUBLIC FROM 509 TO 390 BC; CHAPTER 26: FROM 390 BC TO SENTINUM: POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS

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Further Reading

Bourdin, S. 2012. *Les peuples de l'Italie préromaine: identités, territoires et relations inter-ethniques en Italie centrale et septentrionale (VIII^e–I^{er} s. av. J.-C.)*. Rome: École française de Rome. This is an up-to-date book about Italian peoples, most useful to have a better understanding of the historiographical constructions when compared to material realities. As far as possible, it tries to give some definition of their cultural and political identities through archeological, epigraphical, and literary material. Braccisi, L. 2006. *L'Alessandro occidentale. Il Macedone e Roma*, Roma: Erma di Bretschneider. This book is the last one of a series of studies by the same author on the relations between the Eastern and the Western coast of the Adriatic Sea at the time of Alexander the Great. One can agree or not with his theories; nonetheless, he usefully decenters our point of view from the Italian

peninsula to the Greek East. Burton, P. J. 2011. *Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353–146 B.C.)*. Cambridge, UK/New York: Cambridge University Press. Steeped in international relations theory, this book is very close to Eckstein's approaches of Roman external politics, even if it pays special attention to Roman discourse, and in particular to the notion of *amicitia*. Dench, E. 1995. *From Barbarians to New Men: Greek, Roman, and Modern Perceptions of Peoples of the Central Apennines*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. This is one of the most challenging books about the building of ethnic identities in the Italian peninsula, at the time of the Roman conquest, but also in later periods. Grossmann, L. 2009. *Roms Samnitenkriege: Historische und historiographische Untersuchungen zu den Jahren 327 bis 290 v. Chr.* Düsseldorf: Wellem Verlag. The book is a useful up-to-date study of the Second and Third Samnite Wars, providing an interesting reflection not only on the events but also, as is always necessary in the case of the mid-republican period, on the way the events were related in ancient historiography. Harris, W. V., ed. 1984. *The Imperialism of Mid-Republican Rome: Proceeding of a Conference Held at the American Academy in Rome, November 5–6, 1982*. Rome: multigrafica editrice. The nearly 30-years-old analysis on aggressive Roman imperialism led by William Harris still constitutes a referent point on the matter, and an alternative to the more recent studies proposed by Arthur Eckstein and his students. Loreto, L. 1993. *Un'epoca di buon senso: decisione, consenso e Stato a Roma tra il 327 e il 264 a.C.* Amsterdam: A. M. Hakkert. The author proposes an interesting analysis of the changes that happened at the end of the fourth century and the beginning of the third, in the decision-making process regarding peace and war, as the structures of the state were being set up. Saulnier, C. 1980. *L'armée et la guerre dans le monde étrusco-romain (8^e–4^e s. av. J.-C.)*. Paris: Boccard. Even if it does not take into account the last archeological discoveries as regards armament, the book provides a good clarification on the Roman army, its influences, and its historical evolution. Scardigli, B. 1991. *I trattati romano-cartaginesi*, Pisa: Scuola normale superiore. A still-useful textbook that contains all the ancient sources about this period of peaceful relations between Rome and Carthage, an up-to-date bibliography until 1991, discussing the numerous historiographical, diplomatic, and commercial issues raised by the treaties. Turelli, G. 2011. *Audi Iuppiter: il collegio dei feziali nell'esperienza giuridica romana*. Milano: Giuffrè. This is the ultimate and quite complete review about all the numerous issues raised by this college of priests, ambassadors, and jurists, which activity is mostly known for the fourth century.

Chapter 26

From 390_{BC} to Sentinum: Political and Ideological Aspects

Michel Humm

The period between the capture of Rome by the Gauls, in 390_{BC} according to the Livian chronology,¹ and the battle of Sentinum, in 295_{BC}, is marked by the political and urban renewal of Rome following its destruction by the Gauls (Liv. 6.1.3), the beginnings of the empire's expansion in central and southern Italy (first in Latium and Etruria, then in Campania, Samnium, Apulia, and Lucania), the establishment of the institutional framework of the traditional “classical” republic, the gradual end of the old patricio-plebeian conflict, and the political and social assertion of a new ruling class, the “patricio-plebeian “nobility.” This long century of history began, then, with a heavy military defeat, the dramatic and humiliating aspects of which were emphasized by the story of the destruction of the city in the “Gallic fire” (5.41.10–43.4),² and by the alleged necessity there would have been to pay tribute to the conquering Gauls to persuade them to lift the siege on the Capitol (5.48.8–9).³ The century closed, in contrast, with a great military victory against a massive coalition of Samnites, Etruscans, Umbrians, and Gauls (10.27.1–30.7), which echoed widely even unto the Hellenistic world because it thenceforth secured Rome's hegemony over Italy as far as the gates of *Magna Graecia*, which, moreover, was itself soon to fall under Rome's domination. Situated between the little-known beginnings of the Republic in the archaic era (late sixth and fifth centuries) and the imperial triumph of the “classical” Republic (third and second centuries), followed by the political somersaults of the late Republic (late second and first centuries), the history of this period is that of mid-Republican Rome, which saw the establishment of the principal political, institutional, social, and ideological structures of the traditional Roman republic. It is this history, which mixes external events linked to the beginnings of the Roman conquest of Italy and the huge political and social transformations of Rome's civil domestic affairs, which is recounted in Books 6–10 of Livy's *History of Rome*.

From 390_{BC} to Sentinum: Livy's Sources and Methodology

Livy's narrative nevertheless gives only a general idea, more or less accurate, of the political events, civic institutions, and ideological values of this era: in detail, his narrative is seriously contaminated not only by his own political

and ideological concerns linked to the establishment of the Augustan Principate and the period of civil unrest that had preceded, but also by the preoccupations of the sources on which he relied (Miles 1995; Mineo 2006). Livy's narrative is in fact a veritable palimpsest, containing in itself the different historiographical strata of his elaboration (Soltau 1897; Luce 1977). Livy was certainly a historian, passionate about his subject and capable of looking critically at the narratives brought to him by the different traditions that were available to him, not hesitating at times to challenge his sources and highlight their contradictions. Despite the confidence that he shows, at the beginning of Book 6, in the greatest clarity and certainty offered by his sources on the history that opens after the destruction of the City by the Gauls (6.1.1–3), perhaps under the influence of the position adopted by the annalist Claudius Quadrigarius,⁴ his own uncertainties concerning the events that he narrates resurface regularly and punctuate his narrative of the whole period. Moreover, the discrepancies that exist between his sources concerning the attribution of a military victory over the Samnites in 322 BC cause Livy to question their reliability in general, in a very famous passage directly inspired by Cicero (cf. Cic. *Brut.* 62), in which he denounces the alteration of the memory of past events through the contents of funeral orations and the “false inscriptions of portraits of ancestors,” each family drawing to itself “the glory of high deeds and magistracies by deceptive lies” (cf. Flower 1996, 128–158): “hence this confusion in the deeds of individuals and in the public monuments of things past, and there remains not a single writer contemporary with those times whose authority is trustworthy enough to be relied upon” (8.40.3–5).

Livy was not, however, a historian in the modern sense of the word, for his historiographical project was less the comprehension of the past than the political education and moral edification of his contemporaries. He practically never used “primary” sources, and when he cited them, it was never from “firsthand” sources, but from sources that others had cited before him, notably antiquarians. This is the case, for example, for the “ancient law, written in archaic letters and words” that the antiquarian L. Cincius had discovered at the Capitol and which evoked the clavifixion ritual to be performed by the “chief praetor of the moment” (7.3.5). In contrast, Livy on several occasions employs the term “*auctor*” (or “*auctores*”) to designate, generally anonymously, the source or sources that he contented himself with reporting and following, and whom he accepted as an authority on the subjects he evoked. For Books 6–10, these “authorities” were for the most part chosen from among the authors of the “recent” annalistic tradition of the last century of the Roman republic—such as Valerius Antias (one of Livy's principal sources through Book 38, even if he is never cited by name for the period that spans from 390 BC to Sentinum), Claudius Quadrigarius (cited four times for the period: 6.42.4–5; 8.19.13–14; 9.5.2; 10.37.13), C. Licinius Macer (cited four times: 7.9.3–4; 9.38.15–16; 9.46.2–3; 10.9.10–11), and Q. Ælius Tubero (cited once: 10.9.11). This did not prevent Livy from preferring at times the

narrative of more ancient authors, such as Calpurnius Piso (cited twice: 9.44.3–4; 10.9.12), or even Fabius Pictor (cited once: 8.30.8–10). However, all of these authors themselves followed the historiographical tropisms specific to their time and to their intentions of political, familial, or patriotic propaganda. One can also find, interwoven into Livy's account, simultaneously, the political and ideological concerns linked to Augustus' regime, the reflection of the political and ideological conflicts of the civil wars of the last century of the Roman republic, the aristocratic family traditions concerning the “great men” who contributed to the edification of Roman power (Coudry 2001; Humm 2001; id. 2005, 77–94), and the manifestations of the most chauvinistic of Roman patriotism unique to Livy, especially concerning the Greeks and the Barbarians. Thus, in the long digression on Alexander the Great (9.17–19), Livy scoffs at contemporary Greek authors, deemed trivial, who show themselves to be “more favorable to the glory of the Parthians than to the Romans” and who consider that there would have been no one in Rome who would have dared speak out against the Macedonian conqueror if he had had the time to turn his arms against the West (9.18.6).

As far as political ideology is concerned, one can find marginal traces of the reforming (*popularis*) approach of Licinius Macer, favoring the revolutionary power of the tribunes of the plebs in the Gracchan style; but one especially finds, and clearly predominant, the conservative (*optimatis*) approach of Calpurnius Piso, annalist and committed politician, deeply hostile to the reforms enacted in his time by the Gracchi, or even the more moderate approach of Aelius Tubero, friend of Cicero and defender of the interests of the *nobilitas*: this dichotomy can be perceived in particular in Livy's account of the censorship of Appius Claudius Caecus and of the curule aedileship of the plebeian and *homo novus* Cn. Flavius (9.46; Humm 2005, 229–266). Livy seems to have summarized the major points of these different visions in the style of Cicero, from whom he sometimes borrows vocabulary and ideas (notably the recurring theme of the *concordia ordinum*) or even rhetoric, but who was neither himself exempt from political or ideological prejudice (Mineo 2006, 72–79). Their common political penchant for Pompey “the Great” can be thus observed up through the digression on Alexander the Great, by an allusion to the reverse of fortune suffered by Caesar's rival, who had, for a time, been able to pass for the greatest Roman politician, conqueror of the Hellenized East, and savior of the Republic (9.17.6).⁵ It can therefore prove difficult to distinguish between the ideological principles specific to the fourth century, about which Livy must not have known much (he must not even have realized that there could be a difference with those of his era), and those of the end of the Republic and of the beginning of the Principate, which themselves fall within a conceptual continuity claimed together with those that preceded them, although they had naturally acquired other values and meanings. In the same way, Livy, no doubt like many of his contemporaries, must have considered that political institutions, with their magistrates and

assemblies, remained fundamentally unchanged since the fourth century; furthermore, he must have considered that these had always existed, or in any case for as long as the Republic had been in existence. It was therefore difficult for him to see the nature and the importance of the political and institutional developments that might have taken place between the fourth century and his own era, and especially, to understand what developments might have affected them at the time in relation to the era that preceded that of the beginnings of the Republic and “the night of the fifth century.” At the same time, changes in the political and institutional organization of the republic were such that the narratives transmitted by the annalistic tradition could not fail to bear traces of them. These changes provoked a transformation of the ruling class whose identity asserted itself through a new value system that would become that of the traditional aristocratic Republic, which the Augustan regime, lauded by Livy, later claimed to have restored. Livy's narrative is therefore of exceptional interest in understanding the political and ideological transformations experienced by the Roman Republic during the course of the fourth century BC, for it represents the principal source of information on this era, and sometimes the only source. However, the information given by the Augustan historian can only be used after having understood its origin and construction and having submitted it to historical critique by replacing it, if possible, in its historical context.

The Reorganization of the Magistracy: From Patrician *Imperium* to the Patricio-Plebeian Consulship

The major political event of the period was the division of power between patricians and plebeians, and consequently the gradual end of the old “Conflict of the Orders,” which had animated Roman political life since the start of the Republic (Cornell 1995, 242–271; Raaflaub 2005 [1986]). This division of power was the consequence of a long-standing weakening of the patricians, whose demographic- and clan-based social structures had already been exhausting themselves for a number of years, and brought to a close the “plebeian revolution” begun in the fifth century (Guarino 1975; Richard 1978, 433–588). The victory against the Etruscan city of Veii in 396 BC had demonstrated the essential military role played by the plebs. Conversely, the capture of Rome by the Gauls, for which the old patrician family of the *Fabii* seems to have borne a great responsibility (Liv. 5.35.5–36.11), gave the *coup de grâce* to the patricians' political domination. The division of power was above all the direct result of the so-called “Licinio-Sextian laws” of 367 BC (6.35.4–5 and 6.42.9), passed at the end of about 10 years of conflict, 5 years of which were characterized by the “absence of magistrates” (“*solitudo magistratuum*”: 5.35.10). This actually involved three “plebiscites,” or three “resolutions of the plebs” (“*plebis scita*”), which presented the claims of the

plebeians put forth by the tribunes of the plebs C. Licinius Stolo and L. Sextius Lateranus and voted by the council of the plebs. One of these claims concerned plebeian access to power (*imperium*): these resolutions, then, did not have the force and normative character of laws, since the plebiscite was merely a “wish,” a “demand for reform,” or a “claim,” even “an injunction” addressed to the representatives of the city, and to the Senate in particular (Humbert 1998). Following these plebiscites, the plebs in 367 BC elected a plebeian consul at the centuriate assembly, and after a last attempt at resistance, patrician senators finally accepted the results of the election by lending their “authority” to the choice of the centuries (6.42.10; 6.42.14). In reality, the patricians do not seem to have felt initially obliged to recognize the plebiscite of 367 BC, which did not have the “normative” character that a law would, since from 355 to 351 BC, and in 349, 345, and 343 BC, they again succeeded in imposing their monopoly on the head of state, most of all by resorting to the procedure of the *interregnum*: the plebiscite of 367 BC seems merely to have made possible the accession of a plebeian to one of the two positions as consul. It was not until the tribunate of the plebs of L. Genucius in 342 BC and its avalanche of demands (i.e., plebiscites) that the presence of at least one plebeian in one of the two consular posts became obligatory: of the numerous Genucian plebiscites, one allegedly opened both consular posts to the plebeians (7.42.1), which did not actually come to pass until 172 BC, but this possibility can only be explained if one of the two consular posts was previously reserved for a plebeian. Nonetheless, the plebeians' accession to power during the fourth century radically changed Roman political life inasmuch as it led to a reorganization of the magistracies and to the formation of a new ruling class, the “patricio-plebeian nobility.” This general political context explains the importance of the information given by Books 6–10 of Livy's *History of Rome* for the way the institution functions and the organization of the most important magistracies.

In republican Rome, political, military, and judiciary power was exercised by the magistrates, that is, political officers generally elected by the people (with the exception of the dictators, the masters of the horse, and the *interreges*), and always for a limited time (but which could vary depending on the magistracies). For Livy, as for Cicero (cf. *Leg.* 3.2–11), the Roman magistracies constituted the foundation of the “republican” Roman state, for only the higher magistrates (consuls, praetors, dictators, masters of the horse, *interreges*) held “*imperium*,” which was a power of absolute command, of a near-divine, (“Jupiter-like”) nature and of royal (and probably Etruscan) origin. This unlimited power to command was originally concentrated in the hands of a single person (the king or his equivalent). *Imperium* thus designates the highest public power exercised in the civil sphere (*imperium domi*) with the jurisdiction of criminal law and public law (relations with the assemblies, the Senate, and the lower magistrates), as well as in the military sphere (*imperium militiae*) with the power of military command, as revealed

by Livy's frequent use of the expression "*domi militiaeque*" (5.4.5; 5.10.1; 6.1.3; 6.16.5; 6.41.4; 7.19.5; 7.32.16; see Magdelain 1990 [1977], 209–228; Rüpke 1990). This is also indicated by the almost caricatured opposition Livy poses between "men born for military command, great by their deeds and unskilled in oratory contests, men who were made for the consulship," and those, like Appius Claudius Caecus, "with subtle and skillful minds, experts in law and eloquence, who should be chosen to preside over the City and in the Forum and should be made praetors to administer justice" (10.22.6–7).

A very strong power of coercion was associated with the exercise of *imperium* and was symbolized by the *fascēs* carried by the *lictors* who preceded the holders of *imperium* in their public movements. The *fascēs* and the *lictors* therefore made up a part of the visible symbols of the *imperium* of the praetors, the consuls, or the dictators, the number of which varied with the importance of the magistracy: the conquered Romans of the Caudine Forks were forced to hand them over to the conquering Samnites at the time of their surrender (9.5.13–14), and the Campanian allies generously returned them out of deference to the consular majesty that had been humiliated (9.6.6). However, these insignia had more than a purely symbolic function and could, on occasion, genuinely serve to show and exercise the terrifying power of the magistracy invested with supreme power, that is, the power over the life and death of fellow citizens; they appear, for example, in the scene of the execution of T. Manlius by order of his father, the consul T. Manlius Torquatus "Imperiosus," in 340 BC (8.7.13–22), or in the scene of the disagreement pitting the dictator L. Papirius Cursor against his master of the horse, Q. Fabius Rullianus, in 326 BC (8.32.10). The symbolic and coercive force contained in the simple exhibition of the *fascēs* also clearly appears in the exemplary episode of the praetor of Praeneste, terrified at the sight of the axe that Papirius Cursor had asked one of his lictors to prepare, only to cut nothing but a bothersome root (9.16.17–18).

Livy, on several occasions, stresses the "majesty" of the power to command, which nothing could diminish without risking offending the gods. The manifest sign of this "majesty" was the curule chair, probably royal and Etruscan in origin, and which was a part of the insignia of the higher magistrates (10.7.9): when a magistrate was seated in it, he manifested the "majesty" of his office and power, so much so that all other persons present were obliged to rise and stand before him, as revealed by the famous episode in which the curule aedile Cn. Flavius, scorned by the nobility on account of his social origins deemed too modest, compelled the young nobles to show due respect for his office (9.46.8–9). However, the curule chair was used above all in the context of the judiciary activities of a higher magistrate: in this case, and in order that those to be tried be placed in a situation of inferiority to the magistrate who dictated law and served justice, the *sella curulis* was always placed on a platform (*tribunal*) (8.32.14; 8.33.1), or on the

steps at the top of the Comitium (6.15.1–4).

The reason for this “majesty” stemmed from the *imperium* that resided in the auspices (*auspicia*) taken by the magistrate at the moment of his inauguration. At the beginning of their term, magistrates had to obtain Jupiter's consent through favorable auspices, during an investiture ceremony that took place at the *auguraculum* of the Capitol and which allowed them to take up their jurisdiction (*potestas*) and possibly their *imperium* (if the auspices were major): the magistrate was not then truly “created” (*creatus*) until the auspices had been consulted (Magdelain 1990 [1969–70], 193–207; Humm 2012a). One finds this direct contact between Jupiter and the magistrate invested with his power to command in the process of designation (*dictio*) of a dictator. In 327 BC, the dictator appointed by the consul was challenged by the augurs, who considered his appointment to be tainted by an irregularity (8.23.15–16). Livy then reports the protests of the tribunes of the plebs, who accused the augurs, at the time all still patricians, of political bias, because the dictator was a plebeian (the affair takes place before the passage of the *lex Ogulnia* of 300 BC, which opened the college of augurs to the plebeians). The tribunes reminded them that the particular procedure of the auspicial *dictio* prevented anyone from proving that there had, in fact, been a technical error at the moment of the designation of a dictator, but the anecdote recalls also the patrician origin of the auspices that are invested in a high magistrate. The *imperium* of Roman magistrates, then, had a religious origin, and the patricians had long claimed to have a monopoly over religious affairs.

It is, in fact, the religious nature of *imperium* that had allowed the patricians, after the fall of the monarchy and the institution of the republican regime, to confiscate political power for their sole profit by taking advantage of the monopoly on the auspices, whether it was immediately with the disappearance of the monarchy, or only after a few years of political wavering (Linderski 1990): as far as they were concerned, a plebeian could not become consul “because no plebeian could hold the auspices” (4.6.2). The patricians considered themselves to be the sole guardians of the “auspices of the Roman people,” as Livy indicates in the speech that he attributes to Appius Claudius Crassus, grandson of the *decemvir*, in 368 BC (6.40.3–41.12): in this speech, Crassus violently opposes the plans for political parity between patricians and plebeians proposed by the tribunes of the plebs C. Licinius and L. Sextius, and forcefully claims the patrician monopoly on the auspices. The technical arguments contained in the speech are not fictitious, and are confirmed in a famous passage of the treatise *On auspices* (*De auspiciis*) composed in the first century BC by the augur M. Valerius Messala (in Gellius *Noctes Atticae* 13.15.4; see Smith 2006, 217–225; Humm 2012a, 65–73; id. 2012b, 110–118). The patricians, whom Livy calls “fathers” (*patres*), made up a hereditary social group of people with political pretensions who considered it their right to be able to sit in the Senate, and the institution of the *interregnum*

presupposes that this pretension dated back to the time of the monarchy (Mommsen 1888, 14–15; Cornell 1995, 245–251). This procedure was used in case of vacancy in the supreme power, that is, in case of disappearance, or absence, of two consuls at the same time (this procedure was used at least 11 times during the period from 390 to 293 BC): in this case, the “auspices of the Roman people” (normally held by the consuls, who alone had the jurisdiction to convene and preside at an electoral assembly charged with electing new consuls) fell by right to the patrician senators (Cicero *Ad Brut.* 1.5.4), who then designated from among themselves an *interrex* who “reigned” for 5 days, during which he chose another *interrex* for 5 days, who could convene the *comitia*, until such time as new holders of *imperium* could be designated (Livy 6.41.6; Magdelain 1990 [1964], 341–383). The existence of the *interregnum* clearly suggests, by its very name and by the archaism of its procedure, the royal origin of the auspices as well as of the magistratures' *imperium*, but also the antiquity of the political and social pre-eminence of which the patricians took advantage. This antiquity can also be gauged from the monopoly that the patricians had long held on a certain number of religious offices (6.41.9: pontificate, augurate, kings of sacrifices, flamine of Jupiter), among which were numbered the major flamines of Jupiter, Mars, and Quirinus, which were still to remain the patricians' exclusive privilege, and which evoke the most ancient Roman religious triad, predating the Capitoline triad introduced by the Etruscan kings (Jupiter, Juno, Minerva), and therefore predating the Republic (Mitchell 1986; id. 1990; Forsythe 2005, 167–170).

This initial religious pre-eminence may explain the authority that the patricians held and exercised within the city, as the heads of household (*patres familiarum*) in each family: during the Republican era, the *patres* inspired the magistrates' politics and ratified the decisions made by the popular assemblies by lending their “authority” to them. Etymologically, the *auctoritas* designates the sacred “growth in force” which allows for the increasing of the value of a decision in the same way as would an augur's observing the divine “signs” (*auguria*) or a magistrate's taking the auspices (*auspicia*) (Magdelain 1990 [1982], 385–403; cf. Dumézil 1974, 130–131, 584–586). The patricians therefore held a higher authority because their authority had its source in the auspices, which they considered accessible only to themselves, even in a private capacity. Contrary to the magistrates of the plebs, the auspices were thus at the source of the legitimacy of the “patrician magistrates” (*patricii magistratus*: 6.41.6): this technical expression, used several times by Livy, (3.39.9; 4.8.5; 6.38.7; 9.33.1), designates all the magistrates elected by the people as a whole (*populus*) in one of the electoral assemblies called *comitia*, in contrast to plebeian magistrates elected by the plebs only, without patricians, in the council of the plebs. What fundamentally distinguishes the two types of magistracies, then, is the right to take the auspices, and they were named thus in the institutional Roman vocabulary

because originally only the patricians had *auspicium* and could therefore legitimately exercise these magistracies. It is precisely due to their pre-eminence in religious matters and their claim to retaining the monopoly on auspices that the patricians had managed to retain their monopoly on power up until 367 BC.

The institutional consequences of the political “revolution” provoked by the accession of the plebeians to supreme power are nonetheless quite downplayed in Livy's account. In Livy's mind, as in the minds of all other ancient authors (and still the majority of the modern historians), the consulship was created with the Republic, at the time of the departure of the kings and when a change occurred in regimes at the end of the sixth century (1.60.4; 2.1.7–8; cf. Dion. Hal. 5.1.2). The two annual consuls were allegedly first replaced by “*decemviri* with consular power intended to draw up the laws” (of the XII Tables) toward the middle of the fifth century, before disappearing intermittently from 444 to 367 BC, so to be replaced by colleges of three (or more) “military tribunes with consular power” (Cornell 1995, 334–337; Bunse 1998). The presence of a few rare plebeian names among the military tribunes had led Livy (and probably also previous annalists) to imagine that this was an institutional compromise designed to allow plebeians access to power without, for all that, giving them the possibility of acceding to the consulship, a hypothesis that was almost certainly false (4.6.8; 6.37.5). The year 366 BC, then, had supposedly seen the re-establishment of the consulship, thenceforth shared between a patrician and a plebeian, as well as the creation of two new magistracies, both originally reserved for patricians, allegedly to compensate for the loss of their monopoly on the state (6.42.11; 7.1.1): the praetorship, originally sharing the same civil and military prerogatives as the consulship (Brennan 2000, 58–78; Beck 2005, 63–70), and the curule aedileship, which was modeled after the plebeian aedileship, but endowed with the curule chair to offset the sacrosanct nature that was still attached to the plebeian magistracy.

One must not be taken in by this institutional history, which is actually an annalistic reconstruction. The first higher magistrates of the Republic were called not “consuls,” but rather “praetors” (Varr. *Vita pop. Rom.* fr. 68 Ripsati [by Nonius 24.1 Lindsay]; Livy 3.55.11–12), a generic term for the superior magistrate and military chief (Varro *ling.* 5.80 and 5.87). Some sources evoke the existence of a “*praetor maximus*,” notably Livy on the subject of an “ancient law” recovered in 363 BC (7.3.5–8): the superlative indicates that there must have been at least three *praetores*, and the Greek translation of the consular title, “*strategos hypatos*” (highest general), shows that the expression “*praetor maximus*” preceded that of consul (Mommsen 1887, 75–76; Magdelain 1990 [1969], 313–339; Richard 1978, 455–472; Bunse 1998, 48–57). Certainly, the Roman historiographical tradition, as well as the consular list, attest to the annual existence of the two holders of *imperium*

from the first year of the Republic, but our sources also evoke the procedure of the rotation of the *fascēs*, that is, the alternation between the magistrates of the actual exercise of *imperium*. The *praetor maximus* would therefore be the only holder of supreme power (*maximum imperium*), that is, the one of the praetors who temporarily held the *fascēs*, and with them, the totality of *imperium*. As for the existence of eponymous couples in the consular *Fasti*, it would indicate that this alternation only took place between two of the three members of the college.⁶ In the second half of the fifth century, the college of praetors was replaced (from 444 to 367 BC, with a few “consular” interludes) by “military tribunes with consular power”: as with the magistrates who had preceded them, these were elected by the same assembly under the same auspices and were therefore all of equal rank, but the drawing of lots designated two of them to be entrusted with the direction of military affairs on the foreign theaters of operation, while the third would concern himself first and foremost with the administration and defense of the city of Rome (Bunse 1998, 82–181; Stewart 1998, 52–94). Thus, the holders of supreme power would have become accustomed to commanding in pairs, as suggested by the expression “with consular power” added to the designation of their office: the expression, then, does not signify the preexistence of the consulship, but would designate the collegiate character of this magistracy and could derive etymologically from the verb “*consulere*,” designating the consultative powers of these “military tribunes” (Varro *ling.* 5.80; cf. Dion. Hal. 4.76.2; 5.1.2) obliged to share military tasks among themselves by mutual accord (*comparatio*) (Stewart 1998, 137–181).

The constitutional innovation introduced in 366 BC did not, then, concern the reestablishment of the consulship, but rather its creation by the dismantling of the archaic college of praetors (Humm 2012b, 119–124), which was thenceforth divided into two higher magistrates, now “consuls,” one of which could be a plebeian, while the third praetor, still the “colleague of the consuls and created under the same auspices” (7.1.6), was, for a few more years, still reserved for patricians only: it was not until the election of Q. Publilius Philo in 337 BC (for 336 BC) that Rome saw its “first plebeian-born praetor” (8.15.9). Elected by the same electoral assembly (the centuriate assembly) and members of the same college, the three superior magistrates were therefore originally colleagues equal in power (possibly initially separated by a drawing of lots after the election, like the military tribunes with consular power: Stewart 1998, 95–136). Each had an equal capacity of commanding the army, of triumph, and of convoking the Senate or the Centuriate Assembly. However, what fundamentally distinguished the power of the consuls was the exercise of a collegial command, since they both shared equally the same area of competence (*par potestas*), even if they continued to alternate *imperium* and the *fascēs* for the command of the army when they were present together in the same place. The introduction of the *par potestas* into the old college of praetors made the epithet “*maximus*” obsolete, to such an extent that the

sharing of *imperium* between two magistrates of equal power eventually resulted in the creation of the word “consul” (*consul*, arch. *cosol*), which clearly stresses the simultaneous exercise of power. The third member of the college of praetors, still frequently chosen from the “consular” members (such as Ap. Claudius Caecus in 295: 10.22.9), saw his field of competence specialized and gradually limited to the urban and judiciary sphere (6.42.11; 10.22.7; cf. *Digesta* 1.2.2.27), although he continued to share with the consuls the right to act with the Senate and to convoke the assemblies of the people (Cicero *Leg.* 3.10), although it still sometimes happened that he commanded military operations with an *imperium militiae* (10.24.18–26; 10.31.3–7).

With the Samnite wars, the multiplication of theaters of operation resulted in a corresponding multiplication of the number of “provinces”—that is, territories over which the magistrates with *imperium militiae* were to execute their orders (*provincia*): it is this sense of the word that Livy employs for the period from the fourth through the early third century, even before the term ended up being applied to a foreign territory subject to Rome’s authority (for the first time with the annexation of Sicily, after 241 BC). These “provinces” were assigned by lots or by mutual accord between consuls, or else by decision of the Senate or the People (10.24.2–18). Nonetheless, in order to prevent the multiplication of “provinces” and magistracies with *imperium* from stirring up new rivalries among the ruling oligarchy, the ruling class began to resort to an extension of *imperium*, prolonging for 1 year and for a specific mission the *imperium* of a previous magistrate with the rank of proconsul for a former consul (so Q. Publilius Philo in 326: 8.26.7), or that of propraeor for a former praetor. This solution allowed the ruling class to multiply the number of magistrates capable of commanding troops with an *imperium militiae* without having to increase the number of magistracies.

A New Aristocracy: The Patricio-Plebeian Nobility

In Republican Rome, the “nobles” (*nobiles*) were those individuals who made themselves “known” (*noscere*) and who made a “name” (*nomen*) for themselves through the exercise of the highest magistracies (*honores*), the honor (*honor*) of which was reflected on themselves and their families (Mommsen 1888, 462–463). This “nobility” (*nobilitas*) was distinguished from the former patrician aristocracy by the prestige brought, for those individuals who had proved their qualities and merits, by the exercise of magistracies, whereas the patricians made up a hereditary aristocracy founded purely on blood ties. The plebeian ennobled by the exercise of a high magistracy became a “new man” (*homo novus*), such as L. Sextius after his election to the consulship in 366 (7.1.1), whereas a patrician was never described as such. Even if the nobility ended up becoming to some extent hereditary, it never became completely so, for the failure to exercise a higher magistracy brought about, after but a few generations, the social decline of a

family, which fell back into obscurity (*ignobilitas*). This is why the terms “noble” and “nobility” can only be employed from the moment when the plebeians became able to accede to the highest magistracies of the Roman state. In Livy's mind, as well as in that of the annalist Fabius Pictor (fr. 6 Lat. Peter = 23 Chassignet) and of the so-called *Fasti Capitolini* (*Inscr. It* 13.1.1aa), it was in 366 BC that the plebeians were able for the first time to accede to the consulship, which indicates that this event must have constituted, at least in their minds, a major political change from the preceding era. The political and institutional process taken up by the Licinio-Sextian plebiscite of 367 BC and confirmed by the Genucian plebiscite of 342 BC was to result in the gradual sharing of the quasi-totality of public magistracies and of the majority of the priesthoods, and thus to allow for the creation of a new ruling class, the patricio-plebeian nobility (Hölkeskamp 2011 [1987]). This class was primarily made up of families, patrician and plebeian, of which a member or a direct ascendant had been able to accede to the curule magistracies invested with *imperium*, previously held solely by patricians.

At the end of the Republic, the “nobility” designated the elite of the ruling class, which included families of which a member or a direct ascendant had acceded to the consulship, according to a definition given by Sallust (*Iugurtha* 63.6) and taken up by Gelzer (1912). However, the accession to the consulship, probably only created in 366 BC by the dismantling of the archaic college of praetors (see *supra*), could not have been since that time the only criteria for membership in the new ruling class, all the more so since the praetorship, still unique at the time, seems to have conserved for a certain time a prestige and an importance equal to the consulship. Because of the numerous iterations and extensions of *imperium*, at the turn of the fourth century, the consular magistrates represented but a very small minority of politicians incapable of generating a new socio-political group with its own value system. Those “illustrious” persons, the *nobiles*, must thenceforth have included the former curule magistrates (consuls, praetors, censors, and probably also curule aediles) and their families (Humm 2005, 122–128): the scandal provoked in 304 BC by the accession to the curule aedileship of the scribe Cn. Flavius, son of *libertinus*, can only be explained if this magistracy then gave access to nobility (9.46.1–12). That being said, the nobility could not, at the end of the fourth century, have included more than a small number of plebeians, since they had occupied less than half of the curule magistracies since 366 BC: at the time, the essence of the ruling class must in fact still have been made up of patricians. This situation may explain why Livy, when he evokes the political struggles of the fourth century, often refers to the patricians of the era using the terms “*nobiles*” or “*nobilitas*,” in keeping with a representation of the ruling class conforming to the socio-political realities of the end of the Republic (6.42.9–11; 7.1.5; 10.15.8–9). Therefore, the opposition between “nobles” (patricians) and plebeians in this era as presented

by Livy seems in fact to be the transposition of the conflict between *optimates* and *populares* of the last century of the Republic, so much so that in Cicero, too, *nobiles* is often confused with *optimates* (cf. *Sest.* 136–137).

The patricio-plebeian nobility constituted, then, in the fourth and third centuries, a new and developing social group defined not by collective hereditary principles, but by the excellence of its merits and individual qualities: *honos*, *fama*, *virtus*, *gloria*, and *sapientia* (Hölkeskamp 2004 [1993], 11–48; id. 2011 [1987], 204–240). This “aristocracy by merit” (or “meritocracy”) built up a collective identity for itself through the adoption of new social codes and value systems designed to assure its prestige and pre-eminence in Roman society, and thus to justify its claim to control of the magistracies and of the machinery of the state. As Livy very nicely puts it, the day that the plebs acceded to the consulship, they saw come to them all those things in which the patricians had excelled up to that point: power and honor, military glory, family origin, and nobility (6.37.11). The discourse that Livy attributes to P. Decius Mus in 300 BC remarkably illustrates the way in which the plebeian elite, which gained the right to accede to the highest magistracies and greatest military commands, proved its quality to be equal to that of the patricians, as is indicated by the number of plebeian triumphs. Plebeian representatives thenceforth shared with the patricians the same honorific insignia: the curule chairs and the *toga praetexta* of the magistrates, the tunic embroidered with palm leaves, gold-embroidered toga and laurel crown of triumphant generals, and the sacrificing bowl (*capis*) and the crooked staff (*lituus*) of the augurs; they could also now distinguish their residence by hanging up spoils (*spolia*) taken from the enemy. Finally, on the inscriptions under their portraits, one can read: “with equivalent emotion,” the indication of a consulship, a censorship, a triumph, even an augurate or a pontificate (10.7.6–11). To be noble, it was no longer enough to come from an aristocratic family: one still had to prove one's nobility through one's own merits, which alone could justify political and social pretensions, individual and familial (Hölkeskamp 2004 [1996], 169–198).

This new aristocracy affirmed its existence and the awareness of its own identity through monuments of “self-representation,” such as the Rostra built at the Comitium in 338 BC to give orators a tribute worthy of their social rank or the offices to which they aspired (Livy 8.14.12; Coarelli 1986, 138–160). These monuments often drew their inspiration from Greek models that came directly from Campania or southern Italy, or even from the Hellenistic world, and which marked the beginning of the art of representation in Rome: honorific columns, such as that of C. Maenius in 338 or 318 BC (Pliny *NH* 34.20); equestrian statues, such as those of L. Furius Camillus and C. Maenius in 338 BC (Liv. 8.13.9), or that of Q. Marcius Tremulus in 306 BC (9.43.22); gold rings and military medals in 304 BC (9.46.12); and civic crowns and palms offered to the victors of the games in 293 BC (10.46.3; 10.47.3). The

expression of the values of this aristocracy also appeared in the exhibition (both public and private) of the spoils taken from conquered enemies (Humm 2009), the organization of triumphs or nobiliary funerals (Flower 1996; Itgenshorst 2005), or even by the construction of public monuments identified by the name of their builder, as in the case of the *aqua Appia* and the *via Appia* (9.29.5; Humm 1996). In this context, the social values that defined the Roman aristocracy beginning in the fourth century, and which are often viewed by ancient authors themselves as typically Roman social codes, seem in reality to have been forged at this time after Hellenistic models, for the early Hellenization of this new aristocracy responded above all to a need to assure its political and social pre-eminence, in Rome and in Italy, through the cultural prestige drawn from Hellenization (Humm 2007).

The event that truly marked the birth of this newly forming aristocracy can be found in the text of the Ovinian plebiscite (*plebiscitum Ovinium*), not recorded by Livy and known only through antiquarian tradition (Festus 290 Lindsay, *s.v. Praeteriti senatores*), but which allows us nonetheless to understand the particular circumstances of the famous censorship of Appius Claudius Caecus in 312 BC (Liv. 9.29.5–7; Humm 2005, 185–226). Following a new initiative of the plebs, it was then decided that the senators would thenceforth be chosen by the censors “from the best men in each order,” to such an extent that those who might lay claim to this dignity, but were “omitted” by the censors, lost their rank and suffered disgrace (*ignominia*). The stir caused in the annalistic tradition by Ap. Claudius' revision of the senate roll (*lectio senatus*), which Livy directly echoes (9.29.7; 9.46.10), can be explained by the innovations that stemmed from the application of the Ovinian plebiscite: for the first time, censors (a patrician and a plebeian) together drew up a list (*album*) of senators, composed of patricians and plebeians, which resulted in the construction of the republican “senatorial order.” The Senate was therefore no longer a simple “public council,” informal and temporary, assembled at their convenience by the higher magistrates, modeled after the private family council, to consult the opinions of those that the higher magistrates had chosen in an *ad hoc* meeting (Cornell 1995, 247–248). Thenceforth, the Senate, composed of patricians and plebeians (*patres <et> conscripti*) chosen from the best men of each order and recorded on a written list that was regularly revised, became a permanent council whose political and moral authority would assert itself over all of Roman political life. According to Livy, the revision of the senatorial roll led by Ap. Claudius was nevertheless “corrupted” by the introduction into the senate of *libertini*, that is, individuals with civic origins that were, in one way or the other, suspect. Be that as it may, his senatorial revision does seem to be the first application of the Ovinian plebiscite: thenceforth, senators would be recruited from an aristocracy defined not only by its wealth or networks of influence, but also by its civic, moral, and individual virtues thanks to a “rule of morals” (*regimen morum*) exercised by the censors (Humm 2010). This fundamental political

and institutional reform favored the creation and consolidation of the patricio-plebeian nobility, whose composition would soon be identified with the senatorial aristocracy that controlled the fate of the Roman republic.

The Building of Republican Consensus: *Libertas* and *Concordia*

One of the points of contention in Roman political life that poisoned the relations between the patricians and plebeians during the fifth and fourth centuries was the problem of debt and debt servitude. With the appearance of the first bronze ingots, which marked the birth of a pre-monetary economy, the weighed pound of bronze (*aes liberale*) replaced the estimation in cattle (*pecunia*) as the unit of account for important operations (Crawford 1985, 17–24). In a society where the possession of metal had become a source of prestige, its usage encouraged the development of loans in the form of metal among the rural population, which had insufficient access to this new method of payment and who therefore needed “others’ bronze” (*aes alienum*), an expression generally translated as “debt” (Zehnacker 1990). The archaic procedure of the loan “by bronze and scale” (*per aes et libram*) occurred through the weighing of the quantity of bronze being loaned; this allowed the creditor to secure the person of his debtor by giving him a small, symbolic ingot (*aes nexum* or *rodusculum*), which remained bound (*obligatus*) to his neck by a necklace (XII Tables fr. 6.1 [in Festus 176.5 Lindsay]; Festus 160.32 Lindsay; Festus 162.4 Lindsay; cf. Varro *ling.* 7.105; Gaius *inst.* 3.173–174; see Magdelain 1990 [1986], 25–33; Cornell 1995, 280–283). This weighing was again performed at the time of the reimbursement of the debt: in Livy’s narrative, Manlius Capitolinus reimburses publically, in the Forum, the creditor of an indebted centurion, liberating the debtor “by the scale and bronze” (*libra et aere*) (6.14.5). *Nexum* (“debt-bondage”) thus constituted a process of subjugation, voluntary or not, by which a debtor, having become *nexus* (“bondsman”), put himself at his creditor’s disposition, working for him in order to earn the sum necessary to repay his debt, all the while remaining a Roman citizen (Liv. 7.19.5). In an agrarian economy still in the pre-monetary stage, repayment in kind doubtless generally took place in the form of days of (forced) labor.

However, “the remuneration for manual labor was so low that it was unrealistic to think that it could ever pay off a debt of any significance” (Zehnacker), so much so that the creditor could take direct ownership of the debtor’s person by instigating the proceedings of *manus iniectio* (“laying hands” <on someone>), defined by the law of the XII Tables (fr. 3.1–6 [in Gellius *NA* 20.1.42]): after judgment before a praetor and a grace period of 30 days, the creditor could put the debtor in chains and sell him as a slave outside of Roman territory, “across the Tiber and abroad.” Thus, whereas in Book 2 it was simply a question of *nexi* (“bondsmen”), in Book 6, Livy speaks of

iudicati (“condemned men”) and *addicti* (“individuals who had been sold” <to their creditors>) (6.14.10; 6.15.9; 6.20.6; 6.34.2; 6.36.12): this change in vocabulary seems to convey a legal evolution in keeping with the provisions of the XII Tables recognizing the right of creditors to use the proceedings of *manus iniectio* against insolvent debtors. Debt slavery was, then, a measure of civil disgrace, which allowed Livy to write that “debt threatened the body of free men not only with misery and shame, but also with shackles and chains” (6.11.8). Livy’s rhetoric paints a dramatic picture of a situation on the eve of the Licinio-Sextian plebiscites (in 369 BC): “the plebeians, assailed with usury, rather than reimbursing, by the payment of the capital, what had been lent to them, gave up their bodies to bondage and torment,” to such an extent that “each day condemned debtors were led in droves from the Forum,” and “the houses of the nobles were full of prisoners, and wherever a patrician lived, one could find a private prison” (6.36.12). Thus, the question of debt and the problem of debt slavery were also the cause of a great social unrest among the Roman plebs, that is, the great majority of the population, whose principal preoccupations included these issues, well before the constitutional question of political parity for the sharing of *imperium* and *auspicium* with the patricians.

In the fourth century, the question of debt reappears just after the liberation of Rome from the Gauls and is linked with the cost of reconstruction (6.11.9); it culminates with the uprising provoked by the so-called revolutionary plans of Capitolinus, in 385–384 BC (6.11–20). This patrician supposedly shared the plans of the tribunes of the plebs in looking to liberate the plebs from their debt: after paying off the debts of a centurion driven to the brink of misery despite his glorious exploits and titles, Capitolinus sold the property that constituted the greater part of his patrimony in order to be able to pay back the debts of whoever risked condemnation for debt. Having become the “liberator” of the centurion and the “protector of liberty” of the plebs (6.14.5 and 10), he was immediately accused of demagogy: according to Livy, he was even “the first patrician senator to become *popularis*,” not contenting himself with agrarian proposals, but destroying even the mutual trust upon which Roman society rested (6.11.7). The figure of Capitolinus in Livy is superimposed very precisely on that of Catiline as presented by Sallust: the two characters are patricians; the two gather the plebs in their private home, at night, where their respective discourses have the same Ciceronian rhetorical tone (cf. Liv. 6.18.5 and Sall. *Cat.* 20.9); their activity leads both men to sedition, against which the Senate in each case takes extraordinary measures; those taken against Capitolinus seem to prefigure, and justify, the *senatus consultum ultimum* of 63 BC against Catiline, or even that of 121 BC against C. Gracchus (Oakley 1997, 483–484; Chassignet 2001, 90–91). Accused of having aspired to personal power, indeed even tyranny, Capitolinus was condemned for high treason and executed by being thrown from the top of the Tarpeian Rock (6.20.12), in the name of “the liberty of the Roman people”

(6.19.4 and 7). The episode beautifully illustrates the different meanings attached in Latin to “liberty” (*libertas*): the word first designates the civic rights and personal independence of citizens, and is therefore opposed to servitude; it also designates obedience to the law, because this obedience protects against all forms of absolute uncontrolled power, and therefore against monarchy or tyranny; finally, it designates the collective exercise of power through the *imperium* of the magistrates, the expression of the absolute sovereignty of the Roman people (Wirszubski 1950). Capitolinus' action was, then, led in the name of individual citizens' liberty, which was threatened by servitude because of debt, but he was condemned because his action made him popular and therefore suspected of aspiring to personal power, thus threatening “public liberties.” This ambivalence reflects the ideological controversies between *populares* and *optimates* during the last century of the Republic, where each side claimed to defend *libertas*, but each with their own conception thereof: what is more, in the episode of the *Manliana seditio*, Livy does not even hide his attempt to establish a parallel with the so-called demagogic measures taken by the *populares* of the end of the Republic.

However, behind the annalistic doctoring and anachronisms, there did indeed exist a real problem of debt among the population of the fourth century, and its social issues were all the more serious because they threatened debtors with servitude, and therefore with the loss of *libertas*, which made them fully fledged citizens. Barely a few years after the sedition of Manlius, in 380 BC, the plebs was once again agitated by the problem of debt. This time, it was the tribunes of the plebs who raised the problem by forbidding any auctioning (*addictio*) of an insolvent Roman citizen: in other words, they forbid creditors from enslaving debtors who had been “sold” by legal decision after *manus iniectio* proceedings (6.27.8–11). Similarly, they generally forbid any levying of troops until a solution to the debt problem could be found. It would then seem that the plebeian elite took up this federative theme at this time in order to rally to its political cause (the sharing of *imperium* with the patricians) the majority of the small, poor peasants who found themselves under the domination or the patronage of the great families of the patrician clans (6.39). That is why the question of the abolition of debts appears among the very first claims of the plebeians in the Licinio-Sextian plebiscites, just as does the sharing of *imperium* between patricians and plebeians (6.35.1–5).

Nevertheless, the political success achieved by the plebeian elite does not allow for an immediate solution of the problem of widespread debt, and, even in the mid-fourth century, “the plebs was reduced to indigence and doomed to servitude” (7.19.5). The problem did not find even the beginning of a solution until the reappearance of mixed patricio-plebeian consulships, beginning in 352 BC: the liquidation of debt then became a “public charge,” and the senate agreed to the creation of a commission of five members (*quinqueviri mensarii*), composed of three plebeians and two patricians, charged with repaying creditors with public money in order to free insolvent plebeians from

their debts (7.21.5–8). In 347 BC, another mixed consulship allowed for the reduction of the rate of usury, and the repayment of debts was spread out over a period of 3 years (7.27.3). In 342 BC, a plebiscite proposed by the tribune of the plebs L. Genucius demanded an absolute ban on loans with interest, but this plebeian claim does not seem to have had much effect (7.42.1). The decisive moment was the passage, between 326 and 313 BC, of the *Lex Poetelia Papiria*, which officially abolished *nexum*, and therefore also debt slavery⁷: for Livy, “it was, for the Roman plebs, as if liberty had been established a second time” (8.28.1), since this measure thenceforth ensured the individual liberty of the Roman citizen who “could no longer be kept in bonds or chains” because of his debts (8.28.8); according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, this measure expressly granted “freedom” for former *nexi* (16.5.3). In 300 BC, individual liberty was completed and guaranteed by the *Lex Valeria*, which forbade magistrates from scourging or beheading a citizen who had appealed to the people (10.9.3): in guaranteeing him a form of *habeas corpus*, this law became one of the foundations of the *libertas* of the Roman citizen (Cicero, 2 *Verr.* 5.163).

The double affirmation, during the fourth century, of individual liberty and of political liberty unquestionably contributed to a more consensual political climate, which Livy repeats countless times in writing about the period that followed the Licinio-Sextian plebiscites. Thus, with the election of the first plebeian consul, L. Sextius, in 366 BC, “discord subsided and concord was re-established between the orders” (6.42.12). The election had been held under the dictatorship of Camillus, who, moreover, had been awarded triumph “by common accord of the patricians and the plebs” (6.42.8). According to one tradition not reported by Livy, Camillus had even erected a temple to Concord “overlooking the Forum and the place of assembly of the people”—that is, turned toward the Comitium (Plut. *Camillus* 42.4–6; cf. Ov. *Fasti* 1.641–644). Nevertheless, archaeology has not been able to confirm such a construction at this time, and A. Momigliano had already clearly rejected the historicity of a temple built by Camillus, all the more so because the historicity of this character remains itself quite unconfirmed (Momigliano 1960 [1942]; Ungern-Sternberg 2006 [2001]). In contrast, the bronze temple consecrated by the curule aedile Cn. Flavius in 304 BC seems authentic (Liv. 9.46.6; Plin. *NH* 33.19), and the controversy generated by its dedication brings to mind the introduction of a Greek cult. In fact, the theme of concord is linked to the political philosophy present in *Magna Graecia* in the fourth century: in this context, the presence of the theme of *concordia* in Rome at this time can be naught but the transposition of the *homonoia* advocated by the thinkers and politicians of Pythagorean Italy, such as Archytas (Huffman 2005) and Aristoxenus of Tarentum (Huffman ed. 2012). Livy explains that Cn. Flavius erected his temple of Concord “in Vulcan's precinct”—that is, in the sanctuary of Vulcan or *Volcanal*, which has now been definitively identified with the sanctuary of the Comitium (Coarelli 1986, 161–178). Pliny the elder specifies

that this temple was built “on the Graecostasis,” that is, according to the definition given by Varro (*ling.* 5.155), on an elevated platform that overlooked the stairs of the Comitium (Coarelli 1986, 138–165): it is there that the foreign embassies (doubtless mostly Greek) waited to be received in the Curia by the Senate. The temple erected by Cn. Flavius was therefore situated in a Hellenistic context imprinted with Pythagoreanism: in fact, at the same time, the Comitium seems to have adopted a new form of circular architecture, modeled after the *ecclesiasteria* of a certain number of cities of *Magna Graecia* and Sicily, and the “corners of the Comitium”—that is, the ends of the arc-shaped steps on each side of the Curia building were decorated with statues of Pythagoras and Alcibiades (Plin. *NH* 34.26; Plut. *Num.* 8.20; Humm 2005, 541–600; 611–628).

The Greek concept of *homonoia* designates first and foremost “harmony” between citizens of a city: in this context, it means at once “fraternity” and “mutual solidarity” between citizens “when those who have the means take it upon themselves to help those who have nothing” (Democritus 68 B 255 Diels-Kranz), following a wording which closely resembled that given by Archytas (47 B 3 Diels-Kranz), the principal Pythagorean leader of Tarentum in the fourth century (*strategos* from 367 to 361 BC). However, Pythagorean *homonoia* also applied to relations between cities: this is asserted by a fragment of Aristoxenus enumerating the Italic peoples, the Romans among them, who were affected by Pythagorean doctrines (fr. 17 Wehrli). The message of *concordia* displayed in the Comitium was therefore addressed as much to foreign ambassadors as to fellow Roman citizens. The Comitium was in fact also a place that held particularly important political and judiciary functions, in particular the organization of the vote of the tribes gathered in *comitia* and the seat of the tribunal of the praetor. Now, the construction of the bronze temple of Cn. Flavius was financed with fines imposed on usurers (Plin. *NH* 33.19), as were, a little later, the statues of the founders as children placed “under the teats of the she-wolf” by the *Olgunii* brothers in 296 BC (Liv. 10.23.11–12). This method of financing betrays the conflict that pitted rich citizens (the *usurers*) against poor citizens (those same who elected Cn. Flavius to the curule aedileship: Licinius Macer fr. 18 Peter = 22 Walt = 19 Chassignet, in Liv. 9.46.1; 10–14). It is therefore also to this social conflict that Cn. Flavius hoped to put an end in vowing to dedicate a chapel to Concord “if he managed to reconcile the <superior> orders with the people” (Plin. *NH* 33.19). One can also see that the themes of *libertas* and *concordia* were closely linked. However, civic reconciliation necessitated a real consensual accord between rich citizens and poor citizens who had to find a common interest in living together in the same civic community. In order to achieve this, the method advocated by Pythagorean-inspired political philosophy rested on the principle of geometric equality between citizens—that is, a redistribution of rights and duties based on the qualities and capacities of each. It is precisely this principle of “proportionality” that is at

the heart of the political and institutional reforms carried out in Rome at the end of the fourth century (Humm 2005, 564–600).

Tribes and Citizenship: The Republic of Tribes

Following the conquest of Veian territory and the individual (*viritim*) distribution of lands to the Roman people, Livy recalls the creation of four new tribes in 387 BC (the *Stellatina*, *Tromentina*, *Sabatina*, and *Arniensis* tribes: 6.5.8). These were the first territorial tribes created since the beginning of the Republic, when, in 496–495 BC, the first 21 tribes had been formed (2.21.7). Certainly, tradition attributes the appearance of the first four tribes to the activity of King Servius Tullius (578–535 BC), but real situations at the end of the fourth century, notably linked to the censorship of Appius Claudius, were in fact translated by the “Servian” tradition of the Roman annalistic, and it is highly doubtful that the creation of the territorial tribes as early as the mid-sixth century can be taken for granted (Livy 1.43.13; Dion. Hal. 4.9.6–8; Humm 2005, 345–372; *contra*: Rieger 2007). These tribes first constituted, during the archaic era (fifth–early fourth century), the administrative confines within which the plebs could acquire land with full ownership and thus gain independence from structures of collective farming of clan or curial lands (Humm 2006).

At the beginning of the fourth century, the conquest of the Veii territory and then its being distributed *viritim* to the plebs according to a new unit of seven *jugera* (5.30.8), by increasing the small and fundamentally plebeian estates, supposedly made it become obsolete the two-*jugera* parcels of land (*heredium*) that were traditionally attributed to them from within the property of their clan (6.36.11), and it also provoked the definitive decline of ancient forms of communal farming. This decline was sanctioned by the Licinio-Sextian plebiscite of 367 BC, which was intended to limit the size of farms in order to re-establish, in this area also, political parity between patricians and plebeians (6.35.5), even if Livy is here once again certainly confusing this plebiscite with Gracchan agrarian measures in speaking of a limitation of 500 *jugera*. This plebiscite may have introduced the system of private farming in the *ager publicus* in the form of *possessio*, which would have allowed for a considerable increase in plebeian private property and put an end to the collective farming of the land of the *ager publicus* within the framework of the curiae (Capogrossi Colognesi 2000, 185–227; 229–262). The system of territorial tribes would not, then, have definitively replaced that of the curia as the framework for the exploitation of land until around the middle of the fourth century. This transformation, together with the territorial expansion of new conquests, may explain the way new tribes were created during the fourth century, but also the subsequent passage from the constitutional system of the curiae to that of the tribes.

The mid-Republican era (from 387 to 241 BC) witnessed the successive creation of 14 new tribes, which corresponded each time to an expansion of the *ager Romanus* and to the integration of new citizens into the civic body.⁸ It is therefore during this period that the political, legal, and institutional links between the acquisition of Roman citizenship and integration into a tribe was established, and the territorial tribe changed gradually in nature, eventually becoming an administrative district of the Roman state around the end of the fourth century, following the censorships of 312 and 304 BC. In 312 BC, the censor Appius Claudius Caecus recorded for the first time all the citizens in the tribes during the process of the *census*, whether they were landowners (*adsidui*) or non-landowners (*proletarii*) (Liv. 9.46.10–14; Diod. 20.36.4; Humm 2005, 229–266; 411–414). This innovation greatly facilitated the technical operation of the census at a time when Rome's territorial expansion was driving the spread of these operations over a significantly larger territory than in the past, and which was to continue to spread long after. In making a list of and registering all citizens (including poor citizens and non-landowners) in the tribe of their choice, Appius Claudius unquestionably innovated: thenceforth, the tribe was no longer a simple legal entity that guaranteed individual land ownership to individuals excluded from the great *gentes*, but it had become rather an administrative district of the state in which were registered all citizens living or possessing lands in that district.

The political and social consequences were considerable, a fact that the annalistic tradition does indeed recall: by registering for the first time all citizens in the tribes, regardless of their status (landowners or non-landowners) or their fortune (rich or poor), Appius Claudius transformed the territorial tribe into a “personal” tribe, as Th. Mommsen had already remarked (Mommsen 1887, 403). At the same time, the censors' registration of all citizens in tribes allows for the appearance of “tribal assemblies” modeled after the council of the plebs (Humm 2005, 419–433): Livy echoes, in a text of clearly anti-Grachian political inspiration, the brutality of the reform, which mixed rich and poor in the same voting groups, and which thus gave the majority to the “rabble of the Forum” (*turba forensis*); this was nevertheless corrected by the censorship of 304 BC, when Q. Fabius Rullianus and P. Decius Mus grouped the “poorest” into the four tribes that were (only) then called “urban” (9.46.14). In doing so, at least for a part of the population, registration in a tribe no longer had any “territorial” significance, but guaranteed at least the first right of all citizens: the right to vote in the Tribal Assembly (or indeed, the simple right to vote, inasmuch as the voting criteria retained in the Centuriate Assembly must have prevented the majority from communicating their vote). This “reform of the tribes,” which mixed rich and poor in the same institutional organization, also fell in with the framework of a rewriting of the census voting organization, which only then adopted its “Servian” form with its 193 centuries divided into several classes: it is in this sense that one must understand the expression employed by Livy, in which

Appius Claudius “corrupted the Forum and the Campus Martius” (*forum et campum corrupti*)—that is, the respective meeting places of the *comitia tributa* and the *comitia centuriata* (9.46.11; Humm 2005, 260–266; 283–308). The redefinition of voting criteria allows for all citizens to be taken into account in the Centuriate organization, regardless of their level of wealth, and the *census* thenceforth had the function of compiling a registry of the entire civic population, without exception (and no longer only those who were able to present themselves before the censor with more or less full hoplite equipment—that is, the wealthiest citizens).

The fundamental reason for these innovations stems from the setting up, in place of the old hoplite army (*classis*), of the manipular legion that depended on the “selection” (hence the words “*dilectus*” and “*legio*”) of the best soldiers among all citizens, all of whom were equally liable to be called up. Livy on several occasions evokes the new manipular organization of the Roman army, which must have been put in place in successive steps between the Latin war in the mid-fourth century and the *Lex Atilia Marcia* of 311 BC on the election by the people of military tribunes for the four annual legions (9.30.3; Humm 2005, 278–283): he even offers a detailed description of the manipular army during the battle of Vesperis in 340 BC (8.8.3–14; Humm 2005, 271–277). This new structure of the army came with a new tactical organization that demanded greater military discipline (*disciplina militaris*), which may explain Livy's emphasis on this theme for the whole of this period (7.32.12; 8.7.16; 8.34.2; 8.35.4; 9.17.10; 9.31.10), but also the ruthless harshness of the “Manlian orders” (*Manliana imperia*) against soldiers who kept the habit of fighting “out of formation” (8.7; cf. 8.30.11–13).

The tribe could therefore serve several purposes, the necessity of which did not appear until around the end of the fourth century: the tribe responded first and foremost to the military needs of the era of the Samnite wars, by allowing for the organization of the levy for the mobilization of the legions, whose manipular organization, with its different types of soldiers (*hastati*, *principes*, *triarii*, velites et cavalrymen), relied on the voting structure of the Centuriate organization (Humm 2005, 291–308; 366–372; 590–600). The tribe then allowed for the organization of the levying of the *tributum*, whose creation was made necessary by the creation of the *stipendium*, the pay given to legionaries beginning when poor citizens also began to be mobilized (these made up the light infantry), and made possible by the adoption of bronze as Roman money. Finally, the tribe allowed for the legal and political integration of new citizens originating from the conquests and expansion of the *ager Romanus* (in Latium and Campania). Livy, moreover, explicitly associates the introduction of military pay (*stipendium*) with the adoption of the long, wooden shield (*scutum*) characteristic of the outfit of the legionary of the manipular army and represented on one of the first series of monetary bronze ingots (*RRC*, 7/1), probably designed for payment of the *stipendium*.

The taking of the census by tribes of the entire civic body allows for a new definition of “citizenship,” which greatly facilitated the integration of new citizens into the civic body, since integration was no longer determined by membership in the clan structures of the *curiae*, and therefore by birth and family origin. From then on, to be a Roman citizen, it was not necessary to be a member of a *curia*, but rather to be registered in a tribe. With the beginning of Roman territorial expansion in the fourth century, the question of the integration of new citizens had become a crucial issue. According to a still largely unappreciated hypothesis of J. Cels-Saint-Hilaire (1995, 251–289), “new citizens” would have been designated by the term “*libertini*,” employed on numerous occasions by Livy, notably on the subject of the censorship of Appius Claudius Caecus. If one accepts this hypothesis, *libertini* would not necessarily be freed former slaves (as the term is usually understood), but rather individuals who have achieved *libertas* by becoming Roman citizens, whether they be of servile or foreign origin. These “new citizens” were naturally less well-regarded by their new fellow citizens than the citizens “of old stock” (cf. the *integer populus* Livy's speaking: 9.46.13), which would explain the social and political depreciation to which they were subjected (the civic and legal status of new citizens, even of foreign origin, not being fundamentally different from that of former slaves, at least at this time). Whatever the case may be, the tribal reform at the end of the fourth century allows for the establishment of a relationship of a legal sort between the administrative organization of territory and the holding of citizenship, and this is what explains the ease with which Rome was subsequently able to integrate, during the course of its territorial conquest, ever greater numbers of new citizens.

Publication of a Calendar (*Fasti*) and of the Law (*Ius*): Unification of Civic Space and Time

The reform of the tribes at the end of the fourth century is directly linked to another contemporary innovation, absolutely decisive for the definition of the political and legal institutions of the Roman republic: the first publication of the law (*ius*), and that of the first written calendar (*fasti*) (Humm 2005, 441–480; Rüpke 2011, 44–50). In 304 BC, the curule aedile Cn. Flavius, probably at the instigation of Ap. Claudius Caecus, made public the formulae of the civic law, which up until that point had been kept exclusively among the pontiffs (9.46.5). In archaic Rome, law was above all a language conveyed by oral formulae pronounced by magistrates or private individuals, and of which the pronouncements had a quasi-“magical” effect on resolving a specific legal situation. The law formula, called a “legal procedure” (*legis actio*), would have been behind a corresponding vow or prayer addressed to the gods, and drew its “performative” efficacy from obliging the gods. That is why these formulae were originally composed and kept by the priests, who protected

their operating “magic” character that was due to their sacred or religious origin. The priests, who were thus the first Roman “jurisconsults,” made sure that these formulae were correctly pronounced, without any modifications, and this practice is the cause of the formalistic nature of Roman law. The priests having remained, until the Ogulnian plebiscite of 300 BC, exclusively patricians, only patricians and their clients had the certainty of being able to know the correct formulae to instigate legal proceedings. If the law published by Cn. Flavius became a “civil law” (*ius civile*), that was because it brought together the whole body of the legal formulae that a simple citizen needed pronounce orally in order to introduce a civil process before the praetor. The *ius civile Flavianum* consequently gained a considerable political dimension, since it thenceforth allowed any citizen to instigate legal proceedings independently of the priests and magistrates, and since it ensured the legal autonomy of the plebeians with regard to the patricians.

At the same time, Cn. Flavius also published a calendar called *fasti* so that one could know on what days it was permitted to instigate legal proceedings (9.46.5). This calendar was called *fasti* because it presented, for the first time to the public, the list of the *fas* and *nefas* days of a civil year. The 235 *fas* days of the year corresponded to the days when public activity was religiously permitted (a thing is *fas* when it is permitted by divine law). These days were marked by the letter “F” on the calendar and were open to the activities of political, legal, and military life, as well as to contractual and commercial activities and work. In contrast, the 109 *nefas* days of the Roman calendar, marked with the letter “N,” were the days when public activity was not allowed, because those were days reserved for the gods. On those days, mortal activity was to cease in public spaces, to make way for religious ceremonies honoring the gods. In fact, on those days, the gods attended symbolically to their duties, and men honored them because they exercised these duties in the general interest (Varro *LL* 6.29–32; Macrobian *Sat.* 1.16.2–3). Up until that point, the juridico-religious nature of each day was determined by the college of priests: it was proclaimed to the public by the “king of sacrifices” (*rex sacrorum*) after the observation of the new moon by a “minor priest,” on the day of the “calends” at the start of each new lunar month (Varro *LL* 6.27–29; Macrobian *Sat.* 1.15.9–12). The publication of a calendar that fixed in advance the juridico-religious nature of each day, as can be seen on the epigraphic calendar discovered at Anzio (*Inscr. It* 13.2.1), rendered all of these operations useless and allowed citizens to bypass the intervention of the college of priests. In other words, the calendar published by Cn. Flavius in 304 BC was the civic republican calendar, which, moreover, tradition attributed to the legendary activity of King Numa (Plut. *Numa* 18.2–6; 19.1–8), and which allowed citizens across Roman territory to know in advance the days of the year on which the *comitia* would meet, or the days on one could ask the praetor to “speak the law” to institute judicial proceedings.

The publication of the Roman civic calendar, like that of the formulae of the civic law, is consequently tightly linked to Appius Claudius' tribal reform and to the institution of the *comitia* by tribe. The expansion of Roman territory and the new tribute organization of the Roman people made necessary these reforms, which thus allowed for the unification of the civic space and time of the Roman republic, at a time when Rome was about to take on the dimensions of an empire that would be Italian before becoming Mediterranean.

Notes

- 1 The sack of Rome by the Gauls is dated at 390 BC (Varronian year) by Roman historiography, whereas Polybius (1.6.2) dates the event back to the year of the peace of Antalcidas, (or “the King's Peace”) and of the siege of Rhegium by Dionysius of Syracuse in 386 BC, probably following a synchronism established by Timaeus of Tauromenium. This 4-year discrepancy between the Greek and Roman chronologies can be explained by the introduction into the Roman chronology of the fourth century of four fictitious, eponymous years called “dictatorial years” (333, 324, 309, and 301 BC) or, according to sources, of 4–5 years “of anarchy” (from 375 to 371 BC) or of *solitudo magistratuum* (Livy 6.35.10), during which there would have been no elected curule magistrates because of the obstruction of the tribunes of the plebs. Livy seems to combine several chronological systems, using at the same time a “short chronology” and a “long chronology,” probably with the goal of making 390 BC simultaneously the end of a first cycle of time in Roman history, corresponding to a cosmic “great year” of 365 years since the founding of Rome (5.54.5), and the beginning of a new cycle inaugurated by the figure of Camillus, the *dux fatalis* (5.19.2), and necessarily ending with the Augustan Principate 365 years later: Mineo 2006, 84–108 and 237–241.
- 2 Archaeology has nevertheless not allowed for the confirmation of the destruction of Rome by a fire at the beginning of the fourth century.
- 3 On the annalistic traditions and the historiographical reconstruction of this episode, as it relates to the construction of the figure of Camillus, see Mineo 2006, 222–232.
- 4 Forsythe 2007, 392: “Livy's preface to his second pentad is his reworking of the preface to Quadrigarius' history of Rome.”
- 5 On Livy's “pompeianism,” see Mineo 2006, 112–132.
- 6 *Contra*: Forsythe 2005, 150–155, reckons that the expression “*praetor maximus*,” appearing in Livy's account concerning an event of the year 363 BC, would also apply to the consul who held the *fascēs* after the

institutional reorganization of 367 BC, to distinguish him from his two colleagues: the other consul, and the praetor (but this would completely contradict the principle of *par potestas* between the two consuls). Smith 2011 reinstates the annalistic tradition on the existence of two consuls since the beginning of the Republic and rejects the existence of the *praetor maximus* and of the primitive college of praetors, considering them to be an invention of the antiquarian tradition (without, however, even knowing the reasons for this “invention”).

- 7 The exact date of this measure is disputed, for Livy puts it at 326 BC, whereas Dionysius of Halicarnassus (16.5.9) and Valerius Maximus (6.1.6) place it after the disaster of the Caudine Forks, and Varro (*ling.* 7.105) dates it back to 313 BC.
- 8 Livy 6.5.8 (in 387 BC); 7.15.12 (in 358 BC); 8.17.11 (in 332 BC); 9.20.5 (in 318 BC); 10.9.14 (299 BC); *per.* 19.15 (in 241 BC).

Cross-References

See CHAPTER 24: THE BEGINNINGS OF THE REPUBLIC FROM 509 TO 390 BC; CHAPTER 25: FROM 390 BC TO SENTINUM: DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY LIVIAN HISTORY

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Further Reading

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Part VII

Books 21-45: From the Second Punic War to Pydna

Chapter 27

Rome and Carthage in Livy

Dexter Hoyos

Livy treated the Punic Wars amply: four books narrated the First Punic War (16–18, now lost) and then the Second Punic War (21–30); then three more told of the Third Punic War (49–51, again lost). In Roman tradition, the Second Punic War was a time of heroes—above all, Fabius the Delayer, Marcellus, and Scipio—who with their countrymen were tested to the limit by the vengeful figure of the Carthaginian Hannibal. Livy's own narrative contributes to this heroic picture, and is often seen as painting only that picture. In reality, he presents a much more nuanced portrayal.

Livy's Sources

Polybius, as what survives of his *Histories* show, was one of Livy's principal sources and at times is followed very closely—for instance, in much of Livy's narratives of Hannibal's march to Italy and of Scipio's capture of New Carthage (21.26–38; 26.41–51). Nevertheless, Livy is happy to add items from elsewhere to Polybian material. In a notorious case (21.31–32), his account of Hannibal's advance up the Rhône from “the Island” to the Alps, mainly Polybian, is complemented from elsewhere by the names of three Gallic peoples to mark out the route (Polybius' account being serenely name-free), then by an accurate description of the Durance river, and next by an elaborately fanciful depiction of the Alps in the depths of severe winter even though he knows that Hannibal crossed in autumn (21.35.6)—insertions that throw his own narrative-sequence into such disarray as to nourish forever scholars' and amateurs' never-satisfied quest to identify Hannibal's route and pass.

In places, Livy deliberately ditches Polybius' version in preference for another's: for instance, supplying a detailed, and in places plainly invented—not to mention chronologically distorted—story of the siege of Saguntum, rather than simply repeat Polybius' one-paragraph report (21.7–9, 11–15; Pol. 3.17). Later, he ignores the *Histories'* verbatim copy of Hannibal's treaty with Philip V of Macedon in favor of a pro-Roman travesty that makes the two allies more satisfyingly predatory at Rome's expense (Pol. 7.9; Livy 23.33.9–12; Walbank, *Commentary* 2.42–56; Huss 1985, 342–344; Seibert 1993, 240–246; Lancel 1995, 193–195). In one of his strangest choices, he passes over what Polybius clearly reported (Pol. 15.1.1)—that the Romans ratified Scipio's peace treaty with Carthage in 203 BC. Instead, Scipio's friend Laelius, escorting the Punic envoys to Rome, speaks there against ratification, on the

ground that Hannibal has left Italy, and Scipio's treaty is rejected (30.21–23).

Although Polybius knew, and perhaps drew on, the accounts by Hannibal's long-serving Greek literary companions Silenus and Sosylus, Livy gives no sign of having looked at these for the third decade. Other sources he did use were the first Roman historians, Fabius Pictor and Cincius Alimentus—contemporaries of Hannibal, Cincius in fact a prisoner of his for a time—as well as the late-second-century BC Coelius Antipater (the first historian to devote a work solely to the war), and, from the generation before Livy, the annalists Claudius Quadrigarius and Valerius Antias. A widespread opinion is that these later three were his prime informants, along with Polybius (in another, less common view he knew even Polybius only through Coelius), and that he rarely looked up earlier authors directly. Certainly, he cites Cincius, Fabius, the mid-second-century annalist Piso, Claudius, and Polybius only once apiece in the third decade (Cincius 21.38.3–7; Fabius 22.7.4; Claudius 25.39.12; Piso 25.39.15; and Polybius 30.45.5 with the famously tepid “by no means a source to be disregarded”), but by contrast Coelius and Valerius often. Since all of them are lost save Polybius and not even his *Histories* survive complete, a firm judgment is not possible. Yet, when Livy cites one of these other sources, it is to disagree with its version of events or mention it as one of several competing versions—often implying doubt. That does not suggest that he relies on them more extensively than on Polybius.¹

Livy's Roman sources between them provided immensely detailed material on Rome's political, administrative, military, religious, social, and even economic history between 219 and 201 BC, as they did for the ensuing decades. Much or most of it was probably processed by the annalists from earlier writers and from the published *Annales Maximi*, the year-by-year chronicle kept by the pontiffs (Badian 1966), but again it cannot be ruled out that Livy looked up some of those writers for himself. On the Carthaginian side, naturally, his details are thin—Carthage was not his focus—and nearly all his reports on affairs there concern military matters. For Hannibal's momentous sufeteship in 196 BC (33.45–48), he had access to a fairly detailed and Hannibal-friendly account, but gives no hint about whose it was (directly or indirectly, perhaps from Silenus or Sosylus, both of whom stayed with Hannibal “as long as fortune permitted”: Nepos, *Hannibal* 13.3), but he is obviously happy to use it.

The Vices of the Carthaginians

Although Carthage is mentioned occasionally in earlier surviving books, notably when treaty-relations with Rome are registered, Livy's first considered view of the Punic state and people came at the start of the lost Book 16. He told of the “origin of the Carthaginians and the early times of their city” (so its *periocha* summarizes). Where he found the details is unidentifiable: Polybius

seems not to have written any such survey, but the third-century Sicilian historian Timaeus was available and so too was Philinus of Agrigentum, the pro-Punic historian of the First Punic War. Of course, Livy might have got their information second-hand from Fabius Pictor, Cincius, or the like. If the *periochae* can be trusted, the Carthaginians were one of only two foreign peoples in all of *Ab Urbe Condita* to receive a survey-portrayal, the Germans being the other, in Book 104; sadly, neither survives. However, there was no such survey of Macedon or the Seleucid empire, the Parthians or the Gauls, formidable enemies though these had been too. In turn, the epitome of Book 51 may hint at a lost Livian obituary for Carthage: “Scipio Aemilianus at last stormed the city, in the seven hundredth year after it had been founded,” a suggestively solemn time-phrase. The symbolic status of Carthage as foe *par excellence* explains also his fellow-Augustan Vergil's anachronic diversion of Aeneas to Carthage, to romance and then reject its foundress Dido and set up an ageless enmity between her nation and his unborn one.²

“Pitiless cruelty, a treachery worse than Punic, no regard for truth and no integrity, no fear of the gods or respect for an oath, and no scruples” (21.3.9): in Livy's extant books, Hannibal, the Carthaginian *par excellence*, conveniently embodies most of what later ages liked to dislike in his obliterated people. Punic *crudelitas* was a commonplace—Carthaginians crucified their failed generals and (Greeks and Romans claimed) constantly sacrificed children to their gods. Hannibal's contemporary Ennius was disgusted at both, complaining of Carthaginians' “wicked arrogance” (“*iniqua superbia*,” *Annales* 237, 282W = 215, 287 Skutsch). Just as bad, they were endowed with excess of *astutia*, and were proverbial among Greeks and Romans for duplicity, a commonplace that Plautus annexes for comic effect in his *Poenulus* (Syed 2005, 367–370). From duplicity to treachery was an easy transition: *perfidia/fraus Punica* had a long Roman pedigree. Cato the Censor paraded it in his *Origines* in the context of alleged treaty-breaches down to the attack on Saguntum in 219 BC (*Orig.* 84P), and he was at it again at the end of his life, claiming fresh breaches to justify his demand “*Carthaginem delendam esse*.” Even an early love-poet, Laevius, complained of “*Poeni foedifragi*” (Gell. *NA* 19.7.6; cf. Cic., *Off.* 1.12.38, from Laevius?).³

Unsurprisingly, therefore, these and other evil traits keep appearing in Livy's account of the Second Punic War. During a truce in 203 BC, the Carthaginians attack a beached Roman supply convoy and then on ships bearing Scipio's envoys (30.24.5–25.10). Inevitably, Hannibal practices military *fraus* (e.g., 21.6.12; 22.48.1; 27.33.9–10; 30.31.3), and is unpleasantly prone to *perfidia*—attacking Saguntum in violation of Rome's treaty with Hasdrubal, chaining up prisoners after Trasimene whom a subordinate had promised to release, and dishonoring almost immediately his guarantee of Capua's autonomy (21.2.7; 21.6.3–5; 22.6.11–12; 23.7.4–12, 10.3–9). *Inhumana crudelitas* features too, as in the savagery visited upon Victumulae despite its

capitulation and the petulant crucifying of a hapless Campanian guide, not to mention burning alive the innocent family of the defector Dasius Altinius of Arpi (21.57.13–14; 22.13.5–9; 24.45.13–14; cf. Walsh 1961, 104–105; Levene 2010, 216, 228). Looting the venerated temple of Feronia near Rome and later massacring recalcitrant soldiers in the sanctuary of Lacinian Juno could, of course, be expected from a man with “no fear of the gods” (26.11.8–10, 30.20.5–6). Hannibal’s undoubted fondness for money (Pol. 9.25, 26.11) —a fondness shared by many a Roman, Cato included—is not mentioned in the opening character sketch, but is emphasized as an extra motive for killing Dasius’ rich family, and Livy assures us later on that he was “temperamentally prone to greed and cruelty” (26.38.3).⁴

It has become quite commonplace, in turn, to see the Livian Hannibal as a deliberately chosen literary and moral precursor of Cicero’s and Sallust’s Catiline, sometimes also to Jugurtha in Sallust’s portrayal (Rossi 2004, 376–377; O’Gorman 2009, 238–239; Levene 2010, 99–105). The fact is that Hannibal invaded Italy and won numerous victories against the Roman state —neither of which Catiline did; he sought not to overthrow Rome’s established government or become ruler in its place (both of which were of course Catiline’s alleged aims), but to make honorable terms with it; he then returned home to benefit his own city with political and economic reforms. Finally, he died in exiled old age by his own hand—nothing like the great conspirator, whom the authorities handily suppressed within three or four months in 63–62 BC. Accordingly, the comparison boils essentially down to a few similarities of phrasing in Livy, Cicero, and Sallust, and the truism that both men opposed Rome and supposedly sought to destroy her (although Livy’s Hannibal does not actually seek this: his well-attested oath is entirely different from Catiline’s lurid oath of conspiracy, reported skeptically by Sallust (*Cat.* 22). To try to see Livy’s Hannibal instead as the enemy of Carthage on the strength of a bitter oration that Livy gives to Hanno the Great early on (21.10), stretches credulity yet further.⁵

Carthage: Virtues and Victimization

So far, so bad. However, Livy’s Carthaginians are equivocally depicted. For one thing, the indictment of Hannibal is subverted even before it begins: Book 21 opens with the famous story of his oath to “Jupiter” (presumably Baal Hamon) against friendship with Rome, and it becomes clear across Books 21–39 that this was one vow the general took seriously. Although Livy first gives it in the tendentious propaganda form “to be an enemy to the Roman people as soon as he could” (21.1.4), much later in the exiled general’s speech to Antiochus the Great it takes the form relayed by Polybius and Nepos, “never to be a friend of the Roman people” (35.19.3; Pol. 3.11.7–8; Nep., *Hann.* 2.4–5). Next, after affirming with four rhetorical negatives the man’s utter lack of religious scruple, Livy quietly records him early in 218 BC visiting the temple

of Hercules (Melqart) at Gades, both to fulfill “past vows” and to make “new ones” (21.21.9). Nor is the ensuing story of his famous dream (21.22.6–9) anything but the report of a strong religious experience (cf. Miles 2011, 270–272). Even as he readies for suicide 35 years later, he calls on the gods to witness his betrayal by his host Prusias of Bithynia (39.51.12).

Other vices, too, go missing at times. Inhumanity, for example: after Trasimene, he tries hard, if unsuccessfully, to locate the consul Flaminius' body for burial (22.7.5); later, he does find and honor the remains of the slain Gracchus and Marcellus (26.17.4–7, 27.28.1). The day after Cannae, he addresses his Roman prisoners mildly for the first time: “his war with the Romans was not a fight to the death but a struggle for honour and power”—an axiom that Scipio himself will echo (22.58.2–3; 28.19.6–7). Livy ignores tales told by others: a river bridged with the corpses of murdered prisoners, senators of Acerrae and Nuceria asphyxiated after being promised their lives, and Polybius' story (9.24.5–8) of Hannibal receiving advice in 219 BC—and rejecting the advice, which in fact proved nonsensical—that his troops would have to become cannibals to reach Italy. Livy gives the corpse-bridging and cannibalistic claims to Varro in a woebegone speech post-Cannae, one so full of other falsities and baseless pessimism that the reader readily realizes the emptiness of everything Varro says (23.5.4–15).

Livy recognizes Hannibal's inspiring leadership of men in a well-known encomium (28.12.1–9). It is based on Polybius (Pol. 11.19.1–5), but a totally antagonistic Livy could have ignored Polybius again. In their famous colloquy before Zama, it is a war-wise and almost avuncular general who both lauds and admonishes the confident Scipio, whose stiffly cool reply gives Hannibal's words, in retrospect, further emotive impact (30.30, 31). After Zama, Hannibal fights again—this time for peace against the continuing bellicosity of many fellow-citizens (30.37.7–10). We learn of him during the war talking over his exploits with at least one Roman prisoner, the historian-to-be Cincius Alimentus; and in exile at Ephesus conversing amiably with a Roman ambassador; or as Claudius Quadrigarius says—Livy is skeptical—amiably and flatteringly with Scipio himself (21.38.3–5; 34.14.2–12).

In the postwar books, Hannibalic vices rarely appear. His postwar trajectory continues an entropy that began in Book 26 with the fall of Capua. Though still hating the Romans, as he assures Antiochus, he is no longer a serious enemy to them. Still more strikingly, Hannibal grows in human stature as his greatness shrinks. His sufeteship and exile are reported in entirely favorable terms (33.45–49), and even though he then serves Antiochus, there is little Livian rancor in the telling. At the end, we find a fallen hero persecuted to suicide by Rome, whose debasement he denounces (39.51; cf., satirically, Juvenal 10.147–167). To make the arch-amoralist denounce amorality can look like authorial irony, yet Livy gives no sign that he intends this. Hannibal has become a victim, even an almost pitied victim.

The same holds for his city. No longer a feared enemy, Carthage is first sidelined, then bullied. After the pivotal episode of Hannibal's suffectship in 196–195 BC, she earns mention mainly in subservient roles: making indemnity payments and grain-gifts, being accused by Masinissa of colluding with Macedon, contributing a handful of warships to Roman fleets, and appealing for redress against Masinissa's territorial rapes—appeals that are rarely successful. In the epitomes after Book 45, amid the reports about Masinissa's mounting depredations and allegations of illicit Punic war-plans, the cold and then harsh attitude of Rome toward her, and Masinissa's Machiavellianism, which Livy himself candidly stresses in Book 42, are clear. So too is the city's desperate resourcefulness during the Third Punic War, confirming Carthage as the tragically worthy adversary, and prey, of the expanding empire.⁶

Rome's Heroic Virtues

Livy's concepts and attitudes toward his own republic are well explored in other chapters of this volume. Patriotically positive overall about the heroic and exemplary qualities of older times (“there has never existed any commonwealth greater in power, with a purer morality, or more fertile in good examples; or any state in which avarice and luxury have been so late in making their inroads, or poverty and frugality so highly and continuously honoured, showing so clearly that the less wealth men possessed the less they coveted,” *Praef.* 11, tr. Canon Roberts), he admires the stalwarts who fought Carthage. The aftermath of Cannae prompts one of his best-known remarks: “there is surely no other nation that would not have been crushed by such an overwhelming disaster” (22.54.10). Earlier, he explains the loyalty of Rome's allies against the invaders in gushing terms: “evidently because the authority to which they were subject was just and tolerant, and they did not refuse obedience to a superior people—the only real bond of loyalty” (22.13.11). A suspicious reader might again diagnose ironic subversiveness here, for, after Cannae, Livy lists the many Italian peoples who did now defect (22.61.11–12); but if the gushing earlier exclamation is covert self-deconstruction, it is remarkably covert. His enthusiasm by contrast is still more overt when he tells of Romans' wise choice in a critical consular election (26.22.14):

So much for the disdain some feel for admirers of the past! If there does exist a philosopher state somewhere—a product of our scholars' imagination rather than their knowledge—I certainly would not believe its leaders could be more serious-minded or restrained in their ambition, or the commons more principled, than in this case.

The same selfless patriotism appears in the universally positive response given, “with no senatorial edict and no pressure from a magistrate,” to the consul Laevinus' appeal for citizens to contribute their own funds to meet Rome's military efforts (26.36.12).

So too with Rome's leaders. Fabius Maximus, stoically continuing his delaying tactics though bitterly maligned at Rome, vindicates himself on campaign in such manner that not only does his bumptious colleague Minucius enact a public contrition but Fabius is, in Livy's own phrase, "lauded to the heavens" both at Rome and in the enemy camp (22.29–30). In an anecdote meant to be uplifting, however stilted and stagey, he lauds his son who, at the time he was consul, asserted consular *dignitas* even over his father (24.44.9–10). In Fabius' obituary, Livy approvingly quotes Ennius' famous aphorism: "one man restored our fortunes by delaying" (30.26.9).

Marcellus is another powerful figure. That he defeated Hannibal in a clash in 215 BC is doubted by the historian himself (23.16.12–16), yet he still compliments Marcellus handsomely because this was Hannibal's first Roman defeat: "the achievement of that day was enormous, and possibly the greatest of that war." Marcellus' honorable *comitas* transforms a hostile Nolan aristocrat into a lastingly loyal ally (23.15.7–16.1); and his historical and cultural sensibilities lead him to shed tears over the impending fate of Syracuse, deplore the killing of Archimedes, and honor the slain savant's remains (25.24.11–15, 31.9–10). He refuses to hold a grudge against the Sicilians, who afterward complain to the Senate about his harshness to them (26.32.8).

Scipio Africanus' praises in Livy are more striking still. Not once but twice he is characterized as the war's *fatalis dux*—the fate-chosen leader: a description not granted, in extant Books, to any other figure save the half-legendary Camillus (22.53.6, 30.28.11; 5.19.2). His first exploit is heroically saving his father's life at the Ticinus (21.46.8–10, discounting Coelius Antipater's credit of it to a slave attendant); his next, shaming downcast fellow-officers after Cannae into fulfilling their duty to Rome (22.53). An unbroken series of victories in Spain is matched by generosity, modesty—refusing ecstatic Spanish acclamations as king (27.19.3–6; and "*sensere etiam barbari magnitudinem animi*")—and sexual continence, illustrated in an episode with a future in European art (26.50.1–13). After the war, he strives lengthily though unsuccessfully to save Hannibal from being victimized at Carthage (33.47.4–5).⁷ Other Hannibalic-era leaders receive friendly treatment too, from the elder Scipios and L. Marcius to Claudius Nero.

Rome: Pragmatic Ruthlessness

Yet, Livy does not narrate uncritically. The Romans sometimes fall into undignified panic, for instance, at the news of Trasimene (22.7.6–7), and later at Hannibal's march on the city—especially when a body of Numidian cavalry appears unexplained in the streets (26.9.6–8, 10.5–8; in fact defectors to Rome). In terror after Cannae, they descend to ritual human sacrifice, "a rite not at all Roman" (22.57.6). Antagonism surfaces between the elite,

represented especially by the Senate, and ordinary citizens: in 218 BC, the demagogic Flaminius is the only senator to back the controversial *lex Claudia*; then, as consul in 217 BC, he continues an ill-omened feud with his peers (21.63.3–4; 22.3.9–14). Fabius' delaying strategy—which Livy plainly depicts as correct—provokes the angry citizenry first to make the master of horse Minucius equal in *imperium* (22.25.1–26.7), and then to accept a tribune's bitter attacks on Senate and *nobiles* for provoking the war and then dragging it out *fraude*, making the lowborn incompetent Varro one consul for 216 BC (34.1–35.7); readers know what that will entail. Embers of such antagonism flare up a decade later, when a pugnacious tribune launches an attack “not only against Marcellus [he being his pet hate], but against the nobility as a whole” for dragging out the war “through treachery and delay” (“*fraude et cunctatione*,” 27.21.1–3): though now it takes only a firm riposte from Marcellus to squelch him.

There are other vices too among wartime Romans, such as the profiteering from supply contracts given (despite their known criminality) to the well-connected *publicani* Postumius and Pomponius. Not only do they massively defraud the state and its armies, but, when found guilty, they organize a concerted riot by fellow-*publicani* to intimidate the authorities into overturning the verdict; the consuls and Senate have to intervene (25.3–4). The historian perhaps tries to make this devious duo look slightly less Roman by emphasizing their Etruscan hometowns—Pyrgi and Veii—but their influence and high-ranking connections are soon made clear (Postumius was a kinsman of a plebeian tribune, Servilius Casca, ancestor of 44 BC's “envious Casca”). Livy does much the same with the ringleaders of a military mutiny in Spain, noting that one was from Cales (in Campania) and the other from Umbria (28.24.13), but he does not hide that they were Romans.

Roman soldiers often act without scruple if pressed by fear or greed—slaughtering the suspect inhabitants of Casilinum (23.18.10), and later of Enna in Sicily (24.38–39: Enna “retained by an act that was heinous, or necessary,” 39.7). Despite the Syracusans surrendering peacefully to Marcellus, their city is plundered amid “many instances of atrocities committed from anger and from greed”—including Archimedes' murder (25.31.9–10). Capturing Iliturgi in Spain after a bloodthirsty pep talk by Scipio, the troops slaughter even babies (28.19–20); at Astapa, due to “the greed inherent in human nature,” they struggle to extract gold and silver treasures from the flames, only to suffer horrific injuries themselves (28.23.3–4). Scipio's ensuing illness emboldens restive contingents at Sucro to mutiny for an end to their toils; he requires a degree of cunning, and a very long speech, to quell the sedition (28.24–29).⁸

Nor do Livy's Roman leaders always hew to conventional *mos maiorum*. Outside Casilinum, Marcellus ignores a *de facto* armistice between his fellow-consul Fabius and the defenders and seizes the town by force (24.19.8–10); in

Sicily, he condones the Enna massacre because he judges it a useful deterrent to the Sicilians—wrongly, for instead it encourages defections (24.39.7–8); and he allows rapine and slaughter at Syracuse despite previous kind words to its surrendering citizens (25.25.7, 31.8–11). Worse, we are told later that the vast plunder from the city “was what first started the appreciation for Greek works of art, and the license we now see in the widespread looting of all things sacred and profane,” ultimately to the Romans' own harm (25.40.1–2). Livy, at more length than Polybius, criticizes the general for the carelessness that costs him his life in a Punic ambush: it was out of keeping with his age and experience, and it nearly cast the *res publica* over the precipice (27.27.11; cf. Pol. 10.32.7).⁹

Scipio, in his turn, is full of non-Roman features, beginning with his lifelong ostentatious piety, an ostentation that Livy describes with wry skepticism (26.19.1–9). The young leader is ruthless when it comes to slaughtering foes, such as at Iliturgi and Astapa, and to ruthlessness he can add his own *fraus*, in the sham peace talks with Hasdrubal and Syphax outside Utica before his night attack annihilates their camps and soldiers (30.3–6). As with Polybius, Livy tries to absolve him from any charge of treachery, but his discomfort at the double-dealing can be divined (30.4.9–10; cf. Pol. 14.1–3). The nastiest episode of Scipio's wartime career is the Pleminius affair at Locri in 205 BC: Scipio neither punishes nor even disciplines his vicious subordinate, but instead punishes the victims, a scandal that Livy exposes fully in his lengthy account, even though the general is ultimately not prosecuted (29.9.8–12, 16.4–21.13).

Livy's Intentions

The simplest way to account for these varying depictions would be to see Livy as unskilled at recognizing incongruities apart from small items of detail (such as who did save the elder P. Scipio's life, or how much booty was taken at New Carthage [26.49.1–6]), as unworried by such issues, or as unable to devise how they might be reconciled or disguised. More subtly, D.S. Levene holds that he deliberately presents the paradox of Romans behaving badly in *Ab Urbe Condita* (21–30) so as to break—though clumsily at times—both the traditional mold of heroic stereotyping and the traditional historiographical concepts of time and causality. In this analysis, Livy aims to show the corruption of ancient morality beginning not in the late Republic but as early as the Hannibalic War, with Fabius using Hannibalic *artes* against Hannibal, Scipio showing uncomfortable similarities to Alexander the Great and Hannibal, and (worst of all) Marcellus in Sicily behaving like a prefigure of Verres and then infecting Rome with profligate admiration for Greek art. This analysis, which also envisages Livy consistently presenting a demolition—one never noticed before—of Polybius' views and methodology, in effect welcomes him as a deconstructionist, or perhaps semiotician, ahead of his

Yet, presenting unflattering behavior by otherwise admired Romans is not new to the third decade, nor is criticism of and praise for a bitter foe. In Book 6, Rome's other *fatalis dux*, Camillus, makes something of a fool of himself late in life by fruitlessly opposing inevitable reforms. In Books 9 and 10, the heroic ancestor of Fabius the Delayer, Fabius Rullianus, has furious and rather self-indulgent fallings-out with both Papirius Cursor, his equal in military prowess, and later his own good friend Decius Mus, who afterward sacrifices his life for Roman victory. Domestic and sex crimes are recorded, including a mass poisoning of aristocratic husbands by their evil wives; corruption of public life by aristocratic cliques and factions is decried more than once; and even fourth-century soldiers fall into vice and mutiny. Rome's inveterate foes—the Samnites—are depicted as performing frightful rituals when conscripting their armies, but their valiant and doomed resistance to Rome earns the historian's clear admiration soon after.¹¹

Given the moral ambiguities of Books 6–10, it might seem logical to infer that Livy dates the beginnings of Rome's loss of moral compass from 390 BC on—leaving only her first three and a half centuries to be the era lauded in the preface as fully admirable, and as the one when “dominion was both acquired and extended” (*Praef.* 9); after 390 would then come *labes morum* (collapse of morality) and the inexorable slide to perdition. Yet, it is scarcely plausible so to interpret the *Ab Urbe Condita*, and hardly less so to view Livy's third-decade Rome as already corrupt enough to be the launch pad of moral devastation. There are other possibilities. Livy as master of counter-historical “faction” is one: he depicts Hannibal as irreligious and an oath-breaker, yet effectively negates these accusations both in advance and in the sequel (21.4.9–10 *versus* 21.1.4, 21.21.9); therefore, from the very start, Livy arguably issues covert yet emphatic signals that his treatment of Hannibal is not to be taken at face value. And since he also entitles us to question his depiction of Scipio, Marcellus, and other Romans, we might entertain the possibility that Livy intends the entire decade to be viewed as counterintuitive anti-history—a verdict not far removed from Levene's, and with Livy virtually anticipating Lucian's *True History* or the later biographies in the *Historia Augusta*. Of course, this would devalue if not destroy his value as a historical source, but it would reveal *Ab Urbe Condita* as a very advanced, indeed very modern, work of literature.¹²

A more plausible interpretation is that, in Books 21–30, Livy certainly holds Rome and the Romans in high regard, offers us Greek and Roman stereotypes of Carthage and Hannibal, yet also deliberately includes other—and plentiful—material that sharply modifies both treatments. He thus shows himself alive to the important truth that idealized portraiture (stereotypes still more so) are never the whole story in real situations. Hannibal still commits crimes down to Book 30, but Livy's variety of presentation makes him no more a

standardized villain than Scipio's vividly depicted qualities make him an unquestioned Roman saint. The same holds for Marcellus, who, in Books 23–28, is a realistic and believable blend of indomitable courage, pragmatic ruthlessness mixed with sentiment (those tears outside Syracuse), and charismatic prowess. It is less convincing to see the decade's chief characters as stereotypes of idealized virtues or of moral (or immoral) traits, with contrary aspects downplayed; or to infer that, when moving characters such as Marcellus, Scipio, or the feisty, if lesser, figure of M. Livius Salinator from one situation to another—military operations, political activity, Senate transactions, and the like—Livy conceptualizes and wants us to see each man in terms of successive conventional stereotypes (rash/cautious general, ideal hero/suspect Hellenizer, bad senator/good consul).¹³

Rather than taking on a novelist's role of exploring and dramatizing inner thoughts and feelings, Livy instead reports actions both good and bad, empowering the reader to create in his or her own mind a composite portrait of a humanly complex character—although in places still trying to guide the reader's views via the artificial (and un-novelistic) device of set speeches or by playing down a discreditable act (thus, Scipio attacks the enemy camps only after supposedly informing Hasdrubal and Syphax that talks are at an end [30.4.8–10], a claim unmentioned by Livy's main source Polybius, and almost certainly invented). Livius Salinator, one of the victors at the Metaurus, is in turn a striking example of a lesser character brought to life. Full of *amour-propre* and injured dignity, but testily prepared to serve the republic in crisis, even if it means cooperating with the loathed (by him) Claudius Nero, then later as censor with Nero quarrelling with him again and resorting to near-farcical actions—he transfers Nero and almost the entire citizen body to the lowest census-ranking, *aerarii*—Salinator is a splendidly idiosyncratic nonconformist, nevertheless, with qualities that repeatedly earn his countrymen's trust.¹⁴

Most figures with limited roles do get much shorter shrift, especially the disaster-sowing quartet in Books 21–22, Sempronius Longus, Flaminius, Minucius, and Varro, but one-dimensionality is virtually imposed on them because of their briefer roles. The same is true of most of the Carthaginians. Hanno the Great keeps proffering Cassandraesque prophecies of disaster; Hasdrubal, brother of Hannibal, is a resilient but not very talented commander; the cavalry general Maharbal is notable for one bitter comment (“You know how to win a battle, Hannibal; you do not know how to use the victory!” [22.51.4]); and Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, is known largely for his talent at being regularly defeated by Scipio and as the father of Sophoniba. Only Hannibal's youngest brother Mago stands out more vividly, thanks to his energy and ruthlessness.¹⁵

Livy's tempered handling of the topic of Rome and Carthage allows him both to feel partiality toward his own people—for him, the “good guys” win the

Second Punic War, and just possibly they were still the good guys in the Third Punic War—and, at the same time, to present the two sides in a more realistic and balanced light. In Book 26, indeed, he pauses to give an evenhanded assessment of how each saw its situation in 210 BC, when each believed that fortune might still swing in their favor (26.37): it is no longer—if it ever was—white-hatted Rome versus black-hatted Carthage, but a contest between equals in strength, resolution, and (though he does not say so outright) other qualities. Even if Livy's faults in coping with issues military, diplomatic, and chronological cause readers significant problems about *wie es eigentlich gewesen* (a concept less highly rated now in historiographical criticism), he employs greater integrity and insight in narrating the two peoples and their leaders than he is often given credit for.

Notes

- 1 Translations from Books 21–30 are by J. C. Yardley, with author's permission. Hannibal's route: recently Hoyos 2006; W. C. Mahaney et al., in *Archaeometry* 52 (2010), 1096–1109, a geomorphological study. Livy citing Coelius Antipater: 21.38.7, 46.10, and 47.4; 22.31.8–9, 23.6.8, 26.11.10, 27.27.13, 28.46.14, 29.27.14 and 35.2 (criticized or disbelieved; cited as one of several sources). Valerius: 25.39.14, 26.49.3 and 5, 28.46.14, 29.35.4, 30.19.11 and 29.7. See also note 9 in this chapter.
- 2 Vergil's Dido-Aeneas episode: contrast Hardie 2005, 89, “Aeneas' diversion from his epic track at Carthage in Book 4 is an errancy into the world of elegiac lovers that defines itself as not-epic, not-Roman.” Possible obituary: cf. Tacitus, *Hist.* 3.34 on Cremona's destruction—“this was the decease of Cremona in the two hundred and eighty-sixth year from its beginning. It had been founded in the consulship of Ti. Sempronius and P. Cornelius,” etc. (author's translation).
- 3 Carthage's image in Latin literature: Dubuisson 1992; Levene 2010, 214–217. Cato instigating the Third Punic War: e.g., Astin 1978, 125–130, 283–292; Dubuisson 1989; Miles 2010, 335–339; cf. Le Bohec 2011, 431–435. *Carthaginem delendam esse* (a phrase Cato never uttered in this form): Little 1934; O'Gorman 2004, holds that “the temporality of *Carthago delenda* makes of Cato's speech an address to the future” (120). Something could surely be made of the notable assonance *Carthago/Cato*, the names of the city, and of its effective destroyer: compare C. S. Kraus (in Harrison 2005, 246–247) exploring *ver/vir/vor* patterns in Caesar, *Gallie War* 5.44.
- 4 Corpse-bridges: Valerius Maximus 9.2 ext. 2; Silius 8.668–9 (specifying the Aufidus); Florus 1.22.18 (the Vergellius); Appian, *Hannibalica* 28.121. Acerran and Nucernian senators murdered: Val. Max. 9.6 ext. 2; Dio, frg. 57.30 = Zonaras 9.2.

- 5 Hannibal foe to his own city: J. Clauss, “*Domestici hostes: The Nausicaa in Medea, the Catiline in Hannibal*,” *Materiali e Discussioni per l'analisi dei testi classici* 39 (1997) 165–185. Viewing Scipio as a Roman Hannibal, again a forewarning of decline and Catiline (Rossi 2004, especially 362–376, 378–380), falls into the Clauss-category.
- 6 Carthage in Books 31–45: 32.2.1–4, 36.4.7 and 9 (indemnity); 36.4.5–9, 43.6.11–14 (grain); 34.60–61 (Aristo affair); 36.42.2 and 44.5–7, 42.56.6 (warships). Masinissa's harassments: 33.47.8, 34.61.16–62.18, 40.17.1–6 and 34.14, 41.22.1–3, 42.23.1–24.10, *Per.* 47, 48, 49. His *realpolitik*: 42.29.8–10.
- 7 The “continence of Scipio”: cf. 17 paintings from 1555 to 1848 listed at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allucius> (accessed 13/12/2012). Livy and Scipio: Mineo 2006, 68, 103, 296–314, seeing Livy's Scipio prefiguring Augustus (308–314). Elder Scipios lauded, 25.36.14–16; L. Marcius' exploits in Spain, 25.37–40 (with an extraordinary omen of divine favor, 25.39.16), cf. 26.20.3; Claudius Nero's boldness, 27.43.6–7; Metaurus victory equal to Cannae, 27.49.5; massive rejoicings at Rome, 27.50.9–51.9.
- 8 Panic episodes are fewer, however, than in *Ab Urbe Condita* (6–10) where Roman terror at bad news is a rather overdone motif (6.2, 28; 7.3, 17, 21; 8.29, 39; 9.38, 39, 43; 10.1, 4, 10, 11, 13, 26). By 21–30 it was of course harder to use the motif casually. Mineo 2006, 45–54, stresses Livy's contrasts between the ruling elite's rational responses and the masses' tendency to react irrationally. Slaughtering babies reviled by Romans when done by someone else: Justin 26.1.7; Ziolkowski 1993, 73.
- 9 Livy's language (“*primum initium ... licentiaeque hinc sacra profanaque omnia vulgo spoliandi*”) may be echoing Sallust's at *Catiline* 11.5–8, “for the first time a Roman army acquired the habit of ... defiling all things sacred and profane” (“*insuevit exercitus populi Romani ... sacra profanaque omnia polluere*”)—but certainly contradicts Sallust, who originates such *licentia* only in the time of Sulla and the looting of Asia. Levene wishes Livy to echo Cicero (2 *Verr.* 5.1.1 “C. Verres in Sicilia sacra profanaque omnia et privatim et publice spoliavit”), so as to associate Marcellus with the villainous governor (Levene 2010, 124–125; also 197–214 on Marcellus). Yet, with *sacra profana*, a cliché combination (cf. Cic. 2*Verr.* 4.2, 120; *Invent.* 1.26.38; Horace, *Epist.* 1.16.54, *Ars P.* 397; Livy 24.47.16, 26.34.12, 31.46.4; Ovid, *Met.* 3.710; Pliny, *NH* 2.115; Tacitus, *Ann.* 1.51, *Hist.* 3.33, 5.4; Minucius Felix, *Octavius* 5), it is hazardous to assume Livy echoing some particular predecessor. On the baleful impact of Marcellus introducing Greek art to Romans, see Mineo 2006, 293–296.
- 10 Livy and his sources: e.g., J. D. Duff, *A Literary History of Rome* (3rd

- edn., 1953), 1.470–3; Walsh 1967, 121–123; S. P. Oakley in Chaplin and Kraus 2009, 439–460 (chiefly on Books 6–10); J. Briscoe, *ibid.*, 461–475 (on Books 31–33). Livy's deliberately but clumsily challenging character-stereotypes: Levene 2010, 164–260 (“one-dimensional” portrayals, 166; inconsistent character-traits, 185–196). Livy's Marcellus: Levene 123–126, 197–214; Scipio, 116–123, 231–235, 307; on Livy's approach to causation, Levene 2010, 274–300, 317–392; alleged covert criticisms of Polybius, e.g., Levene 2010, 152–159, 270–276, 300–302.
- 11 Camillus, 6.38, 42; Rullianus quarrelling, 8.30–35, 10.24; Roman crimes, e.g., 6.14–20 (Manlius' sedition), 8.15 (Vestal *incestum*), 8.18 (murders); 8.28, 10.31 (sexual depravity); cliques, 7.32, 9.26, 9.41; seditious army, 7.38–41; Samnites, 10.31, 38.
 - 12 Vigorous skepticism about Livy and other Roman historians as conscious postmoderns: Lendon 2009.
 - 13 See also, Walsh 1961, 100, 102–103, 109 (Livy depicts Roman leaders as “the embodiment of the Stoic virtues,” history as “dominated by idealized heroes and denigrated villains”); Levene 2010, 165 (character-development “almost entirely absent”), 180 (unexplained “lurches of character”), 186 (“we need to see each character according to the roles that he plays in a dynamic system of interactions with other characters”). A more sympathetic view of Livy's character-portrayals: J.-E. Bernard, *Le Portrait chez Tite-Live* (Bruxelles, 2000), esp. 163–303; cf. Mineo 2006, 255–291.
 - 14 Livy palliating Scipio's attack on the camps: Walsh 1961, 98; Scullard 1970, 125–126; Burck 2009, 282–284; contrast Levene, 233.
 - 15 Idiosyncrasies of Livius Salinator (27.34.3–15, 35.5–9, 40.8–9; 29.37.8–17) judged as switching from stereotype to stereotype: Levene, 167–170, 185–196. Hanno's gloom: 21.3.2–4.1, 10.1–11.3; 23.12–13; 30.42.15. Vigorous Mago: 21.54–55; 25.32, 35–36; 28.12–13, 23, 27, 37, 46; 29.5; 30.18–19.

Cross-References

See CHAPTER 3: PORTRAITS OF PEOPLE; CHAPTER 10: LIVY'S POLITICAL AND MORAL VALUES AND THE PRINCIPATE; Chapter 11: LIVY'S HISTORICAL PHILOSOPHY

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Chapter 28

Livy: Overseas Wars

Giovanni Brizzi and Giambattista Cairo

The departure point for discussing Rome's overseas conquests and Livy's contribution to reconstructing this period is undoubtedly the end of the Hannibalic War. Besides the huge financial expense to the Republic, the aftermath of that war was an immense damage to the peninsula during the 15 years of Hannibal's campaign: according to Hannibal's bronze tablet celebrating his victories in the sanctuary of Hera Lacinia (46.16), 400 cities were conquered or defected to him and were subsequently recovered by Rome; many others were burned, and several were repeatedly sacked by the two opponents; fields and farms in the south were devastated and entire populations expatriated. The cost was especially high in human lives. The censuses reported by Livy document this loss: the census of 204 BC (39.37.6) records 56,000 citizens lesser than that of 233 BC (*per.* 20).

If to this loss we add the predictable lack of new births in the civic body, the total number of missing citizens (almost all among men liable to military service or *adsidui*) is closer to perhaps 100,000. This figure could be doubled by considering the losses among Italic and Latin allies (*socii*), who were more numerous than the *cives*. To the dead and the missing, we should also add those prisoners of war who were sold in the slave markets of the Greek East and never returned to Italy. The conflict had cost at least 200,000 people, a figure confirmed by the censuses. "The blighting effect of the Hannibalic War was so severe that the figure (of citizens) attained in 234/3 BCE had still not been regained in 174/3, despite the fact that since the end of the Hannibalic War the *Ager Romanus* had been greatly enlarged by sweeping annexations both in the south and in the Po basin" (Toynbee 1965). Sustained almost entirely by the adult male population, these losses constituted a veritable disaster for the Roman society, which depended on agriculture for sustenance and military force. The loss seems especially devastating when compared to its contemporary demographic potential: the Italian confederation had lost almost a third of adults of military age.

Only by appreciating these figures can we understand the logic behind subsequent overseas developments. To set the scene: Ptolemy IV Philopator, who died in 204 BC, was succeeded to the throne of Egypt by Ptolemy V, a child under regency (Liv. 31.14.5). The kings Philip V of Macedonia and Antiochus III of Syria attempted to exploit the situation by entering into a secret agreement to divide between themselves the Ptolemies' non-Egyptian territories.

Dispatched to communicate to the Syrian ruler the victory over Hannibal, the Roman embassy consisting of C. Claudius Nero, P. Sempronius Tuditanus, and M. Lepidus probably also had the task of mediating between Antiochus and Ptolemy. Philip had meanwhile embarked on a campaign in Asia, which was immediately opposed by the Rhodians and Attalus I of Pergamum. Beaten twice by sea, at Chios and Lade, Philip withdrew temporarily to the boundaries of his kingdom while his adversaries took on their side most of the Cyclades (31.15.8).

Roused by the embassies of Pergamum and Rhodes, the Senate proposed to declare war against Macedonia, but “at the first meeting of the people, the proposal was rejected by nearly all the tribes” (31.6.1). When this attempt failed, Rome and its allies began to press Athens to enter into the conflict. A coincidence helped the developments: two Acarnanians were executed by the Athenians when they were found guilty of having violated the Great Mysteries of Eleusis. While operating on the Thracian coast, Philip allowed his allies the Acarnanians to wreak havoc on Attica with the support of auxiliary Macedonians (31.14.6). His action offered Rome the *casus belli* to intervene.

Livy proposes two explanations for the Roman decision to declare war against Philip. The more significant one appears in P. Sulpicius Galba's speech to convince the people to reverse their original decision and to approve the war against Philip. To dramatize the Macedonian threat, the consul compares the eventual sack of Athens (which belonged to the *foederi adscripti* of the Romans according to the Treaty of Phoinice, 29.12.14) to Hannibal's siege of Saguntum (31.7.6). Philip is paralleled if not to Hannibal at least to Pyrrhus, compared to whom Philip is more powerful and dangerous (31.7.8 ff.). According to Livy (31.3.6), Galba excited a fear that had spread both among the masses and the nobility. Galba finally persuaded the people by playing on collective fears of a new invasion of Italy: “Citizens,” warns Galba “you do not decide on peace or war—the latter is inevitable—but on whether you transport your legions to Macedonia or allow your enemies into Italy... exposing yourselves again to the treacherous betrayals of your allies” (31. 7.2, 31.7.14). Livy offers an alternative motive of his own speculation (31.1.9–11). Philip, he says, was guilty of sending troops to Hannibal before the battle of Zama and hence incurred the resentment of the Romans (30.26.3, 32.5, 42.4; 45.22.6). This resentment was revived by his attack against Athens, and the Athenians' request for help led to the war.

This idea should be reviewed thoroughly since it also appears in the opening of Book 31 as the official reason for the war (31.1.8–10). The idea of a Macedonian involvement at Zama is ignored by tradition, including Polybius. For Livy, Rome was being sincere when presenting its war against Philip as a continuation of the Punic war and when asking Masinissa for cavalry contingents to be employed against Philip in Macedonia (31.11.9–10). The

statement, however, is implicitly disavowed shortly after: urged by private demand for repayment of loans made to the state during the war against Hannibal, the Senate essentially admitted that the war with Philip was to be regarded as an entirely new war.

As for the official reason given for the declaration of war, namely the Macedonian attack against Athens, the episode seems to have been the result of maneuvers by Roman diplomacy with the collaboration of its eastern allies including Athens. The Athenians' punishment of the two presumably sacrilegious Acarnanians seems extreme and provocative; surely they must have expected that their fellow citizens would seek revenge against Athens involving their ally Philip. Shortly thereafter, Rhodes and Pergamum, who had already sent an embassy to Rome to denounce the Macedonian operations in Asia, induced the Athenians to declare war on Philip by promising them Roman help (31.14.11–15, 7). Apprised of the situation by Valerius Laevinus, the Senate sent him as *propraetor* in the East in command of a fleet (31.3.1–3, 6), and then lent an ear to the Athenians' call for help (31.5.5–7). Galba, who had received the *provincia Macedonia* by lot, presented a *rogatio* to the assembly to get the vote of the people (31.6.1). Everything points to Athens as the one seeking a confrontation.

Several events before and after the formal declaration of war also hint at the involvement of Rome in creating a pretext for intervention. The Senate, which had earlier sent an embassy to Ptolemy asking for his neutrality in case of war (31.2.3–4), iterated their request to him when the Athenians, terrified by the arrival of Philip, asked Egypt for help (31.9.1–5). When hostilities started, even the Rhodians and Attalus avoided involvement (31.15.11; 16.7–8). The whole operation seems to have been de facto entrusted to Rome even before its formal intervention.

The Senate, however, was not unanimous. Africanus was probably opposed to the war since he was prevented by law from attaining further magistracies and was reluctant to see another rise. The people too, exhausted by the previous war, rejected the motion in their first vote. The tribune Q. Baebius certainly stirred the popular feeling against the war, probably guided by Scipio (31.6.4–5).

Ultimately, the decisive argument for the majority of the people was the Spectre of a new invasion of Italy. If as it is said, “to be safe from aggression...is the sincere aspiration of the many,” it is also true that “it is the mantle under which the few and more powerful hide to the others and maybe partly to themselves their own desire of war” (De Sanctis 1969). Whether Rome's fear was founded upon a realistic basis or was even believed by those who embraced it, it became a compelling instrument of psychological pressure for some influential senators. The real reason for the war seems to emerge from Galba's comparison between Philip and Hannibal (31.7.3–13): the winner of the next conflict (the consul implies) would be comparable to

the victor of Zama. A senatorial subgroup, the so-called “eastern lobby” (Badian 1958), supported the war perhaps to oppose Africanus. This group included experts in Eastern politics, among them P. Sempronius Tuditanus, M. Valerius Laevinus, and P. Sulpicius Galba. The victor of that war did not emerge from their ranks, however, since T. Quinctius Flaminius was probably one of Scipio's men. Yet, quite predictably, Flaminius freed himself from Africanus by presenting himself as figure alternative to him, and not only in matters concerning Greece.

The war against Philip began undoubtedly as a pre-emptive war; as Galba proclaims, “let Macedonia rather than Italy have war” (31.7.13). Livy's narrative follows the changes of the Roman command. He begins with the extension of Galba's *imperium* after his consulship (*prorogatio*), continues with the Roman successes at Ottolobos and the hills of Banitsa, followed by the response of the Greeks and the Aetolian League and until the brief interlude of P. Villius Tappulus consul in 199 BC, who took over from Galba (32.1.3).

In the spring, Tappulus was replaced by his successor, T. Quinctius Flaminius (32.9.6), a young private citizen *cum imperio*. Scipio (who had meanwhile returned to the control of domestic affairs) probably helped Flaminius to the consulship before his completing the *cursus honorum*. In this regard, it seems significant that 2,000 men returning from Africa and shipped to Macedonia with P. Sulpicius Galba mutinied after a few months, while 3,000 of Scipio's veterans enlisted in Flaminius' army.

Roman operations led to a gradual encirclement of Macedonia, which not even the attack of Antiochus against Pergamum was able to break (32.8.9–16). Discouraged by Roman diplomacy, Antiochus eventually gave up (32.27.1). The agreement between Philip and the Seleucid king provided for mutual aid against Ptolemy, Attalus, and the Rhodians, but Antiochus was now a friend and ally of Rome. Philip made his stand against Flaminius at the edge of Epirus to prevent him from reaching Thessaly to join the Aetolian allies. He blocked the Straights of Aous, a bottleneck in Chaonia along the valley of the Aous river (modern Vijose, Voiussa; 32.5.8–13). While the opponents faced each other, peace negotiations began on the Epirots' initiative. Philip was willing to give up his recent gains and defer war indemnities to an impartial arbitration, but Rome's position had changed. Flaminius rejected the offer and asked Philip to abandon even Thessaly. After unsuccessful negotiations, hostilities were renewed, but the Romans bypassed the enemy positions with the help of the Epirot Charopus. Philip managed to escape, but in the process lost his camp and 2,000 soldiers (32.11–12).

While even the Achaean League sided with Rome, the war moved into Thessaly. New negotiations commenced at the end of the year. They came to naught, however, since Philip, while more open to concessions, refused to

surrender his ancestral strongholds, the so-called “fetters of Hellas,” which guaranteed his hegemony against the Greeks: Chalcis and Acrocorinthus in Greece, and Demetrias in Thessaly (32.31–37.5). It is possible that Flamininus had at first agreed to negotiate with Philip because he feared that his command would not be extended, but he broke off negotiations when he heard of its renewal. Forced to resume the war, Philip sought the support of the Lacedaemonian ruler Nabis by offering to him the city of Argos (32.38.1–9). Yet, Nabis betrayed the king by passing to Rome's side and by concluding an armistice with the Achaeans (32.39. 1–40.4). Roman diplomacy was again able to close the breach between potential allies. Finally, unable to prolong hostilities, Philip decided to join battle. At the heights of Cynoscephalae in Thessaly, the Macedonian phalanx was surrounded by the legionaries and utterly defeated after an initial victory (32.6–10). Less crucial were the battle between the Achaeans and the Macedonians in Corinth and the taking of Leucas, which was followed by the surrender of Acarnania.

The policy of the Greek states to shift alliances for mutual expedience in what could be called “dynamic equilibrium” had benefitted the *res publica* in the war against Philip. The Romans, however, preferred a system of relations based on a less volatile and more safe (for them) “static equilibrium.” Therefore, despite the Aetolians' insistence, Flamininus could not utterly prostrate Macedonia, especially now that Antiochus was both on good terms with Rome and an ally of Philip. Antiochus could at least act as a mediator, especially since he had just concluded the fifth war of Coele-Syria by defeating Ptolemy and by asserting his dominance over the region. Rome imposed on Macedonia tolerable conditions for peace (33.11–13). Freedom and independence were proclaimed for all Greeks of Europe and Asia (3.25.4–7), whereas Philip had to forfeit control of subject populations in his ancestral boundaries and pay 1,000 talents to the Romans, half immediately and half in 10 annual installments. He also had to surrender to Rome all prisoners and deserters and relinquish all his decked warships except five and his cumbersome royal galley (33.30). The Roman request to surrender the vanquished fleet became habitual after Zama.

Ratified by the Senate and solemnly proclaimed at Corinth, the principle of freedom and autonomy of Greece forced Flamininus to renege on the agreement to grant to Aetolia the lands subject to Macedonia. However, Rome prevailed by regaining the garrisons from Greece, including those in Demetrias, Chalcis, and Acrocorinth, after concluding operations against Nabis, who had refused to abandon Argos. Thus ended a conflict that, while driven primarily by internal motives, was presented as a necessary preemptive war (“so that you may not receive enemies in Italy,” to remember Galba). Rome seemed bent on “passive prevention,” adopting the principle of deterrence, which (in theory at least) should ensure the status quo. The precedent of Carthage, deprived from its elephants and fleet, suggests that the

roots of this deterrence strategy lie with Scipio.

It has been argued, and with good reason, that this doctrine prevailed in Rome “not immediately after the acquisition of the first provinces in the third century, but certainly since the Roman intervention in the Greek East in the second century” (Haase 1997). After the victory over Hannibal and Carthage, Roman politicians were forced to reckon with the public trauma, so that they alternated deterrence and preemptive wars such as the Macedonian. Naval disarmament aimed to prevent the defeated from any future aggression, to eliminate the possibility of an attack against Italy, and to bring the war into the enemy's territory (a strategy considered vital already by Galba). To this strategy, the *res publica* now added an aggressive stance evident both in the institutionalization of permanent strategic reserves (the *legiones urbanae*) recruited almost every year after Zama even during peacetime, and in the procedural changes in the declaration of war (*indictio belli*), which became more prompt and flexible.

To judge from Livy (e.g., 31.7.3–13, 34.60.3–4, 35.23.2, 35.23.10, 39.35.4), however, fear continued to have a strong influence on Roman political choices; its effects were lasting, as is evident from the warnings of Galba (31.6–8) and those of Eumenes about the aggressive intents of Perseus (42.11.4; 13:10). Fear was especially influential in what has been called the “psychosis over Antiochus” (Will 1972). Between 194 and 192 BC, the deterioration of relations with Antiochus triggered fears of an invasion of Sicily and even of Italy (34.60.1–61.16, 35.23.1–11). The Senate then activated the military apparatus of the *res publica*, taking measures for the defense of the south. These included establishing colonies for policing land and sea in the south of the peninsula (34.45, 53, 35.9, 40), and enlistment of forces for strengthening the fleet (35.20–21, 41). A naval squadron was sent to Sicily to patrol the waters against the feared invasion, and its garrisons were strengthened with an emergency contingent (*tumultuarii milites*, 35.23, 29). Shortly thereafter, the southern army was transferred to Tarentum and Brundisium, then overseas to Apollonia to guard the main point of embarkation for an invading army. It was replaced by two legions enlisted for the following year (35.41).

The panic of Rome makes more sense once we remember that the exiled Hannibal had been at the court of Syria since 195 BC. In 194 BC, the consulship was given to Africanus, who was considered the only man capable of dealing with Hannibal. Rumors also floated about a Punic plan to invade Italy again. Livy twice reports this plan (34.60.5 and 36.7.17–20), which would have been repeatedly and variously presented to Antiochus. In one of the two versions, Hannibal suggests sending a fleet division cruising off Corcyra and the others to ravage the shores of Italy. Meanwhile, the army encamped at Apollonia would prohibit the Romans from landing and would eventually invade the Italian peninsula.

It is said that this project, which would imply the friendship or at least the neutrality of Macedonia, should probably be relegated to myth (De Sanctis 1969). Yet, we may disagree with this opinion. Livy himself provides a clue to this effect. Between 192 and 191 BC, when the occupation of Chalcis and the massacre of a small Roman contingent made war inevitable, Antiochus “was not idle during the winter. Some of the Greek communities he endeavored to win over by sending envoys to them while others sent embassies spontaneously to him” (36.5.1). Among those who came to Antiochus were the messengers of the Epirotes, led by Charopus the Elder (Pol. 20.3.1–7). Aiming again to remove the war from their territory, they put themselves at the king's disposal and promised him anything he wanted, provided that he guaranteed their protection. They implored him not to expose them unnecessarily “bare and unarmed to the Roman war.” Evidently, they were hoping to avoid confrontation both with Antiochus, whom they were prepared to obey, and the Romans. Livy summarizes their objective: “if, as they were inclined to believe, Antiochus kept clear of Epirus, all would be safe so far as the Roman armies were concerned, whilst they would have secured the king's good graces by expressing their readiness to receive him, had he gone to them. If on the other hand he entered Epirus, they hoped that the Romans would pardon them for yielding to the superior strength of one who was on the spot, without waiting for help from afar” (36.5.1–7). Antiochus, who did not intend to take Epirus, bought some time by replying that he would notify them of his decision.

In hindsight, the conclusions seem obvious. Seeing the small forces accompanying Antiochus, the Epirotes must have realized that their fears were unfounded. The Seleucid army was simply inadequate to occupy their land. Their relief, however, was cancelled by the fear of becoming unnecessarily compromised to the eyes of Rome. They were therefore trying to save their territory from becoming the scene of the Syrian clash with Rome. However, the only plan with which they were directly concerned was that of Hannibal, already discarded by Antiochus. Some of the Epirot ambassadors' statements seem to reflect precisely this plan. Therefore, the plan must have been known before being mentioned for the last time at that moment, and it had evidently percolated into Epirus. De Sanctis (1969) considers the project implausible because it would require “the friendship or at least the neutrality of Macedonia”; this, however, is a weak argument. Hannibal, who realized the danger posed by Rome, could not conceive that the two kings, who 10 years earlier had been unanimous against Egypt, would not be so now, when the very survival of the Hellenistic world was at stake.

Despite numerous meetings in Corinth (where Flamininus invited the envoys of Antiochus to demand that they free the cities of Asia), in Lysimachia, and finally in Rome, relations between the two powers gradually deteriorated. Antiochus, who denied Rome the right to intervene in Asia, crossed the

Hellespont and refused to surrender his strongholds in Europe, which he considered the property of his ancestor Seleucus I. The Aetolians exacerbated the situation. Disappointed by the division of Greece, which had left them with crumbs, they now sided with Antiochus after plotting against Rome with Philip and Nabis. They lured Antiochus into Greece by promising nonexistent support and the delivery of Demetrias, which they had managed to occupy by deceit (35.34.12).

The easy Syrian victory over a small Roman contingent dispatched to Chalcis and the occupation of that city (35.50.6–51.10) were perhaps Antiochus' only successes. Having escaped with just 500 men after the defeat of his forces by Acilius Glabrio in the vain defense of Thermopylae (36.16.8 ff.), the king was overpowered first by sea at Cape Corycus and at Myonnesus, and then definitively by land. Transported into Asia, the legions formally controlled by Lucius Scipio, Africanus' brother, defeated the Seleucid army in the "Field of Cyrus" (Curupedion) northeast of Magnesia in Sipylus (37.39.7–44.1). In addition to ordering Antiochus to withdraw from Asia west of the Taurus, to pay 15,000 talents in 12 years, and to surrender Hannibal and other enemies of Rome, Rome forbade him to make war against the people of Europe and its islands and to sail beyond Cape Sarpedon with armed vessels. His fleet was also drastically reduced. In addition to his elephants, he had to deliver all but 10 of his warships (38.38.8).

However, Roman fears were not dispelled. The colonization of coastal and inland areas immediately following the war against Hannibal was motivated by strategy rather than by demographic needs. We observe an intensive colonization between 197 and 194 BC, a time when a large part of the people and the Senate feared an attack by Antiochus (and perhaps even by Carthage). Eight Roman colonies were founded then, probably intended to guard landing sites in Italy. The Latin colonies Vibius and Thurioi seem designed to control the treacherous Bruttii. The strengthening of existing Latin centers such as Venosa and Narnia can be explained as the intention to renew the connection with Samnium, the loyalty of which was dubious. Conversely, the ending of the Syrian threat from sea, which had ceased with the destruction of Antiochus' fleet, may explain the immediate abandonment of two colonies, those of Sipontum and Buxentum. Their abandonment must have been motivated by the needs of the state rather than by a peasant base decimated during the Hannibalic war. Despite everything, the fear of attack was a lasting one in Italy. Fear remained for the north border, which was believed to be vulnerable. It was not the Cisalpine Celts to be feared, but the population north of the Alps manipulated by Rome's Eastern enemies (such as the Bastarnae, whom Philip and Perseus incited "to break into Italy": 42.11.4). Thus was born the Via Aemilia, the first example of the *limes*. Through it, the Apennine frontier was manned, which marked the Roman political boundary. The colonies of Bononia, Mutina, Parma, and the Latin Aquileia were united

by the road to guard this boundary.

Things, however, were changing. Immediately after Magnesia, the Scipionic doctrine of “static equilibrium” was essentially repudiated by the expedition of Scipio's successor Cn. Manlius Vulso against the Celts of Asia. Rome was changing methods and mentality. The increasing ruthlessness with which it dealt with its enemies was evident already in the murder of the anti-Roman Boeotarch Brachyllas, which was perhaps perpetrated with the complicity of Flaminius.

Rome's brief collaboration with Macedonia during the Syrian war ended when Philip, asked to evacuate the Thracian cities taken from Antiochus, brought Thracian mercenaries into the city of Maronea and had his opponents massacred. Denounced by Roman emissaries, Philip avoided Roman reprisals only because the courtier Cassander who was summoned to Rome to be questioned about the events at Maronea died on the way, perhaps poisoned by the king (39.34.10; another envoy, Onomastus, was prevented from going by the king, 39.34.2–9). When Philip's youngest son Demetrius was sent to Rome to defend his father, the Senate (or at least a part of it, led by Flaminius, 39.48.1, 40.11.1) responded with intrigue: establishing a practice that later became common for hostages, it tried to influence the prince by fueling his hopes for succession. Demetrius' subsequent conflict with his elder brother Perseus became so hostile that it dragged to ruin several Macedonian notables (40.3.7), including the inhabitants of rich coastal cities in Chalkis who were deported and replaced with Thracians (40.3.3–4). Finally, Demetrius himself was murdered at the orders of his father (40.24.5 ff.). A sealed letter attributed to Flaminius but engineered by Perseus was forged as evidence against Demetrius (40.23.6–9, 40.54.9–55.7). Upon realizing this, Philip seems to have died of a broken heart. Livy dramatizes the accusations against Demetrius through a speech given by his morally dubious brother to Philip. There, Perseus hints at a domestic treachery: “we have in our bosom, I do not want to say a traitor, but at least a spy, whose body, after he was a hostage at Rome, the Romans gave back to us but whose soul they keep.” Perseus' concluding aphorism “those who go to Rome whole and uncorrupted...return from there tainted by Roman blandishments” (40.11.1–3) applies to other distinguished Greeks of that time (Antiochus IV of Syria, Charopus the Younger, Polybius) who were deeply influenced by Rome by spending time there as hostages.

Upon his succession, Perseus exploited a difficult situation for Rome. Rome now faced an open friction between Rhodes and Pergamum for Lycia (42.14.8–10; 26.8–9) and the discontent of the Achaean League with the situation in Peloponnese (42.37.7–8). Perseus took the opportunity to increase his treasury, his armed forces, and his arsenals; he launched effective social policies shielding urban masses from their pro-Roman elites (41.22.7–8, 42.13.6–11, 42.13.30, 43.4–44.8, 46.7–10); he built a network of alliances by

reconnecting to the priesthood of Delphi, by forming a pact with Boeotia, and by tightening his relationships with the kings Prusias of Bithynia and Seleucus IV Philopator (42.12.3 ff.) through wedlock. The latter alliance surely must have reminded Rome of the previous secret pact between Macedonia and Syria against Egypt.

Perseus was also responsible for destroying pro-Roman leaders such as the Thebans Eversa and Callicrates and the Illyrian Artetaurus (42.13.6–7, 40.5–7). These crimes remain obscure, unlike the attempt on Eumenes of Pergamum, the main ally of Rome in the East. On his return from Rome, where he had openly attacked Perseus, Eumenes was climbing to Delphi from the port of Cirrha when he was gravely wounded by two falling boulders. Livy argues that the attack was not an accident and provides evidence. Patrols conducted immediately, he says, found the body of a man apparently killed by his accomplices: “they fled toward the ridge of Parnassus with such speed that when one of them was delaying their escape, finding it difficult to keep up with the others on the pathless and difficult ground, they killed him in order that no information might be got from him in case he were caught (42.16.1). The murdered man was one of three Macedonians “accustomed to the performance of such crimes.” According to Livy, the group was led by a certain Evander, a commander of auxiliaries, who had orders from Perseus to murder Eumenes. To this purpose, Evander was carrying a letter from Perseus to his friend Praxo, a woman of wealth and influence at Delphi (42.15.3).

Two aspects of the attempt on Eumenes assimilate it to those against Eversa, Callicrates, and Artetaurus. All are violent attacks that appear natural or accidental (poison, shipwreck, landslide), and take place when the victims either prepare to speak against Perseus or have already become his enemies by accusing him. Perseus, considering a war with Rome as inevitable, probably tried to prepare by covering his tracks. To do so, he had to eliminate the “eyes” of Rome in the East; allies and embassies who, as he angrily claimed “came one after the other to spy upon his words and actions” (42.25.8; see a similar complaint by Philip, 39.26.5). Although dubious, the episode of the Brundisian Ramnius (or Rennius: 42.17.2–9, 40.9, 41.3) also belongs to this context. Ramnius revealed to Valerius Laevinus Perseus' proposition to him to poison those ambassadors from Rome visiting Brundisium whom he (Perseus) would indicate to him (Ramnius).

An ambiguous ultimatum to Perseus that deceived him by holding out the possibility of peace departed from Rome's traditional principles of warfare. Criticized for being cunning rather than courageous, the plan was branded by a part of the Senate as “new wisdom” (42.47.9). This “new” ethic of Rome had been, by that time, effective for 40 years. After the victory of Pydna and the dismemberment of Macedonia into four districts, in the name of a *fides* that Rome itself no longer observed, this ethic propelled the punishment of Epirot Molossi, who were sold en masse into slavery.

Let us conclude with an event, which, although beyond the chronological scope of this study, confirms several points made in the preceding text: the destruction of Carthage in 146 BC. According to the stipulations of the Treaty of Carthage in 201 BC, all border disputes involving Carthage should be arbitrated by the Senate. Moreover, Carthage was required to get Roman approval before going to war. Repeatedly provoked by the Numidian Masinissa who gradually raided their borders, the Carthaginians appealed several times to the clause requiring Rome to defend them. Finally, disappointed by Rome's arbitration, Carthage took up arms in 151–150 BC. The result was disastrous: not only were the Carthaginians defeated, but their initiative offered Rome the pretext to wage war against them.

Much has been said about the Roman motives behind the so-called “Third Punic War.” Among the most influential interpretations are those of a political bend (Rome desired control, perhaps for fear of new “democratic” developments taking place in Africa, Greece, and Spain), and those arguing for economic reasons, based on the famous anecdote of Cato's figs (30.37.2–6). And yet, the claim that the Third Punic War was only “a fig war, similar to the oil war that our world has experienced rather more recently” (Le Bohec 2011) is not convincing. Motives of a different nature moved Cato and the partisans of the war. The issue of the *metus Punicus*, the fear of Africa, deserves attention as a strong motivational factor. In discussing the fate of Carthage, Cato and his main opponent, Publius Scipio Nasica, appealed to this very issue. Cato pointed out the danger posed by an enemy dangerously close to Italy. Nasica, who defended Carthage, followed a rationale dear to the most illustrious of his kinsmen, Scipio Africanus: that the menacing shadow of the Carthaginians constituted a valuable stimulus to Rome's martial prowess and moral austerity.

Although supporting different courses of action, both Cato and Nasica were motivated by the same notion: the *metus Punicus*. Their unanimity seems peculiar. Given that Carthage was now reduced to a state of irremediable weakness, residual Roman fears should have been quelled, softening even Cato. The line taken by Scipio Nasica is even more surprising. While it would have been far more logical to ask for clemency for the Carthaginians claiming that they were no longer dangerous, Nasica instead iterates Cato's argument, albeit reversing its conclusions. If, in the middle of the second century, the *metus Punicus* did not seem inappropriate and anachronistic, it must have therefore sounded still plausible to the Romans and had to exert influence on them. Was this fear only the product of “collective psychology” (Le Bohec 2011), or were there real premises behind it? The literary sources report certain facts about Carthage that, in the eyes of Rome, must have constituted a real threat. Carthage was rich, populous, and filled with diverse weapons and war resources. It is telling that when the Carthaginians accepted their disarmament in obedience to the dictates of Rome, they delivered 200,000

suits of armor, innumerable weapons, and perhaps 3,000 catapults. Since Carthage was being ruled by Cartalo's democratic–nationalist faction since 153 BC, Masinissa and his sons had good reason to suspect that the Punic preparations for war were directed not only against Numidia but against Rome itself. But, how could the Numidian princes convince Rome? Whereas in the war of the Celtiberi against Rome, we should not conclude rapidly (as someone did) to see the “long arm” of Carthage, Punic gestures toward a naval rearmament must have registered as stubborn and disquieting conduct to the Romans. As early as 171 BC, Masinissa's son Gulussa had warned the Senate about the intention of Carthage to obtain again a large navy: the excuse, he said, was to assist the Romans against the Macedonians, but, once they had built a fleet, they could then decide who to consider as their enemy or ally (43.3.6–7). Almost 20 years later and during an embassy to Africa, Cato was able to see for himself the massive stocks of timber prepared for shipbuilding and to be surprised at the busy arsenals (*per.* 47.20; the impression was confirmed by a second embassy, *per.* 48.6). Carthage was able to build quickly an important fleet even when it was already under siege. The last opportunity to avoid war was granted by the Senate on appeal by Scipio Nasica: “it was agreed to refrain from war if the Carthaginians would burn their ships and dismiss their army” (*per.* 48.55).

While ancient authors are often criticized for justifying Rome's attack, solid archaeological evidence now confirms the naval armament of Carthage. The British excavations of the UNESCO “Save Carthage” project show that one of the two artificial harbors of Carthage (the circular one) was an important military arsenal. The docks could accommodate a fleet of at least 170 ships (if not 200, according to Appian). The port dates to “probably at a date close to the end of Carthage's independent existence in the middle of the 2nd century BC” (Hurst 2010). The fact that a state that was prohibited from owning more than 10 warships could acquire such a resource was alarming to Cato, and inevitably to the whole Senate.

However, if this was the new port, what was the state of the Carthaginian navy on the eve of the last war? What became of the fleet that the docks would accommodate? Here, we find ourselves in the realm of conjecture. As mentioned earlier, rumors of a military reconstitution had circulated for a while. Had a close monitoring by the Senate forced Carthage to eventually comply with the treaty of 201 BC, which limited its naval forces to only 10 vessels? Were the hauls of the new port left empty and useless? Many seem to think so, but others believe that Carthage possessed more than the allowed 10 ships. In any event, the Roman ultimatum to Carthage to burn their fleet (*per.* 48.24) indicates that, for Rome, the fleet was as good as reconstituted (Lancel 2002).

Regardless of details, some conclusions are indisputable. The construction of a military port equipped to accommodate nearly 200 vessels announced a

clear intention to acquire a major navy. Equally alarming to Rome was the extraordinary Carthaginian shipbuilding, which could materialize a large fleet in a relatively short time (Strab. 17.3.15). With this in mind, Cato's fig aphorism takes on a different perspective. As has been rightly pointed out, the fig anecdote must be interpreted "in a very different sense: if a ship laden with fruit makes the trip in so little time, one might think that a warship would scarcely take more, a fact which was indeed more worrying" (Le Bohec 2011, 431). Whatever their real intentions in trying to rebuild their naval power, Carthage committed the mistake of underestimating the Rome's reflexive terror at the prospect. Traumatized by the war against Hannibal, Rome had embraced the doctrine of deterrence. An indispensable measure taken to ensure its safety was systematically destroying the fleets of defeated powers. Beginning with the fleet of Carthage, this strategy would presumably prevent a new invasion of Italy.

There remains the question of the Punic army, whose strength is still partially underestimated. Masinissa's defeat of the Carthaginians in Oroscopa anticipates a typically Numidian tactic that the Romans, although much stronger than Carthage and Numidia, would in turn experience by Jugurtha to their detriment: attracting a superior enemy in a favorable territory, then destroying it. In my opinion, the Numidian victory does not imply a converse Carthaginian weakness. If anything, the difficulty encountered even by Aemilianus in capturing Carthage belies this interpretation. Forced to count on its own citizens only for its defense, Carthage evidently settled on a new military structure based on civic levy. The presence of 200,000 suits of armor in the city seems to confirm this point.

Departing from the notion of a presumable Carthaginian weakness, some scholars (e.g., Gsell) have elaborated a theory about the causes of the Third Punic War that seems quite plausible: the Libyan city seemed dangerous not as much by itself but as incorporated into a Numidian state larger and more cohesive than the Punic had ever been. I am convinced, however, that, for Rome, the real problem was Carthage, not Numidia. Some projections can be made about the aftermath of the Third Punic War. One plan was to rebuild the city away from the sea—the possibility seems ruthless but not without motive. Economic motives for the war should be relegated to the background; conversely, political and psychological ones must have been in the forefront. When the fear of Hannibal came to overlap, realistically or not, with that of Carthage, the now rampant Roman imperialism did the rest. Carthage made the mistake of awakening residual fears and of drawing those fears upon itself. Rome was induced to preemptive wars, eventually collecting the bitter harvest of Cato's figs.

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Chapter 29

The Roman Republic and its Internal Politics between 232 and 167_{BC}

Klaus Bringmann

This chapter is not concerned with aristocratic family alliances and groupings. Indeed, Heuß (1956) reacted to such preoccupations with much skepticism:

To shed light on the innermost workings of the roman aristocracy is...in my opinion impossible. It is also my opinion that we are not missing out on any particularly worthwhile results from not doing so (English translation).

Even taking a more positive attitude to such research, for example, that carried out by Scullard (1951) and Develin (1985), the bounds of this chapter nevertheless only allow for examination of the broader themes and the most consequential developments of internal politics, concentrating on only the most important sources.

The outbreak of the Second Punic War came at an inopportune moment for Rome, whose priorities included the expansion of her rule over the Italian Peninsula and solving the problems resulting from the growth of both the city and state. Before the war, C. Flaminius, a social climber of plebeian background, had managed to reach the pinnacle of the hierarchy of officials and enact significant reforms. He met with a great deal of resistance, but was ultimately successful. Von Ungern-Sternberg (1986) further attributed Flaminius' ascent to the historical conflict of the orders, and rightly so, at least since the main aim of this social struggle was to include the local elite in the political leadership of the *res publica*. We must also agree with his observations that this process only came to an end with the Second Punic War, when the two leaders, both “new men” (Flaminius and Terentius Varro), failed in their offensive strategy against Hannibal. The enemy within was defeated in a lengthy war under the leadership of old families, with the demands of this war leaving no room for the issues that had previously occupied the political agenda.

Over the years, our picture of Flaminius has been distorted almost beyond recognition. Flaminius is represented as a lone opponent of the Senate and the gods. Lonely he certainly was not—in fact, he found allies even in the inner circles of old, established families (Feig Visha 1987). After all, without their backing, a career such as his would have been unthinkable. As tribune of the People in 232_{BC}, Flaminius's legislation on the settlement of the *Ager Gallicus* led his opponents to accuse him of “demoralizing the populace” and

provoking the Celtic Wars of 225 BC (Pol. 2.21.8). The first accusation refers to the way in which his settlement laws were enacted, namely, forcing his proposal through the assembly without authorization from the Senate and in the face of considerable opposition. The second reproach is based on the factual context surrounding the settlement law. Rather than strengthen the position of small holders, the intention was to strengthen the Roman presence on *Ager Gallicus* (conquered in 284 BC), which, contrary to what Polybius states (Pol. 2.19.7–8), was still settled by Celtic Senons, something that has been archaeologically proven by Oebel (1993). In 236 BC, the *Ager Gallicus* had been the target of a Celtic attack from Upper Italy (Pol. 2.21.2–6). It was probably in reaction to this that Flaminius instigated an allocation of land to Roman settlers. This was part of an offensive strategy aimed at expanding Roman rule north of the Apennines. As consul in 223 BC, Flaminius defeated the Insubrer tribe beyond the Po River, and as censor in 220 BC, he built the *Via Flaminia*, connecting Rome with Ariminum, the strategic starting point of the offensive in Northern Italy. A reason for the resistance with which his settlement law was met can be found in the inclination toward a defensive strategy in the face of the Celts. As far as Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, his main opponent, is concerned, we know that he was a champion of the defensive approach. In 219 BC, he refused to comply with the order to immediately declare war on Carthage, and, after the catastrophic battles at Lake Trasimene and Cannae, he embarked upon a strategy of attrition, which avoided staking everything on one chance.

The law on the settlement of *Ager Gallicus* is not the only case in which it is important to consider the aims that Flaminius pursued not from the perspective of a later problem but instead to regard them in the context of the challenges of his time. As censor in 220 BC, he passed a law affecting the status of fullers (Elster 2003, n. 90). Fullers produced cloths of varying qualities and required a great deal of water for their trade. Most researchers agree that the purpose of this law, the *lex Metilia de fullonibus*, was to restrict luxury garments and regard it in parallel with the luxury laws of the second century (Baltrusch 1989, 50–52). Feig Vishna (1987) has refuted this interpretation by indicating that water from two basins fed by aqueducts was provided for both fullers and public baths in return for a fee, supporting her argument with reference to the water consumption of the fullers and to the message delivered from Frontin (*Aq.* 2.94). In 220 BC, the city of Rome must have already been a significant center of cloth production, requiring great water consumption, so as to necessitate the regulation of the modalities of water distribution.

At the outbreak of war in 218 BC, Flaminius was the most prominent but by no means the only supporter of the *Lex Claudia de nave senatoris*, which allowed senators to own just one small ship (Elster 2003, 83)—the only source where this is mentioned comes from Livy (21.63.3–4). From him, we learn about the

aim of this law; members of the senatorial class would be denied from carrying out any commercial activity other than the commercialization of products made from their own country estates. This is an anachronistic justification, which derives from the spirit of transfiguration of the ancient Roman simplicity, as it emerged in the second century. Taking this interpretation as a starting point, German historians, especially (e.g., Baltrusch 1989, 36; Heuss 1998, 81f.; Bleicken 1999, 192), have attributed a fundamental socio-political significance to this law, claiming that it firmly established the senatorial class on its agrarian foundations, and excluded it from all trading activities. As a consequence, land ownership increased in Italy, eventually leading to the agricultural crisis during the Gracchian period. Yet, in light of the requirements that resulted from the war, there emerges a completely different meaning for the legislation (Pelletier, 1969; Feig Vishnia 1987, 11f.; Bringmann 2003). The Roman war planning of 218 BC intended to counter Hannibal's threat of invasion with the establishment of two battlefields overseas, in Spain and North Africa. Accordingly, it was necessary to charter a great deal of private shipping space in addition to the war fleets; here, there was money to be made. The *Lex Claudia* excluded members of the senatorial class from this potential business, the reason being that those who made the decisions about armament and its financing should not earn from it, and should rather be completely devoted to their political and military functions during the impending war. This intention of the law explains why certain conditions of the *Lex Claudia* found their way into the *de repetundis* laws of the second and first centuries BC. Although probably not intentionally, the law came to favor the so-called *publicani* class, prosperous businessmen who were commercially active on behalf of the state; their heyday would dawn with the Great War.

The internal development during the time of the Second Punic War will now be examined, albeit with attention only paid to the most important issues, namely, how the war would be financed, and how, in a time of dwindling demographic power, a strong army and navy could be mobilized. In the first 3 years of the war, Rome suffered defeats and severe loss of life. In the battle of Cannae, fatalities alone stood at around 70,000 men and 80 senators.

Providing advice on how the Senate could be re-populated, Sp. Carvilius Ruga made the revolutionary suggestion of summoning two councilors to the Senate from each of the 30 Latin colonies. Carvilius came from a plebeian family and twice held the office of consul (234 and 228 BC). He seems to have been a political sympathizer of C. Flaminius. His suggestion of how to increase the number of senators was met with refusal. Leading the opposition to Carvilius' suggestion was Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, who, in the instable period following the defeat, was adverse to any experiments, even in internal politics (Liv. 23. 22.1–9). Concerning the deployment of new legions to Cannae, not only were recruits who had not reached the minimum age of 17 years enlisted, but there was even a redefinition of the line that, in this

slaveholding society, separated the free from the enslaved; willing and physically able slaves (reportedly numbering 8,000) were called to arms in return for the promise of liberation. A year later, another taboo was broken when around 6,000 capital criminals and debtors were drafted into the military (Liv. 23. 14.3–4). A lack of sailors for the navy posed the next challenge, and, in 214 BC, following the decision of the Senate, an edict was issued that enforced slave owners to pay and equip up to eight sailors (depending on property) (Liv. 24.11.7–9). In 212 BC, due to a lack of recruits, two senatorial commissions were sent out, tasked with rallying all free men from either side of the 50-mile boundary around Rome, and calling to arms anyone who was fit for service, even if they had not reached the age of 17 years (Liv. 25. 5. 5–9). In 207 BC, as the union between Hasdrubal and Hannibal loomed, the Senate suspended the privilege of Rome's coastal colonies that had excluded them from having to provide recruits (Liv. 27. 38.1–5). A year earlier, only 137,108 citizens were counted, about half of the number registered prior to the war (Liv. 27.36.6–7). Four years later, the number stood at 214,000 (Liv. 29.37.8). This was apparently due to the reduction of the minimum census for the fifth class from 11,000 asses to 4,000 asses. This explanation can also be found in Gabba (1976, 5–6), albeit dated to the years 214–212 BC. This measure, which served to widen the recruitment basis, is likely to have been carried out in 207 BC, as the threatening attack from Hasdrubal was draining the reserves. Latin colonies and allied communities were also affected by this exhaustion of military forces. In 209 BC, the 30 Latin colonies refused to appoint any further contingents and, in so doing, caused the Senate to panic (Liv. 27.9.1–10; 10). Twelve colonies stuck to their decision to refuse, but were punished later on, in 204 BC, once victory over Hannibal seemed secure. As punishment, they had to produce contingents that were twice as large as those that had been demanded in the past and also had to pay a capital levy (Liv. 29.15.1–15).

For Rome, financing the war was even harder than recruitment. As early as in 216 BC, there had been signs that insolvency was imminent. The slaves who were recruited to serve in legions following the Battle of Cannae were purchased by the state, seemingly in return for debenture bonds (cf. Liv. 22.57.7–12 with 24.18.12). A short while later, the *tresviri mensarii* commission was appointed and given a high rank, and its aim was to do something about the lack of money (Liv. 23.21.6–9). This appointment was triggered by the state's finding itself unable to pay and feed the troops in Sicily and Sardinia. A loan was taken from King Hieron II of Syracuse, and, in Sardinia, it came down to the confederates themselves to take care of payment and nourishment of the troops (Liv. 23.21.1–5). In 215 BC, taxes were doubled to raise capital. It was decided that half of the money would be reserved for the payment of salaries (Liv. 23.31.1–3). The other half was destined for the repayments of the loan from King Hieron. However, as war with Philip V of Macedonia was imminent, this turned out to be impossible;

the money that had been destined for the repayment of debts was required for the provision of armored fleets (Liv. 23.38.12). Hieron was also called upon to provide support in the form of wheat and barley (Liv. 23.38.13). By the end of the year, there were no funds left for the payment and accommodation of the army, which was operating in Spain. The commanders in Spain, P. and Cn. Scipio, offered to find money on site to pay the soldiers, but they insisted that other necessary supplies be delivered. As they insisted, praetor Fulvius Flaccus succeeded in making a contract with the *publicani*, which bound the latter to provide the necessary loan. To support its demands, the state referred to the large profits that army suppliers had enjoyed over the previous years (Liv. 23.48.4–12). In return, the *publicani* asked the state to cover the risk of loss of ships, threatened as they were by storms and enemy privateers (Liv. 23.39.1–4). The Senate accepted, and in so doing unwittingly became a victim of fraud. Old, decrepit ships were loaded with low-value goods and deliberately sunk far out at sea. In 213 BC, the dishonest trick was discovered. Due to their dependence on army suppliers, the Senate did not dare take action against the perpetrators. They were, however, confronted by two tribunes of the people, Sp. and L. Carvilius. The main culprits, declared as guilty by the people's court, eventually went into exile, along with many other businessmen who had supported them (Liv. 25.3.8–4; 25.3.11). A year earlier, the state had already been forced to declare itself bankrupt. Essential building works had to be funded by loans, the assets of widows and orphans were made available to the treasury, and the army's horsemen and centurions who came from the wealthy echelons of society went without pay (Liv. 24.10. 10–14).

In 210 BC, there was a spectacular change of things. The consul M. Valerius Laevinus suggested to the Senate that magistrates and senators lead a donation drive to bring the large amount of privately owned precious metal and copper coins to the *tresuiri mensarii* bank commission, to be offered to it on loan (Liv. 26.36.5–11). In this manner, it was possible to create a new currency and to ensure that the treasury could function again, albeit at the cost of an increased burden of debts. Yet, when the turning point of the war occurred, loot of considerable monetary value started to become accrued nearly every year, and from 209 BC Rome had the spoils of the Spanish mines at its disposal. Therefore, in 204 BC, Valerius Laevinus suggested beginning to repay the loans (Liv. 29.16.1–3). The Senate decided to organize the repayments in three installments. The first two appear to have been completed, but not the third, since, at the time it was due, in 200 BC, the impending war against Philip V was claiming all financial resources. The creditors presented themselves to the Senate, demanding payment. They argued that a great deal of land was up for sale (this was one consequence of the war), and that they wanted the money for the purchase of this land. The Senate therefore decided to offer them state-owned land, fortuitously located within 50 miles of Rome, in return for a small fee and with the option of exchanging the land for the sum of money owed, when the treasury was able to pay it (Liv. 31.13.6–9).

The petitioners took the land, and never exchanged it back. They had good reason not to. The area surrounding Rome, the most significant consumer center, generated the highest profits for market-oriented agriculture. When the land holding law of 111 BC brought an end to the land reforms of the Gracchian period, the then owners of the “*triens*” land (thus named since it had been handed to them in lieu of the third installment of the 210 BC debt repayments) were given an express confirmation of their rights (CIL I² 585, 32). This was one of the long-term consequences of 210 BC's borrowing. Another was the creation of a new currency after the old one collapsed under the pressures of war.

At the outbreak of war, Roman currency consisted of silver and copper money. The basic unit of the former was the silver “double drachma,” defined by a weight-standard that was widespread in Southern Italy, and that of the latter was the copper “*as*,” which was defined by the official weight standard of a Roman pound, at 324 grams. A gradual reduction in weight had led to the development of the *as* and its fractions into credit money, whose material value was beneath its nominal value. The *as* was not only a coin per se, but also an accounting unit, used to define the outgoings, income, debentures and assets of citizens. In 217 BC, the *as* was devalued to the semi-liberal standard (i.e., 162 grams: cf. Crawford II 1989, 615f.). As a consequence, the amount of money in circulation increased, and all debentures expressed in asses lost value. This meant that debts that had been initially recorded according to the liberal standard were cut by 50%. Then, between the years 215 and 214 BC, the weight of the *as* fell from the semi-liberal standard to the triental standard (108 grams) and the quadrantal standard (81 grams). Finally, the silver currency collapsed completely. In 213–212 BC, the percentage of silver in the double drachma fell to 80%, then 60%, and then 30%. The war, led from above and financed on credit, was met with the collapse of a currency that was no longer functioning.

What came next was the invention of an ingeniously calculated system, based on privately credited coin metals. To be exact, two currencies were created, each for a different area of circulation. One was primarily for use in the battlegrounds of Southern Italy, and this silver coinage, determined by the weight standard of a drachma, was called *uictoriati*. The other currency, the *denarii*, was for use within Rome. These were a new creation, weighing 4 *scrupli* (4.5 grams). The name and stamp on the front side (X for 10) showed that this silver coin was equivalent to 10 asses. The *as* itself weighed 54 grams, calculated according to the sextantal standard. Not only were all fractions included in this system, but also those gold coins that on one side bore the image of Mars, god of war, and on the other an eagle. Depending on weight, these coins were stamped with numerals indicating 20, 40, or 60. In contrast to the coins of the *denarii* system, the *uictoriati* carried no indication of value, they had no fractions, and, unlike the *denarii*, which were made

from pure silver, the *uictoriati* contained about 20% non-precious metal. In this way, it was cleverly ensured that the coins of the *denarii* system and the warfare currency that was the *uictoriati* did not mix, and, on the whole, remained in the separate circulations for which they had been intended. One would not be mistaken to assume that this double currency was the creation of the *tresuirii mensarii*.

The Great War also led to new developments in another area; in the north, Celtic and Ligurian tribes had entered the war on Hannibal's side. The colonies of Cremona and Placentia were isolated outposts. These districts suffered attacks from their neighbors, a consequence of which was the migration of many of their inhabitants to Rome. After the turning point of the war in 206 BC, ambassadors from both colonies went to the Senate to plead for help. The Senate ordered for the towns to be protected, and sent those who had fled to Rome back to their homes (Liv. 28.11, 10–11). However, it seems as if the Senate's promise did not result in any real action. In the year 200 BC, after the end of the Great War, Cremona was seized and Placentia put under enormous pressure by Celts and Ligurians acting under the command of Hamilcar, a Carthaginian officer who was continuing to wage war on his own initiative (Liv. 31.10.1–11.3). Rome had to start from the beginning on the Po Plain. The delegation from both colonies that had come to Rome in 206 BC induced the Senate to demand that all those who had fled to Rome on account of the events of the war return home. However, it was not easy to obey this order. As Livy described, the free farmers had been devastated by the war; there was a lack of slaves, livestock had been plundered, and villages had been destroyed or burned to the ground (Liv. 28.11.8–9). Southern Italy suffered even worse devastation than Latium and its surroundings. It was in this area that Hannibal had succeeded, following the battle of Cannae, in making significant inroads into Roman territory. In 215 BC, Capua switched allegiance to Hannibal, as did the city of Arpi in Apulia. Next to do so were some of the Greek settlements of Southern Italy: Tarentum, Locri, and Croton. Italic Samnites, Apulians, Lucani, and Bruttians also changed sides to side with Hannibal. The Roman re-conquest of these regions saw harsh punishments handed out; executions, expropriations, enslavement, deportation, and the annexation of vast estates. In the case of Capua in the year 210 BC, a 500-km² area of fertile land, the *ager Campanus*, was confiscated (for details of the conditions, see Liv. 26.33.1–34.13). When the personal property of the expropriated noblemen was then auctioned off, and the districts that had now been declared as state-owned were leased, a conspiracy developed that had to be brutally put down (Liv. 27.1–7). To finance the final stages of the war in 205 BC, land on the western edge of the *ager Campanus* was sold off (Liv. 28.46.4–6). The basic requirement of a cadastre, which would have at least enabled the land to be put to proper use, was missing. Amidst the confusion and conflict surrounding the property situation, private proprietors tried to add to their land by moving boundary

stones. In 173 BC, when this was discovered, a consul was given the task of fixing the borders between private and state land, and a plebiscite governed the ways in which the land of the regulated *ager publicus* (Liv. 42.1.6 and 19.1–2) could be leased. In 165 BC, it was possible to consolidate laws regulating ownership, and this was facilitated by the creation of a map and the buying back of part of the private land (Gran. Licin 15; cf. Cic. *Leg. Agr.* 2.82). In the end, it took 45 years for the state to definitively exercise its right of ownership and lease the entirety of the land.

The confiscations with which Rome punished its apostate allies caused, understandably, a great deal of bitterness among those affected. This suffices to explain why Rome used the considerable growth of the *ager Publicus* in Southern Italy as an opportunity for a generous distribution of land, in order to help re-establish the Roman dominion. In Apulia and Samnium, soldiers who had served in Spain and Africa under Scipio were each given two *iugera* per year of service (Liv. 31.4.1–3 and 49.5). Modern calculations estimate that 42,000 veterans were given land (Brunt 1971, 292). Strategically important colonies that had suffered losses during the war were granted new settlers. This first happened immediately after the war, in Venusia (on the border between Samnium and Apulia: Liv. 31. 49.6) and in Narnia (Umbria: Liv. 32.2.6–7). The region of Etruria had also shown its readiness to abandon Rome during the war, and, for this reason, the Senate occupied Arretium and took hostages in 207 BC. Ten years later, the colony of Cosa on the coast of Etruria received 1,000 new settlers (Liv. 33.24.8–9). In addition, two colonies of Roman citizens were founded on same coastline: Saturnia (Liv. 39. 55.9) and Graviscae (Liv. 40.29.1). The establishment of colonies further to the south had begun even earlier. In 194 BC, eight colonies of Roman citizens were founded on the coast, each beginning with 300 families: Volturnum, Liternum, Puteoli, Salernum, Buxentum, Tempesa, Croto, and Sipontum (Liv. 34.45.1–3). They bordered the whole of the south, from Campania to Apulia. In the same year, the decision was made to secure the Bruttian peninsula, where Hannibal had managed to hold power the longest, with two large Latin colonies (Liv. 34.53.1–2). The first was Copia on the Thurii territory in the northeast, and the second was Vibo Valentia in the southwest. The first was founded in 193 BC with 3,300 families (Liv. 35.9.7–8), and the second in 192 BC with 4,000 families (Liv. 35.40.5–6).

However, the most pressing issue was the reinforcement of those two colonies on the Po Plain, which had suffered especially badly. Initially, it was important to re-establish security in the face of the aggressive neighbors. Several military campaigns were started, until, in 190 BC, it was decided to deploy 6,000 new settlers (Liv. 37.46.9–11). At the same time, it was decided to found two new colonies in the region between Arminium and Placentia (Liv. 37, 47.1–2) that the Boians had been forced to abandon in 191 BC (Liv. 36.39.3). A year later, the Latin colony Bononia was founded with 3,000

settlers (Liv 37.57.7–8). Two years later, consul Aemilius Lepidus saw the strategically important road from Arminium via Bononia to Placentia built (Liv. 39, 2). In 183 BC, two colonies were founded along this road, Mutina and Parma, each with 2,000 citizens (Liv. 39.55.6–8). This period of colonization gradually came to an end between 184 and 174 BC. In the middle Adriatic, three colonies of Roman citizens were established, Potentia and Pisarum in 184 BC (Liv. 39.44.10) and Auximum in 174 BC (Liv. 41.27.10). The Latin colony Aquileia was founded in the east so as to provide protection against attacks. The 3,000 settlers who first began this large colony were added to in 169 BC with 1,500 new families (Liv. 40.34.2–3). On the Ligurian coast in the west, the Roman civilian colony of Luna was founded in 177 BC with 2,000 families (Liv. 41.13.4–5). This colony served to protect Etruria from the Ligurians. One of their tribes, the Apuan Ligurians, had been deported to Southern Italy and re-settled there on the *ager Taurasinus* in Samnium, near Beneventum (Liv 40.38.1–7 and 41.1–4). In the year 173 BC, the public land in the north, which the Ligurians and Celts had been forced to abandon, was shared out between veterans. Romans were given 10 *iugera*, while Latins and allied veterans each received three (Liv. 42.4.3–4).

The events of the war and the expropriation and colonization which followed brought about migratory movements that shook the political structure of the Italian peninsula and led to an increase in the Roman population. One of the first indications of this comes from the complaint made by the Latin colony of Narnia in the year 199 BC—that their depleted number of inhabitants had attracted immigrants who were proceeding to conduct themselves like citizen colonists (Liv. 32.2.6–7). This prompted the Senate to see to it that the number of fully entitled citizens was restored to a state that would enable colonies to provide their army contingent. How this was done can be illustrated by the example of Cosa. A list was made available, where applicants for citizenship and land lots could sign up. This list was open to all those who belonged to allied communities, and only excluded those who had been in enemy camps after the outbreak of the Great War (Liv. 33.24.8–9). Those who were accepted were given a small farm and, as new citizens of a Latin colony, a higher status that even enabled them to acquire the privileged rights of Roman citizens. This prospect evidently proved a reason for fraudulent schemes; in the colonies Puteoli, Salernum, and Buxentum, members of the Hernici tribe from the allied township of Ferentinum claimed to be Latins in order to be accepted into the colonies and gain Roman citizenship (Liv. 34.42.5–6).

Considerable portions of the population of Italy were relocated after the Second Punic War. In addition, there was substantial migration to the large metropolis of Rome. In 187 BC, envoys of many Latin communities complained about the exodus to Rome and about the addition of the immigrants to the lists of Roman citizens. The Senate ordered the removal of

these immigrants from the Roman census lists, and apparently 12,000 Latins were made to return to their homes (Liv. 39.3.4–9). However, this did not bring an end to the problem. In 177 BC, Latin envoys appeared again in Rome, explaining that their communities were becoming deserted due to the continued exodus to Rome, and warning that they would soon no longer be able to supply their army contingents (Liv. 41.8.6–12). This problem did not only affect the Latins. Envoys of the Paeligni and Samnites also complained that they had lost 4,000 families to Fregellae, a community under Latin law, and were no longer able to provide the required contingent of troops. The migration was driven by the desire to achieve better living standards in Rome, and the potential for gaining Roman citizenship. The since-introduced restrictive provision, which decreed that Latins could only be granted Roman citizenship if they had descendants still living in their native communities, was being circumvented. Fathers sold their children, with the stipulation that they would be set free in Rome and become citizens. Those without children let themselves be adopted by Romans. The envoys who brought these abuses to the attention of the Senate were listened to. It was decided that the migrants should be sent home and the legal loophole closed. However, this measure did not bring an end to the migratory movements, which were gradually beginning to represent a threat to the political and military organization of Italy.

When Rome brought the process of colonization to an end in 170 BC, it was not because there was no longer any land available for allocation, but rather because the strategic aim of securing Roman dominion throughout the Italian peninsula had been achieved. In Southern Italy, the Roman state was still in possession of large areas of farmland and pasture. The regulation was made, perhaps by law, that these areas would be handed over to large-scale businesses in return for a fee for their use. Individuals got up to 500 *iugera* of farmland for plowing and were allowed to keep up to 100 cattle and 500 sheep on the pastureland (Bringman 1986). Over the course of two generations, the exact situation regarding the ownership of this state land changed as a result of inheritance and buying and selling, with the result that the original boundaries were no longer respected, and private land ownership increased. At this point, Tib. Gracchus, making recourse to the original placement of borders, suggested that land could be reclaimed and used for a program of settlement that would strengthen small farmers. His suggestion sparked a political crisis that could not easily be calmed.

Throughout this period, the population of Rome was growing. Initially, people left the land out of fear of the enemy and then, after peace was settled, out of a desire for better earning potential, which was brought about by jobs created by the building boom of the post-war years. The many novelties generated by festivals, games, and triumphal processions were another pull-factor, and the prospect of gaining Roman citizenship continued to be an important incentive.

Additionally, there was an increase in the number of slaves and freemen, affecting Rome's role both as a center of trade and industry and as the home of large aristocratic families. The state issued contracts for the construction of temples and the improvement of infrastructure, and, in cases of food shortages, it was seen to, when possible, that grain was sold at reduced prices. However, aside from these examples, politics only got involved when public safety or the time-honored social norms, the *mos maiorum*, seemed under threat. In the year 213 BC, as a stream of refugees from the land was filling the city, foreign sacrificial priests and soothsayers found a new audience, and knew how to make profit from these people, who were frightened by their own vulnerability. The senate intervened, banning private sacrificial practices carried out under foreign customs and ordering all books on divination or rites to be handed in (Liv. 25.1.1–6). In 205 BC, in an acknowledgment of the religious mood of the masses, the cult of the “Great Mother” from Asia Minor was officially recognized in Rome and public awareness largely turned away from the cult practices generally considered objectionable in Roman eyes (Liv. 29.10.1–11, 8 and 14.1–14). In 187 BC came the discovery of a Greek mystery cult that had spread throughout Italy, organized in private groups. This discovery served as an excuse for widespread persecution (dramatically described in Liv 39.8.3–19.7 and 40.19.9–10; cf. Pailler 1988). A Senate decision (CIL, I² 581) led to the practices of the so-called Bacchanal cult being subject to many restrictions and its activities requiring individual permission from the Senate. The aim was obviously to hinder secret religious societies as potential hotbeds of anti-state conspiracies, and to undermine public morale.

The monetary economy became the real driving force behind change. For the Roman state, the creation of money was necessary in order to be in a position to repay creditors. Those defeated in the war paid the debts of the victors in the form of loot that was seized from them and the reparations that were imposed on them. The sums of money that were gathered by these means added up to around 282 million *denarii* (Frank 1933, 126 f.). From this, it was not only possible to finance colonization and construction work, but also to pay off debts. When, on the occasion of his triumph in 187 BC, Cn. Manlius Vulso delivered the proceeds of his brutal raid of Asia Minor to the treasury, it became possible to repay the citizens 25.5 yearly installments of capital levy payments (Liv. 39.7–5). Thus, the debt was paid off. The state was able to go to war, make investments, and pay off its debts. Its creditors also came into large sums of money. The military commanders who also belonged to the senatorial aristocracy had used their command and authority over the loot for their own personal enrichment, and the soldiers of victorious armies were given, depending on rank and arms category, various monetary rewards instead of allocated lots of land.

However, turmoil was hot on the heels of triumph; the division between the

society's rich and poor grew bigger, and the possibility to make money by granting loans with usurious interest rates was taken advantage of. Corruption and the misuse of official powers for personal gains was commonplace. For some, there emerged a life of luxury and excess of the kind that could have been found in the royal courts of the Hellenistic east. This was all seen as the demise of the *mos maiorum*, the modest ways of the elders, and many attempts were made to reverse the trend, including laws and edicts, the judicial measures of censors, criminal proceedings, and the power of the word. The first such law was probably the *lex Cincia de donis et muneribus* of 204 BC. Here, it was decreed that no one could receive money or gifts in return for legal representation in court (Elster 2003, n. 130). When serving as praetor in 198 BC, Cato the Elder expelled all the usurers from Sardinia and limited the amounts that the provincial governors could claim, themselves and their staff (Liv. 32.27.3–4). The measures were interconnected; in return for usurious interest rates, the moneylenders had been providing the provincials with the funds needed to meet the demands of the governors. As consul in 195 BC, Cato initiated a law that roughly determined what the province governors could demand for their expenses from the tributary communities (Elster 2003, 143). Two years later, the Senate allowed M. Sempronius, the tribune of the people, to introduce the proposal for a law that would forbid usurers to circumvent the conditions of Roman law on the limitation of interest rate by assigning their debt claims to Latins or confederates, and thus benefit from a higher interest rate on their loans to Roman citizens. The law (Liv. 35.7.2–5) saw to it that allies and Latins had to abide by the same conditions as Roman citizens when it came to loan transactions (Elster 2003, 146). A further law, accepted 1 year later, the *lex (P)laetoria de circumscriptionem adolescentium*, was aimed at stopping the exploitation of young people in business contracts. It fixed the age of legal capacity at the completion of 25 years and ensured that, in the cases of younger people, the legally valid closing of a loan transaction depended on the agreement of a custodian (Elster 2003, 147). Interventions against the power of money were also made in other areas, especially in appointment of officials and in elections. The *Lex Orchia de cenis* of 181 BC limited the number of guests at banquets (Elster 2003, 160), and the *Lex Cornelia Baebia* was the first law to make corruption of elections punishable (Liv. 40.19.11; Elster 2003 n. 161). In 180 BC, careers in public offices also began to be regulated (Liv. 40.19.11), by the initially unsuccessful *Lex Villia annalis* (Elster 2003, 164). This law decreed that a certain time interval must pass between appointments on the public office career ladder, and established a minimum age for such positions. The aim was to prevent abnormal careers, and to ensure equal opportunities within the ruling classes.

Cato the Elder stood at the forefront of the fight against the abuse of power in public office, embezzlement, and all kinds of corruption and indulgence. In 187 BC, he was involved when the Scipios, who had defeated Antiochus III, were investigated for the embezzlement of loot and compensation money

(Elster 2003, 157). As censor in 184 BC, he saw to it that the property values of luxury goods and slaves, for which high prices had been paid, were estimated at 10 times the value or price paid, and taxed at three times the usual rate, three instead of one per thousand. He expelled L. Quinctius Flamininus from the Senate on the grounds of misuse of official power, and confiscated the horse of L. Scipio, who had defeated Antiochus III (Liv. 39.42.5–44.9). His severity made him many enemies, but this was of no concern to Cato, whose temperament and attitude made him a born fighter. When, in 164 BC, he had to justify his actions before the censors, he took the opportunity to turn his explanation into a stinging attack of the wrongdoings of others. In a quotation recorded by Fronto, Cato explains how, preparing to appear before the censors, he took inspiration from an old speech (ORF 3 173 Malcovati):

“I ordered the tablets to be brought out on which my speech concerning the judicial wager with Marcus Cornelius had been written. The tablets were fetched: the services of my ancestors were read out; then those that I had done for the state were read. When the reading out of both of these was finished, the speech went on as follows: Never have I lavished my money or that of the allies in order to win favours.” “Oh no!” I said, “Don’t write that.” Then he read out, “Never have I imposed prefects on the towns of your allies, to plunder their property and their children.” “Delete that too; they don’t want to hear that. Read further.” “Never have I divided booty taken from the enemy or prize money among the small circle of my friends and therefore snatched it away from those who had captured it.” “Erase as far as that too: there is nothing they want said less than that. It is not needed; read on.” “Never have I granted travel passes so that my friends could gain large sums by means of the warrants.” “Go on and delete up to there too, immediately.” “The money intended for the wine distribution I have never shared out among my attendants and friends nor have I made them rich to the detriment of the state.” Most certainly erase that, right down to the wood. See, if you please, in what condition the state is, when for fear that it could cause anxieties I dare not recall the good services that I performed for the state, from which I used to gain gratitude. Thus it has become normal practise to do ill with impunity, but not to be allowed to do well without impunity.¹

With this masterpiece of rhetoric, the speaker styled himself an example of old righteousness in a world that had been put out of joint by money. It was also his view that the current behavioral displays of the women in rich families contributed to this ruinous world, an opinion that informed his opposition to the abolishment of the *lex Oppia* in 195 BC (Liv. 35.1–8; Elster 2003, 141). This law of 215 BC prohibited women from wearing colorful dresses and any gold jewelry that weighed more than half an ounce (13.62 grams), and also limited their ability to travel in carriages (Liv. 34.1.2–3; Elster 2003, 98). At the height of war in 215 BC, the idea behind the measure

was to ensure that the appearance of rich women in public was in line with the general mood of mourning, both for the fallen soldiers and for the gravity of the military situation. Twenty years later, in the very different context of the post-war period, Cato interpreted the *lex Oppia* as a protective barrier against the dangers of unbridled indulgence, and vehemently, albeit futilely, opposed the abolition of this wartime law.

However, the judgment of historians would prove favorable toward Cato and his supporters. Valerius Maximus identified the women's initiative to have the law abolished—the initiative that Cato opposed—as an indication that the victories over Hannibal and Philip V had incited Rome to audaciously pursue an unchecked lifestyle (Val. Max. 9.1.3). The unrest that was directed at the Scipios and Cn. Manlius Vulso following the Antiochus war also made an early entrance into historiography. When Livy drew a link between the luxury goods that were displayed at the triumph of Manlius Vulso, and the origin of a changed lifestyle in Rome (Liv. 39.6.7), he was in agreement with the historical work of Calpurnius Piso, itself written in the spirit of Cato (F 37 Forsythe). Accusations similar to those made against Manlius Vulso also arose in the context of L. Scipio's return from the east (Plin. *NH* 33.148). For Calpurnius Piso, a further milestone in the degeneration of the *mos maiorum* was to be found in the term of the censors in the year 154 BC (F 41 Forsythe). Here, there was talk of a sense of shame being undermined in the context of certain events, which Cato would undoubtedly also have seen as indicators of a moral decline. According to Calpurnius Piso, the victory over King Perseus and the start of the undermining of this sense of shame were to be read as symbolic. Whether, and if so, how, he considered the context between external triumphs and internal degeneration, we do not know. At this point, the Greek historian Polybius starts playing his part, as he sets about continuing his historical study of the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy (Pol. 6.57.5–9; 31.25.2–7). He asked the question of whether the destruction of Macedonia was not perhaps indicative of the danger that the achievement of world supremacy and the riches concentrated in Rome would worsen the moral strength of the elite class and that the avarice and ambition of the powerful could bring instability to the internal order of Rome. Thus, what went on during the period of time that has been the subject of this chapter led to a question that the late republican crisis-consciousness would come to answer (Bringmann 1977).

Notes

- 1 Translation taken from Dominik, W. and Hall, J., eds. 2010. *A Companion to Roman Rhetoric*, 65. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

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Further Reading

The following recommendations of further literature focus on the following topics: the formation of groups and family alliances within the ruling classes, the effects of the war against Hannibal, demographic development and the recruitment of those fit for military service, the role of war and expansion, the monetary economy, doing business with the state, colonization, and the influence of Greek religion and culture and the history of the city of Rome.

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Chapter 30

Livy, Polybius, and the Greek East (Books 31–45)

Arthur M. Eckstein

Introduction

In the trajectory of Livy's grand narrative of Roman imperial expansion, the conflict between Rome and Carthage dominates Books 16–30, and the next 15 volumes, Books 31–45, are dominated by Rome's confrontation with the formidable successor-states to the empire of Alexander the Great in the eastern Mediterranean. First comes the war with Philip V of Macedon (200–196 BC), then the war against the Seleucid emperor Antiochus III the Great (191–188 BC), and finally the war against Philip V's son Perseus (171–168 BC); in between are significant diplomatic tensions.¹ To be sure, Livy in Books 31–45 covers numerous other topics: serious Roman wars in northern Italy and in Spain, Roman elections and internal political strife (including the trials of the Scipios in Book 38 and the juicy Bacchanalia scandal in Book 39), the usual omens and religious events; however, the central subject of these 15 volumes is the confrontation with the Greco-Macedonian monarchies, and especially Macedon. The reason is not too difficult to seek. The great monarchies now replaced Carthage as the main enemy of Rome—that is, they were now the main obstacles to what Livy views as the destiny of Rome to rule the Mediterranean.

Livy was not only a scholar but a literary artist as well. He carefully constructed his history of Rome in five-volume segments, which scholars call “pentads”; the extent to which the eastern monarchies dominate Books 31–45 is shown by the points where the Livian pentads divide. Thus, Books 31–45 begin with the outbreak of the war against King Philip V of Macedon, and close with the invasion of European Greece by the Seleucid emperor Antiochus the Great; Books 36–40 begin with the war against Antiochus and end with the death of Philip V in 179 BC; and Books 40–45 ends with the Roman defeat of Philip's son Perseus, and Rome's break-up of the Macedonian kingdom into four separate republics.²

The amount of space, 15 volumes, that Livy devotes to these wars in the Greek Mediterranean is about the same as the space he devoted to the Roman struggle with Carthage. However, the period covered is only half as long: 32 years as opposed to 64 years. This shows the importance that Livy ascribed to this period, to the wars in the East, and to the diplomatic tensions between those wars. The focus on Macedon is particularly noticeable. One reason is

that, whereas modern scholarship distinguishes the original Argead dynasty of Macedon—the family of Philip II and Alexander the Great—from the later Antigonid dynasty that succeeded as rulers there in 277 BC, the ancients did not make such a clear distinction. Thus, as with the Greek historians, Livy thought of the rulers of Macedon in the late third and early second centuries BC as the descendants of Philip II and the great Alexander; it was all “the House of Macedon.” No wonder, then, that the elimination of the Macedonian counterweight and threat to Rome took on such importance, or that Livy ended Book 45 with Macedonian royal children named Philip and Alexander being marched through the streets of Rome, along with their father King Perseus, in the triumphal procession of L. Aemilius Paullus (consul II, 168 BC), the Roman conqueror of the kingdom.³ There is yet another way of showing the extraordinary importance of Macedon for Livy. While the Greek historian Polybius ended his history of Rome's rise to world power with the parallel Roman destructions of Carthage in North Africa and Corinth in Greece, Livy ended Book 50 of his history (the end of a pentad and the end of the 10th pentad, thus a very dramatic break-point) with the defeat of the Macedonian pretender Andriscus—that is, with the final Roman defeat of Macedonian power. The destruction of Carthage is held over until Book 41, and Corinth for Book 42.⁴

The writing of history at Rome was traditionally based not so much on primary research in archives or in reading inscriptions, or on archaeological discovery, but on the artistic reworking of literary histories from writers closer to the events and already published.⁵ Beginning with the Hannibalic War period (218–201 BC), Livy had better and more voluminous written sources on which to draw for his own work than he had possessed for the earlier and more obscure periods of Roman history; occasionally, these sources were even contemporary to the events. Indeed, he complains at the beginning of Book 31 that he now has so much material to draw on that he feels as if he is wading out step by step from shallows into a deep and wide sea (31.1.1–5). He wonders if he will ever finish, and, in fact, at the beginning of Book 31, he was still less than one-fourth of the way through his gigantic work.⁶

Scholarly investigation has demonstrated the startling fact that, in Books 31–45, almost two-thirds of Livy's narrative is based primarily on the account written by Polybius of Megalopolis (ca. 160–120 BC) about Rome's wars and its rise to the status of a world power. Polybius was an experienced politician and military man who had been deported to Italy from his native Achaea in 168–167 BC following Rome's war against Perseus, on grounds that he had not supported Rome enthusiastically. In exile in Rome, and then later back home in Achaea, he devoted himself to analyzing how and why the Romans had become the dominant Mediterranean power; the result was a large historical work, 40 volumes long.⁷ We know that Livy followed Polybius for long stretches of his own history because significant segments of Polybius' history

survive, and we can compare the lengthy Greek texts of Polybius to what is clearly a parallel narrative in Latin by Livy.⁸ In addition, Nissen demonstrated long ago that, even where no parallel Polybian text survives, other criteria allow us to deduce that Livy is following the Achaean historian—such as if the Livian account forms part of a continuous narrative that begins with a surviving Polybian parallel text; or if passages contain Greek terminology that Livy has to explain; or if passages in a Greek context refer to detailed facts that are unlikely to have been well-known at Rome.⁹

Moreover, Livy is explicit in his praise of Polybius' historical work, and about his own reliance upon it: “a writer worthy of credence on all topics having to do with Rome, and especially authoritative about affairs in the Greek East” (Liv. 33.10.10).¹⁰ The earlier Livy 30.45.5 is similar.¹¹ In his favorable judgment, Livy followed the high estimation accorded Polybius in the previous Roman generation by Cicero, a figure whom Livy in turn admired; to Cicero, Polybius was “an especially reliable authority” on historical matters.¹² Thus, it was not only Livy's personal opinion that led him continually to follow Polybius, often in preference to Roman sources; rather, he was partaking in a larger trend at Rome: the positive reputation of Polybius as a historian among Romans in the first century BC.¹³ An example of how far Livy was willing to depend on Polybius in order to structure his narrative of eastern affairs in Books 31–45 is the sequence of speeches that appear at significant points in Livy's narrative: wherever we can check the extant Polybian text, in places where Polybius has a personage giving a speech, Livy has the same personage giving a speech too.¹⁴

However, this does not mean that Livy, in the long sections of Books 31–45 dealing with Greek affairs, was simply translating Polybius into Latin. By this stage in the writing of his history, Livy had firmly established his own ideas, and had perfected his own manner of composition.¹⁵ Thus, in writing about the East, Livy sometimes—according to his own taste—added material from the Roman annalists to supplement what he found in Polybius.¹⁶ In addition, the Livian speeches in or about the East, though based on Polybian material and presented in the same sequence and with the same speakers, have been re-worked into masterpieces of Latin rhetoric by Livy: they are organized according to the formal rules of Latin epideictic oratory, and often depart significantly in mood and tone from the Polybian original.¹⁷ This fact points to a larger aspect of Livy's relationship to the Greek historian: Livy was not only a literary artist in his own right (as Polybius, too, intended to be), but Livy followed his own purposes in writing the history of this period.

A list of the differences between Polybius and Livy concerning the great eastern wars will be instructive at this point. The topic of difference also offers us an opportunity to investigate in detail how one important ancient history-writer interacted at length with a previous one. In other words, here we can, for once, examine in detail exactly how an ancient historian used his sources.

Moreover, Polybius and Livy were not ordinary writers: both men enjoyed high reputations in antiquity, and possessed outstanding—if differing—personalities.¹⁸

First, a fundamental issue: how Livy's text is chronologically structured. In Books 31–45, Livy keeps to a traditional Roman annalistic organization of material, a chronological organization followed by his Roman predecessors such as the Sullan-era annalists Valerius Antias and Claudius Quadrigarius. That is, from Livy's Book 2 and the first annual elections of consuls in the Roman Republic (replacing the kings), Livy's organization of events runs from the entry of one pair of consuls into office (the beginning of one consul-year) to the entry of the next pair into office (the beginning of the next consul-year). In terms of the solar calendar, this means that the chronicle of events runs from late winter to late winter.¹⁹ The result, in Books 31–45, is that Livy ignores Polybius' differing chronological organization, which was by Olympiad-year after Olympiad-year, a system that narrated events from early autumn to early autumn. In other words, a new Polybian Olympiad-year started in the middle of the Romans' consul-year.²⁰ Livy evidently had difficulties in reconciling these two chronological schemes, and the result is that he occasionally puts events in the East in the wrong year. However, we see here Livy's natural adherence to a Roman style of presentation in the writing of history, a point to which we will return.²¹

Second, Livy was writing in Latin for the late-first-century BC Roman elite, whereas Polybius was writing in Greek primarily for Greeks 150 years earlier; their audiences differ, and so do these writers' interests.²² Thus, by comparing parallel texts, we can see that Livy has sometimes abbreviated, for his Roman audience, Polybius' highly detailed narratives of Greek affairs. Livy is explicit about this: at 29.12.1, he admits that he has left out 2 whole years of warfare in Greece during Rome's first war with Macedon because Roman forces were not much involved (207–206 BC). Yet, we know that, in these years, Philip V's successive invasions of Aetolia drove Rome's main ally, the Aetolian League, right out of the war—a most important event, with long-range repercussions for Roman–Aetolian relations. Livy simply does not cover it.²³ Similarly, at 33.20.13, Livy is explicit that he is abbreviating his account of the Rhodian naval confrontation with the formidable fleet of Antiochus III (spring of 197 BC)—Polybius narrated it *in extenso* (Pol. 18.41.a)—since, Livy declares, he barely has enough room for all the events that directly involve Rome.²⁴ Strikingly, Livy even omits from his work two lengthy passages describing how Greek politicians should deal with Rome, which Polybius himself no doubt considered analytically central—the debate between the Achaean statesmen Aristaenus and Philopoemen (ca. 184 BC) over how to confront Roman power (24.11.1–13.10), and the discussion of the sycophantic policy toward Rome adopted by their successor Callicrates (24.8.1–10.15). These passages have left echoes in the Greek tradition (Plut. *Phil.* 17.3; Paus.

8.51.4).²⁵ However, Livy omitted them, probably because he thought they would have slowed down the momentum of his narrative.

Third, Livy's Greek was good but not perfect; Polybius could be a complex and technical writer, and there are clearly times when Livy misunderstands Polybius' text. Sometimes, these errors are minor, but sometimes there are real howlers. Thus, where Polybius has a meeting of the general assembly of the Aetolian League at Thermum in 'Αἰτολία ἢ τῶν Θερμικῶν σύνοδον *suvnodon* (18.48.5), Livy twice misunderstands this as a reference to Thermopylae the famous pass (31.32.3–4; 33.35.8), shifts the Aetolian assembly 75 miles eastward to Thermopylae, and states that this is where it always met.²⁶

Fourth, and more seriously, there are occasions when Livy, for reasons of patriotism, downplays or even suppresses Polybius' criticism of the behavior of Rome or individual Romans. A simple example is Livy's depiction of the Roman sack of the city of Ambracia in 189 BC. Following Polybius (21.30.9), he records that the Roman troops seized the many beautiful paintings and marble statues that adorned the city (a former royal capital of Epirus); but, by way of amelioration, he adds: “nothing beyond this was touched or violated” (38.9.14)—a phrase not found in the corresponding passage in Polybius.²⁷ A more complex example is the two historians' picture of T. Quinctius Flaminius. He was a major figure: consul in 198 BC, proconsul in Greece 197–194 BC, the victorious general in 197 BC in Rome's war with Philip V of Macedon, and the originator of the Isthmian Declaration in 196 BC (on which, see the text that follows). Polybius depicts Flaminius as a talented general and a clever, even unscrupulous politician, both in his dealings with the Greeks and in his manipulation of politics back in Rome so that he could retain his command in Greece for as long as possible (see esp. Pol. 18.1–12). Livy's own account of Flaminius' years of command in Greece is clearly based on Polybian material, even to sequence of subject-matter and speeches, but Livy has suppressed the reasons for Polybius' admiring but ambiguous judgment of Flaminius. Thus, not only does Livy omit Flaminius' cynical political calculations to gain the extension of his Greek command (a theme prominent in Polybius), but he suppresses even Flaminius' friendly attitude and jokes with Philip at the peace conference at Nicaea in autumn 198 BC (intended, Polybius implies, to signal his possible willingness for a compromise peace if he were not prorogued); in Livy, what we get instead is criticism of King Philip himself for his undignified behavior in making jokes.²⁸ And though Livy, in a passage based on Polybius, depicts the murder of the pro-Macedonian politician Brachylles of Boeotia in winter 197–196 BC, he omits Polybius' implication that Flaminius was complicit in the murder.²⁹ The end result—the intended result—is to turn Livy's Flaminius into a virtuous, dignified, and solemn Roman, a Roman of *gravitas*, the kind of Roman of the past whom Livy loved to portray. Polybius' picture is far more

complex.³⁰

And this points to how the purposes of the two historians are radically different. It is not simply that Livy suppresses information in Polybius that was embarrassing to Rome; he does, but he operates from more than crude patriotism. Polybius sought to produce a handbook of good and bad decision-making for his own and succeeding generations of statesmen, primarily Greeks; his writing is thus coolly analytical, and, though dealing often with inherently dramatic events, is intent on avoiding the sensational.³¹ Livy is didactic, too, but his goal is different: he is intent on asserting the validity of old-fashioned Roman morality and the (allegedly) virtuous way of life that, in the past, led to Rome's enormous success, in contrast to what he sees as the corruption of his own times—the period that saw the Republic replaced by a permanent dictatorship. This sentiment is famously expressed in Livy's *Preface*.³² However, just as Livy's goal is different from that of Polybius, so is his literary strategy: where the Greek historian aims at objective analysis of political and strategic problems, Livy deploys artistic skill to produce emotional impact via vivid images of virtue and vice.

This, too, is evident from studies of the parallel accounts of events in Polybius and Livy, which show exactly how Livy employs and yet differs from Polybius. First, he tends to simplify and abridge the original Polybian narrative, eliminating what he clearly sees as unnecessary circumstantial detail. This is because Livy, in using Polybius as a major source, faced a writer of great length (40 volumes) and Thucydidean attention to exact detail (e.g., the names of minor Greek political figures)—much of which would have little meaning either to Livy or his audience.³³ However, at the same time that Livy often simplifies the original prolix Polybian text, he intensifies it emotionally: he opts for vividness and rapidity of description, seeks to carry the narrative along quickly (a virtue missing from Polybius), while eliciting powerful emotions in his audience.³⁴ And, not only is Livy intent on creating scenes with an emotional impact on his audience, he is in general far more concerned than Polybius to portray the emotions of past historical figures themselves.³⁵

For instance, we have the Polybian and Livian narratives of the fate of the city of Abydos in 200 BC. Besieged by King Philip V, most of the population committed suicide rather than surrender to him and face the likelihood of mass enslavement. Polybius covers this event in detail (16. 30–34), and we can see what Livy (in 31.17) did with the original text. Polybius repeatedly praises the excellent courage of the Abydenes, which was shown in their staunch defense of the city against great odds, and which then led them to die rather than surrender and become slaves. Polybius calls their mass suicide an act “worthy of memory,” and “splendid and admirable.”³⁶ Livy's account is obviously based on Polybius, but it is much shorter, omits Polybius' numerous details about the course of fighting during the siege, and omits the names of

the Abydene leaders. However, most importantly, Livy's evaluation of the Abydenes' conduct is sharply different. In language far more emotional than Polybius' detached praise, Livy is condemnatory: he describes the Abydenes as engaged in mass hysteria, filled with rage, desperation, and—finally—madness (*rabies*). For him, the mass suicide is nothing but a terrible crime (*facinus ... execrabile*). He does not want to inspire admiration for the freedom-loving Abydenes, but to place his audience as witnesses in the doomed city, experiencing the horrors of the Abydenes' act.³⁷

Moreover, in Polybius, the story of the Abydenes is analytically linked to a larger important political point: Polybius has argued since Book 7, and with increasing intensity since Book 15, that Philip V's brutality as he pursued his ever-expanding imperial goals was having a counter-productive impact on his fortunes, fostering a firm resolve among Greek governments to resist him (see esp. 15.21–24, the Greek reaction to his mass enslavements at Cius and Thasos).³⁸ However, Livy ignores the broader Polybian analysis in which Abydus is set; his goal is emotional impact. Such lack of interest in context, in favor of vivid descriptions of individual events—followed often by a lack of analytical interest in consequences—is a frequent aspect of the Livian narrative.³⁹

Similar conclusions come from studies of Polybius' and Livy's parallel narratives of the Isthmian Declaration. At Corinth in summer 196 BC, the Romans and the proconsul T. Quinctius Flaminius, victorious over Philip V, proclaimed, to the Greeks assembled for the Isthmian Games, the Roman decision to leave all Greek states free: free not only from Macedon, but free from Rome as well, ungarrisoned, untaxed, and enjoying their own ancestral constitutions and laws. The original event was clearly dramatic—and was intended to be. Polybius' version of this scene has its drama; but Livy's version is actually longer.⁴⁰ That is because Livy focuses in detail on the powerful emotions of the Greek crowd as they absorb the good news. Whereas at Abydus Livy wanted to put his readers amid a scene of horror at the beginning of the war against Philip, here, two volumes later, Livy wants to place his audience amid the joy of the Greek crowd as the war ends, the threat of Philip is removed, and freedom proclaimed. Polybius records the joy of that crowd too, but from the outside; he is more interested in offering his own analysis of the historical meaning of the declaration.⁴¹

A close examination of how Polybius and then Livy, working from Polybius, depict the battle at Cynoscephalae, where Flaminius and his Greek allies decisively defeated Philip and won the war (June 197 BC), will underline in detail the differences in narrative style between the two authors—and their differences in broad historical purpose as well.⁴²

Polybius appears to have had excellent sources for Cynoscephalae, and there is no reason to doubt his outline of the course of the fighting—which has, indeed, been confirmed by archaeology (e.g., the discovery of Flaminius'

camp, exactly where Polybius said it was).⁴³ However, Polybius' narrative is itself an artistic construct, powerfully shaped by the contrast he continually wishes to draw between a cautious, calm, and calculating Flamininus, and an impulsive, emotion-driven Philip; it is a way for Polybius to demonstrate proper generalship to his audience.⁴⁴ By contrast, for Livy, desperation and desperate improvisation characterize the actions of *both* commanders during the battle. Livy's depiction of the battle is so different from Polybius that some scholars have suggested that it owes much to Roman annalistic versions of the battle, which for some reason were hostile to Flamininus.⁴⁵ However, Livy is explicit that his account of Cynoscephalae is based directly on Polybius, whom he praises for accuracy (33.10.10). The origin of the differences in depiction lies not in different sources but in differing ideological–literary purposes: Polybius is interested in drawing up models of good generalship and bad generalship for his audience, whereas Livy is interested in impressing upon his audience the sheer chaos and excitement of battle.⁴⁶

The course of the battle was complex. The Macedonians were camped on the north side of the Cynoscephalae ridge, the Romans and their Greek allies on the south side. Scouting forces from each side blundered into each other at the top of the ridge in a morning fog; both sides began reinforcing their troops; and the arrival of the new reinforcements swung the battle back and forth. Philip had sent a large part of his army to forage; but when his light forces appeared to be winning the battle on top of the ridge, he recalled his infantry and took whatever part of the phalanx he could gather up and over the hill. The rest of the phalanx, recalled from foraging, followed in haphazard fashion. Philip's phalanx charge drove the Roman left down the ridge, but Flamininus had kept his right wing legion in reserve and it now charged up the ridge against the disorganized part of the phalanx that was just arriving. The charge was successful, and drove off half the Macedonian army; then parts of the Roman right wing turned and caught Philip and his phalanx from behind as they were advancing down the ridge. The Macedonians, surrounded, suffered very heavy casualties. The Roman right also advanced upon the remnant that had fled, and though the phalanx remnants tried to surrender, they were massacred. Meanwhile, Flamininus' Aetolian allies, who had helped block the Macedonian advance over the ridge earlier in the battle, looted Philip's camp.⁴⁷

Within this structure, Polybius depicts Flamininus as acting carefully and cautiously. He has proceeded into Thessaly slowly, taking care not to be caught by surprise. When his scouts are driven back from the top of the ridge the first time, he sends reinforcements, which drive the Macedonians back; but meanwhile he deploys his entire army from the camp in an orderly fashion. When the Macedonian phalanx itself, with Philip in command, pushes down the ridge, driving the Roman left back again, Flamininus calmly rides over to the right, observes the opportunity caused by Macedonian

disorganization on the top of the ridge as the rest of the phalanx is arriving, and leads the Roman right's decisive charge against it. By contrast, Philip acts in a haphazard and emotional manner. At first, he sets his army marching westward, then changes his mind because of the fog, returns to the old camp, and sends his men to forage. Then he recalls them hurriedly when he suddenly decides to risk all on top of the ridge after his scouting forces make contact and the light infantry reinforcements he has sent appear to be doing well; then he decides to commit his phalanx to battle on the basis of false information that inflames him with optimism, even though he knows that the hilly ground is unsuitable for a phalanx. At the top of the ridge, he then gambles everything by committing his available phalanx infantry to a charge, even though only half of it is there. He is unaware of what is happening on his disorganized left when—arriving haphazardly on the top of the ridge—they are struck by Flamininus' organized right wing. From this perspective, it is clear why the Romans won. And to seal the point, Polybius appends to his narrative of the battle a long digression on the advantages in flexibility possessed by Roman segmented legionary organization over the great phalanx-mass, and the Roman habit of keeping a reserve force available to use at crucial moments (18.28–32).

Livy has none of this. His focus is on chaos and excitement, not rational battle-management. For purposes of drama, he exaggerates the foggy conditions that Polybius reported: “fog as dark as night” causes the Macedonian army's morning march to fall apart, and causes the Romans to fear ambush on the ridge top as the scouting forces collide (Liv. 33.7.1 and 33.7.4).⁴⁸ As in Polybius, the Macedonians drive the Roman scouts down the ridge, and Flamininus responds; Philip then actually sees his forces in trouble on the ridge (33.7.9–10: nothing like this in Polybius), and sends up his light troops, which in turn drive the Romans back. However, while Polybius next has Philip responding ecstatically to messengers' information about a victory that is false (already blocked by Flamininus' further reinforcements), and thus committing his phalanx wrongly to the battle, this aspect is downplayed by Livy. Instead, Livy emphasizes Philip's *reluctance* to commit the phalanx, and his doubts about the suitability of the ridge for a phalanx attack, which works best on a level plain; he finally acts only to secure the safety of the forces already engaged (33.8.2). This is effective as drama—the king reluctantly commits his phalanx to the battle, which will end in catastrophe—but it is not Polybius. Indeed, as A. H. MacDonald has pointed out, it is precisely the type of easy dramatic moment that Polybius objected to in over-rhetorical writers such as Phylarchus.⁴⁹ And thus, where Polybius contrasts the styles of the opposing commanders, Livy—in the service of the desperation theme—actually equates them: “The Roman did the same as Philip (*idem et Romanus*...) committing his entire force from necessity, rather than to seize an opportunity in the fighting” (33.8.3).

Livy, similar to Polybius, then describes the successful push of Philip and the incomplete phalanx down the ridge against the Roman left. However, here, at the moment of Philip's decision to launch the phalanx attack—the decision that will lose him the war—Livy (33.8.13) misunderstands Polybius' Greek and thinks he orders the phalanx not to use their famous long spears, but swords.⁵⁰ Livy follows Polybius with Flamininus' ride from the embattled Roman left over to the Roman right and the subsequent charge of Flamininus and the Roman right against the disorganized Macedonian left (33.9.1–8). However, Livy omits Flamininus' observation of the disorder on the ridge and his rational calculation of the opportunity this offers—a calculation that is central to Polybius' explanation of what happened, discussed in a passage of over 50 words (18.25.4–5). Instead, Livy merely has the unhelpful remark that Flamininus attacked the Macedonian left because he thought that the defeat of one part of Philip's army would entail the defeat of it all (33.9.1). What mainly interests Livy is the drama of the attack up the ridge itself, not the tactical reasons behind its success; he stresses the impact upon the Macedonians of the huge, charging Roman war elephants (an exaggeration of what Polybius says).⁵¹

The end at Cynoscephalae, finally, presents us with two examples of Livy's patriotic censorship. First, Polybius has the remnants of the defeated Macedonian left, driven down off the ridge, attempt to surrender, raising their pikes, but while Flamininus is hesitating about what to do, the excited Roman troops attack and massacre most of the Macedonians, only a few escaping (18.26.9–12). Livy, too, has Flamininus hesitating over whether to accept the surrender and the excited Roman soldiery attacking—but in Livy the Romans only kill a few; most of the Macedonians actually escape (33.10.3–5).⁵² Second, Polybius says that Flamininus' soldiers then rushed to loot Philip's camp, and were infuriated to find the Aetolians already making off with the booty; they complained bitterly and even taunted Flamininus for having risked their lives while allowing the Aetolians to reap the reward (18.27.3–5). These two stories create a dark Polybian picture of Roman soldiery; and in Polybius the Roman soldiers' taunting seems the origin of the quarrels between Flamininus and the Aetolians, quarrels which will have a long-term negative political impact.⁵³ However, all this is missing from Livy, who downplays the soldiers' hope for loot (though admitting it) and omits entirely the soldiers' jealousy of the Aetolians and their taunting of Flamininus (33.10.6).⁵⁴

We know there was another version of Cynoscephalae—an Aetolian version, contemporaneous with the battle. This version appeared in a speech by the Aetolian diplomat Archidamus in 192 BC, attempting to persuade the Achaeans not to side with Rome in a war with Antiochus III, the new ally of the Aetolians. Archidamus stresses Antiochus' great power and the Romans' overblown military reputation. Archidamus had been one of the Aetolian cavalry commanders at Cynoscephalae (Pol. 18.21.6), and both Polybius and

Livy (following Polybius) have the Aetolian cavalry fighting with great courage on the Roman left.⁵⁵ In Archidamus' version, it is the Aetolians' bravery that in fact won the battle, while Flamininus, panicking at the Macedonian advance, spent his time sacrificing to the gods like a priest (Liv. 35.48.12–13).⁵⁶ The accusation of panic or cowardice against Flamininus also appears in Plutarch (*Comp. Phil. and Flam.* 2.3), which suggests that this was a significant Greek tradition about Cynoscephalae—a tradition that was the opposite of Polybius' Flamininus as the calm and calculating manager of battle.⁵⁷

The tradition probably originates in a Greek misunderstanding of traditional Roman attention to religious ritual before battle.⁵⁸ Of course, Polybius intended his audience to believe that Archidamus' accusation was false, for it contradicted Polybius' own previous version of Flamininus' behavior during the battle, which they had read. Archidamus also contradicts Livy's version of Flamininus, who is more pressured but a quick opportunist who certainly does not panic; there is no reason to think that Livy expected his readers to believe Archidamus any more than Polybius did. Moreover, Flamininus in front of the Achaeans is then allowed to deliver a crushing rhetorical response to Archidamus (Liv. 35.49). Archidamus' presentation of a version of events that itself contradicts the previous narrative, and then its refutation by an opposing speaker, is in fact a standard Polybian literary–historical technique, and Livy is following it here.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, the Archidamus tradition shows that Polybius' version of the battle is the result of his choosing among several available narratives, which is what Livy does as well. In terms of basic historiographical procedure, then, Polybius is not that different from Livy. However, his choice of emphasis certainly is.

Hammond argues that perhaps in reality the Roman victory owed a great deal to chance.⁶⁰ Polybius would have found this very irritating; he wrote a careful analytical account of the battle precisely to combat the idea that the Roman victory was due to chance (18.28.5).⁶¹ Hence, not only Polybius' depiction of Flamininus as a highly competent battle manager contrasted to Philip as a reckless one, but also the long appendix on the tactical advantage of the flexible Roman legion over the Macedonian phalanx, and the Roman habit of maintaining reserves, to deal with emergencies or to push home victory (18.28–32).⁶² However, Livy did not think the excursus on military technique—a typical example of Polybius' technical advice to his audience—worthy of inclusion; though he forthrightly declares that he is following Polybius' account (33.10.10), his literary–historical purpose is different.

Livy's version of the Cynoscephalae is vivid, and it is more easily followed than the narrative of Polybius, which is filled with complex fighting and the names of Macedonian sub-commanders. In other words, the case of Cynoscephalae shows that Livy is a better *writer* than Polybius: clearer, less didactic, more dramatic, and less encumbered by details.⁶³ However, whether

Livy is as good an analytical historian as a different question. Polybius' purpose in describing the battle was to analyze for an audience of statesmen and potential generals the causes of Philip V's defeat, which he ascribed to a series of careless and reckless decisions by the king as commander-in-chief. This rational analysis of the fighting is then put into a broader context, also analytical: the general superiority of the legion, and of Roman battle technique. The victory is thus ascribed as much to Roman organization as to Roman valor and Flamininus' steadiness.⁶⁴ Livy, by contrast, is simply not as focused as Polybius on analysis of the causes and consequences of events.⁶⁵ He wants to put the reader in the middle of the battle, to elicit its excitement and confusion—and then to end the battle in a highly satisfactory manner. And this depiction of a glorious victory is congruent with Livy's own larger purpose in writing his massive history—which was to recall to his readers, during a time “when we can neither bear our vices or their remedy” (*Praef.* 9), the moral stature of Rome and Romans of the past, and to urge renewal. Thus, as H. Tränkle says, the differences between Livy and Polybius are not only founded on dissimilar narrative technique: the differences in narrative technique are themselves founded on different ways of looking at history, and what we can draw from it.⁶⁶

One final point. Polybius saw the events in Greece after 220 BC, and especially after 200 BC, as crucial to the growth of Roman power; looking back, so did Livy. He did not follow Polybius in stressing the importance in Greek events of Polybius' own Achaean League (hence, the fall of Achaëa, which ended Polybius' history, appears in an undramatic place in Livy Book 52). However, no doubt influenced by Polybius' analysis and his own flare for the dramatic, Livy agreed on the historical importance of Rome's confrontation with and eventual defeat of the formidable Hellenistic monarchies. Hence, a large majority of Books 31–45 is devoted to the Roman wars with Macedon and the Seleucids. However, Roman geostrategic focus and effort can be measured not only by literary tradition, but more objectively by the known placement of military units and commanders. And here, certain facts stand out starkly. Whereas Livy devotes only about one-third of Books 31–45 to events in Italy and the West, it is there that the actual Senate of 200–168 BC placed its military emphasis. Of the 68 consuls elected between 200 and 168 BC, only 13 were sent with commands east of the Adriatic, and these allocations were concentrated in the war years 200–198 BC, 191–188 BC, and 171–168 BC. Of the almost 200 praetors elected, the second-highest elected office at Rome, none was ever sent east of the Adriatic—although praetors regularly received fighting commands in Spain in this period. Indeed, except for 189 BC, one consul (and often both) served in northern Italy every year during this period. Both consuls served in Italy every year between 188 and 172 BC.⁶⁷

What held for military commands naturally was reflected in the distribution of troops: whereas large expeditionary forces were sent to the East three times in

the period covered in Livy's Books 31–45, the Roman forces in northern Italy in this period averaged four legions a year—as large as the largest expeditionary force ever sent into the East.⁶⁸ Further, in antiquity, there were no permanent embassies in foreign capitals; this means that whatever official communication occurred between states was by means of ad hoc envoys sent on specific missions. And when it comes to such special envoys sent out from Rome to engage with the Greco-Macedonian monarchies, the story is similar to that with commanders and troops. Except for a single courtesy call at Antioch by Flamininus in 183 BC, no Roman embassy visited the Seleucid Empire between 188 and 172 BC (16 years); and no Roman embassy visited the court of the Ptolemies in Egypt—the third of the Greco-Macedonian great powers—between 200 and 173 BC, that is, 27 years.⁶⁹ All of this suggests that the actual Roman governing elite of this period was still very much centered on Italy and the West.

So why does Livy focus so much on the East? In part, it is clear that he preferred basing his narrative on Polybius than on the Roman annalists. Livy's main sources on the West were these Roman annalists, and he did not much trust writers such as Valerius Antias (see his dry comment at 32.6.5–8 on an alleged Roman victory in Greece in 199 BC).⁷⁰ For another, the story the Annalists had to tell in the West was dull—the slow, grinding expansion of Roman power in Liguria and Spain—though they tried to spice it up with suspect tales of Roman victories that never had any consequences. Polybius provided Livy with richer material, material easier for him to work up into his own—more dramatic—narrative style. Polybius' detailed depiction of the crucial defeat of Philip at Cynoscephalae (see the preceding text) is an example of the rich literary mine that Livy found here. The fact that the majority of the material in Livy's Books 31–45 is based on Polybius' work is testimony that Livy's praise of Polybius in 30.45 and 33.10 was sincere.

However, I would also suggest here at the end what I posited at the beginning: Livy became sincerely convinced that Polybius' view of the importance of the wars in the East was correct. This comes through in Livy's remark that the Hannibalic War had ended just in time to prevent Rome from having to meet Philip as well as Hannibal in the field, and similarly Philip had been defeated just in time to prevent Rome from having to meet Antiochus and Philip together (33.19.6). The dangers represented by these powerful states are underlined. No corresponding statement by Polybius exists, but after Book 5 his work is fragmentary, so that proves little. Conversely, these Livian remarks parallel Polybius' own later statement that the Seleucid emperor Antiochus IV would never have obeyed the Roman demands to cease his conquest of Egypt (168 BC), except that Rome had just defeated King Perseus of Macedon at Pydna; thus had Tyche (Fortune) arranged things (29. 27.11–13). It is probable, then, that Livy in 33.19 was drawing a Polybian moral about the dangers that Rome faced east of the Adriatic after 200 BC.⁷¹ Livy's

lack of interest in Achaean affairs shows that he did not follow Polybius blindly; so what we see here is Livy's sincere hindsight.⁷² Livy's view, therefore, was different from that of the actual Senate, which after 200 BC found itself busily trying to cope with the multiple simultaneous problems it faced in widely separated areas both in the East and the West. And here we have Livian analysis at last.

Notes

- 1 The war of 200–196 BC was actually the second war that Rome fought against Philip V; the first occurred in 214–205 BC, and originated in Philip's attempt to take advantage of Roman weakness after their defeats at the hands of Hannibal. Livy covered this first war in Books 24–29, but it was not a central theme. By supporting traditional enemies of Macedon, especially the Aetolian League, in a war against Philip in European Greece, the Romans fended off what they saw as a possible threat by Philip to join Hannibal in Italy. The war ended in a compromise peace; see Eckstein 2002.
- 2 On the Macedonian-centered structure of the pentads of 31–45, see Walbank 1971, 48.
- 3 Livy 45.39.7: “*Philippus et Alexander, filii regius, tanta nomina...*” For the ancient view that the Antigonid dynasty was part of “the House of Macedon” and thus inheritors of Alexander's ambitions for world rule, see Walbank 1993/2002. The two sons of Perseus were remembered at Rome: Philip and Alexander reappear as captives with Perseus on a coin of the 60s BC of L. Aemilius Lepidus Paullus, (consul 50 BC): Crawford 1974, 62.
- 4 Walbank 1971, 48.
- 5 See Tränkle 1969/2009, 476. Polybius complains about the Romans' aversion to primary research and dependence on already-published material: see Pol. 3.26 with Eckstein 2010.
- 6 In its final form, Livy's history was an astounding 142 volumes long.
- 7 On Polybius' life and career, see conveniently Eckstein 1995, 1–15.
- 8 It is frightening to realize that Books 41–45 of Livy only survived the Middle Ages in one (damaged) manuscript; see Briscoe 1993, 40.
- 9 Nissen 1863: 53–85; cf. Briscoe 2009, 461 and n. 5. An example of the latter procedure: Livy 32.21.23—a reference, in an Achaean statesman's speech to an Achaean audience, to Philip V's murder of the otherwise unknown Chariteles of Cyparissia. See Eckstein 1990, 56.

- 10 “*Non incertum auctorem cum omnium Romanarum rerum, tum praecipue in Graecia gestarum.*” Livy is explaining here why he is following Polybius on the battle of Cynoscephalae rather than the Roman historians Valerius Antias and Claudius Quadrigarius, who wrote in the 80s BC.
- 11 “*Polybius, haudquaquam spernandus auctor*”; this is strong (not weak) praise: see Briscoe 2009, 471 and n. 37.
- 12 “*Polybius, bonus auctor in primis*”: *Off.* 3.113; Cicero's translation of Pol. 6.58 then follows in 3.114. On Cicero's impact on Livy, see esp. McDonald 1957, 159–160; cf., Tränkle 1969/2009, 477.
- 13 Cicero in *De Re Publica* modeled his theory of the mixed constitution on the discussion in Polybius' Book 6. More Ciceronian praise of Polybius: *Rep.* 1.34 and 2.27, cf. 4.3. M. Junius Brutus the Liberator supposedly was writing an abridgement of Polybius on the evening before Pharsalus in 48 BC: Plut. *Brut.* 4.8.
- 14 Walbank 1971, 64.
- 15 *Ibid.*, 49.
- 16 An example is the two extra peace terms imposed on Macedon in 196 BC, which Livy gives at 33.30.8–10 from the annalist Valerius Antias, missing from the Polybian parallel passage at 18.44 and certainly false: Briscoe 1973: 203, and 1993: 39. Conversely, Livy did not restrict his use of Polybius to events in the East, but used him sometimes for events at Rome: compare Pol. 21.18–24 to Liv. 37.53–54, with Briscoe 1981: 374.
- 17 On this, see in general Ullmann 1929; cf. McDonald 1957, 163; Walbank 1971, 63. Even where Livy follows a Polybian outline closely, subtle changes result in a different mood; compare the speech of the Rhodians before the Senate in Pol. 21.23 to Livy's version in 37.54, with Walbank 1971, 63.
- 18 Tränkle 1969/2009, 478.
- 19 See Rich 2009.
- 20 Modern scholarly custom is to contrast Polybius with the Roman annalists; but Polybius' organization of historical events by Olympiad-year after Olympiad-year means that Polybius is actually an annalist himself: Briscoe 2009, 462, n. 7.
- 21 See Tränkle 1969/2009, 481–482; 1977, 49–50. A list of the chronological mistakes adduced by modern scholarship: Briscoe 2009, 463–464.
- 22 On Polybius' intended audience, see Walbank 1972, 6–7

- 23 See Eckstein 2002.
- 24 Further examples of Livy's abbreviating the detailed material on Greek politics that he found in Polybius: 35.40.1; 39.48.6 and 53.1; 41.25.8. See Walbank 1971, 66 and n. 6; Tränkle 1969/2009, 483.
- 25 Walbank 1979, 264.
- 26 See also, Walbank 1971, 53, with other examples; cf. Briscoe 1973, 316–317, and 2009, 467.
- 27 Compare Pol. 21.30.9 to Liv. 38.9.14, with the Walbank 1971, 62.
- 28 Walbank 1971, 55 and n. 63. Flaminius' friendly attitude and jokes with Philip at Nicaea: Polyb. 18.6.1, 6.5, and 7.5–6 (missing from Livy). Livy's criticism of Philip's jokes at the conference (33.34.3) may have been influenced by his belief that kings should be dignified, as befitted their powerful station: McDonald 1957: 162.
- 29 Compare Pol. 18.43.7–12 to Liv. 33.27.5–28.3, with Tränkle 1977, 149–151.
- 30 On Livy's Flaminius, see Tränkle 1977, 145–151; cf. also Walsh 1963, 101.
- 31 On Polybius' opposition to sensationalist writing, see, for example, Sacks 1980, esp. Chapters 4–5; On Polybius' purpose: Eckstein 1995, esp. Chapters 1, 8, and 9.
- 32 On the pessimistic mood of Livy *Praef.*, see Moles 2009; for Livy's attitude(s) toward the politics of his own time, see Badian 1993.
- 33 See Tränkle 1969/2009, 483–484. Examples of Polybian detail: the names of the Epirote mediators of the peace treaty between Rome and Philip V at Phoenice in 205 BC (Livy 29.12.12); the name of the representative from the small town of Pellene (and the name of his father) who swung the Council of the Achaean League toward an alliance with Rome in autumn 198 BC (Livy 32.22.4–8).
- 34 Tränkle 1969/2009, 483; cf. Briscoe 1993 (a study comparing Polyb. 29.3–9 with the streamlined version of Liv. 45.23–25). Tränkle (ibid.) points to Livy's unusually frequent employment of Latin participles to keep the narrative moving along quickly.
- 35 Walbank 1971, 53.
- 36 The Abydenes' bravery: Pol. 16.30.3, 30.5; 31.7–8; 32.1; 33.1–3. Their resolve to die as μνήμης ἄξια (16.30.3), and σεμνὸν καὶ θαυμάσιον (16.33.4; cf. 34.10–12).

- 37 Detailed analysis of Livy's account of Abydus: McDonald 1957: 168–170; Tränkle 1977: 167–170. Destructive Abydene emotions: note the great intensity of language in 31.17.4; the mass suicide a terrible crime (17.9).
- 38 Discussion in Eckstein 1995, 88–90.
- 39 See McDonald 1957, 163; Tränkle 1969/2009, 484. The observation goes back to Witte 1910.
- 40 Pointed out by Tränkle 1969/2009, 484.
- 41 Isthmian Declaration: Pol. 18.45 vs. Liv. 33.32–33. Detailed comparison of the two descriptions: Tränkle 1969/200, 489–493; 1977, 137–139. The Romans naturally expected that the Greek states would henceforth be “friendly,” but the fact that Rome was sincere in the Isthmian policy is shown by the total withdrawal of Roman troops from Greece in spring 194 BC, even in the face of the threatening advance of the Seleucid emperor Antiochus III westward through Asia Minor and across the Hellespont into Thrace: see Eckstein 2008, 283–302.
- 42 Pol. 18.18–32; Liv. 33.4–10.
- 43 Polybius had both Aetolian and Macedonian eyewitness sources: see Walbank 1967, 575–581. Archaeological confirmation of Polybius' account: Hammond 1988.
- 44 On this theme in Polybius' work, see Eckstein 1995, Chapter 6.
- 45 Carawan 1988, 221–224.
- 46 Eckstein 1995, 183.
- 47 On the complicated course of the battle, see Eckstein, 183–192.
- 48 See the comments of McDonald 1957, 161; Tränkle 1977, 100–101.
- 49 McDonald 1957, 161 (noting esp. Pol. 2.56–63). See also Eckstein (forthcoming).
- 50 Livy misunderstands καταβαλοῦσι τὰς σαρίσας at Pol. 18.24.9 (they lowered spears for a charge), and has Philip ordering the Macedonians to throw away their long spears as an impediment (!) and go forward with swords: cf. McDonald 1957, 161; Walbank 1971, 54; Briscoe 1973, 263; Tränkle 1977, 188 n. 35.
- 51 Compare Pol. 18.25.6–7 to Livy 33.9.7.
- 52 See Walsh 1963, 152; Briscoe 1973, 265; Briscoe 2009, 468.
- 53 Walbank 1967, 584; Eckstein 1987a, 287–288.

- 54 See Briscoe 1973, 266.
- 55 Pol. 18.22.3–6, echoed briefly at Liv. 33.7.12–13.
- 56 Set in a Greek diplomatic context involving a meeting of the Achaean League, this Livian passage is based on Polybian material; see Briscoe 1981, 206 and 212–213.
- 57 Eckstein 1995, 189–90.
- 58 Liebeschuetz 1979, 4; cf. Briscoe 1981, 213.
- 59 See Eckstein 1987b, on Nabis' speech at Sparta in 195 BC, directly contradicted by the earlier narrative of events.
- 60 Hammond 1988, 76.
- 61 Walbank 1967, 586.
- 62 Eckstein 1995, 191–192.
- 63 See, in general, Tränkle 1969/2009, 486–488.
- 64 Polybius was clearly impressed with Roman organizational ability, see also Pol. 10.17, and, of course, 6.1–48 (on the Roman constitution and the Roman army). Polybius believed that the Romans were brave fighters (6.52.7), but that the Macedonians were the most courageous and violent individual soldiers in the Mediterranean: sources and discussion in Eckstein 1997, 181–182.
- 65 See also, Tränkle 1969/2009, 484.
- 66 *Ibid.* 489.
- 67 See Eckstein 2008, 347.
- 68 Walbank 1971, 58–59; Sherwin-White 1984, 11–12; Eckstein 2008, 347–348.
- 69 See Eckstein 2008, 355. Roman envoys on special missions do appear occasionally in European Greece, but in most years after 188 BC there were none.
- 70 Cf. Walbank 1971, 57.
- 71 Cf. Walbank 1971, 60.
- 72 Briscoe 1973, 284.

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Further Reading

A student interested in seriously pursuing these topics should start with two monumental historical and literary commentaries: F. W. Walbank's three-volume *Historical Commentary on Polybius* (1957; 1967; 1979), and John Briscoe's three-volume *Commentary on Livy* (1973; 1981; 2008, covering Books 31–40). On Livy as a writer, two good sophisticated introductions are Walsh, P. G. 1963. *Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods*, and Luce, T. J. 1973. *Livy: The Composition of his History*; but the most important single item is A. H. McDonald's wonderful essay in *Journal of Roman Studies* (1957). On the specific problem of how closely Livy in Books 31–45 followed Polybius (and did not follow him), two excellent starting points are Walbank, F. W. 1971. “The Fourth and Fifth Decades,” in Dorey, T. A. ed. 1971, *Livy*, and Briscoe, J. 1993. “Livy and Polybius,” in W. Schuller, ed., *Livius: Aspekte seines Werkes*. Other highly useful articles on this subject include those by J. Briscoe and by H. Tränkle in the excellent collection in Chaplin, J. D. and Krauss, C. S., eds. 2009. *Oxford Readings in Classical Studies: Livy*.

Part VIII

Books 1-142/150. Periochae

Chapter 31

The Periochae

Luigi Bessone

A while ago, with an interval of few months, my introduction to the *Periochae* in “Atene e Roma” (Bessone 1984, 42–55) and Jal's exemplary edition (1984, I–II) were published. Since then, I do not think there has been considerable progress in the studies, though there have been important contributions, both sectional (Gärtner 1983; Hayne 1990) and of a wider perspective (Hellegouarc'h 1994; Kraus and Woodman 1997). Chaplin's research work in the last 10 years will be extensively utilized in this chapter. It will be enough to summarize the main points here, while adding some recent innovative ideas; new acquisitions only concern the joint transmission of the *codices* including both the *Periochae* and Florus' *Epitome*, but without affecting the thesis, now fully accepted, that each work owes its own origin to Livy, though it is more loosely derivative in Florus owing to the coexistence of various concepts inside a vast body of doctrine, necessarily limited in the *Periochae*, which is a combination of indexes and summaries of Livy's books.

Their varying extension, from the few lines of *Per.* 135 and 138 to the whole printed pages of *Per.* 2, 22.29, 48, and 49, makes it difficult to define their very nature, the latter displaying an epitomical and breviary-like quality, with the shortest mostly having the arrangement and conciseness of an index. Curiously enough, the two that are by far the shortest, 135 and 138, come before and after the missing ones, 136 and 137, whose conciseness can equally be presumed, which makes us think of the author's deliberate choice. Once the civil war ended with Antony's and Cleopatra's suicide (*Per.* 133) and Octavian was officially bestowed with the title of “Augustus” and with other honors (134), the attention of the last *Periochae* is directed almost exclusively to the external wars aiming at expanding and consolidating the empire. With the exception of Lepidus the Younger's conspiracy at the end of *Per.* 133, Marcellus' and Octavia's death (140), and the final tribute paid to Drusus the Elder (142), there are only essential hints spanning the period from M. Crassus' Eastern wars (134–135) to the campaigns of Drusus (138 ff.), whose accidental death temporarily interrupted the conquest of transrhene Germany (142.1).

The total silence on the activity undertaken by Agrippa, whose death is mentioned in *Per.* 138, between 27 and 12 BC, could then be accounted for by a *saut du même au même* by the copyist, who, because of the concise context crammed with proper names, might have inadvertently omitted the lines referring to the character. This hypothesis is formulated without a claim to guessing right, but in the reasonable belief that the text at the epitomist's

disposal was complete (contra Syme 1979, 402).

Finally, Chaplin has dealt with the complex theme of *Per.* 131–142, of their overall brevity, and of the absence of *Per.* 136–137. She wonders whether these features depend on the personal choice of the epitomist, whose interest in the aristocratic Gauls (*Per.* 139.2; 141.3) suggests his being native to that area (Jal 1984, XXV–XVI), or whether they mirror Livy's *modus scribendi*. Consistent with the thesis about the outstanding length of *Per.* 48–49 (*infra*), she sides with the second hypothesis, which absolves Livy of the charge brought against him by Syme regarding his poor grasp or even non-existent analysis of the internal mechanisms regulating the regime disguised as *res publica restituta*.

Too many unknown facts are still inhibiting the solution to the problem: we do not know when Livy started writing on historical issues, whether it was in 29–27 BC, which is the prevailing opinion (Mineo 2006, 83; 110), or before 31 BC (Burton 2000, 443–445). Even his birth date is controversial, 59 or 64 BC, and we do not know when and why he returned to Padua, and how far he had got with his work, which poses the fundamental dilemma about whether or not he changed the work pace. Along with Syme, I would exclude the possibility of a doubling of his old-age production (*contra* Pascucci 1971, 98, and Stadter 1972, 287).

According to Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, *Praef.* 16, Livy had achieved considerable fame and could have stopped writing—but a restless human soul needs intense mental activity to thrive (Syme 1979, 411)—words that can be referred to the preamble to a lost book, the opposite to his initial doubts (Liv. *Praef.* 1–3), and to the feeling of dejection experienced while writing (Liv. 31.1.2–5). Ascribing this concept to Book 121, apparently published after Augustus' death, might be tempting, although I would reject the hypothesis whose only merit is to keep the subdivision into decades and pentads, which can regularly be found (Stadter 1972; *contra* Mineo 2006, 108). The ending in the year 43 BC, with Octavian being involved in the triumviral proscriptions, would not have been useful to either the prince or the writer, despite Stadter's observations.

In my opinion, the work, dropping the original plan, was to end with the *coup-de-théâtre* of the year 27 BC. *Per.* 134 considers the assumption of *cognomen* Augustus, together with a change of name of the month Sestile, as emblematic of the restoration of the world order. General reconciliation, marked by the first closing of the temple of Janus—the third in the history of Rome—and the adoption of *nomen Augusti* are the subjects that Florus focuses on at the end of the *Epitoma* (2.34.65–66), certainly a text based on Livy's (Hose 1994, 138–140; Hellegouarc'h 1994, 172–174).

An able rhetorician, Florus anticipated many ensuing facts, which were to take up Book 135 and all the following ones; *Per.* 142 is entirely devoted to

Drusus the Elder's exploits, ended by his death in the year 9 BC. The mention of the Teutoburg Forest defeat in Flor 2.30.29–39 seems to confirm the addition *Clades Quinctili Vari*, which a descendant and namesake of Pithou made to the last line of the 1566 edition of the *Periochae*. Rossbach connected this date with Obs. 72 “*multitudo Romanorum per insidias subiecta est*,” which seems to be relevant to Varus' disastrous defeat, and deduced that Livy had probably got to the year 9 AD (Jal 1984, XIX–XXIII).

The ensuing hypothesis concerns a higher number of books, as a 20-year period covered by Book 142 would definitely go against the current trend. One might wonder, then, how the glorious history of Rome, from its foundation, could end in an ignominious defeat, even more tragic than Drusus' death, which, nevertheless, Syme regards as an excellent point of arrival (1979, 447–448). Hence the hypothesis that Livy envisaged writing 150 books, also including about Augustus' death in 14 AD. This theory is stimulating, though unlikely as the two of them were almost the same age, and Livy even died before him if his death were incontestably proved in the year 12 AD, that is, 2 years before Augustus (Syme and Walsh).

If no formulation of definite theories is possible because of too many unknown facts, any claim to explaining Livy's consonance with Augustus' ideals through the *Periochae* sounds unrealistic. Chaplin preliminarily records that the unfavorable portrayal of Antony mirrors both the compiler's animus and Livy's attitude. The latter point is usually taken for granted, since Livy, as an Augustan writer, shares Augustus' reform-minded program without rejecting republican ideals (Kraus and Woodman 1997, 70–74). The remark that the *Periochae* do not misrepresent Livy's spirit is helpful, but Livy's attitude toward Augustus' policy cannot be inferred from the last *Periochae* only dealing with the conquest wars. There emerges a feeling of sympathy for Drusus the Elder, whereas it is only later, with Velleius Paterculus, that Tiberius is fully appreciated (Badian 1993, 22–23). Besides, no attention is paid to the internal problems that Syme (1979, 445 ff.) points out in the Livy of the last period.

The method of composition is straightforward and clear as there is an alternation of accounts of self-contained episodes and of facts that are merely mentioned, with such standard sets of words, such as “*res praeterea ... continet (hic liber)*,” “*belli ... ortum narrat*,” “*res [but also ‘prodigia, expugnationes’, etc.] referuntur*.” Rarely does this wording introduce a more articulate account, as in *Per.* 31.1 “*causae referuntur hae*”; they are usually conclusive statements that leave out further details. It would be useful, though impossible, to find out whether it is the writer's coining or whether they are words borrowed from *Periochae*, which is conceived merely as a compilation of indexes of Livy's books. Only one copy of them is still extant, the so-called *Per.* 1a, placed at the beginning of the whole corpus obviously to fill an initial void. The other *Periocha* of Book 1, marked as 1b and similar to the

following ones, actually shows a fairly sketchy opening as it starts from Ancus Marcius, and not from his accession to the throne either, but it unexpectedly begins *in medias res*, with, in addition, the incorrect attribution to his reign of Attus Navius' miracle, which, as everybody knows, is related to Tarquinius Priscus' reforms (Liv. 1.36.2–8; Flor. 1.1 (6).2–4).

In order to remedy this deficiency, an unknown scribe placed the entire *Per. 1a* before the whole corpus, heedless of the duplicate created in regard to the last four kings. This order, definitely careless, was prior to the writing of the oldest manuscript available nowadays, which was the first to place Florus' text before the *Periochae* themselves. Certainly, the author of this juxtaposition is none of the compilers of the *Periochae*: if *Per. 1b* shows recurrent characteristics in the course of the books, where mere statements alternate with broader narrative developments, *1a* shows such peculiarities as to account for the assumption leading, in turn, to a series of *Periochae* conceived in the same way, just as indexes of Livy's books; in the short period, from Ancus to Tarquinius Superbus, in which a textual comparison is possible, no elements confirming any kind of interdependence are to be found.

The *1a Periochae* are obviously prior to the ones we possess, *1b ff.*, mostly for two reasons: the need for indexes of so extensive a work must have arisen quite soon; once the *Periochae* started circulating autonomously, in their way replacing Livy's *Annales*, simple indexes of the original work would no longer be felt as necessary, also thanks to the spreading of abstracts and collections of various kinds, for example, sylloges of speeches, the customary reference being Mettius Pompusianus (Suet., *Dom.* 10), guilty of keeping “*contiones ... regum ac ducum ex Tito Livio.*”

The well-known, controversial epigram 14.190 by Martial might hint at *Periochae 1a*, once regarded as crucial evidence of the Livian epitomical theory, which Jal refuted, just as one would have expected of him. However, accepting Jal's thesis, that this epigram cannot be related to the lost first-century epitome, does not entail denying the existence of an epitomized Livy, based on other grounds, as we can see later on. It simply means to acknowledge, with a due recantation as to Bessone (1977, 56–57, n. 3), that Martial juxtaposes the Livius *ingens* with something definitely quite shorter contained in relatively few parchment leaves and that can be neither be a single book extract nor the detailed summary of the whole work.

Its existence is established by the Oxyrhynchus Livian papyrus—a fairly extensive collection of fragments, nowadays irremediably corrupt owing to the combined action of time and of the copyist's ignorance—from Books 37–40, covering the years 190–179 BC, and Livy's 48–55, related to the years 150–137 BC. The first collection can be compared with Livy's original, while, as to the second, we have no choice but to refer to their respective *Periochae*. The comparison compass is reduced further when considering that only the final parts of Books 37 and 48 are still extant in the papyrus. Though we can share

the peremptory statements of Bingham (1978, 462) and Jal (1984, II, 110–113) on the total independence of the *Periochae* from the mutilated papyrus, which both the content and the strict adherence to Livy's original division into books undoubtedly classify as sections of an epitome, we cannot deny the formal affinity, anyway sufficiently confirmed by the critics, between the layout of *Per.* 1a and the Oxyrhyncus papyrus, in its turn closely related to the *Liber prodigiorum* or *De prodigiis* by Iulius Obsequens and to Cassiodorus' consular lists.

As long as it was nearly taken for granted that the so-called Livian tradition entirely came from the *Annales Ab Urbe Condita*, not directly but from the (even too much) mythicized first-century *Epitome*, the solution seemed obvious: on the one hand, the so-called “narrative” authors, from Velleius Paterculus to Eutropius and Orosius, and on the other, the ones adopting a strict, chronological approach; since the latter group shows specific common traits and cannot therefore go back to the same source as the former, the need arises to hypothesize an intermediary, identified in a lost Chronicon. Obviously, this means that *Periochae* 1b ff., basically all of them with the exception of 1a, are to be counted as belonging to the narrative genre, within which a variation can be observed. A small group of authors sharing especially formal peculiarities stand out as opposed to the *Periochae* and Orosius, showing some common traits. The most significant example is Fabius Maximus Cunctator, portrayed as the one who “*Hannibalem mora fregit*” in Amp. 18.6; “*Anonymous De viris illustribus*” (*De vir. Ill.* 43.2), whereas Eutr. 3.9.2 replaces *mora* with the instrumental gerund “*differendo pugnam*” and adds “*ab impetu*” to “*fregit*.”

The impression of a common source based on *mora* and *frangere* is strengthened by the comparison with Flor. 1.22.28 “*ut, qui frangi uirtute non poterat, mora comminueretur,*” a kind of vocabulary utterly foreign to Liv. 22.8–30; *Per.* 22.6 ff.; Oros. 4.15.7. A *contaminatio* within these works does exist; Eutropius has influenced Orosius' “*impetum Hannibalis cunctando tardauit*” of which, anyway, he is the absolutely reliable source, the word “*frangere*” oddly reappears centuries later in Vallauri's *Epitome Historiae Romanae*, the last Latin abstract of Livy's work, as far as we know. Since Flor., *loc. cit.* and *De vir. Ill.* 42.6 arbitrarily place Fabius' temporizing tactics later on after Cannes, unlike Eutropius (3.9.2–10.1) who is free from this flaw, it would be legitimate to think that one may have led the other astray, given the uncertain chronological order (Hellegouarc'h 1994, 170), but more authors alike have reduced Florus' rhetorical style to essentials all in the same way is definitely puzzling: most likely, Florus enriched in his own way a common model that cannot be Livy.

Who can “*Hannibalem mora fregit*” trace back to? These words in a biographical chapter of L. Ampelius' *Liber Memorialis* and in a collection of biographies such as the *De vir. ill.* might incline us toward a biographical

source. The only one available is Cornelius Nepos, notoriously careless when describing Hannibal's invasion of Italy as a continuous series of victories, including the one against Fabius dictator after Cannes (Hann. 5.2–3). Most likely, the same error occurred in Fabius Cunctator's biography postulated for *De excellentibus ducibus Romanorum*. In that case, however, Nepos' exploitation by Florus must be assumed. However, though Florus may have been influenced by the biographical genre (Jal 1967, LIV–LVI), in this instance, he is no more suggestive of Nepos than Valerius Maximus (3.8.2), who, then, on the basis of the common recurrence of the verb “*frustro*,” could be regarded as the source of *De vir. ill.* 42.6.

If we keep within the Livian sphere of activity, the concise expression “*Hannibalem mora fregit*” is reminiscent of equally succinct traits of *Per.* 1a, and occurring again in 1b ff., where the author merely lists deeds and events with no descriptive frills, narrative accounts, or anecdotal episodes. The presence of some 1a statements in *Per.* 1b ff. entitles us to surmise that the author of 1b ff. meant to create an independent, self-contained work, taking his cue from *Per.* 1b ff.—that is, from the original indexes of Livy's books. This might account for the hybrid nature, based on an alternation of indexes and summaries, of our *Periochae*, though the limited textual comparison of 1a and the surviving part of 1b does not provide any supporting documents.

The question arises, then, as to where he derived the necessary material from, which means reverting to the old, unsolved dilemma: Livy's original or an epitome of Livy? Whereas the most accurate textual comparison between *Per.* 1–10, 21–45, and Livy's extant books has not provided a definite answer, but has, if anything, revealed a clear preference for Livy's original (Bingham 1978, 444–445), Jal definitely sides with the hypothesis of direct recourse to Livy's original. In order to disprove the Epitome theorie, Jal spared no arguments, fully sharing the stance of those who settled the issue by labeling such theory as a “philological figment.” We admit that Martial's well-known epigram, in itself, provides no evidence of the existence of a Livian epitome dating from the first century AD, but the divergences between Livy and the *Periochae*, as well as the latter's convergences with Orosius compared to Livy's original, are still to be examined. Omitting the umpteenth list of the passages at issue, we mean to confine ourselves to examining some situations following Bingham, who has systematically revised the *Periochae*. Without ever sharing the negational approach of C. M. Begbie (1967), who dismissively reduced the real differences between the *Periochae* and Livy's extant texts to just two, Bingham (1978, 392–400), who rightly pruned the divergences between the two texts, while neglecting the minor ones or the ones with obviously simplifying purposes peculiar to the abridged style and method, counted 124, which can be divided into three categories: 55 whose origin was not related to Livy, 65 versions of different importance, and 4 of indefinite origin.

Jal's personal survey has considerably, though heedlessly, reduced its number. Given how easily numbers can be altered, numerical differences can reasonably be regarded as copyists' oversights, whereas it would be rash to regard the frequent onomastic mistakes as such; for example, *Per.* 2.7: L. Valerius is changed in P. by Jal on the assumption that Liv. 2.7.8 is the direct source, without his ever wondering why Lucius recurs in *De vir. ill.* 15.1, why L. Valerius Publicola in Eutr. 1.9.4, and also in Cassiodorus' lists, all of them being exponents of the so-called Livian tradition. I would likewise hesitate about attributing Collatinus' forced abdication (*Per.* 2.2) to Livy, on the basis of Liv. 4.15.4, whereas in 2.2.7–10 it is evidently self-imposed: Jal (1984, LXXVI; cf. Bingham 1978, 391) assumes the existence of a really well-informed epitomist, who, while summarizing Book 2, recalls what part of Book 4 can be found in Cincinnatus' speech, making, at the same time, the right change.

Only a few critics agree that the author of the *Periochae* was such a well-advised person, so that we wonder if the collection was instead the outcome of the joint work of different authors. Though this opinion is not shared, as the unity of the *Periochae* usually tends to be preferred, at least one case of the author's obvious inadequacy must be reported (*Per.* 116.2): “*diadema capiti suo impositum in sella reposuit.*” We do not know what Livy was saying on this point, but “*in sella*” is unacceptable. According to the “*uulgata*” that started with Cicero, Antony repeatedly tried to crown Caesar sitting “*in sella aurea*”; somebody reports the toss of the diadem among the crowd; actually, the only place where it could not land was on the golden seat occupied by Caesar, unless we consider “*in sella aurea*” the conceptual equivalent of “*in gremio*,” that is, on Caesar's knees, where Cassius Longinus got to according to Nicola Damasceno.

Even more serious than this flaw is the jumble of several events. Hence, the uninterrupted dictatorship, from late February to early March 44 BC, precedes, together with the other honors conferred on Caesar, the explosion of resentment against him, for not standing in front of the senatorial legation *deferenti hos honores* (one of which, at least, not yet conferred), probably in autumn 45 BC, and Antony's offer of the diadem during the Lupercalia, on February 15, 44 BC, as well as the removal from office of the two tribunes, Epidius Marullus and Caesetius Flavus, certainly in January of the same year. Then, the fact that such anachronisms are not peculiar to the *Periochae*, but can be found elsewhere in the Livian tradition, assumes special importance.

Only by a strained interpretation does Jal reduce to a few dozens the actual divergences between the *Periochae* and Livy's extant books, generally attributed to non-Livian sources, or to variants in the tradition, which produces a paradoxical effect: the huge imbalance existing between the mental exertion and learning involved on the one hand and the final outcome achieved on the other. In order to reduce Livy's books to few pages or just a

few lines, the author places before the original text variants that can be derived with the utmost care from Livy's speeches belonging to different categories, he rationalizes their internal structure by grouping them thematically, providing common conceptual links and shifting them accordingly, and he amends Livy resorting to alternative versions, showing a behavior typical of one who clearly exhibits his learning, while he has not even signed.

Orosius is notoriously obsessed with a strong desire to sound erudite, which leads us to a cursory reassessment of his concordance with the *Periochae* in contrast to Livy. This time, the observations by Jal, who, in his turn, benefited from the material collected by K. Zangemeister and F. Drescher, are preferred. Of the 16 cases recorded by Zangemeister, only two are considered convincing (Jal 1984, XLVIII–LII): one of them, maybe a chance one, consists in the reverse order, as compared to Livy, in giving an account of the death of Scipio, Hannibal, and Philopemenis (Bingham 1978, 354); the other one concerns Gnaeus Scipio's struggle against Mago, instead of Hanno as reported by Livy (*Per.* 21.8 and *Oros.* 4.14.9 vs *Liv.* 21.60.5–6). The remaining 14, among which is the almost identical account of the Capua senators' self-poisoning (*Per.* 26.5; *Oros.* 4.17.12; *Liv.* 26.14.1–5), are considered worthless by Jal, since they show no major differences from Livy, which is debatable and not constitute a definitive argument.

As the divergences between the *Periochae* and Orosius are really more numerous than the convergences, given their different aims and nature, Jal assumes that Orosius may occasionally have used the *Periochae*. Following this line of reasoning, ending with the gloss on p. LI, note 2, we reach an unacceptable conclusion: if Orosius and the *Periochae* converge when Livy's *Annales* are used and differ when one of them strays, it follows that they each have a duplicate of republican history; Livy's monumental work not being enough, Orosius also draws on the *Periochae*, whose author has, in his turn, used Livy's books combined with another model. We have already mentioned how difficult this hypothesis is as regards the *Periochae*; the organization of the work is paramount to Orosius. Since his writings were to cover an enormous expansion in both time and space, and he was working to a tight deadline, he could not indulge in too extensive a work.

Then, Drescher's former study becomes topical again: he failed to reconstruct the first-century *Epitome*, which was his objective, but he retains the merit of probing the Livian tradition through its leading exponents (Jal 1984, LI and note 6). The resulting account, definitely a varied one, far from disproving the epitomical thesis, rather strengthens it: how can we otherwise reconcile those works undoubtedly Livian, but extremely poor, such as Ampelius' *Liber memorialis*, or those drastically reduced, such as the *Periochae* (even the longest ones, if compared to the original), as spare and unpretentious as summaries or also as heterodox as the biographies of the *De vir. ill.*, with

constant recourse to the Livius *ingens*, enriched with an alternative source, and, moreover, combined with the undoubted interdependence of Orosius and Eutropius and Florus, of Eutropius and Ampelius and Florus, of Florus and Velleius Paterculus, etc. (Bessone 1977 and 1982)?

Here follow some concrete examples so that what is stated in the preceding text may not sound like a *petitio principii*. Livy and the *Periochae* differently show which gate in Rome Hannibal arrived at in 211 BC. In Liv. 26.10.3, he is reported to be moving toward *Porta Collina*; in Val. Max. 3.7.10 and *Per.* 26.2, he is reported to be approaching *Porta Capena*. The difference can be explained with Liv. 26.10.1, where Fulvius Flaccus enters Rome through *Porta Capena* and later camps between the *Esquilina* and the *Collina*. This confusion has an obviously clear reason, but it would be curious that two writers, different as to time, intellectual stature, and aims, were led to it likewise. On the other hand, we can be certain that Valerius is not the source of the *Periocha* if we consider the fact that the same place is mentioned but that different events follow: according to *Per.* 26.3, a miraculous rain prevents the battle, whereas according to Valerius, the piece of land Hannibal is already occupying is sold at the usual market price.

Both events are reported in Liv. 26.11.2–4 and 6, and Flor. 1.22.45 and 47; as in *Per.* 26, Florus omits the hail in the storm (Liv. 26.11.2) and the *Periocha* extends to 3 days the 3-day storm reported by Liv. 26.11.3. Rather than postulating the existence of alternative sources at every turn, the solution that seems most simple and realistic is still the intermediation of a Livian epitome; the participation of Valerius Maximus reintroduces the hypothesis, disconnected from Martial (*supra*) and with no supposition of either Livy's or his son's personal involvement, but corroborated by the so-called “Assmann's evidence” (Bessone 1982, 1232, 1233) of a first Livian epitome that had been circulating since the 30s AD (Delicado Méndez 1996, 415–417).

The concordance between *Per.* 1b.32, Amp. 17 and *De vir. ill.* 5.3 as regards the use of the apposition “*colonia*” aiming at being more specific about the *Ostia* legal statute, even at the risk of an anachronism if we consider Liv. 1.33.9, can be explained in two ways: either none of them followed Livy in order to go after Plin., *Nat hist.* 3.56 “*Ostia colonia ab Romano rege deducta*,” each one telling exactly which king was concerned, or they all, including Pliny, consulted another source providing this detail, which Pliny takes for granted. The idea of writing an epitome of Livy (not one only) may have grown right in Plinian literary circles; we can make this assumption thanks to his nephew's report about the family habits when he informs Tacitus of the eruption of Mount Vesuvius, which caused his uncle's death (Plin., *Ep.* 6.20.5; cf. 3.5.10; 6.16.7).

The affinity existing between *Per.* 1a and the chronologically oriented works does not necessarily entail dating it back to late antiquity too. It can be what is left of that subject index to Livy's every single book, as it was before being

enriched and taking the epitomical form. Our previous hypothesis about the existence of an early epitome composed of 142 books is to be rejected since the epitomical technique entails, *in primis*, the reduction in numbers of them, as Lactantius still teaches us in his own self-epitome of the *Diuinae Institutiones* for Pentadius; they were reintroduced instead in *Per.* 1b ff. and, in parallel, though independently, in the chronologically oriented texts. These ones combine the resurrection of the original division into books with the intention of rendering their synthesis a self-contained history, supplying each book with a network of chronologically arranged events that, on the contrary, the *Periochae* omit. If their first aim were to summarize the history of Rome following Livy as a source (Chaplin 2010, 466), we cannot understand the reason for such great care in following Livy's division into books; Bingham is more convincing (1978, 440) as he chooses, instead, to give a brief and clear summary of Livy's every single book, although the work took the form of a simple and, to some extent, independent handbook of Roman history. Chaplin's contribution, the latest on this subject as far as I know, mainly follows Bingham and Jal, of whom she shares the basic opinions as to the origin of the *Periochae*, based, as they think, directly on Livy's original, without taking into due consideration her own first draft of the survey of *Per.* 21 previously proposed.

The purpose of identifying the author's techniques and of explaining the main criteria used for abridging Livy is, certainly, highly commendable, but there emerges a crucial element that is not to be undervalued: inaccuracy, which definitely makes us reconsider Jal's assumption (1984, XXVI; LXVII–LXXX; cf. Chaplin 2010, 452) about the epitomist being a learned man, very ambitious in style, scrupulous and so well informed as to prefer, sometimes, more reliable non-Livian traditions. According to *Per.* 21.1, while explaining the reasons for the Second Punic War, Livy relates Hannibal's crossing of the *Hiberum* before launching the attack on *Saguntum*, in direct violation of the treaty signed by Hasdrubal. On the contrary, Liv. 21.2.7 places *Saguntum* “in the middle of the possessions of the two peoples” and remarks that the site is “*ultra Hiberum, in parte Carthaginiensium*” (5.3), where Hannibal plans the subjugation of “*omnia trans Hiberum*” (5.17); the logistic clarifications obviously reflect the Roman point of view, according to which *Saguntum* is placed beyond the *Hiberum* (7.2), in an area of Punic influence, and only after the slaughter of the “very opulent” town will the Carthaginians cross the river (21.16.6; 20.9).

The fact that the two Roman legations in Carthage have been merged into one is not due to a process of simplification (Liv. 21.10.1 and 18–19.1, respectively). *Per.* 21.3–4 refers exclusively to the latter, where the relative connector “*de quibus iniuriis*” explains the reason why the legation had been sent (21.2): “*Saguntum ... capta est.*” It follows that the report in *Per.* 21 is even more synthetic than Orosius' one, which at least in 4.14.2 re-proposes

Liv. 21.9.3 as regards Hannibal's refusal to meet the Roman ambassadors, although in terms and tones unrelated to the supposed model. In conclusion, the only exact correspondence of both of them with Livy's text concerns the duration of the siege, 8 months.

They both omit the several diplomatic efforts; neglect the siege warfare mentioned in Liv. 21.7–9.2, 11.3–12, 14; leave out Hanno's speeches in Carthage (21.10) and Alorcus' in Spain (13); and directly move on to the Ticinus river, while totally ignoring the bloody horseback skirmish by the Rhône (21.29.1–4). The method is typically epitomical and, in our opinion, the similarity of the two texts as to choices and omissions likewise, though Orosius reports more details, is indicative of a preliminary selection based on an epitome that inspired both. From Oros. 4.14.4, the epitomist's curiosity about Hannibal's Alpine maneuvers re-emerges, whereas *Per.* 21.5 claims that, among the “*ferocissimas Gallorum gentes*” referred to in Oros. 4.14.3, only the *Volcae* had been explicitly mentioned.

It is not surprising that all the sources, or at least most of them, preferably report the first exploit of the African-to-be, who saved his father by the Ticinus river, considering the crucial role the young man later played in the ongoing conflict; however, it is the different position of Aemilius Paulus' “vow” in Liv. 45.41.8 and *Per.* 44.4, otherwise hardly explicable, that is the most important to our thesis.

Chaplin (2010, 458–460) establishes a connection between *Per.* 48 and 49 on the one hand and the incredible profusion of speeches contained or delivered therein, almost a mark of respect for the power of words, speeches, or letters, potentially capable of changing the course of history. However, it should be noted that this cult of words is more apparent than real: of the three *suasoriae* by Cato “*ut Carthaginensibus ... bellum indiceretur*,” only the first is accounted for (*Per.* 48.4: “*exercitum specie contra Masinissam, re contra Romanos accitum in finibus haberent*”); the second, using a narrative subjunctive mood, repeats what has previously been introduced by *suasit* (48.15: “*Cum Cato suaderet*”); and, in the third, Cato is no longer the only one to *suadere* in concrete terms “*ut in Africam confestim transportaretur exercitus*.”

Scipio Nasica's replies are equally scanty, “*contra dicente*” in *Per.* 48.5, “*dicente nihil temere faciundum*” in 48.15, and barely more articulate in 48.24: “*dicebat nondum sibi iustam causam belli uideri*.” Actually, Cornelius Nasica sounds more convincing when proposing the dissolution of the theatre “*tamquam inutile et nociturum publicis moribus*” (48.25) than when discoursing on the *metus hostilis*; the most eloquent seems to be Aemilius Lepidus, *princeps senatus* for six times, who, before dying, asked his children for unpretentious obsequies, since (48.11) great men's funerals must be impressive for the quality of the imagines, not for their cost. However, rather than with speeches, *Periocha* 48 is crammed with anecdotes and self-

contained short narratives, and it is on their abundance that, in our opinion, its greater length and other similar ones' depends, and hence the obvious disproportion between the concision with which *Per.* 21 relates tragic events (from Saguntum to the Trebbia), disastrous for Rome, and the unexpected extent of *Per.* 48, with the premonitory signs of the impending, certainly much less demanding, Third Punic War.

Finally, in order to illustrate how it broke out (*Per.* 49.1), the author quotes, without explaining them, the *diversae sententiae* of the contest between the *sapientissimus uir* M. Porcius Cato and *Scipio Nasica*, the *vir optimus* par excellence. We have to go beyond the first half of the 27 paragraphs into which Jal has divided the *Periocha*, actually as far as the lines devoted to the Third Punic War, in order to find examples of that extraordinary verbal dynamism typical, in Chaplin's opinion, of the years 154–148 BC, such as to account for the most unusual length of the two *Periochae* dealing with them. The first speech in *Per.* 49.16 is about the comparison Cato made in the senate between vigorous Scipio and the pale exponents of the *nobilitas*, which is why it is automatic to attribute all the exploits formerly related (49.11–15) to Scipio Aemilianus, whatever the origin of the cryptic *Orphitianum* mentioned by Jal (1984, I, 123, n. 12). There follows Cato the Censor's support to Scribonius Libo's *rogatio*, the speech *pro Galba* delivered by Q. Fulvius Nobilior, and Galba's three orations, still extant just like Cato's.

In the oration against Cornelius Cethegus, Galba justifies the massacre of the Lusitanians, aiming at preventing a possible sneak attack. The fact that *Per.* 49.20 dwells on it longer than usual suggests special attention to the theme in the source, but then the *Periocha* moves on to the matter of the pseudo-Philip, which occupies the remaining paragraphs 21–27, the last six of them being devoted to the *fabula* contrived by Andriscus to give himself out as Perseus' son. The *fabula* presupposes the assimilation of a story, though I think that it is the search for the *fait accompli* or for any anecdote providing a kind of portrait, as for Scipio Major by the Ticinus river in *Per.* 21, that is at its root or behind the role assumed by Scipio Aemilianus even before the consular government.

Bingham and Jal have exhaustively dealt with correspondences and divergences between the *Periochae* and the extant Livy. Chaplin (2010, 1) tries to establish the different weights attached to some characters in the two works, but she has to rely on somewhat imprecise impressions because of the epitomist's mixed reaction to facts exactly alike, such as the records of the *principes senatus* (meticulous attention to Aemilius Lepidus, none at all to Aemilius Scaurus, both “recordmen”), and the ups and downs of careers, especially of Cato Uticensis, whose many failures are reported, contrary to Livy's usual restrictive practice of mentioning them only when they end in controversial issues. However, are we quite certain that Livy did not make any exceptions for prominent personalities, in the lost books and in the court

proceedings against both Scipio Major and Scipio Minor in Book 38? There is no doubt about the different attention devoted to Sulla, from the time of his quaestorship under Marius (*Per.* 66), who, on the contrary, is ignored as long as possible, negatively connoted in 69.5, and disposed of in no really gratifying terms in the summary of *Per.* 80.9–10.

Wholly misleading in the reconstruction of the lost Livy, the structural observations might seem to support the so-called “pentecaidecadica” theory (i.e., based on groups of 15 books), formulated years ago just following the suggestion of the *Periochae*, arranged around prominent figures: Scipio Aemilianus in Books 46–60, Marius in *Per.* 61–75, Sulla from 76 to 90, Pompey (91–105), Caesar (106–120), and Octavian from the early beginning to *pax Augusta* (121–135). The aforesaid theory, which would consider the idea of a last group 136–150, confirming the interruption of the work while in progress, finds a correspondence in the thematic groups of the extant books, properly completed by the *Periochae* of the second decade: 1–15 about the unification of Italy; 16–30 including the overseas experience of the first two Punic wars, introduced by the new proem to *Per.* 16.1 “*Origo Carthaginiensium*”; and 31–45 concerning the expansion in Greece and in the east, which culminated in the fall of Perseus' Macedon.

Cross-References

See INTRODUCTION: LIVY; CHAPTER 17: THE COMPOSITION OF THE *AB URBE CONDITA*: THE CASE OF THE FIRST PENTAD;
CHAPTER 18: READING LIVY'S BOOK 5

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Further Reading

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As to the chronologically oriented group, fundamental are the works by Schmidt, P. L. 1968. *Iulius Obsequens und das Problem der Livius-Epitome*. Wiesbaden: Mainz Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur. Id. 1993. “Livius-Rezeption und kaiserzeitliche Historiographie,” in *Livius: Aspekte seines Werkes*, W. Schuller (ed): 189–201. Konstanz: Universitätsverlag.

Bessone, L. 2012. “I Lupericali del 44: una rivisitazione,” in *Acta Classica Univ. scient. Debrecen*. 48, 35–57, is now essential in order to understand the discussion on *Per.* 116.

Part IX

Reception

Chapter 32

The Transmission of Livy from the End of the Roman Empire to the Beginning of the Seventeenth Century: Distortion or Discovery, a Story of Corruption

Pierre Maréchaux

Did Livy fade into obscurity during the Middle Ages? It would not be incorrect to say so. Of the 142 books that make up his work, only 35 have survived to the present day. Particularly noteworthy is the disappearance of the 20 books dedicated to the history of his own era, which doubtless recorded his personal memories and the testimonies of people involved in the events he recounts. The grammarian Priscian had them at around 475 AD, and there were indications of their existence during the next century, but no trace of them remained in the century after that. The primary responsibility for this disappearance lies with Pope Gregory the Great (590–604), the enemy of secular literature who fought paganism with stubborn relentlessness. Livy's work was not seen again until some 600 years later, when it made a very tentative reappearance. Toward the end of the Roman world, Livy once more experienced a few philological peaks. And so, throughout the fifth and sixth centuries, the omnipresence of *suscriptiones*, notes annexed to a work, denote the interest taken by great families such as the Nichomachus or the Symmachus to commission “recensions” of the First Decade (Reynolds-Wilson 1988, 29). A short while later, the attention of Cassiodorus, which did so much for the transmission of classical literature, stopped short of Livy. Toward 535 AD, Cassiodorus devoted his *conversio*, his withdrawal from public life, to an *otium literatum*, during which time he founded the monastery at Vivarium close to present-day Squillace, in Calabria (Courcelle, 1938). He endeavored to preserve the didactic heritage of the ancient writers; the historian did not escape this, but, since he stood for a genre that was not included in the *trivium* disciplines, which formed the basis of monastic education, the rhetorical treatises of Cicero, Quintilian, and Fortunatus were preferred, as were the many logical works emanating from the Aristotelian tradition. In fact, a second Livy could be found in a *scriptorium* whose reputation equaled that of Vivarium, in the form of Flavius Josephus, named “Graecus Liuius” by Jerome of Stridon (*Epistulae ad Eustochium*, 22.35.8), and particularly in the form of Jerome himself. Despite Cassiodorus making much of the *Decades* author, he never studied him, thus casting off the *History of Rome* in favor of a *historia ecclesiastica* (Lesné, 1937). Libraries in

the Carolingian period favored Quintus Curtius and Pompeius Trogus, somewhat neglecting Livy. It was the 1300s before the *Ab Urbe Condita* experienced an upsurge in recognition—from then on, it was not only appreciated, but translated and commented upon. Dante held in great esteem this *Titus Livius, gestorum romanorum scriba egregius* (*De Monarchia*, 2.3.6), author *che non erra* (*L'Enfer*, 28.12). Toward 1320, an English Dominican friar, Nicholas Trevet, wrote a commentary in Latin on Livy. Then Petrarch united into one volume (*Brit. Libr., Harley 2493*) the three Decades of the *History of Rome* that were known of at the time (1–10; 21–40), annotating and editing the text himself, before transferring it to the library of Lorenzo Valla, who used it to write his *Emendationes sex librorum Titi Livii* (21–26) in 1446–1447 (Nolhac 1965, vol. 2, 11–36). The fourteenth century saw the beginning of a real treasure hunt for Livy's manuscripts. Convents were searched in the hope of finding even just a fragment of the lost manuscripts. Pope Nicholas V was a particular zealot, perhaps to make up for the damage caused by Pope Gregory, but the results were negligible, and the offerings of the available manuscripts had to be settled for. The invention of printing quickly guaranteed their wider distribution. We shall come back to this later on.

For now, we will look at the French translations. The attention paid to Livy by Pierre Bersuire, Canon of Avignon, friend of Petrarch, and author of the *Ovidius Moralizatus*, played a particularly important role in the story of the acceptance of his *Decades*. Between 1354 and 1356, at the command of King John II of France (John the Good), the Dominican monk translated Decades I, III, and IV (with the exception of Book 33). This translation was the product of the intellectual relationships that Bersuire had developed with the various scholars with whom he rubbed shoulders during the 30 years he spent at the papal court in Avignon (he was a close friend of Petrarch, who built on the *Ovidius Moralizatus* in *Africa*, and he worked on the popular version of Livy's works that he had created). Thus, he was able to gain access to the text of the Fourth Decade, which had only just been released back into circulation, to a better version of the first five books of the Third Decade and to the copious notes on Decades I and III written by the English Dominican friar Nicholas Trevet. As the translator's prologue highlights, readers should look for examples, templates, and rules of strategy in Livy's work. The Latin historian “unequivocally became [and is this, deep down, really such a betrayal?] a treatise on political, military and moral education” (J. Monfrin 2001, 768). The translation was certainly first reviewed for Charles V, and then again around 1400. The translation work performed by Pierre Bersuire, the first in a series of scholarly translations sponsored by John the Good and his son Charles V, played a special role in the history of the French language, as it obliged Pierre Bersuire to transpose a significant, largely foreign vocabulary from everyday medio-Latin into the vernacular. The *realia romana* glossary, which appears at the beginning of the translation, epitomizes the linguistic

process that led to French being considered a scholarly language. Bersuire's translation was highly successful. The 60 or so manuscripts that survive bear testimony to that. The oldest of them share characteristics which prove that copiers would habitually reproduce them and offer them for sale. They contain illustrations that are practically identical from one volume to the next, demonstrating that a sort of iconological assembly line was set up in the workshops to speed up production. The reliability of Bersuire's translation made it stand out; his unobtrusive additions were isolated from the rest of the text using a formula equivalent to our footnotes. The small glossary preceding the text explained the words that did not figure in sixteenth-century French vocabulary, and which Bersuire had to fabricate by Gallicizing the Latin terms as best he could (on Bersuire's methods, see Rychner 1963). In a well-documented article, Frédéric Duval (2005) demonstrated that Bersuire's concern for intelligibility was a marked improvement on earlier translations with their blind transpositions or misunderstood calques. Bersuire's glossary remained perfectly structured and conformed to the two principles of formal calque and semantic calque. A term's place in the glossary was always justified by the frequency of its use. The notional scope ranged from the military and political to the religious. When all is said and done, Bersuire did not develop his glossary to function independently of the translations, but rather only as a practical move toward facilitating access to Livy.

Several French-language histories of Rome drew heavily on this landmark translation. In 1454, Jean Mansel finished writing the *Histoires Romaines*, essentially replicating Bersuire's text and combining it with the *Faits des Romains* and the *Chronique de Baudouin d'Avesnes*. A few years later, he inserted the *Histoires Romaines* into his *Fleur des Histoires*, a compilation history of the world, which was widely disseminated. Furthermore, prior to 1477, Henri Romain compiled a summary of Bersuire's translation, supplemented by Jean Le Bègue's translation of Leonardo Bruni's *De Bello Punico*. Several foreign translations were also based upon Bersuire's: an anonymous Catalan translation from the end of the fourteenth or the beginning of the fifteenth century, the Castilian translation produced by Pedro Lopez de Ayala, chronicler and grand chancellor of Castile at the end of the fourteenth century or during the very early years of the fifteenth century. This work was printed in 1497, 1505, 1516, and 1544. In 1429, Rodrigo Alfonso Pimentel, Count of Benavente, summarized Ayala's translation in a single volume. Until the sixteenth century, therefore, Spanish-language readers gained access to Livy through Bersuire. Finally, in Great Britain, John Bellenden used Bersuire's text when he translated Livy into English in 1533, at the command of King James V of Scotland.

The first edition of *Historiae Romanae Decades* was printed in 1469 at Subiaco near Rome by Sweynheym and Pannartz, typesetters from Mainz. It was edited by Giovanni Andrea dei Bussi, the first papal librarian under Pope

Paul II, who prepared and revised the majority of the Classical editions published by these printers between 1468 and 1472. The Vatican Library still holds the manuscript that Sweynheym and Pannartz used for printing (*Vat. lat. 6803*). The *editio princeps* and the subsequent versions of 1470, 1472, and 1478 were, however, incomplete (Miglio 1988; Hall 1991; Davies 1997); the most complete version was most certainly that of Grynaeus, published in Basle in 1531. Livy's publication history varies between annotated and non-annotated versions; the whole of the sixteenth century, and part of the seventeenth century, is studded with *lectiones* and *enarrationes* aimed either at delivering a lesson in philology or at shedding light on the text from a historical, geographical, or institutional perspective. Famous humanists worked hard to ensure that Livy was accepted and, in so doing, created a learned group of enthusiasts, including Josse Bade, Philippe Béroalde the elder, Barnabé Brisson, Gabriele Faerno, Pietro Filelfo, Robert Gaguin, Heinrich Glarean, Jacques Gohory, Johann Gronovius, Jan Gruter, Daniel Heinsius, Pomponio Leto, Aulo Giano Parrasio, and Marcus Antonius Sabellicus. We will focus on just a few of the key figures who represent the changing face of Livianism: Machiavelli, Erasmus, Scaliger, Casaubon, and Lipsius.

Machiavelli's *Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy* (1513–1525) comprised of a free commentary on the first 10 books of *Ab Urbe Condita*, from the origins of Rome to the Third Samnite War. On the whole, the first book discussed legislation and the constitution of the state; the second, foreign policy and conquests; and the third, the stability of the state, the army, and the development of institutions. Compared to *The Prince*, this work was somewhat rambling, although Machiavelli's style attempted to overcome this: similar time periods, lexical patina, Latin phraseology, well-balanced comparisons, and conceptual analogies, all addressed the need to clarify the more general theoretical premises of a work written not according to a rigid structure, but which rather subscribed to an *ordo fortuitus*. The *Discourses* were driven by two convictions: the immutability of human nature and the need to emulate the Ancients. The ideal put forward in the *Discourses* was that of a utopian vision of a free and popular city; free in that its citizens would express their will by voting and would own their own assets, and popular in that the people would participate in a political life in which they were the agents. In the face of mounting corruption, the actions of Regulus, Horatius Cocles, and Cato were to exemplify a *virtù* no longer known to the world. The *Discourses*, therefore, revived the *translatio studii*, as Machiavelli's approach appeared to take after that of the ancient historian. There was precedent for this: a “new version of the origins of Florence,” interpreted as a “Roman representation” of the “last years of the Republic,” had been authorized by two Chancellors of the city at the turn of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries: Coluccio Salutati (1331–1406) and Leonardo Bruni (c. 1370–1444). The latter, in particular, elevated the

Florentine people by writing a 12-book history about them, and by writing in Latin, which was intentionally “livian,” calling freely upon the books of *Ab Urbe Condita*, and blending their influence with those of Thucydides, Polybius, Sallust, and Tacitus. To Bruni, in many respects (such as concern for factual accuracy rather than the presumed significance of myth and legend, subordination of rhetorical orchestration in favor of highlighting rational causality, and the pedagogy of political wisdom), Livy in no way represented an intangible ideal, whereas the respectful Machiavelli considered him an inspiration, an ethical evangelist. And, in actual fact, the *Discorsi* do not amount at all to a commentary on Livy, as the liberties taken by their author testify: breaks in the chronological sequence of events; different comments made on the same examples; references made to episodes falling outside the Decade in question, whole sections of which had, in contrast, been disregarded altogether; and, above all, multiple mismatches between the order of ideas and the sequence of historical events, as if the logic of the former resulted from a principle of intelligibility unique to Machiavelli himself, hidden within the threads of a relationship with the latter, selected specifically for this purpose. Machiavelli claimed that, until that time, nothing was known about the Roman ideal and that he wanted to establish it from then on as the original, true version. It was customary among the people of Florence to celebrate this tradition, so as to better disguise their inability to co-exist with history in their present. In fact, the *Discourses* had a demystifying value, and their praise of Rome would burst the bubble of this vanity. Machiavelli's lesson was doubtless the following: even if the historian has to constantly guard against anachronism and attempt to “give himself an ancient soul,” to coin Livy's phrase (“*nescio quo modo fit animus antiquus*,” 43.13.2), to understand ancient times from within, he should no less be wary of the illusion that he could think like Alexander or Cicero to re-establish the motives for their political actions or, like Pindar or Horace, to fathom the mysteries of poetry. We will only be able to understand recollections of the Ancient world if we acknowledge that the link with ancient civilizations is an integral part of our world and, as such, is therefore subject to change as knowledge develops, and to a refocusing of the issues. There is not just one, but many “recollections” of Antiquity (Bec, 1985).

However, we must not forget philology when considering Machiavelli's “updating” interpretation and Bersuire's overtly translational approach, since returning to sources is above all about the preparation of texts. Giuseppe Billanovich has masterfully retraced the history of the Livy tradition (Billanovich 1981 and Billanovich and Menegazzo 1982). If Petrarch had managed, as early as 1325, to collect most of the *membra disiecta* of Livy's corpus, with the ultimate aim of putting together the “most sophisticated” collection of works in his library (Billanovich 1981, 115), this restoration went hand in hand with a fantasticism that sometimes bordered on the extraordinary with respect to the all-encompassing search for Livy's remains

(Ullman, 1955). In Padua, his homeland, an incorrect interpretation of an inscription, discovered around 1320 and placed in the church of Santa Giustina, led to the exhumation of the Roman historian's putative coffin nearly a century later. In 1451, Antonio Panormita, Neapolitan ambassador to Venice, managed to see the skeleton and was rewarded with a piece of the forearm bone for his master, Alfonso of Aragon. In actual fact, Livy was the victim of meddling on two fronts: his supposed body was being broken up into relics at the same time as the scattered bones of his *History* were being reconstituted into a *corpus*. The gift of Livy's bone, given by the Republic of Venice to the King of Naples, echoed the splendid *codex (regius)* that Cosimo de' Medici gifted to the very same Alfonso of Aragon in 1444.

The *restitutio* of the texts was the major occupation of the Italian academies. Working in the Florentine circles that surrounded Cardinal Colonna around 1435 were Leonardo Bruni and Poggio Bracciolini. In Naples, meanwhile, Panormita and Facio worked together to use the success of Cosimo's gift of the *codex regius* to oust another humanist of exceptional standing from the Court of Naples: Lorenzo Valla. The latter made them pay dearly, however, by writing against them his philological work of art, which he begun in 1446: his *Emendationes* on Livy's six books relating to the Second Punic War (Regoliosi 1981, 1986, and 2005; Billanovich 1958, 247–253). Whereas, from Bruni to Machiavelli, the historiographical preference had been more or less the First Decade, this philological joust chose the horrendous Third Decade, thorny with the textual problems inherent in disordered transmission, as the field of battle. And the mastery of Valla, as sharp a philologist as he was a fierce polemicist, was such that some of his opinions are still considered authoritative. Furthermore, Lorenzo Valla, steeped in the style of Cicero as he was, cited Livy as one of the authors to emulate. For example, in *Antidotum in Facium*, he asks Pogge to justify the use of a construction by giving an example *aut ex Cicerone...aut ex Liuio* (Chomarat 1980, 236).

Antonio Sabellico was largely responsible for the embodiment of an historical as well as a stylistic Livianism. His *Historiae Rerum Venetiarum* followed Livy's historical technique very closely: confrontation of witness testimony, recognition and validation of the most ancient sources, those that were closest to the events, and perspicacity in resolving chronological issues. This book, the *editio princeps* of which appeared in 1487, was written in complex, elegant language, and was divided into four Decades. However, the freedom with which he confused his sources, neither distinguishing nor even citing them, led to consider that the work long enjoyed undeserved popularity. There have even occasionally been accusations of historiographical raiding (*ibid.*) leveled at this book. It would seem that it was written in a purposeful, uncontrolled way. We know that the author would have submitted it for approval by the Senate and that, once granted, he would have become the official historian of the Republic. Sabellico confused testimonies, added

contradictions and errors, and quoted texts without understanding their underlying motivations; in short, he offered the reader a geographical panorama, peppered with historical *excursus*. This was, perhaps, ironically, the reason for his success. We should not forget, however, that the book pandered to Venetian nationalism, and was, for a long time, an instrument of politico-cultural propaganda (a theme of Venetian *libertas*, justification for the city's epithet of *respublica*). And so it came about that Sabellico hatched a lasting comparison between Venice and Rome; unbeknownst to him, he was creating a plurisecular *topos* (Maréchaux 2006, 743–749). The writing of this combined history deserves examination in the light of *De Reparatione Linguae Latinae*, an essay on style, written 2 years later, in which can be found seeds of all the qualities of Livy's style that had made such a mark upon hearts and pens between 1480 and 1560. Sabellico and Valla shared a common enemy; monastic *barbaries*, which was responsible for the glaciation and decline of the Latin language. In the face of this, all that was required was to evoke memories of those whose works had healing powers *ad reparandum latinam linguam*: Petrarch, Boccaccio, L. Valla, Filelfo, the Palermitan Bessarion, N. Perotti, and Landino. However, it was not simply a case of celebrating the language of contemporary figures or of those from the recent past. After them came the Latin masters, notably Cicero and Livy, the orators, and in terms of the historical genre, it was Livy's aesthetic standards that became the watchwords for the younger generation: *lima*, *eruditio*, *copia*, and *elegantia*. Thus, in *De Reparatione*, Sabellico attempted to rejuvenate atavistic blood within the crucible of a new world and to reconcile an eternal *latinitas* (altered by conservative habits) with a principal of progression, an awareness of historical advances.

Sabellico's book was the first of a long series of works that immured Livianism into literary criticism and theoretical historiography. These were the two main approaches to studying Livy during the Renaissance. Following them allows us to map the changing tastes that set the tempo of reception of the Roman historian for nearly two centuries. After Sabellico, the second courier, alongside More, was Erasmus. The humanist from Rotterdam, in common with the general trend between 1480 and 1550, did not hesitate to place Livy on the historiographical podium, with Sallust beside him (Chomarat 1980: 402). In *Letter to Robert Gaguin* in 1485, he maintained that the ideal historian should unite *felicitas liuiana* and *elegantia sallustiana* (Allen n°45, vol. I, 150, 35). This opinion was reminiscent of that of Quintilian, who saw Sallust as a Latin equivalent of Thucydides and Livy as the second Herodotus (*Inst. Orat.* 10.1.32). Thereafter, Erasmus' praise of Livy was ceaseless, ranking him first of all the Latin writers in his preface to the 1531 publication of Livy's work. And in his 1535 work, *Ecclesiastes*, when he was considering the authors most capable of making the scriptures easier to read, needless to say, he recommended Livy for his *prudencia* and *eloquentia*, almost certainly only referring to the imaginary *orationes* that the

historian had scripted for the heroes in his *History*. We will see that, nearly 70 years later, Justus Lipsius harshly dismissed the Roman historian from the pantheon of *auctores* for contorting *prudencia*. Moreover, criticism was leveled at Livy by the character Nosoponus in Erasmus' *Ciceronianus*, but this was not indicative of Erasmus—Nosoponus was none other than the Northern European humanist Christophe de Longueil, who was friendly with Bembo and Sadoletto, and who betrayed his own people by supporting the Ciceronian Papal courts. In order to reach his goals, Nosoponus, eaten up by zeal for Cicero and for antiquity, was infected by the same illness as the sophists and their successors in the post-Christian era, that of idolizing words and forgetting about the things they were intended to mean. He would also give himself over completely and utterly, with a fanfare of styles, collections of phrases, and other philological landscaping, to erecting a temple in the name of *optimus stylus*. In fact, his opinion on Livy's *contiones*, which were nevertheless reputed to be purer than his *narrationes*, was incontrovertible. Livy deserved to be dismissed, as did Caesar, Sallust, or Valerius Maximus. Nosoponus denounced him as completely *incompositus* since, even in the best passages, his periods were not as euphonic or as harmonious as Cicero's, and, as for the famous *patauinitas*, this could not in itself be considered an ideal (ASD I-2, 657). No matter how much praise Erasmus heaped on Livy, citation statistics were not always in his favor when compared to Suetonius and Sallust; *De Copia* carries 46 quotations against 93 for Suetonius. On the other hand, however, he is the clear winner in *Adages*, with 80 quotations against Suetonius' 39. It appears that he was inevitably drafted in to reinforce any discourse on Ancient Roman institutions or events, and hence the adage "*Citis quadrigis: Jovis quadrigis*" (on a fast chariot, the chariot of Jupiter). This brief text, which sought to illustrate the expression "*citis quadrigis fugere*" (to flee on a fast chariot), that is to say as fast as possible (*ocissime*), was coupled with occasional illustrations borrowed from Plautus, Homer, and Cicero, whether or not the action involved a *seruus currens* or whether it referred to a God who had to leave Olympus to come instantaneously to earth. However, the quotation from Livy that was to close down Erasmus' argument was the distortion of physical understanding (supernatural speed) in favor of a slightly topological meaning, stigmatizing Camillus' *hubris* when he appeared at Veii, once it had fallen, in a chariot worthy of the highest gods (*Adages*, 320):

Livius primae decadis libro quinto narrat Camillum captis Veii ita triumphantem ingressum urbem, ut curru equis albis juncto veheretur et ob id eum triumphum clariorem fuisse quam gratiorem, quod Solis ac Jovis currum aequiparasse molliretur. (In Book 5 of Decade I, Livy narrates that, having taken the city of Veii, Camillus entered the city on a chariot pulled by white horses—such was the display he made of his triumph—and that this endowed his triumph with more prestige than approval as he dared to rival the chariot of the Sun as well as that of Jupiter.)

Having said that, Erasmus' seal of approval on Livy's work was given, above all, in his discourse on History, a long thesis shared by three canonical introductions: by Suetonius in 1517, by Quintus Curtius in 1517, and in *Apophthegmes* in 1531. In it, Livy was depicted as infinitely commendable, because he was like a true mirror (*certissimo speculo*), as any good historian should be (Allen n°2431). And, for the most part, history according to Livy was a fabric of moral portraits, which left to one side the life of the population and the economics of the day. The only thing that counted, in Livy's eyes, was the individualism of the great historical figures, and hence his interest in *facta* and *dicta*. And so, he perceived the world as a vast stage, and the history that unfolded upon it as a tragedy, played out by the verbal *furiosi* or *prudentes* from which fell *sententiae*, the very forcefulness of which indicated historical realism. Erasmus, therefore, unlike his contemporaries, judged Livy's *contiones* without amenity—very useful for eloquence training, but the fact remained that they were the fruit of invention. It should be recognized that the gallery of sometimes monstrous personalities, which History would have us consider, focused on Suetonius, and that the *Institutio Principis Christiani*, dedicated to the future Emperor Charles V, completely overlooked Livy, who, like Sallust, “praised, on occasion, that which a Christian prince absolutely should not” (ASD, IV-I, 180, 454ff.). This discrepancy is explained by the fact that, unlike Machiavelli, Erasmus and More interpreted history as Christians impassioned by their own age, using the past to occasionally read about actual events. In fact, Erasmus' concept of history was neither completely cyclical nor completely linear. It was a mixture of both, that is to say it was both pagan and Christian at the same time (Gilmore 1963). Although Erasmus acknowledged the cyclical pattern of successive forms of government, a pattern that he judged to be plausible, his belief was rooted in the concept of linear, directional, irreversible time. This history of salvation that took primacy over all other types of history did not apply to the secular history that only pointed to terrestrial achievement here on earth (the supremacy of one people, chosen by Providence or Destiny, over another, as seen in the *Old Testament* or in *The Aeneid*). At the very best, the *res gestae* of the monument erected by Livy presented characters who, completely altered by *excecrabilis imperandi sitis*, changed their masks, but were unable to change their nature. And so, Erasmus, similar to More, felt that Roman history simply reshuffled the same cards and laid them down in oft-repeated combinations.

In fact, Erasmus was most interested in Livy as a model of style, and, in his *Paraphrase upon the New Testament* (1523), he is seen to be evaluating the scriptures in the light of the Roman historian: “the style of the Gospel is simple and without skill; compared with that in the *Histories* of Thucydides or Livy, many weaknesses can be found” (ASD, I-2, 644–645). A literary study of the exegeses of Erasmus highlights the extent to which historical or tropological commentary has been infused with Livy's style, as demonstrated

by Jacques Chomarat (1980, 631–632). Livianism was, therefore, very much in vogue between 1480 and 1560. It was not uncommon to find a large number of “rhetorical” publications in the market, designed to gather the *flores* of Livy's eloquence, or to note comments in the margin of such and such an *oratio* highlighting creativity or arrangement; some publications placed Livy's discourses on the same footing as Cicero's. One such publication was *Artificium Dialecticum et Rhetoricum in Tres Praeclarissimas Orationes ex T. Liuii & Cicerone*, published in Cologne in 1529 by Johannes Gymnicus, and written by Barthélémy Masson (Latomus), a humanist from the Rhineland and a high-level Ciceronianist who was appointed Chair of Latin Eloquence at the *Collège Royal* by King François I in 1534. *Artificium Dialecticum et Rhetoricum* is a collection of three texts: Camillus' speech to the Assembly of the People after his timely arrival and his victory over the Gauls (5.51ff.) and two of Cicero's *orationes*, including *Pro Archia*. Essentially, Masson engages in dividing up Livy's text to highlight its *dispositio*: “*exordium a querela et aduersariorum in simulatione, narratio, conclusio*.” He semi-systematically applied the principles of *Rhetoric: For Herennius* to distinguish the characteristics of the *inventio* (the *rationcinatio*, or deductive reasoning; the *propositio*, or exposé of the point to prove; the *ratio*, which sets out the truth of the thesis; the *rationis confirmatio*, proving the *ratio*; and the *complexio*, conclusion) and the logic of the arguments (*argumentum a tempore, argumentum a fictione ex repugnantibus, argumentum ab honesti et utilis comparatione*). Occasionally, Livy's work was deconstructed for the purposes of mimicry, such as in Petrus Rhenanus' collection *Elocutiones Latinae Linguae ex T. Liuii Patauini Operibus, de Omni Paucis Exceptis, re qua in Quotidiano Sermonem Utimur, Desumptae* (Basle and Westhemerus 1542). This book aimed to strengthen the *sermo quotidianus* of apprentice Latin scholars by teaching them the *puritas* found in the best passages taken from Livy's works: it was presented as an anthology of example texts without annotations, such as *the Crossing of the Alps, Numa and Egeria, the Death of Archimedes, Description of a Conspiracy, the Greed of the Gauls, an Example of Cruelty, the Prudence of Hannibal*, etc.

In order to gain a precise picture of Livianism, Livy's influence on rhetorical treatise and on Renaissance poetry must also be studied, such as the *summa* entitled *Poetices Septem Libri*, published in 1561 by the humanist Julius Caesar Scaliger of Agen. The notion of “imitation” was an essential theme of this dense work, and it was not so much a question of seeing how Livy could be considered a model of style, but rather one of analyzing the poetic potential behind prose. Poetry had the “narrative form” in common with history, but it was able to mix up fact and fiction more freely, even to the point of inserting purely fictitious episodes at the very heart of actual fact. Scaliger actually understood that fiction could be coupled with more serious genres. Whereas Aristotle considered that putting Herodotus into verse did not qualify as poetry, Scaliger considered that Livy, despite being a writer of prose, already

had something of the poet about him, and hence this famous text: “Is Lucain a poet? Of course! Grammarians amuse themselves with trivia, as usual, whilst denying he has written an historical work. Firstly, I admit that it is pure history: it must be distinguished from Livy; and, in fact, this is achieved by the verse. That is peculiar to the poet. And next, who amongst us does not know that all the epic poets took their themes from history? Whether a rough sketch or a detailed painting, whether they gave it another face, they made poetry from history... Yes, I think Livy deserved more to be called a poet than Lucain deserved not to be. For just as the tragic poets tell a real story and adjust the actions and the words to the characters, so do Livy and Thucydides introduce unknown public speeches to those to whom they are attributed.”

However, this interest in Livy's style declined and did not last: the disciples of the *Respublica litterata* in France and northern Europe in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries conducted a re-evaluation of Livy, and their criticism of the historian suggests an about turn. This new direction was particularly evident in the dialogue that developed between Isaac Casaubon and Justus Lipsius. Improving on Pierre Danès, lecturer at the Collège Royal (1532–1533), whose practice was to draw on a broad historical knowledge that prominently featured the Roman historian during his lessons on Aeschines and Demosthenes, Isaac Casaubon, whose Latin translation of Polybius was a landmark, put Livy right at the heart of a real problem on historical writing. Firstly, he demonstrated how the *res gestae* of Ancient authors formed the bedrock of modern theology, in that they only served to illuminate the work of God. In short, Polybius and Livy were only the clerks or the scribes of divine judgments. That led to lengthy consideration of the benefits of the historical genre: history encouraged the acquisition of attention and experience, and historical examples resembled a burning mirror that, far from simply reflecting human actions, concentrated the light and, through magnification, set light to indirect witnesses. It is primarily in his accolade for Polybius that Casaubon set about arranging a quick reference guide to the historians of Antiquity (Parenty 2009, 177–193). Unlike Thucydides, he did not consider Livy a master of wisdom, and his works, like those of Tacitus, bordered on universality. At best, the historical *inuentio* of *Ab Urbe Condita* was the result of deliberately declining logic, adapted to an average readership and mixed with commonsense. In fact, the Aristotelian motto that an unreal likelihood is better than a real unlikelihood could be applied to him. In a word, Casaubon “propelled” Livy toward the fictional, but this did not prevent recognition of his sound judgment, moral rectitude, and knowledge of civil and military affairs. He continued:

Magnus, Deus bone, auctor T. Liuius; lactea quadam ubertate dictionis diuinitus facundus, amans uirtutum, osor uitiorum...Enique, siquid iudico, hoc solum ingenium (de historicis loquor) populus Romanus par imperio suo habuit. Caeterum tantus et tam admirabilis scriptor ut

elegantia Polybium facile uincit, quod ingenue fateor, ita...a Polybio non...uincitur. (Good God, but he's a great author, Livy, divinely eloquent with a sweet, abundant style, like milk, lover of virtue, detester of vice...In fact, in my opinion, he is the only talent (I'm talking about historians) worthy of his empire that the Romans had. Moreover, he is such a good writer, so admirable, that as far as word choice is concerned, he beats Polybius.)

This was a seminal reference work on the respective merits of historians. And, in his *Politica* (1589), Justus Lipsius suggested ranking historians likely to provide examples of *prudencia ciuilis*. Of course, despite being a philologist, and in contrast to Casaubon, Lipsius was thinking as a political theorist. The two men knew each other and constantly exchanged ideas after Lipsius, ready to write *ciuilis doctrina*, had expressed his utmost respect for Casaubon when his annotated edition of Strabo (*Strabonis Rerum Geographicarum Libri 17*) was published in Geneva in 1587. It must be said that the Belgian humanist exerted an influence over Casaubon that was obsessive and embarrassing, and exceeded the initial *aemulatio*. And so, his preface on Polybius, from which the preceding verdict on Livy is drawn, could be considered as a posthumous development designed to counteract the judgments handed down from what he considered to be the historiographical court represented by certain pages of *Politica*. In fact, Lipsius would endeavor to judge Livy by three criteria: *ueritas* (any history that contravenes truth is the master of falsehood), *explanatio* (history must show the causal links between *res gestae*), and *iudicium* (the historiographer must scrutinize events with a discernment capable of retaining certain facts and setting others aside). Lipsius judged Livy's *ueritas* in stylistic rather than ontological terms. As a theorist of *breuitas*, the writer did not find in Livy anything that would have enabled him to corroborate his version of *History*. In fact, for Lipsius, the modern historian should be well-versed in affairs of State, in addition to being a master of wisdom, able to decide and to judge; he must present himself to his contemporaries as the most certain guide, able to unlock the mysteries of modern monarchies and, at the same time, the affectations of a new, merciless type of man. In those times of civil war, the ideal historian should hold a mirror that was *uelut theatrum hodiernae uitae* to this new Iron Age. Thus, in *Politica*, which was itself transmitted via speeches and prefaces between 1572 and 1605, Lipsius continually compared Thucydides and Tacitus with Livy, whom he judged harshly, unlike his contemporaries. History was a combined genre, nesting within it philosophy, poetry, and eloquence, but this composite discipline required a style that was far removed from that practiced in Padua. The ideal historian—and Tacitus, in particular, was held up as an example of this—should persistently cultivate the art of *emphasis*, which the Reformist educator Jean Sturm described as “*clara et intellecta obscuritas*.” The emphatic style suited the foundation of customs in that it presumed mistrust of the transparent meaning of words: discourse no longer had to entirely reflect

concepts and the sequence in which they occurred, but would continually steer the reader toward an elusive meaning, giving great pleasure in the final, risk-ridden solution. And so, Livy's style was too pure for Lipsius, and none of Tacitus' spice could be found in it: "Every page, no, every line contains advice, precepts and dogma; yet they are so short, so hidden, that you have to have a very keen nose to sniff them out" (1605 preface to Tacitus' *Opera*, translated [into French] by Amelot de la Houssaye). As for *explanatio* and *iudicium*, the other two criteria for a good historian, Lipsius saw neither in Livy.

However, throughout the first half of the sixteenth century, Livy was reputed to be the ultimate historian, as confirmed by P. Burke (P. Burke 1966, 146–148), and it appears that Lipsius wasted no time in battling this predominance, as shown by these extracts of his first preface to Tacitus *in extenso* in 1574:

A Livii lectione semper commotior surrexi, non semper melior, aut ad vitae casus instructor. (I always rose from reading Livy more moved, not always better or best prepared to face life.)

Or even:

Non ille Annibalis Romanis uictorias, non speciosam Lucretiae necem, non uatum prodigia aut Etrusca portenta recenset, et quae alia sunt oblectandi magis quam instruendi lectoris. (As for Tacitus, he did not review Hannibal's victories over the Romans, the gallant death of Lucretia, the wonders of the prophets or the supernatural events of the Etruscans, and other things that were meant to charm the reader rather than to instruct him.)

It is obvious that Livy has been the victim of progress. Did the *res literaria* become more refined? That is the question that should be asked of the entire history of textual transmission. In fact, if the Latin Middle Ages were enthralled by their encounters with Livy, sometimes to tame him (Bersuire), sometimes to monumentalize him (Petrarch, Valla), the sixteenth century, strengthened by Livy's two essential themes, the historical model and the stylistic one, constantly "hollowed them out" to shake once and for all the very foundations of Livianism. Machiavelli's stance against antiquity gave us a Livy that he himself would not recognize; the eclecticism of Sabellico and Erasmus and the progressive philosophy of Scaliger highlighted his flexibility; and Latomus' and Rhenanus' attention was focused on renouncing historiography in favor of rhetoric; but the final, fatal blow was given by Justus Lipsius, in response to judgments made above all by Casaubon. Livy was to be the victim of a Tacitism that was no longer content to take a fresh look at historiography, but which wanted to equip it with a new style: *breuitas* sounded the death knell for Livy's *amplificatio*. However, would his subject matter have been able to survive him? Not at all, because the progress of the archaeology practiced by those such as the antiquarian Lipsius was no longer

interested in the letter of Livy's works, and in its relevance to the event. Livy was ruined by anti-archaeologists, and then by Lipsius, the prince of humanist antiquarians. These hiccupping contrasts of history were necessary, so that, in transmission, his potential could be highlighted. Because, by reading Livy, the main players in the *res literaria*, reviewers, translators, rhetoricians, philosophers, or poets, did not only appear hollowed by reflection—at the risk of overshadowing his image to some extent—but they revealed him stroke by tiny stroke, and this sometimes blind and involuntary corruption bestowed upon him a rich and metamorphic fate.

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Nabis

Naevius

Namuci

Naples

Narnia

Navius (Attus)

Nechtán

New Carthage

Nexum

Nicaea

Nichomachus

Nicias

Njör

Nola

Numa

Numantia, numantine

Numidia, Numidians

Nympsius

Octavian/ Octavianus (Caius Julius Caesar Octavianus)

Octavius, C. *see* also Octavian and Augustus

Odyssey

Oeneus

Olcades

Odin

Onomastus

Optimates

Orestes

Ostia

Oxyrrhinchos

Padua, Padova

Paeligni

Palaepolis

Palatine

Panaetius

Pannonians

Papirius Cursor, L.

Parisiensis

Parma

Parnassus

Parthenius of Nicaea

patauinus/patauinitas

pater patriae

patricians

pax deorum

Peisidike

Pergamum

Periander

Periochae

Perseus

Petrarch

Philius

Phrygians

Placentia

plebiscites

pietas

Pila Horatia

Pimentel (Rodrigo Alfonso)

Pisarum

Pisistratus

Plato

Plautus

plebeians

Poemander

Poleinikes

Policraticus

Polyaenus

pompeianism

Pompey, Pompeius Magnus, Gn.

Pomponius Mela

Pomponius, M. (praet.)

pontifical tables (tabulae pontificum)

populares

Porcius Cato, M. (Cato the Elder)

Porsenna

Porticus Octavia

Posidonius

Postumius Pyrgensis

Postumius Tubertus

Postumus Cominius

praefatio

Priscianus

princeps

princeps iuuentutis

principate

principes

Privernum

prodigies

prudentia

Ptolemy IV Philopator

pullarii

Puteoli

Pydna

Pylades

Pyrrhus

Quinctius Cincinnatus, L. (cos. 460 BC, dict. 458)

Quinctius Flaminius (T.)

quindecimviri

Quintilius Varus

Quirinus

Raeti

Ramayana

Ratherius Veronensis

regifugium

Remus

republican

Res Gestae

respublica restituta

Rhea Silvia

Rhodes

Romain (Henri)

Romulus

Sabellico (Antonio)

Sabines

Saguntum

Salernum

Salisbury, John of

Sallust

Samnites

Sant' Omobono

Sappinates

Sardinia

Satricum

Saturnia

Saxo Grammaticus

Scaliger (Caesar)

Scipio Aemilianus: *see* Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus, P. (cos. 146)

Scipio Africanus: *see* Cornelius Scipio Africanus P. (cos. 205)

scutum

Second Punic War

secular games

Seleucus IV

Sempronius Gracchus, Ti. (cos. 215)

Sempronius Gracchus, Ti. and C (tr. pl. 133 and 123– 121)

Sempronius Longus

Seneca

Sentinum

Sergius

Servilius Ahala, G.

Servius Tullius

Sextius Lateranus, L.

sibylline

Sicily

Sicinius

Silenus

Silva Arsia

Simonides

Sipylus

Skjöldunar dynasty

Solon

Sophonisba

Sororum tigillum

Spain

Sparta

Spartacus

Spirensis/Speyer

spolia opima

stemma

stipendium

Suetonius

Sulla: *see* Cornelius Sulla Felix, L.

Sulpicius Galba, P.

superbia

Syme

Symmachus

Syphax

Syracuse

Syria

Tacitus

Tanaquil

Tarentum, tarentine, Tarentini

Tarpeia

Tarquinius, Arruns

Tarquinius Collatinus, L.

Tarquinius the Elder (Priscus)

Tarquinius Superbus

Tatius, Titus

Taurus

Tempsa

Terentius Varro, G. (cos. 216)

Terentius Varro, M.

Terminus

Teutoburg

theater of Pompey

Theopompus

Thermopylae

Thessaly

Thor

Thuaneus

Thucydides

Thurioi

Tiber

Ticinus

Timaeus

Timasitheus

Toxeus

Trasimene

Trebia

Troy

Tresuri mensarii

Trevet

triarii

triumph, triumphal, triumphales

triumviri

triumvirate

Tullia (Servius Tullius'daughter)

Tullius Cicero, M. (cos. 63)

Turdetani

Turnus (*see* Herdonius)

Twelve Tables

Umbrians

Vaccaeï

Valerius Antias

Valerius Corvus

Valerius Laevinus

Valerius Maximus Nosoponus

Valerius Messala

Valerius Publicola

Valla, Lorenzo

Varuna

Varus: *see* Quintilius Varus

Veii

Velleius Paterculus

Vercellae

Verginia

Verginius (Virginia's father)

T. Verginius (cos. 479)

Via Appia

Vibius

Vibo Valentia

Victoriati

Vicus Sceleratus

Villius Tappulus, P.

Virgil

Virtus

Vivarium

Volsci

Vormaciensis Worms

Vossianus

Xenocrites

Zama

Zeno of Rhodes

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